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     The topic of my thesis is “The campaigns of the Norman dukes of southern Italy to 
Byzantium, in the years between 1071 and 1108 A.D.” As the title suggests, I am 
examining all the main campaigns conducted by the Normans against Byzantine 
provinces, in the period from the fall of Bari, the Byzantine capital of Apulia and the 
seat of the Byzantine governor (catepano) of Italy in 1071, to the Treaty of Devol that 
marked the end of Bohemond of Taranto’s Illyrian campaign in 1108. My thesis, however, 
aims to focus specifically on the military aspects of these confrontations, an area which 
for this period has been surprisingly neglected in the existing secondary literature.  
     My intention is to give answers to a series of questions, of which only some of them 
are presented here: what was the Norman method of raising their armies and what was 
the connection of this particular system to that in Normandy and France in the same 
period (similarities, differences, if any)? Have the Normans been willing to adapt to the 
Mediterranean reality of warfare, meaning the adaptation of siege engines and the 
creation of a transport and fighting fleet? What was the composition of their armies, not 
only in numbers but also in the analogy of cavalry, infantry and supplementary units? 
While in the field of battle, what were the fighting tactics used by the Normans against 
the Byzantines and were they superior to their eastern opponents? 
     However, as my study is in essence comparative, I will further compare the Norman 
and Byzantine military institutions, analyse the clash of these two different military 
cultures and distinguish any signs of adaptations in their practice of warfare. Also, I will 
attempt to set this enquiry in the light of new approaches to medieval military history 
visible in recent historiography by asking if any side had been familiar to the ideas of 
Vegetian strategy, and if so, whether we characterise any of these strategies as 
Vegetian? 
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Introduction 
 
     In my thesis The campaigns of the Norman dukes of southern Italy against Byzantium, in 
the period between 1071-1108 A.D, I intend to examine all the main campaigns conducted by 
the Normans in the Byzantine Empire’s western Balkan provinces, in the period from the fall 
of Bari, the capital of Byzantine Longobardia (Italy) and the seat of the Byzantine governor 
of Italy in 1071, to the Treaty of Devol that marked the end of Bohemond of Taranto’s 
Illyrian campaign in 1108.  
     It aims to focus specifically on the military aspects of the Norman infiltration in the south, 
a research area which for this period has been relatively neglected by existing scholarship. 
Two of the classic publications for this period are Ferdinand Chalandon’s Histoire de la 
Domination Normande en Italie et en Sicile and his Essai sur le Règne d’Alexis Ier Comnène 
(1081-1118).1 Even after more than a century of its publication, Chalandon’s Domination 
Normande remains one of the best accounts of the Norman establishment in southern Italy, 
with the first volume examining the political and social developments in the dukedom of 
Apulia up to Roger II’s accession in 1128. Chalandon’s Essai sur le Règne d’Alexis Ier 
Comnène examines the reign of Alexius Comnenus from his accession to the throne to his 
death, with the third chapter of this study dealing with Robert Guiscard’s 1081-5 invasion of 
Illyria. Chalandon’s works, along with R.B. Yewdale’s Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch,2 are 
two of the oldest and most useful works I was able to use in my research. 
     However, a number of views expressed both by Chalandon and Yewdale on the general 
social-political context of the events they analyse, such as the relation between Guiscard and 
his vassal counts, or Bohemond’s dealings with Alexius Comnenus, have been challenged by 
                                                 
1 F. Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile, 2 vols., Picard, 
Paris, 1907; idem, Essai sur le Règne d'Alexis Ier Comnène, 1081-1118, Picard, Paris, 1900. 
2 R.B. Yewdale, Bohemond I, Prince of Antioch, Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1970; the most recent 
study about Bohemond: J. Flori, Bohémond d’Antioch, Chevalier d’Aventure, Payot, Paris, 2007. 
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Graham Loud in his recent The Age of Robert Guiscard.3 Although being undoubtedly an 
expert in the political, social, economic and religious history of the Italian peninsula in the 
eleventh century, Loud does not claim to be a military historian of this period. His chapter on 
the Papacy and southern Italy (1060-80) is useful in explaining the political and diplomatic 
relations between Guiscard, Rome and Germany on the eve of the 1081 invasion, but the 
following section on the Norman attack on Byzantium focuses on diplomacy with no detailed 
attention being paid on the actual military operations. In addition the author limits his 
analysis to Italy, and does not follow Robert Guiscard’s exploits in the Balkans in detail. 
Thus, although the Age of Robert Guiscard, along with Huguette Taviani-Carozzi’s French 
edition of the La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard et la conquete Normande en Italie,4 
consist two of the best accounts on the southern Italian history in the eleventh century and 
beyond, the military aspect of the Norman infiltration plays a rather secondary role.      
     Of direct relevance is A.G. Savvides’ Byzantino-Normannica. The Norman Capture of 
Italy and the First Two Norman Invasions in Byzantium.5 This short study is very useful as it 
provides a very detailed bibliography of relevant Greek, English, German and French titles 
for this period. Savvides also pays significant attention to the geography and topography of 
the regions where the Norman invasions took place, thus being able to clarify certain vague 
points linked to information given by our primary sources. However, this monograph reads 
                                                 
3 G.A. Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest, 
Longman, London, 2000. 
4 H. Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard et la conquete Normande en 
Italie, Fayard, Paris, 1996; I have been unable to consult R. Bunemann, Robert Guiskard 
1015-1085. Eine Normanner erobert Suditalianen, Cologne, 1997. The references in my 
thesis to German works are citations from other studies in the field or came as a result of the 
kind help from friends and colleagues. 
5 A.G.C. Savvides, Byzantino-Normannica. The Norman Capture of Italy and the First Two 
Norman Invasions in Byzantium, Uitgeverij Peeters en Departement Oosterse Studies, 
Leuven, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Loud for sending me his review of Savvides’ 
monograph. 
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like a simple narrative of the events, with no serious questioning of the sources, while the 
author does not pay any attention to the major battles of this period.  
     Thus, for this particular part of my research I intend to give answers to a series of 
questions. What were the Norman methods of raising their armies in southern Italy and what 
similarities can we identify with Normandy and France in the same period? What were the 
numbers and consistency of the Norman armies in Italy, Sicily and Illyria? What was their 
operational role in the rebel armies of the Lombards until 1041? What were the battle-tactics 
of the Normans in this theatre of war and how innovative were they in comparison to 
contemporary warfare in France? Were battle-tactics more important than numbers in the 
battlefields of Italy, Sicily and Illyria? What was the role played by their leadership in this 
matter?  
     As my study is in essence comparative, I will further compare the Norman military 
organization and institutions with the Byzantine ones in relation to another series of 
questions: in what way were these two military systems different and which one appears to 
have been working more efficiently in the second half of the eleventh century? What light do 
these campaigns throw on the clash of two different types of military structures and how far 
did this prolonged confrontation lead to changes or adaptations in their practice of warfare? I 
will ask if we can characterise the Normans strategy in specific operational theatres – like 
Italy, Sicily and Illyria – as Vegetian.6 In relation to this issue, separate questions will be 
asked about the importance of military handbooks, like Leo VI’s Tactica and Nicephoros 
Phocas’ Praecepta Militaria, for the Byzantine military establishment of the eleventh century 
and whether any of them were available to Byzantine commanders of this period like Alexius 
                                                 
6 J. Gillingham, “Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages”, War and 
Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt, Boydell, Woodbridge, 1984, 
78-91; “’Up with Orthodoxy!’ In Defence of Vegetian Warfare”, Journal of Medieval 
Military History, 2 (2004), 149-58; S. Morillo, “Battle Seeking: The Context and Limits of 
Vegetian Strategy”, Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2003), 21-41; C.J. Rogers, “The 
Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages”, Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 
(2003), 1-19. 
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Comnenus. What sort of information about their enemies were these manuals providing the 
Byzantine officers with?  
 
     Before going into a detailed examination of the two military systems in southern Italy and 
Byzantium, an analysis of the use and value of the primary sources is essential.7 I will discuss 
the main Latin and Greek sources of the eleventh and twelfth century, such as Amatus of 
Montecassino, Orderic Vitalis, William of Apulia, Geoffrey Malaterra, Anna Comnena and 
others that provide the most information about the Norman establishment in Italy and their 
Illyrian expeditions. In particular, I will examine their accuracy in relation to military events, 
and the description of the battles and sieges.  
     In the second part of my thesis I will deal with the military organization of the Norman 
Dukedom of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily and the Byzantine Empire. Beginning with the 
Normans, the main problem for every historian of the period is the lack of primary material 
that can shed light to the administrative system introduced in the Peninsula in the second half 
of the eleventh century. Scholars like Cahen, Chalandon, Martin, Taviani-Carozzi and Loud 
have studied the introduction of feudal institutions in the south but a significant question still 
remains unanswered, mainly due to the absence of charter evidence and primary material 
before the turn of the century; were military institutions like the arrière-ban or the service 
d’host introduced in Italy as well, and if so, what examples of their use do we have? This 
question almost immediately takes us to another issue which is the use of household and 
enfeoffed troops in the Norman expansion in Italy and Sicily; what was the role of these 
troops in the major Norman campaigns in the Italian Peninsula and across the Adriatic in the 
                                                 
7 My bibliography of primary sources extends from ninth to twelfth century Latin, Greek, 
Armenian, Arabic and Scandinavian sources, most of them translated into English or French, 
but a substantial number of them had to be translated by myself. For any charter material 
available for the Norman establishment in Italy in the eleventh century I had to rely mostly on 
the editions of Trinchera, F. Nitti, C. Cahen, R. Menager, M. Fauroux and the rich material 
provided by Loud’s The Age of Robert Guiscard, J.-M. Martin’s La Pouille du Vie au XII 
siècle and Taviani-Carozzi’s La terreur du monde.    
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eleventh century? In order to give answers to these questions, some contextual discussion is 
necessary of Norman military institutions to establish what patterns the Normans in Italy may 
have drawn on. And since no territorial expansion can be complete and secure without the 
establishment of some kind of fortified sites, I aim to explore the building of new 
fortifications in Apulia, Calabria and Sicily in relation with the parallel development of 
several specific types of defences, like the motte-and-bailey castle in France and Normandy 
in the same period. 
     The secondary bibliography about the organization of the Byzantine Army of the Epigonoi 
(1025-1081) is surprisingly limited. Detailed works by Haldon and Treadgold that examine 
the structure, consistency, battle-tactics and formations of the Byzantine Army do not always 
take their analysis up to 1081.8 The deeper reason for this, however, is the lack of credible 
evidence from the primary sources and charter material after the death of Basil II (1025), a 
period of neglect and serious decline in the army. Thus, in order for me to present a clear 
view of the Byzantine army’s structure, consistency and numbers on the eve of Robert 
Guiscard’s siege of Dyrrachium, I must take my analysis back to 1025 and examine several 
points; the decline of the thematic and tagmatic institutions; the geopolitical developments in 
the Balkans and Asia Minor and the military defeats of Byzantine arms in this period, in an 
attempt to give answers to a number of questions, including whether any of these defeats 
were significant enough to destroy a large part of the Imperial army? What were the 
consequences of the great territorial losses of the Empire in the second half of the century? 
The same attempt to reconstruct and piece together the evidence that we have from the 
primary sources will be done for the units of the Imperial navy in two separate periods, from 
1025 to 1081 and from 1081 to 1108. As a supplementary chapter to the aforementioned 
section, I will present the military organization of the theme of Longobardia on the eve of the 
Norman arrival in Italy.  
                                                 
8 W. Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, 284-1081, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
1995; J. Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204, UCL Press, 
London, 1999. 
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     The final point before going into the Norman expeditions to Illyria will be to examine the 
numbers, consistency, battle-tactics and diplomatic alliances of the Normans from their first 
appearance in Italy in the second decade of the eleventh century to the 1070s. I divided this 
part of my thesis thematically into three distinct sections dealing with: the major siege-
operations conducted by the Normans from the capture of Reggio (1059) to the siege of 
Salerno (1077) and Naples (1078); the naval operations, focusing on the transportation of the 
Norman army to Sicily in 1061; and the pitched battles fought in the major operational 
theatres in Apulia and Sicily against the Byzantines, the Muslims and the Papal-Lombard 
coalition of 1053. 
     These chapters form the background to the second part of my thesis which deals with the 
Norman campaigns in Illyria and the Greek mainland. But to be fully aware of the significant 
developments in the battlefields of Dyrrachium, Ioannina and Larissa, the political, social, 
economic and diplomatic background of these campaigns have to be addressed. As is evident 
from the titles of several chapters in my thesis I attempt to present several major points 
concerning the wider socio-political context of the Norman infiltration in the south and the 
Byzantine period of the Epigonoi relatively briefly but with as many significant details as 
possible due to the limited length of this study. Thus, for example, I could not present all the 
major geopolitical events in the Balkans or Asia Minor or the defeats of the Imperial Army 
since 1025, nor refer to the naval tactics of the Imperial Navy in detail, as seen through Leo’s 
Tactica.  
     For the Norman expeditions in the southern Balkans, my research will focus on the series 
of comparative questions already mentioned that have to do with the strategy and battle 
tactics applied by both the Norman and the Byzantines. My primary objective is first to 
analyse the military institutions on both sides of the Adriatic in the second half of the 
eleventh century, the military organization of the Normans and the Byzantines and the basic 
structure and consistency of their armies along with their main battlefield tactics. Next, I will 
examine three particular campaigns in the period between the years 1071 and 1108. The first 
of these is the invasion conducted in the Byzantine province of Illyria by Robert Guiscard the 
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Duke of Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, when he landed in the Epirotic coast opposite the island 
of Corfu, in the early summer of 1081, and proceeded to the siege and capture of the strategic 
city-port of Dyrrachium, in November 1081, after beating the Imperial army in a battle in the 
outskirts of the city a few weeks before. For the years 1082-3, with the absence of Robert 
Guiscard to Italy, his son Bohemond was left in charge of the Norman army. He campaigned 
throughout Epirus and Western Macedonia and reached as far as Thessaly and Arta, deep in 
the Greek mainland, laying siege to the city of Larissa, until he was defeated by Alexius 
Comnenus’ army in the summer of 1083.  
     The second campaign is the invasion of Illyria under Robert Guiscard which took place in 
the autumn of 1084. The Norman forces, after defeating a Byzantino-Venetian naval 
squadron in Corfiot waters and relieving the besieged garrison of the Corfiot citadel, prepared 
to take advantage of their success and proceed to the capture of the island of Cephalonia – the 
capital of the thema of the Ionian Sea islands. Thus, from a strategic point of view it can be 
seen that Robert Guiscard did not target Thessaloniki like in 1081, but rather the economic 
centres of the southern Greek mainland, namely Athens, Corinth and Thebes. However, his 
sudden death on the 17th July 1085 put an abrupt end to his campaign which was abandoned 
almost immediately.  
     The third and final campaign I analyse is that of Bohemond of Taranto, Guiscard’s first-
born son from his first wife Alberada, who, after taking part in the First Crusade and being 
proclaimed Prince of Antioch – officially in March 1099 – launched an invasion of Illyria in 
the year 1107, with the first target of his invading army once more being Dyrrachium. 
However, Emperor Alexius, after his valuable experience twenty six years before, did not 
seek a battle but resorted to the blockade of the Norman camp by land and sea. After the 
starvation that crippled the Norman army, Bohemond sought peace terms which resulted in 
the Treaty of Devol in 1108.  
     The study of the battle-tactics employed by two distinctively different military cultures in 
a specific military theatre will serve to underline the degree of adaptability of each one of 
them and to what extend we can point to a flow of military ideas from one coast of the 
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Adriatic to the other. In a sense, these three battles should be examined along with the chapter 
on Bohemond’s participation in the First Crusade, in order to point out the differences, if any, 
in the strategy and battle-tactic mentality of both the Normans and the Byzantines. Contacts 
between Norman Italy and Byzantium did exist since the middle of the century, even though 
the last pitched battle between Norman and Imperial troops occurred in 1041, and both sides 
chose to confront each other close to Dyrrachium, with the Norman cavalry charge winning 
the day over the elite footsoldiers of the Varangians. But there is no repetition of the same 
mistake by Alexius outside Larisa (1083) and Dyrrachium (1108), with the lessons of 1081 
and the First Crusade obviously being learned. Thus, there is a great value in studying the 
Norman-Byzantine clashes in the Balkans during the last decades of the eleventh century, for 
we can understand a great deal about the strategic mentality of the Normans and the 
Byzantines and how each military system coped with the challenges posed by such 
operations. 
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1. Primary sources and the problems of military history 
 
      The objective of this chapter is to examine the main primary sources of my doctoral thesis 
– Latin, Greek, Armenian, Arabic and Scandinavian. In the first section of this chapter I will 
examine the three major “Italian-Norman” chroniclers, namely Amatus of Montecassino, 
William of Apulia, and Geoffrey Malaterra, followed by Orderic Vitalis, whose account is 
valuable in establishing the links between Normandy and Italy, and Anna Comnena who is 
our most detailed Byzantine source for the reign of her father Alexius. I will focus my 
analysis on the chroniclers’ social, religious and educational background, the date and place 
of the compilation of their work, their own sources and the way they collected their 
information from them, their bias and sympathies and, thus, their impartiality as historians. 
Other eleventh or twelfth century chroniclers who also provide useful information of 
relevance will also be more briefly discussed. This section will be followed by a comparative 
analysis of Anna Comnena, William of Apulia and Geoffrey Malaterra as military historians 
where I will examine their work strictly through a military perspective. 
 
Amatus of Montecassino 
 
     The History of the Normans,9 compiled by Amatus of Montecassino around the year 1080, 
is the earliest chronicle material we have for the Norman establishment in southern Italy and 
                                                 
9 L'ystoire de li Normant et la Chronique de Robert Viscart par Aimé, moine du Mont-Cassin, 
ed. by M. Champollion-Figeac, J. Renouard, Paris, 1835; from hereafter: Amatus; the main 
secondary works for Amatus’ life and work are: Amatus of Montecassino, The History of the 
Normans, tr. P. Dunbar and revised with notes by G. Loud, Boydell, Woodbridge, 2004, pp. 
1-38; from hereafter: The History of the Normans; K.B. Wolf, Making History, The Normans 
and their Historians in eleventh-century Italy, University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, 
1995, pp. 87-122; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 15-7; E. Albu, The Normans in 
their Histories: Propaganda, Myth and Subversion, Boydell, Woodbridge, 2001, pp. 106-44; 
Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. xxxi-xxxiv. 
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Sicily, from its earliest stages in the 1010s to the death of Richard I of Capua on 5th April 
1078. The author provides little information about himself in his work and almost everything 
we know about Amatus comes from the continuator of the Chronica  monasterii Casinensis 
up to AD 1139, Peter the Deacon, and a work he authored himself, The Deeds of the Apostles 
Peter and Paul dedicated to Gregory VII and probably written just before the composition of 
the History, around 1078/9. He may have come originally from the area of Salerno,10 joining 
the monastery of Montecassino as an adult during the rule of Abbot Desiderius (1058-86) and 
witnessing firsthand the intellectual revival of the period. The original Latin text has been lost 
and Amatus’ History survives only in a fourteenth century French translation where the 
translator have either omitted, summarised or paraphrased parts of the original text or added 
comments of his own.11 Amatus was a contemporary, living in the monastery of Monte-
Cassino which was in close proximity to the Norman principality of Aversa and he was, 
therefore, an eye witness of the events he describes or, at least, he had access to people who 
were there in the events while he must also have had access to Monte-Cassino’s archive 
material.  
     From the dedication of his work to Abbot Desiderius we understand that Richard I of 
Capua (d. 1078) and Robert Guiscard (d. 1085) are the protagonists of Amatus’ work.12 In 
Amatus’ History the Normans were launching a Holy War against the Muslims that were 
holding Christian lands (Sicily), while against the Byzantines he viewed them as “liberators 
who called on the assistance of God” against these “effeminate” oppressors.13 And it is made 
                                                 
10 The History of the Normans, pp. 11-12; Wolf, Making History, p. 88. 
11 The History of the Normans, pp. 18-23; Wolf, Making History, pp. 89-90; Albu, The 
Normans in their Histories, pp. 109-110. 
12 Amatus, “Prohème de lo Storiographe, a lo molt reverent et Saint Messire Désidere, serve 
de li servicial toe”, pp. 1-4; “Dedication to the most Holy and Reverend Master Desiderius, 
Servant of His Servants”, The History of the Normans, pp. 41-2. 
13 Amatus, I. 21. 
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clear through Amatus’ writings that the Normans had received Divine favour only because 
they trusted their future in His hands.14 
     The History of the Normans is divided into eight books, beginning with a brief 
introduction as to who were the Normans and how and why they came to Apulia, and ending 
with Robert Guiscard’s siege and capture of Salerno (1076/7) and the death of Richard I of 
Capua in 1078. Each book covers a period of seven to eight years but the dating in Amatus’ 
work is problematic. He rarely provides us with any dates in his account and in the few cases 
where he does he simply mentions the day of the month and not the year. This problem 
becomes more acute because of the author’s method of not following a strict chronological 
order in his narrative, but rather finishes an individual story by reaching to its conclusion and 
then carries on with the events that should have preceded it. One characteristic example is 
when Amatus narrates the victory of the Normans at Castrogiovanni in 1061 and he 
immediately goes on to the siege and capture of Bari, while between Bari and the capture of 
Palermo there is the first half of book VI that interferes.15 This thematic approach makes 
Amatus’ work difficult to use as a source by itself and it certainly needs to be examined in 
combination with the other two of his contemporaries, Malaterra and William of Apulia.  
 
William of Apulia 
 
     The first of the “Italian-Norman” chroniclers who narrated Robert Guiscard’s expeditions 
to Illyria was William of Apulia, with his Gesta Roberti Guiscardi being the only work of the 
period that focuses on the achievements of the Duke of Apulia.16 Judging by his name, 
                                                 
14 The History of the Normans, pp. 24-5. 
15 Amatus, V. 24-28, VI. 14; The History of the Normans, pp. 36-7. 
16 Guillaume De Pouille, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, ed. and tr. by M. Mathieu, Instituto 
Siciliano di Studi Byzantini et Neoellenici, Palermo, 1961; from hereafter: Gesta; the main 
secondary works are: La Geste de Robert Guiscard, introduction by M. Mathieu, pp. 3-96; 
Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. xxxviii-xl; Wolf, Making History, pp. 123-42; 
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Guillermus, we assume that he would have had Norman ancestors, although that name was 
known to Italy even before the coming of the Normans.17 Also, from letters that he wrote to 
Pope Urban II, we can see that he was French, although not necessarily from Normandy.18 
His last name, Apuliensis, suggests he was a Norman who was born in Apulia, probably at 
Giovenazzo.19 William is writing his work certainly between the years 1088-1111, judging 
from the people to whom this work is dedicated, namely Pope Urban II (1088 - June 1099) 
and Roger Borsa (1085-1111) – Robert Guiscard’s heir to his Dukedom. However, certain 
textual references help us narrow down this period to 1095 – August 1099.20 
     He seems to have been a member of Roger Borsa’s court and probably a layman, 
assuming from the rare appearances of religious motifs in his work and his passionate interest 
in the art of war.21 He was very much aware of the importance of certain military factors in 
campaigns, such as composition of forces, battle-plans and siege equipment like, for example, 
in the battle of Civitate and the sieges of Bari and Dyrrachium.22 But apart from this sparse 
evidence about his life, William of Apulia’s full identity remains elusive. If he was indeed a 
member of Roger Borsa’s court, he would have access, like Anna Comnena, to certain high-
ranking officials of the dukedom. He must have been able to talk to the veterans of Robert 
Guiscard’s campaigns or even to Roger himself, who had participated, among others, in the 
second Illyrian invasion in 1084. However, the writer does not mention, unlike Anna, where 
he gets his information from.23  
                                                                                                                                           
Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 20-3; Albu, The Normans in their Histories, pp. 
106-44. 
17 Gesta, p. 17. 
18 Ibid., p. 17. 
19 Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. xxxix. 
20 Gesta, p. 11; Wolf, Making History, pp. 123-4; Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. 
xxxix . 
21 Albu, The Normans in their Histories, pp. 136-7. 
22 Gesta, II. 122-256, pp. 139-147; II. 480-573, pp. 159-163; IV. 235-448, pp. 217-229. 
23 Gesta, p. 26. 
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     William uses his first two of the five books of the Gesta as an introduction, dealing with 
the establishment of the Normans in Italy from 1012 until the capture of Bari in 1071. The 
third book covers the period from 1071 until 1080, while the last two books of William’s 
work focus on Guiscard’s invasion of Byzantium (1080-85). In his description of the 
Normanno-Byzantine confrontations in Apulia, it is most likely that William was indeed an 
eyewitness, but he did not know much of what was taking place in Campania or Sicily, based 
on the fact that he is very brief for everything that did not concern his homeland.24 Apart 
from the events that he had witnessed, he had certainly used the lost Annales Barenses which 
Lupus Protospatharius had used in his Chronicon,25 and although it was generally believed 
that Amatus’ History had been used as well, more recent studies have shown that they both 
wrote their works independently with the material from the Annales Barenses being the only 
link between them.26 William has based his narrative of the Illyrian invasions on oral 
testimonies from eye witnesses, but these sources are not identified and we cannot be certain 
whether he got his information from knights, footsoldiers or just men who had followed the 
army in the baggage train. The sole exception is his mentioning of one source, which had also 
been used by Anna, a Latin envoy called Jean who was sent by the Bishop of Bari to travel 
with the Norman army.27   
     The two people, to whom William’s work is dedicated, as he points out in the prologue 
and epilogue of the Gesta, are Roger Borsa, Duke of Apulia and Calabria (1085-1111), and 
Pope Urban II (1088-99). It is quite possible that Roger Borsa commissioned the writing of 
the Gesta, not only to immortalise his father’s achievements in Italy and Greece, but also to 
solidify his claims as heir to the duchy of Apulia against those of his older half-brother 
Bohemond. As to why he chose William is unknown, but the fact the latter was a Norman 
                                                 
24 Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. xl. 
25 Ibid., p. xxxix. 
26 Gesta, pp. 26-38; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. xxxix; Albu, The Normans in 
their Histories, p. 110. 
27 Gesta, pp. 38-9; Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. xl; Alexis Ier, p. xii.  
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who might also have had Lombard roots and who had grown up in an area that included the 
Byzantines, gave him great advantage over others. Roger Borsa’s influence in the Gesta is 
great and focuses mainly on two points. First, where William is referring to the legitimate 
succession of the dukedom of Apulia by Roger, after the death of Guiscard at Cephalonia in 
1085, and thus strengthening his claims over Bohemond’s.28 Second, where the author 
narrates Guiscard’s campaigns against Alexius we can clearly see an attempt to make this 
part of the Gesta more “pleasant” to the ears of Roger.29  
     Although William was commissioned by Roger Borsa and was under the “protection” of 
Urban II, Marguerite Mathieu believed that: “his impartiality, his neutrality is remarkable” 
and that “the author is generally objective, although certain tendencies for concealing things 
do exist.”30 However, by contrasting William’s narratives of the Sicilian and Illyrian 
campaigns, we get a sense of strong disapproval of Robert Guiscard’s quest across the 
Adriatic. We have to bear in mind that William was writing his work at a period of religious 
enthusiasm due to the launch of the First Crusade and when the Byzantines were still 
considered as allies and the natural leaders of Crusade.31 Unlike Malaterra – who was writing 
shortly after the Crusade – or Amatus, William does not accuse the Byzantines of being 
effeminate warriors who do not deserve to hold Apulia for themselves and, in fact, he even 
deflates Guiscard’s pretext of invading Apulia to restore Michael VII Doukas to the Imperial 
throne.32 Finally, William narrates the public anger over the conscription of footsoldiers from 
all the corners of Apulia and Calabria, identifying them as a group which was against the war 
                                                 
28 Gesta, V. 345-348, p. 255. 
29 For example, Roger’s key role at the naval battle with the Venetians; ibid., V. 155-198, pp. 
245-7. 
30 Gesta, pp. 22, 27. 
31 William would not have been aware of Alexius’ return to Constantinople from 
Philomelium, in spring 1098.  
32 Gesta, IV. 246-63, pp. 216-8. 
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with the Byzantines, contrary to Malaterra’s report of fear of the unknown only troubling the 
minds of his knights.33  
 
Geoffrey Malaterra 
 
     Geoffrey Malaterra,34 or a monk35 named Geoffrey who bore the “cognomen” Malaterra 
from his ancestors, was the third chronicler who had decided to commemorate the conquest 
of Italy and Sicily by the Normans in the late eleventh century, and indeed the only one 
whose main focus is Roger Hauteville. Although we know very little of Malaterra’s life, he 
himself noted he had come from a region “beyond the mountains”, that is the Alps, and that 
he had recently become a Sicilian.36 It is possible that he was born in Normandy, although 
recent studies have cast doubt on Pontieri’s conviction that Malaterra was indeed a Norman 
simply because the chronicler refers to the Norman knights as nostri.37  It is, however, almost 
certain that he came to Sicily at the request of Count Roger who wished to re-establish the 
power of the Latin church in the island right after its complete conquest from the Muslims in 
                                                 
33 Gesta, IV. 128-33, p. 210; Malaterra, 3. 24. 
34 Goffredus Malaterra, De Rebus Gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae Comitis et Roberti 
Guiscardi Ducis Fratris Eius, RIS, vol. 6; hereafter: Malaterra; the main secondary works on 
Malaterra are: E. Pontieri, I Normanni nell’Italia meridionale, Libreria scientifica editrice, 
Naples, 1964; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. xxxvi-xxxvii; Wolf, Making History, 
pp. 143-71; Geoffrey Malaterra, The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of hid 
Brother Duke Robert Guiscard, ed. and tr. K. B. Wolf, University of Michigan Press, 
Michigan 2005, pp. 1-33; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 17-20; Albu, The 
Normans in their Histories, pp. 106-44. 
35 Malattera was in the secular clergy and sometime later in his life he became a Benedictine 
monk: Malaterra, p. 3; The Deeds of Count Roger, p. 41. 
36 Malaterra, p. 4; The Deeds of Count Roger, p. 42. 
37 Pontieri, De Rebus Gestis, p. iv. Compare with Wolf, The Deeds of Count Roger, pp. 6, 7, 
especially n. 6; and Taviani-Carozzi, who argues that Malaterra was almost certainly born in 
Normandy: La terreur du monde, p. 18. 
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1091. As Malaterra himself states, it was at Roger’s specific request, that he began writing his 
De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae comitis et Roberti Guiscardi ducis fratris eius.  
     Malaterra’s sources for his work, for he was not an eye-witness himself to the events he 
describes in his history, were primarily oral, gathered from people who had witnessed the 
events, although we cannot be sure whether he had access to any archival material.38 But like 
William of Apulia, he does not identify any of his sources and we do not know whether they 
were knights, footsoldiers or other followers of the Norman army. There is a debate as to 
whether Malaterra had used the Anonymi Vaticani historia Sicula in his work, a history of the 
Norman conquests in southern Italy and Sicily up to 1091 written during the reign of Roger 
II, or whether these two sources for Robert Guiscard’s and Roger’s lives were written 
independently.39 However, Malaterra would have been aware of the works of William of 
Jumièges or William of Poitiérs, but it is not likely that he knew of William of Apulia’s work, 
since the latter was writing between the years 1095-99, just a few years before Roger’s death 
in 1101. 
     The person that dominates Malaterra’s work is Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily. 
Malaterra regarded Roger as a generous patron to whom he could not refuse, when asked, to 
commemorate his deeds.40 It is likely that Roger, very much aware that his life was about to 
end, being in his late sixties, commissioned Malaterra to write the history of the Norman 
conquests in Calabria and Sicily. One of the reasons was that he wanted his accomplishments 
to be transmitted for posterity, thus Malaterra’s writing was in “plain and simple words” in an 
attempt to magnify and glorify the warlike ventures of Robert and Roger, presenting them as 
part of a divine plan.41 However, Roger certainly wished to strengthen the claims of his sons, 
Simon and Roger, against those of their cousin, the son of Robert Guiscard, Roger Borsa, to 
                                                 
38 Malaterra, p. 3; The Deeds of Count Roger, p. 41. 
39 Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. xxxvii-iii. 
40 Malaterra, p. 4; The Deeds of Count Roger, p. 42. 
41 O. Capitani, “Specific Motivations and Continuing Themes in the Norman Chronicles of 
Southern Italy in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries”, The Normans in Sicily and Southern 
Italy, Lincey Lectures 1974, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, p. 6. 
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the island of Sicily. But, beyond Malaterra’s intention to immortalize the Count, he seems to 
have written his work with an eye of entertaining him and his companions.42 Given the fact 
that he was commissioned to write his work, Malaterra was certainly partial in his narrative 
and we can certainly note that he did conceal certain events which will be examined later on.  
 
Leo Marsicanus, Romuald of Salerno and Lupus Protospatharius 
 
     Other primary sources for the eleventh century Norman infiltration include Leo 
Marsicanus and the continuators of his Chronica monasterii Casinensis.43 This work entails 
the history of Montecassino from the sixth century up until 1072,44 putting greater emphasis 
on the events of the eleventh century. It was authorised by Abbot Oderisius I (1088-1105) 
probably around 1098, and it must have been concluded by the time Leo was elected cardinal 
of Ostia by Pascal II in 1101. Leo’s continuator was a certain Peter the Deacon who carried 
the narrative up to the year 1139.45 Romuald, archbishop of Salerno for the years 1153-81 
and a leading prelate of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily with political ambitions, is an 
important primary source for the eleventh century Normanno-Italian history. He has written 
numerous works, primarily of ecclesiastical interest, but his most important piece was his 
Chronicon from the creation of the world up to the year 1178.46 This work is the first attempt 
in Italy since antiquity to write a universal history. Romuald’s sources for the eleventh 
                                                 
42 The Deeds of Count Roger, p. 9.  
43 Chronica monasterii Casinensis, MGH, SS, vol. 34; Chalandon, Domination Normande, 
pp. xxxiv-xxxv; Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 6; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, p. 16. 
44 Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 6; 1075 according to Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. 
xxxv. 
45 Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du 
monde, p. 16. 
46 Romualdus Salernitatis, Chronicon, RIS, vol. 7; D.J.A. Matthew, “The Chronicle of Romuald 
of Salerno”, The writing of history in the Middle Ages: essays presented to Richard William 
Southern, ed. R.H.C. Davis, J.M. Wallace-Hadrill, Clarendon, Oxford, 1981, 239-74; 
Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. xlix-lii. 
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century were Leo’s Chronica, the Annales Casinenses47 and a lost chronicle from Salerno 
that was also used from the author of the Chronicon Amalfitanum.48 However, since he is not 
a contemporary of the events he describes that makes him a less reliable source. In addition, 
we need to mention Lupus Protospatharius’ Chronicon that deals with the history of the 
Mezzogiorno between the years 805 and 1102.49 
 
Orderic Vitalis  
 
     Valuable information concerning Norman affairs in southern Italy and Sicily come from 
Orderic Vitalis, arguably one of the greatest chroniclers of his time. Born near Shrewsbury, in 
1075, he was the son of a clerk, Ordelarius, who had accompanied Roger Montgomery, earl 
of Shrewsbury, from Normandy to England in the wake of the Conquest. Sent, at the age of 
ten to the abbey of St. Evroul in Normandy, he was to spend his entire life there, dying in or 
after 1141. The main body of Orderic’s Ecclesiastical History was written between the years 
1123-37 and it consists of thirteen books. In Book VII, which was written probably after 
1130, Orderic examines the period from the dethronement of Nicephorus Botaneiates, in 
1081, to the death of William the Conqueror in 1087. Although Orderic had used many 
written sources for his recapitulation of the events of William the Conqueror’s reign, such as 
William of Poitiérs and William of Jumièges, for the most events in Normandy, England and 
southern Italy in the years 1083-95 and in 1101-13 he relied mostly on oral sources, people 
that were coming to St. Evroul or those he had met on his travels,50 and from his own 
                                                 
47 Annales Casinenses, MGH, SS, vol. 19. 
48 “Chronicon Amalfitanum”, Amalfi im Fruhen Mittelalter, ed. U. Schwarz, Tubingen, 1978, 
chapters 23-41, pp. 204-21. 
49 Lupus Protospatharius, Annales, MGH, SS, vol. 60; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 
xxvii-xxviii; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, p. 23. 
50 The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. M. Chibnall, (6 vols.), Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1969-80, vol. VI, p. xix. 
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memory.51 But the dependence on oral testimonies may have caused confusion on his 
recollection of dates and events. Certain events are put in the text in vague chronological 
terms,52 while certain times his dating is also wrong, even by many years. Orderic’s use of 
military terms, like most of twelfth-century chroniclers, is also imprecise, for example his use 
of acies may mean a line or a column, while pedites applies to both foot-soldiers and 
dismounted knights. And in general, Orderic’s battle-narratives become distorted by 
anecdotes from eye-witnesses which are thrown into the narrative of the events.53  
     In the beginning of book VII, Orderic refers to the campaign against Byzantium in 1081. 
Before that, however, he briefly mentions the dethronement of Michael Doukas (1078) and 
Nicephorus Botaneiates (1081) and pseudo-Michael’s appeal to Guiscard. But for the 
campaign itself, Orderic’s narrative is very brief. For the four-month siege of Dyrrachium 
Orderic does not give anything but some brief comments of no particular importance, while 
for Alexius’ army we only get a vague comment on its size and consistency.54 Regarding the 
battle of Dyrrachium, Orderic only mentions its outcome, while following Guiscard’s 
absence to Italy, our chronicler only vaguely refers to one of the battles at Ioannina (1082)55 
and he neglects – deliberately or not we do not know – to mention the Norman defeat at 
Larisa (1083) that caused Bohemond’s retreat to Dyrrachium. Concerning Bohemond’s 
invasion of 1107 in book XI, there is a list of the knights that joined Bohemond from 
England, France and elsewhere and their preparations before the crossing of the Adriatic.56 
However, for the actual siege of Dyrrachium and the Treaty of Devol (1108), Orderic does 
not give us anything but some very general information about the course of the siege.  
                                                 
51 Orderic Vitalis, vol. IV, pp. xx-xxii.  
52 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. xxiii-xxiv.  
53 Ibid., vol. VI, pp. xxi-xxv. 
54 Ibid., VII, p. 19; from now on the latin number will be referring to the book of the 
Ecclesiastical History and not the volume, unless stated otherwise. 
55 No place or chronology are noted, but we presume that Orderic must refer to the battles of 
Ioannina in 1082: Ibid., VII, pp. 28-9. 
56 Ibid., XI, p. 71. 
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     Orderic Vitalis is the main primary source that provides detailed information about 
members of great Norman families travelling to southern Italy, thus helping me establish the 
link between Normandy and the Norman infiltration in the south. Book III, which along with 
Book IV examine events in England, Normandy and parts of the history of St. Evroul, 
presents the internal history of several major Norman families in the first half of the eleventh 
century. We read about William of Giroie – originally from Brittany – who was to become a 
“scourge” of his enemies in Gaul, England and Apulia, while his grandson William III Giroie 
was known in Apulia as “the good Norman.”57 Another son of the former, William of 
Montreuil,58 is identified in the service of Richard I of Capua while Robert II Grandmesnil, a 
grandson of William I Giroie was exiled in Italy for three years in 1061, along with Ralph III 
Tosny, Hugh of Grandmesnil and Arnold Echauffour.59 William Echauffour, another member 
of the Giroie family, after receiving his knighthood from Philip I of France he went to Apulia 
where he took a noble Lombard wife and won thirty castles in the name of Robert of 
Loritello, nephew of Robert Guiscard.60 These are just a few examples of how helpful 
Orderic is in establishing the origin of a number of Italian immigrants, and along with 
Professor Ménager’s studies on French charter material of this period, we are able to piece 
together the puzzle of the Norman/French descent to Italy.  
 
Anna Comnena  
 
     Anna Comnena, one of the most important and influential historiographers of the 
Byzantine literature, was the first-born child of the Emperor Alexius I Comnenus. She was 
born on the 1st December 1083 and at the very young age of eight she was betrothed to 
Constantinos Doukas, the son of the deposed Emperor Michael VII Doukas (1071-78). But 
                                                 
57 Ibid., III, pp. 22, 26. 
58 Ibid., III, p. 98. 
59 Ibid., III, pp. 90, 106. 
60 Ibid., III, p. 126 . 
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Anna’s hopes of gaining the Imperial throne were dashed by Constantine’s death (sometime 
before 1097), and from then onwards we can clearly see the emerging hatred she had for her 
younger brother and heir to the throne, John. After an attempted rebellion with her mother 
Irene,61 following the death of her father Alexius in 1118, she was sent into a comfortable 
exile at the monastery of Theotokos Kecharitomenes until 1143, the year her brother died. It 
might seem possible that Anna started compiling her work after the death of her husband in 
1137, but it seems more likely that she would have waited for her brother to pass away. Thus, 
the work was compiled within five years, since we understand that her fourteenth of the 
fifteen books was finished in 1148.62 
     As a daughter of an emperor, she was in daily contact with many distinguished figures of 
the Byzantine Empire. She also acquired an education, and indeed a catholic one, that very 
few women had in that period.63 As she writes in the preface of the Alexiad, she had 
“fortified her mind with the Quadrivium of Sciences”, meaning geometry, arithmetic, 
astronomy and music, while Rhetoric, Philosophy and Dialectic certainly filled her 
curriculum.64 She had also studied Greek classical history65 and she had some, although 
vague, knowledge of the geography of the Balkans and Asia Minor. Her interest in theology 
was general, but her religious beliefs were strictly orthodox and she despised, if not hated, all 
                                                 
61 J. Chrysostomides, “A Byzantine Historian: Anna Comnena”, Medieval Historical W
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 Worlds, ed. D.O. Morgan, School of Oriental and African 
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 Alexiad, tr. E.R.A. Sewter, Penguin, 
Studies, London, 1982, 35. 
62 “For thirty years now, I swear it by the souls of the most blessed Emperors, I have no
I have not spoken to a friend of my father”. Since Anna was sent on exile in 1118, we 
presume that she means the year 1148. See: Alexiad, XIV. vii, vol. II, p. 291; Sewter, 
63 G. Buckler, Anna Comnena, a Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, pp. 178-87.  
64 Annae Comnenae Alexiadis libri XV, annotationes ad
Bonn, 1839-1878, “Praefatio”, pp. 4-5; Sewter, p. 17. 
65 See cites the story of the deception of the Spartans by Themistocles at Salamina (480 BC)
See: Alexiad, VI. X, pp. 310-11; Anna Comnena, The
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the non-Christians.66 After the death of Constantinos Doukas, Anna was married to 
Nicephorus Bryennius, a man with great education and with passion for knowledge. 
Nicephorus had already started writing a work about Alexius’ life, at the request of the 
Empress Irene, but his death in 1137 left it unfinished. However, the latter’s work turned out 
to be a useful history of the Empire from the times of Isaac I Comnenus (1057-59) until the 
middle of Botaneiates’ reign (1078-81), rather than a biography of Alexius, and Anna 
summarized it in the first two books of her Alexiad.67  
                                                
     Anna’s position in the Imperial Court brought her in daily contact with many leading 
figures of the Empire. Apart from her father and Emperor, she also had access to several 
other important officials like her uncle and governor of Dyrrachium George Paleologos, her 
husband and a trusted senior official Nicephorus Bryennius, her grand-mother and regent 
Anna Dalassena, Empress Irene, Taticius who was Alexius’ representative to the Latin 
Armies of the First Crusade,68 several ferry-men69 of the Bosphorus who were carrying 
messages and news to and from the capital and a “Latin envoy sent by the Bishop of Bari to 
Robert Guiscard.”70 As she notes in her fourteenth book, “I have often heard the Emperor and 
George Paleologos discussing these matters in my presence.”71 Further, she gathered useful 
information from eye-witnesses of the events she describes: “My material ... has been 
gathered ... from old soldiers who were serving in the army at the time of my father’s 
accession, who fell on hard times and exchanged the turmoil of the outer world for the 
 
66 Buckler, Anna Comnena, pp. 307-53; Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. xix. 
67 Buckler, Anna Comnena, pp. 230-1. 
68 A very important source because when Taticius leaves the Latin camp to return to 
Constantinople, her narrative becomes less accurate.  
69 Alexiad, XIV. vii, vol. II, p. 291; Sewter, p. 460.  
70 For this Latin envoy named Jean, see: G.A. Loud, “Anna Komnena and her Sources for the 
Normans of Southern Italy”, Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages, Essays Presented to 
John Taylor, ed. I. Wood, G.A. Loud, Hambledon, London, 1991, 47. 
71 Alexiad., XIV. vii, vol. II, p. 291; Sewter, p. 460.  
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peaceful life of monks.”72 Finally, she was an eye-witness herself in a number of events for 
“most of the time, moreover, we were ourselves present, for we accompanied our father and 
mother. Our lives by no means revolved round the home.”73  
     There is an argument that Anna did not use her own memories for the events prior to 
1097, the year in which she describes in full detail the camping of the crusaders at 
Constantinople, something that might explain the confusion in her tenth book.74 For earlier 
events, we know that she took extracts verbatim from the Chronographia of Michael Psellus, 
and she may have read the works of Attaleiates, Skylitzes, Zonaras and Leo the Deacon.75 It 
has also been argued by Mathieu that Anna also used William of Apulia’s Gesta as a source, 
and because she did not speak Latin it is very likely that she used a translator. For three 
episodes regarding Guiscard’s siege of Dyrrachium, Anna uses brief passages of the Gesta 
nearly verbatim, and though their similarities are limited and brief this strongly suggests that 
Anna had somehow obtained William’s work.76 However, this argument has been strongly 
criticised by Loud who believes that it would have been impossible for Anna to have had 
access to a rare manuscript such as the Gesta and simply points out to a well-informed 
common source, probably Nicephoros Bryennius whose instrumental role in drawing the 
Treaty of Devol will be seen in the following chapters.77  
     Other sources for the Alexiad include four main categories of documents. First we have 
the “memoirs” written by war veterans who had become monks, and which works were 
compiled probably at the request of the Emperor himself.78 Second, judging by the quotations 
                                                 
72 Alexiad., XIV. vii, vol. II, pp. 292-3; Sewter, p. 461; see also: XIV. vii, vol. II, p. 290; 
Sewter, p. 459. 
73 Alexiad, XIV. vii, vol. II, p. 290; Sewter, p. 459. 
74 Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. xi. 
75 Buckler, Anna Comnena, p. 231. 
76 Mathieu, Gesta, pp. 38-46. 
77 Loud, “Anna Komnena”, 50-52; for Nicephoros Bryennios, Loud bases his argument on an 
unpublished lecture by J. Howard-Johnston. See: Ibid., 52, n. 50. 
78 Alexiad., XIV. vii, vol. II, pp. 292-3; Sewter, p. 461; see also: Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. xii. 
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that we have in her work of a chrysobull79 appointing Anna Dalassena as Regent,80 a letter to 
Henry IV of Germany,81 the correspondence between the Emperor, John Comnenus and the 
habitants of Dyrrachium in 1091,82 and many other letters,83 we may assume that she had 
direct access to the state archives in Constantinople. Further, Anna must have used the 
diplomatic correspondence between her father, or other high-ranking officials, and foreign 
leaders, including the period of Guiscard’s Illyrian campaign, the passing of the crusaders 
from Constantinople and letters written to the Seljuc chieftain Tutush and the Sultan Kilij 
Arslan.84 Finally, she certainly had access to the documents of important treaties, like the 
Treaty of Devol (1108) which is the longest diplomatic document cited by Anna,85 along with 
Alexius’ chrysobull to the Venetians (1082).86 
     However, in many places in manuscript of the Alexiad there are lacunae where Anna 
Comnena omits to tell us of a certain date, place or a name, either because her memory 
simply failed her or perhaps because she did not want to go into further details for various 
reasons (i.e. personal sympathies). One such relevant example can be found in Book V where 
Anna includes Bohemond’s campaign in Thessaly (1082-3). When describing the Byzantine 
army’s course towards Larissa to meet up with the Normans, Alexius “made his way to 
another small place commonly called Plabitza, situated near the River [...].”87 What we also 
need to mention, albeit briefly, is the inconsistencies between different parts of Anna’s work, 
which leads us to the conclusion that she probably did not compile the books of the Alexiad 
                                                 
79 This was the official order by the Emperor which was written down in a parchment and 
then folded and sealed by the official secretary who was responsible for the Emperor’s seal. 
80 Alexiad, III. vi, pp. 157-8; Sewter, p. 116 . 
81 Ibid., III. x, pp. 174-7; Sewter, p. 126. 
82 Ibid., VIII. vii, pp. 413-4; Sewter, p. 262. 
83 Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. xii-xiii. 
84 Alexiad, I. ii, pp. 16-7; Sewter, pp. 33-4; see also: IX. iii, p. 434; Sewter, pp. 274-5. 
85 Ibid., XIII. xii, vol. II, pp. 228-46; Sewter, p. 424. 
86 Ibid., IV. ii, pp. 191-2; Sewter, p. 137. 
87 Alexiad, V. v, p. 245; Sewter, pp. 167-8  
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in their chronological order.88 For example, the city of Dyrrachium with its fortifications are 
first mentioned by Anna at the end of Book III,89 but the most detailed description can be 
found in Book XIII when she writes about Bohemond’s siege of 1107-8.90 
     Anna Comnena had, of course, her prejudices, racial, social and personal, but that does not 
mean that she was necessarily trying to deceive her audience. Throughout her history her 
love, affection and admiration for her father and his achievements is unquestionable.91 But 
with the ancient Greek historiographers, and especially Thucydides,92 being her model, her 
stated objective certainly was to tell the truth and nothing else. Anna displays her remarkable 
concern for impartiality in history when, writing about the oral testimonies she had gathered, 
she noted: “Most of the evidence I collected myself, especially in the reign of the third 
Emperor after Alexius [Manuel I, 1143-80], at a time when all flattery and lies had 
disappeared with his grandfather.”93 And as she remarked in the preface of the Alexiad, 
“whenever one assumes the role of a historian, friendship and enmities have to be forgotten. 
... The historian, therefore, must shirk neither remonstrance with his friends, or praise of his 
enemies. For my part I hope to satisfy both parties, both those who are offended by us and 
those who accept us, by appealing o the evidence of the actual events and of eye-
witnesses.”94 
 
Attaleiates, Psellus, Skylitzes and Zonaras 
                                                
 
 
88 Buckler, Anna Comnena, pp. 253-6. 
89 Alexiad, III. xii, p. 185; Sewter, p. 133 . 
90 Ibid., XIII. iii, vol. II, p. 190; Sewter, p. 403. 
91 For example: Ibid., XV. iii, vol. II, pp. 344-5; Sewter, p. 478. 
92 Buckler, Anna Comnena, p. 205; Chrysostomides, “Anna Comnena”, 33. 
93 Alexiad., XIV. vii, vol. II, pp. 291-2; Sewter, p. 460. 
94 Alexiad, “Praefatio”, pp. 3-4; Sewter, p. 18. 
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     Michael Attaleiates95 was a senator and a judge who held the high Court title of proedros 
and supported the party of the provincial aristocracy, born between 1020-30 and died 
sometime after 1085. His most significant and influential work was his History96 which 
examines the period 1034-79/80, based primarily on first hand observations and oral 
testimonies from the protagonists of the events. His work is not as personal as Psellus’ 
Chronographia but it is, indeed, considered as a rhetoric panegyric of the old Emperor 
Nicephoros III Botaneiates, which make him less impartial for that period that a modern 
researcher would wish. Moving on to another important primary source of the eleventh 
century, the Chronographia97 of Michael Psellus examines the years 976-1078 structured 
around the reign of the Emperors. Psellus was one of the greatest intellectual figures in the 
eleventh century Byzantine Court, a writer, poet, philosopher, and statesman with a career in 
the civil administration, he was born in the capital in 1018 and died sometime after 1081. One 
of the senior officials in Constantine IX’s (1042-55) government, he resigned only to return 
to the capital after 1059 as the “senior philosopher” (ypatos ton philosophon). His work was 
compiled in two parts, with the second section that deals with the period 1059-78 being 
written at the request of Michael VII (1071-78), thus being a panegyric of these three 
Emperors. Although the Chronographia has some serious deficiencies, like the lack of dates, 
names, place names and, generally, Psellus’ vague geography, it is generally agreed that the 
  
work hold a very high place in the catalogue of medieval histories, being compiled by an 
educated man who not only recorded history but also helped make history.  
     John Skylitzes’ life is rather obscure but we know he lived in the second half of the 
eleventh century and he held the titles of kouropalates and drungarie of the Watch.98 His 
                                               
95 Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. I, p. 229. 
96 Michaelis Attaliotae, Historia, CSHB, vol. 47, ed. I. Bekker, E. Weber, Bonn, 1853. 
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Synopsis Historiarum99 encompasses the period between 811-1057 and he is conceived as the 
continuator of Theophanes the Confessor100. Skylitzes uses a variety of sources and 
sometimes presents contradictory conclusions, while the sections also differ stylistically as 
well. The major hero of the last part of Skylitzes is Catacalon Cecaumenos, and we may think 
that he must have been close to that senior general writing his Στρατηγικόν between 1075-78. 
Skylitzes’ material is organised according to Imperial reigns and, as the work relies on 
sources – apart from Psellus – which have not survived, it is of the greatest value for the 
history of the eleventh century. His work was taken up to the year 1078 by an unknown 
writer who might have used the History of Attaleiates. Another valuable work is John 
Zonaras’ Epitome Historiarum,101 a chronicle going from the Creation to the year 1118 
(Alexius Comnenus’ death) and written by the commander of the Imperial bodyguard 
(drugarios tes viglas) in Alexius’ Court sometime in the middle of the twelfth century – after 
having become a monk. But Zonaras largely copies Skylitzes, Attaleiates and Psellus and his 
material is used in a somewhat mechanical, often superficial manner with occasional errors. 
e criticized Alexius Comnenus’ governance and monetary policy and his work is a polemic 
riting Medieval Military History: the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Principal Narrative 
H
against Anna Comnena’s eulogy of her father.   
 
W
Sources Compared 
 
     The aim of the present section is to examine Anna Comnena, Geoffrey Malaterra and 
William of Apulia as military historians, and will attempt to assess the accuracy of their 
description of battles and sieges. Some of the major questions that will be raised are: to what 
                                                 
99 Ioannes Skylitzes, Georgius Cedrenus, Synopsis Historiarum, CSHB, vols. 34, 35, ed. I. 
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extent are the figures they provide for army size, reliable, both in absolute numbers and in the 
ratios given between cavalry and infantry? What is our chroniclers’ knowledge of the local 
geography where the military operations took place, and to what extent – if at all – were they 
familiar with the terrain of the battles or sieges, or the campaign routes of armies which they 
describe? How accurate or detailed are their description of castles and fortifications? Another 
major point is the extent to which these chroniclers provide dating of major military events, 
and how far do their narratives permit the accurate reconstruction of a chain of events? 
                                                
Amatus of Montecassino has been consciously omitted because, even though his account is 
most valuable for the earlier period of the Norman infiltration in Italy, the History of the 
Normans concludes in the year 1078 and, thus, does not deal with the main events of my 
research which is the Norman invasions of Illyria. 
     In his introductory chapter to Art of Warfare,102 the eminent medieval military historian J. 
F. Verbruggen analyses both the limitations and general value of several medieval sources 
like clerical and secular accounts. Since my research includes a court layman (William of 
Apulia), monks (Malaterra, Amatus and Orderic) and a well-educated princess (Anna 
Comnena), a brief presentation of the aforementioned limitations has to be made at this point. 
In many cases several of the clerical sources give a narrative of battles, sieges or entire 
campaigns which is incomplete, “in order not to bore the reader” simply because reporting 
these events in a form of today’s war-correspondent was not their objective. It is undoubtedly 
an over-simplification to say that all clerics were ignorant of military affairs; Orderic Vitalis, 
for example, is one of the foremost sources for Anglo-Norman military history, and much of 
his information came from contact with people who had seen active service. Nevertheless, 
many ecclesiastical chroniclers show little interest in recording details such as tactics and 
weaponry, or to report in detail what really took place in the battlefield; their accounts of 
battle are influenced by invention or borrowed from classical models, particularly in their 
 
102 J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages, From the 
Eighth Century to 1340, tr. S. Willard, R.W. Southern, Boydell, Woodbridge, 1997, pp. 10-
18. 
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terminology, while they tend to ascribe a victory to a miracle or God’s intervention. Secular 
sources are, generally, more reliable in their accounts, especially when the person was an eye-
witness of the events he or she describes, even though they have the tendency to glorify their 
ources. According to his critique, Delpech and Kohler – 
                                                
heroes or certain groups of people depending on their sympathies. And when these sources 
were written in the vernacular they are extremely valuable as they provide a clear and distinct 
terminology. However, the fact that some of them might not have been experienced in 
military affairs also bears the risk of mistaken or inaccurate report of events.103   
     This chapter, however, fits in the more general question about the dangers in using 
chronicle material by modern military historians. This topic was first raised by Verbruggen in 
the mid-1950s and has been picked up since by John Keegan and, among others, Kelly 
DeVries.104 In his introductory chapter “Weaknesses of Modern Military Historians in 
Discussing Medieval Warfare”, Verbruggen criticized some of the so-called old school of 
military historians – H. Delpech and the Prussian general Kohler – in producing works that 
lack the critical faculty which is indispensable to a study of the art of medieval warfare, in 
contrast to other historians like Charles Oman and Hans Delbruck. His main argument is that 
it is absolutely neccessary to check the military value of each chronicler’s account, because 
even the best narratives may include inventions and legends which can be spotted solely 
through the comparison of many s
who were experienced army officers but not professional historians – accepted all estimates 
of the numbers of troops and battle tactics used at their face value without “filtering” their 
enormous amount of data, with their lack of historical criticism leading to their work being 
discredited by modern historians.   
     To return to the main topic of my discussion, the question of numbers can be a tough one 
indeed; even in modern warfare, it can be difficult for a general to be fully aware of the 
 
103 Although this argument is dismissed by: Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 16-18. 
104 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle, A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme, Pimlico, 
London, 2004 (first published in 1976), pp. 27-36; K. DeVries, “The Use of Chroniclers in 
Recreating Medieval Military History”, Journal of Medieval Military History, 2 (2004), 1-17. 
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discrepancy between nominal troop numbers and actual combat effective men. Such 
difficulties would have been much more acute for a medieval commander. In large-scale 
expeditions like Hastings, Dyrrachium or Matzikert, the commanding general would only 
have known the leaders of main contingents, along with a rough estimate of their size. Thus, 
for contemporary chroniclers who report the size of an army or opposing armies in a 
battlefield, we cannot expect them to provide us with accurate or detailed information for a 
number of reasons. Their estimates were affected by the inherent tendency of such narratives 
to exaggerate; by bias towards friend or foes; and, unless the chronicler had taken part in an 
expedition, the reliance on oral testimony from eye-witnesses which always bears the great 
risk of miscalculation or inflation. Other reasons may include the time when a chronicler 
author includes the names of all the senior Byzantine officers along with the consistency of 
might be writing his account, like Anna Comnena’s compilation of the Alexiad many decades 
after the events had taken place.  Finally, there is always the case when a number of knights 
might have dismounted or lost their horses for several reasons (battle casualties, fatigue, 
disease), thus counted as infantry by inexperienced chroniclers in military affairs.105  
     For the Norman campaigns of 1081 and 1084, we are more dependent on Latin sources for 
numbers of Robert Guiscard’s forces, while unsurprisingly Anna Comnena appears far better 
informed about the consistency and size of her father’s armies. Thus, Anna reports that the 
Norman army in 1081 comprised of 30,000 men which was carried across the Adriatic in 150 
ships of various sizes with – a rare detail – 200 men in each ship,106 a clear exaggeration in an 
attempt to magnify her father’s victory over the Normans. However, the Alexiad’s details of 
the consistency of the 1081 and 1107 Byzantine armies are extremely valuable since the 
the armies. She does not, however, provide an estimate of their numbers, with the exception 
                                                 
105 For all of these difficulties in reporting the figures of armies in the Middle Ages see: 
Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 5-9; J. France, Victory in the East, A Military History of 
ress, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 122-42; Haldon, 
er, p. 69. 
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106 Alexiad, I. xvi, pp. 74-5; Sewt
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of the 2,800 Manichaeans and the Turkish force sent by Sulleyman I.107 Further, she reports 
that 13,000 men – a rather implausible figure – were drowned after the Normanno-Venetian 
naval battle in the Corfiot waters in autumn 1084.108  For the Norman host, however, Anna 
only uses numerous adjectives like countless, innumerable and others, although she does 
provide us with a figure on the losses that the Normans suffered in 1085 due to an outbreak of 
malaria, giving the excessive figure of 10,000 dead men of which 500 were knights.109 It 
would thus appear that the numbers given by Anna, although rare are mostly unreliable, 
mainly because the author is writing many decades after the events. 
     It is not surprising that William of Apulia should be much better informed about Robert 
Guiscard’s expeditions than Malaterra. We know that Guiscard’s main army was transported 
in 1081 in “fifty liburnes”,110 with William being our only source for the participation of the 
Dalmatians in this expedition.111 However, the composition of the fleet and the army is not 
given by the author, who is also silent about the casualties inflicted on the Norman fleet by a 
storm before its arrival at Dyrrachium. For the Byzantine army, William is obviously less 
well informed than Anna, writing about a “grand army” with “different nationalities” both 
“Greek and Barbarians”,112 while he is also unaware of the size of the Venetian fleet in 1081. 
Regarding Guiscard’s second Illyrian campaign, William notes that the size of the Norman 
fleet was 120 ships.113 Further, at the point where he refers to the casualties due to the severe 
cold in the Norman camp in the winter of 1084-5, he assessed the casualties to be five 
hundred knights in less than three months,114 the same figure been given by Anna Comnena 
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as well. Finally, for this campaign we are also informed that Roger Borsa, along with Robert 
II, took part in it while the only son of Robert Guiscard who is not mentioned at all by 
William is Guy, who did take part as Anna Comnena informs us.115   
     Malaterra’s focus of his work is Roger Hauteville’s conquest of Sicily, with Apulia and 
Illyria being but a mere sideshow in his narrative. Thus, we only gain some rough estimates 
of opposing armies from Malaterra’s narrative, although some useful exceptions have to do 
with the 1081 invasion army which consisted of 1,300 knights,116 a rather reasonable size for 
a cavalry force. Also, during the siege of Kastoria by Guiscard’s forces in the spring 1082, 
we are told that the numbers of the defenders included 300 Varangians.117 Nonetheless, for 
the crucial events of this period like the sieges and battles of Dyrrachium and Larissa, 
Malaterra is silent when it comes to numbers. For example, he writes about the Byzantine 
forces mustered in October 1081: “The Emperor alerted the entire empire ... and mobilised a 
r the invasion of 1107-8, none of our 
main sources give any estimate of their numbers and we have to rely solely on other 
                                                
large army ... and thousands of soldiers.”118 The Byzantine army was, indeed, larger than the 
Normans but these comments were probably made intentionally to make Robert Guiscard’s 
victory sound even greater to the ears of his patron, Roger Hauteville. 
     Even though all of our main sources let us down when it comes to giving accurate figures 
about the opposing armies, fortunately for modern historians other Latin chroniclers writing 
about this period seem much better informed and perhaps more reliable. For example, we 
should compare Malaterra’s 1,300 knights for the 1081 campaign with the 700 horse given by 
Romuald of Salerno, although we must remember that Romuald was writing in the second 
half of the twelfth century.119 For Bohemond’s army fo
 
, p. 244; Alexiad, VI. v, p. 282; Sewter, pp. 188-9. 115 Ibid., V. 144, 151
116 Malaterra, 3. 24. 
117 Ibid., 3. 29. 
118 Ibid., 3. 26, 27.  
119 Romuald of Salerno, s.a. 1081. 
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contemporary sources like the Anonymous of Bari, Fulcher of Chartres, Albert of Aachen 
and, although not a contemporary, William of Tyre.120  
     Another crucial point is the geographical knowledge of our chroniclers and their degree of 
familiarity with the area where the events they describe take place. Is their presentation of the 
battlefields and campsites detailed and accurate enough to track the route of each army? If we 
begin our analysis with the Latin sources, it is evident that both William of Apulia and 
Geoffrey Malaterra are not aware of the geography of Illyria and Epirus and rely on 
information passed on to them by eyewitnesses when it comes to place names, rivers, plains 
and, most importantly, the surrounding areas of Dyrrachium and Larissa. Starting with 
William of Apulia, although in many cases he does mention certain locations, there is no 
detailed description of the surrounding areas and in some cases we are unable to identify 
these particular places on a modern map or follow the route of an army. For Guiscard’s 
crossing of the Adriatic, he does mention that Otranto was the gathering point for the 
embarkation of his army,121 but William is silent concerning the disembarkation point on the 
Illyrian coast. Before the siege of Dyrrachium, William informs us about the preparatory 
conquests in the Illyrian and Epirotic coastline, meaning the cities of Avlona along with 
“certain others by the coast”,122 while before that, Bohemond is mentioned as having taken 
Corfu, Butrinto and Vonitsa.123 Further, there is no description of the city or of the 
surrounding areas of Dyrrachium, and the precise location of Guiscard’s camp is probably the 
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one given by William in book V where he describes the starvation of many Normans at their 
camp near the River Glykys.124  
     Crossing over to the Byzantines, from the amount of information we get from the Gesta it 
is impossible to track down the route of Alexius’ army from Constantinople to Dyrrachium or 
 away from the Normans. Malaterra is also 
exactly the same vagueness when he describes the Norman siege of Kastoria.132 Finally, 
                                                
to identify the place where he pitched his camp. For the entire period of 1082-84, the only 
details we get from the Gesta are the mentioning of the places where the three battles took 
place, the cities of Ioannina, Larissa and Kastoria.125 Regarding Guiscard’s second invasion, 
we are informed that the latter embarked his army at Taranto and sailed for Greece from the 
port of Brindisi,126 while the two Norman armies are joined “at the junction which was held 
by the other sons of the illustrious duke,”127 meaning the port of Butrinto.  
     The De Rebus gives us even less details than the Gesta, like the port of Hiericho where the 
Norman fleet reached shore,128 and that they moved their ships at a place where the Vjossa 
River flows to the sea.129 But no more information is given about the area around the city of 
Dyrrachium or about the nature of the battle-ground, even though we do know that Alexius 
set up his camp at a distance of four stadia130
vague regarding the preparatory conquests before the major siege operations. After the battle 
of Dyrrachium, he writes that: “Various fortresses in the same province were unable to 
withstand the threat that the duke posed,”131 but he fails to be more specific. And we can spot 
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when Malaterra’s narrative goes on to Bohemond’s campaigns in the Greek mainland, his 
brief chapter only deals with the battle outside Arta.  
     Anna Comnena’s knowledge of the topography of the Balkans is another weak point in 
her work. More specifically, valuable information is given about the point of embarkation 
and disembarkation of Guiscard’s army in 1081,133 while for Bohemond’s invasion in 1107 
we are told that these were Bari and Avlona respectively.134 For the area of Dyrrachium, 
however, Anna’s description is vague and wholly insufficient. She does mention some of the 
rivers, like Glykys where the Normans pitched their camp, or Charzanes where the 
Byzantines later pitched theirs, and she even mentions the name of the church of St Nicholas 
where the Varangians sought shelter after their retreat from the battle. But in her thirteenth 
book Anna becomes more accurate concerning the land-blockade of the Norman army in 
1107/8 – perhaps because she wrote that part of her work first. She identifies certain 
mountain passes (Petra), rivers (Charzanes, Diavolis, Bouse) or insignificant places where the 
Imperial army spent the night (Mylos).135 But all of the above would probably have been 
random eyewitness information rather than personal knowledge of the area. The only detailed 
description of the Dyrrachium area can be found in her twelfth book during Bohemond’s 
siege of the city in 1107/8.136  As for Alexius’ course from Constantinople to Dyrrachium in 
                                                
1081, we know next to nothing of the exact route that he followed, apart from his stop at 
Thessaloniki at an unknown date. It is very likely that the Emperor would have followed the 
same route again in 1108 to face Bohemond, thus Anna’s list of the stops the Emperor made 
during his march: Geranion, Chirovachi, Mestos, Psyllos (in the River Evros) and 
Thessaloniki where he spent the winter.137 
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     For the period 1082-83, Anna once more avoids giving us any specific details of the 
Emperor’s route until he reached Ioannina. There is also no description of the area around the 
city, especially where the double battle was fought, and after the defeat of the Byzantines 
Anna has Bohemond in her account marching and countermarching over the Balkans in the 
most bewildering fashion.138 For the actual siege of the city of Larissa and the battle that was 
fought between the two armies close to the city, there is only a description of the place where 
Alexius chose to encamp his army,139 while a few place names do appear later on Anna’s 
s fleet, in 
                                                
narrative which, however, do not really help us construct a full and comprehensive image of 
what really happened that day. For Guiscard’s second campaign in 1084 the information that 
we have are more scarce and we only know about the places of embarkation (Otranto) and 
disembarkation (Avlona), the places of the triple naval battle with the Venetians (Cassiopi 
and Kerkyra), the place of Guiscard’s death and the port where the rest of Guiscard’s fleet 
had anchored after the battle (Vonitsa).   
     Another striking drawback of our Latin chroniclers’ accounts is the lack of dates. Starting 
with the Gesta, no indication of dates is given in any of his books, and even certain 
references to seasons are also very rare. Even though William of Apulia records the events in 
his story in relatively good chronological order, we need to confirm what he is writing with 
the accounts of Geoffrey Malaterra, Amatus of Montecassino or Anna Comnena and other 
contemporary chroniclers. For example, we know that the shipwreck of Guiscard’
1081, happened “in the summer.”140 Of which year, however, William does not mention and 
we have to read the Alexiad to confirm that it took place in June 1081. Further, William tells 
us about the “occupation” of the city of Dyrrachium by the Venetians (1083) sometime 
during the winter and that they stayed there for fifteen days.141 For the second Illyrian 
 
e winter of 1083-84, see: Ibid., V. 96, p. 240; idem, V. 84, p. 240. 
138 Ibid., V. v, pp. 242-43; Sewter, pp. 166-7 . 
139 Ibid., V. v, pp. 244-45; Sewter, pp 167-8. 
140 Gesta, IV. 218, p. 216. 
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campaign, the only dates given in Book V are the amount of time the Normans spent at the 
Illyrian coast, right after their arrival.142  
     Turning to Malaterra’s history, although his narrative generally follows a good 
chronological order, in his third book that focuses on Guiscard’s Illyrian campaigns he gives 
only two specific dates. Thus, Guiscard reached Otranto in May 1081,143 but Malaterra does 
departure from the capital, we only know that Pakourianus was despatched to Dyrrachium in 
                                                
not give any more details concerning the actual siege of Dyrrachium. However, before the 
surrender of the city to the Normans, we are informed that Alexius arrived at Dyrrachium 
with his army in October 1081,144 but no more details are given about the day of the battle. 
For the following period of Guiscard’s departure to Italy and Bohemond’s whereabouts in the 
Greek mainland, Malaterra is surprisingly vague and brief and our efforts to reconstruct the 
events lay mostly on the rest of the historians of this period.  
     Before we examine Anna Comnena’s lack of sufficient dating in her Alexiad, we need to 
remember two points which I have already mentioned. That she was writing in the 1140s, 
thus several decades after the events had taken place and being an elderly woman in her 
sixties, things that would have certainly affected her recollection of the events. Second, the 
different sections of her work were not composed in their chronological order, something 
which inevitably leads to confusion and inconsistencies. Regarding my period of research, 
Anna writes that the first siege of Dyrrachium began on the 17th June,145 and that the 
Normans were already encamped at Glabinitza for seven days to recover from their 
shipwreck, so we can trace their arrival at the Greek coast around the 10th.146 As for Alexius’ 
 
 except from the cavalry, stayed for the winter at the camp near the River 
 the interesting but unconvincing argument by 
k place in 1082 and not in 1081: Buckler, Anna 
3.  
142 All the units,
Glykys until the spring of 1085, see: Ibid., V. 207, p. 246. 
143 Malaterra, 3. 24. 
144 Ibid., 3. 27. 
145 Alexiad, IV. i, p. 187; Sewter, p. 135; see
Buckler that the battle of Dyrrachium too
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August along with an unknown number of men.147 But since the Emperor did not leave for 
Dyrrachium “until the disposition of the troops was complete”, and bearing in mind that 
in November 1082 as I will prove later.151 
have to do with Alexius’ defensive measures. So, the Emperor arrived at Thessaloniki in 
   
Alexius was reconnoitring the ground around Dyrrachium on the 15th October,148 he should 
have left Constantinople around the end of August. Anna Comnena also notes that the battle 
of Dyrrachium took place on the 18th October,149 but the dating of the city’s surrender is 
unknown and we can only pressume from Anna’s words that it must have occured some 
weeks after the Byzantine defeat, certainly sometime in the early winter.   
     For the following two years period, Anna’s chronology is surprisingly weak and the only 
dates that she gives us are two. After Bohemond had established his headquarters at Ioannina 
in spring 1082, Alexius left Constantinople with his troops to face him in the month of May 
of that year.150 The next date Anna gives us has to do with Bohemond’s arrival at Larissa and 
the beginning of the siege in full force – 
Considering that the governor of Larissa, Leo Cephalas, dispatched an urgent letter to 
Alexius six months after the start of the siege (April, 1083), and that shortly after the 
Emperor’s army was on the move to Larissa, we assume that Alexius must have arrived at the 
besieged city in May 1083.152 For the rest of the period until Guiscard’s death at Cephalonia 
our only sources of dates are the Latin ones.  
     Our observations on Anna Comnena’s narrative so far apply equally to Bohemond’s 
invasion. Between 1105, when the Emperor was notified about Bohemond’s plans to invade 
Illyria, and the actual invasion two years later, we only get three indications of a date which 
                                              
147 Ibid., IV. iv, p. 198; Sewter, p. 140.  
148 Ibid., IV. v, p. 203; Sewter, p. 143. 
149 Ibid., IV. vi, p. 208; Sewter, p. 146. 
150 Ibid., V. iv, p. 237; Sewter, p. 163. 
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September 1105153 to spend the winter in the Macedonian capital, because we find him there 
in the beginning of spring (March, 1106).154 The second date has to do with the Emperor’s 
chium. Anna tells us, however, that the Norman fleet was very well 
                                                
attendance at a ceremony in Thessaloniki, in honour of the patron of the city St. Demetrius, 
on the 25th January 1107. Unfortunately, for the crucial period between Bohemond’s invasion 
and the Treaty of Devol, we are only informed about Alexius’ departure from the capital on 
the 1st November 1107.155 
     Anna’s accounts of the battles fought are not considered to be her best parts of the 
Alexiad. However, her descriptions “though not the finest specimens of her art, are often 
lucid, instructive, and even interesting.”156 The first battles that are examined by Anna are 
those between the Norman and the Venetian fleets off the coasts of Dyrrachium, in June 
1081. No number for the Venetian ships is given, although Anna notes that it “comprised all 
types of ships.”157 The Norman fleet had 150 ships of all types, but we are not informed 
whether several units returned home after the disembarkation of the Norman army, or if they 
all remained at Dyrra
protected by “every sort of war machines”, probably because they anticipated a confrontation 
with the Venetians. As for the description of the naval battle itself, unfortunately Anna does 
not give any details about the naval tactics employed or the chain of the events that led to 
Bohemond’s retreat.  
     The Normanno-Venetian naval battle off Dyrrachium is also described in detail by 
Malaterra who gives a rather different version of the events. In the De Rebus there is a vivid 
description of the events of the first and second day, including the preparation of the Venetian 
ships for the battle, a reference to the morale of the two armies and the deception of the 
 
153 It should read “the twenty-fourth” and not “the twentieth” year of Alexius’ accession to 
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Normans.158 Also, Malaterra notes the use of Greek Fire during the naval combat.159 
Although William of Apulia talks about the Venetian-Byzantine alliance, he does not go into 
more detail and he gives the misleading impression of Venice being a satellite state of 
Byzantium.160 After mentioning the reason why Alexius called for the Venetians – to enforce 
a naval blockade,161 William also highlights the Venetian dominance in the Adriatic Sea.162 
ot so detailed 
However, for the actual naval battle, no number of the opposing fleets is given and the 
description of the three-day battle is too short and vague. Only the deception of the Normans 
by the Venetians is mentioned, along with the participation of the Dalmatians in Guiscard’s 
fleet.163  
     The two of the most important land battles of this period, however, were the ones close to 
Dyrrachium and Larissa. Anna Comnena notes the exact date of the battle of Dyrrachium, 
18th October 1081, but again no numbers of the opposing armies are given apart from 
estimations of their size and composition. Surprisingly though, Anna takes us to her father’s 
war council the day before the battle where the battle-plan is finalised.164 Her narrative for 
the day of the battle is relatively detailed as to have an idea of the battle-lines drawn by first 
light and how the actual battle unfolded. Regarding the battle-lines, we know the senior 
officers of the opposing armies and where exactly they were stationed, but for the Normans 
we are unaware of the composition of each unit. Although the Alexiad is n
concerning the battle formations, the crucial tactical moves that decided the outcome of the 
battle are noted, like the attack of the Norman wing commanded by Amiketas which was 
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160 Gesta, IV. 278-282, p. 218.
161 Ibid., IV. 286-290, p. 2
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163 Ibid., IV. 300-311, p. 220. 
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repulsed by the Varangians, and the latter’s ill-thought advance far beyond the Byzantine line 
of attack and their retreat after they were attacked by a Norman infantry detachment.165  
     The Gesta is no better informed about the events on the 18th October than Anna, so we 
only get the basic outline of the events of the day. William’s description lacks certain 
important details, like names and units, along with the description of battle tactics employed 
by the opposing armies. We are not aware of the consistency of the units of both sides, not all 
of the senior commanders are identified, and a description of the terrain is also absent. 
 
                                                
Williams tells us about the initial retreat of certain Norman units, but Anna seems better 
informed when she writes that this was just the Norman flank commanded by Amiketas and 
not the entire Norman army as William noted.166 We are also not informed about retreat of 
the Varangians that led to the collapse of the Byzantine army’s resistance, and William ends 
his narrative with the words: “Alexius was defeated; his own (soldiers) had retreated. More 
than five thousand Greeks had lost their lives in that battle, and, between them, a multitude of 
Turks.”167 
     For the battle of Larissa, apart from the date of the battle which is not given, Anna 
Comnena once again takes us to Alexius’ war council which took place the previous day.168 
We are informed about the leading officers of the army along with Alexius’ stratagem to
deceive the Normans. As for the Byzantine battle lines, Anna only tells us that “they (the 
generals) were instructed to draw up the battle-line according to the principles he himself 
(Alexius) had followed in former engagements.”169 The narrative, however, is even less 
detailed for the Normans than it is for the Byzantines, and before the beginning of the battle 
we know nothing about Bohemond’s battle plans or the consistency his army’s units. The 
 
wter, pp. 146-8. 
, p. 224; Alexiad, IV. vi, p. 210; Sewter, p. 147. 
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description of the actual battle is realistic, but it lacks the crucial information we need 
concerning the battle formations and the tactical movements of the two armies in the field.170 
     Unfortunately, our Latin sources are far less informed about Bohemond’s achievements in 
the Greek mainland between the years 1082 and 1083, and it seems remarkable that the 
events in Kastoria, Arta and Larissa are even mentioned. Malaterra probably chose not refer 
to the turn of events in Greece after the Norman defeat at Larissa. For William of Apulia’s 
2 
                                                
narrative on the battle of Larissa, although once more we do not have any numbers for the 
opposing armies or any estimations for their consistency,171 we are aware of the opposing 
commanders and the Byzantine battle plan during the first day of fighting which led to the 
deception of the Normans and the sack of the Norman camp by Alexius’ units. As for the 
aftermath of this battle, the Gesta examines the main turn of events that led to the Norman 
retreat from the area of Larissa, the reasons why the latter had to retreat along with the cities 
where their officers sought refuge after their defeat in the field.17
     Regarding the actual siege operation against Dyrrachium by the Normans, Anna Comnena 
provides a description of the city’s defences, although the one given in her twelfth book is 
much more detailed and accurate, along with the siege equipment that the besieged army had 
in his disposal.173 However, there are no estimated figures of the size of the army that was to 
defend the city from the Normans nor any comments about the losses inflicted upon them. As 
for the besiegers, Anna refers to the siege equipment that was brought from Italy, mainly 
wooden towers, which “terrified the people of Dyrrachium.”174  
 
170 Although there is a description of Bohemond trying to teach his men the tactic of a 
6; Sewter, p. 172. 
e were a number of Turks at Alexius’ army, see: Gesta, V. 
 p. 188; Sewter, pp. 126, 135. 
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     The siege of Dyrrachium is the only one described by William of Apulia in his Gesta, and 
it is the most detailed we have. Before the beginning of the siege, we are informed of the 
negotiations between George Monomachatos – the governor of Dyrrachium, later replaced 
with George Paleologos – and Robert Guiscard for the surrendering of the city to the 
Normans, a piece of information provided only by William.175 We also have a few comments 
on the city itself, including a short paragraph on its history, while we are told that it was 
do not have an estimate for the size of the besieged army. For Alexius’ troops we only know 
that “they were completely equipped for siege warfare and for fighting in open country” but 
                                                
“very well fortified” and “surrounded mainly by brick walls.”176 William tells us that the city 
was besieged from all sides, while the Norman fleet participated in the attack by blockading 
the city,177 and that also a siege tower was constructed to help with the siege.178 Concerning 
the situation of the besieged population, their reaction to the attack and their defensive 
measures, the Gesta gives a basic outline of what had happened before the Byzantines 
decided to sent a letter to the Emperor pleading for help.179 Much to our disappointment, 
Malaterra’s study of the siege operation consists of only twelve verses of little value 
compared to the Alexiad or the Gesta.180 
     For the siege of the city of Larissa, the whole operation was overshadowed in Anna 
Comnena’s narrative by the battle itself and we know next to nothing about the city’s 
fortifications or the course of the siege apart from the urgent letter dispatched to the Emperor 
from the governor of the city, Leo Cephalas.181 The siege of Kastoria, however, which took 
place after the battle of Larissa, is recorded in the Alexiad in greater detail. Dates for the siege 
and the surrender of the town, which was occupied by Bryennius, are not given and we also 
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Anna does not say if he dismissed any of his units after his victory at Larissa. Also, there is a 
description of the city’s natural defences, along with the siege equipment of the Normans and 
e Byzantines which consisted mainly of catapults and helepoleis.182 In addition to the 
in the following chapter, the 
th
Alexiad, we can conclude from Malaterra’s very brief narrative that Guiscard surrounded and 
attacked the city many times before its surrender, while in the meanwhile he was trying to 
convince the defenders to come to terms. Further, he mentions that Guiscard did not have 
siege machines with him, but he does not tell us what have happened to those who were used 
at Dyrrachium.183  
 
     Here I have examined the three main primary sources of my research strictly from a 
military perspective, reaching significant conclusions about their value for eleventh century 
historiography of warfare. Every medieval chronicler who reported a campaign had the 
tendency of inflating the numbers of soldiers reported for various reasons at a time. William 
and Geoffrey were much better informed about the consistency and size of the Norman army, 
while we have to say the same for the Byzantines and Anna Comnena. However, the vast 
majority of information we get from all three of our sources has to be dealt with cautiously, 
because the giving of numbers in not one of the strong points in their narrative. 
Unfortunately, the absence of relevant record and charter material for this early period of the 
Norman establishment in Italy make it impossible to be more precise about the numbers 
engaged in these military campaigns. As I will analyse 
Catalogus Baronum is the earliest recorded list of fixed quota owed to King Roger of Sicily, 
but this was compiled quite late (1150s-60s) and does not reflect eleventh century reality. As 
for the Byzantine army, the complete lack of charter or archive material, combined with the 
decline of the thematic armies in the eleventh century and the practice of raising mercenaries 
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instead (which I discuss in a subsequent chapter), makes any estimate of the size of the 
Byzantine units deployed at Dyrrachium or Larisa very risky. 
     The same difficulties exist for our chroniclers’ knowledge of the local geography where 
Robert Guiscard’s expeditions took place. None of our sources followed the armies in Illyria 
or Thessaly and, thus, their descriptions of cities and battlegrounds are vague. Few places, 
rivers, plains and the surrounding areas of Dyrrachium and Thessaly are described 
adequately. Modern archaeology has managed to identify a number of the locations 
mentioned in our sources, including Dyrrachium’s fortifications, but there is still much to be 
one as I will point out later in the main chapters of my thesis. The absence of sufficient 
ates is also striking, even though we have to remember that all of our authors were writing 
any years after the events – and in the case of the Alexiad some five decades later. As for 
e description of the two major sieges and battles of Dyrrachium and Larisa, Anna Comnena 
 our best source even though her presentation of the battle tactics used reveals her lack of 
nowledge on military affairs. William’s description lacks certain important details as well, 
ke names and units, along with the analysis of battle tactics employed by the opposing 
rmies, while Geoffrey Malaterra’s account is too short to even be considered.  
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2. Norman military institutions in southern Italy in the eleventh century: problems and 
comparisons 
 
     In studying the Norman infiltration into southern Italy during the first half of the eleventh 
century, along with its remarkable effects on Italian and Sicilian society, we need briefly to 
examine those who migrated from parts of France to Italy as mercenaries, and the factors 
underlying the substantial Norman migration into southern Italy. In so doing, we should also 
note another important issue highlighted by scholars such as Graham Loud.184 Although 
g into the peninsula as 
ormans, it must be asked how ‘Norman’ was the Norman conquest of southern Italy, and 
institutions of pre-Conquest Normandy and Anglo-Norman England in the eleventh century.   
I. ind the Norman descend to Italy 
contemporary chroniclers referred to the bulk of the warriors descendin
N
thus how far can we speak of a distinctive ‘Norman’ form of warfare in the south? And what 
was its relation to military tactics and organization operating in eleventh century Normandy 
and, more widely, in France? Serving as an introduction to a discussion of the military 
organisation of Norman Italy, this chapter attempts to establish a link with the basic military 
 
 The political and social reasons beh  
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     A factor that certainly had encouraged contacts between France and Italy during the first 
quarter of the eleventh century was pilgrimage.185 Italy was the crossing point of every major 
pilgrimage route leading to the Holy Land, with the Normans appearing as pilgrims in two of 
the three quite different versions concerning the coming of the Normans to Italy.186 Amatus 
of Montecassino writes about a group of forty Norman pilgrims who witnessed a Muslim 
attack at Salerno while returning from Jerusalem “before the year 1000” and they were 
recruited by Gaimar IV to help the defenders.187 William of Apulia’s and Lupus 
Protospatharius’ version has a group of Norman pilgrims who met with Melus, a Lombard 
noble, while on pilgrimage on Monte Garganno in 1016, and promised to reinforce the 
latter’s planned Apulian rebellion against the Byzantines.188 In each case, the means to purify 
the soul from sin through pilgrimage had significantly increased the religious and social ties 
between Normandy and Italy since the beginning of the eleventh century. Finally, we have to 
highlight the role of the great religious site of the Sanctuary of Monte Sant’ Angelo sul 
Gargano dedicated to Archangel Michael as the religious link between Jerusalem, Italy and 
Normandy.189 
     Another contributing factor to the Norman migration to the south has been identified as 
the over-population of Normandy.190 The classic example of this period is the sons of 
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Tancred of Hauteville, whose reasons for venturing to Italy are suggested by Amatus of 
Montecassino, Geoffrey Malaterra and Orderic Vitalis. According to Amatus “these people 
[the Normans] had increased to such a number that the fields and orchards were not sufficient 
for producing the necessities of life for so many”,191 while Malaterra adds that “the sons of 
Tancred [Hauteville] noticed that whenever their aging neighbours passed away, their heirs 
would fight amongst themselves for their inheritance resulting in the division of the 
patrimony – which had been intended to fall to the lot of a single heir – into portions that 
were too small. [...] Ultimately, with the guidance of God, they came to Apulia, a province of 
Italy.”192 Orderic Vitalis highlights the same reason through the last speech he puts into the 
mouth of Robert Guiscard a few hours before his death in July 1085: “We were born of poor 
and humble parents and left the barren (sterile) country of the Cotentin and homes which 
could not support us to travel to Rome.”193 All of these accounts underline the fact that the 
division of the family patrimony was a serious issue in eleventh century Normandy and that 
eleventh century.194 In the case of the Hauteville family, we should not be surprised to see the 
departure from Normandy of William, Drogo and Humphrey, and gradually in the following 
r, half-brothers of the former three. 
   
customs of inheritance dashed the aspirations of many younger sons for acquiring a piece of 
land for themselves. The type of “joint” tenure, where the younger sons were given a share of 
the patrimony under the control of their elder brother, which would satisfy the younger 
members of a family and discourage emigration, only became usual towards the end of the 
decades of Robert Guiscard, Mauger and Roge
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     Apart from the issue of inheritance which affected many young Normans, political factors 
played an important role in the decision to leave for Italy. Many who did so were exiles195 – 
) and the minority years of William II. The turbulent 
victims of the ducal wrath due to their military or political opposition to him, although some 
were later pardoned by the duke and reinstated. Others were escaping the bitter conflicts 
between aristocratic families, during the crucial decades for the rise of aristocratic power 
(1035-55) as we will see further down, such as the Tosny and the Beaumont families.  
     But the main driving force behind the expansion of the 1020s-50s to Italy was the political 
and social disturbances in Normandy and many parts of northern France after the break-down 
of Robert II’s regime in 1034, and especially during William II’s minority.196 These dramatic 
years between 1047 and 1057 appear in great contrast to the period of greater stability and 
peace of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries in the duchy, a situation which had 
attracted political exiles from Anjou and Brittany including families like the Taisson or the 
Giroie, who would quickly become leading members of the Norman aristocracy. As Bates 
notes, the dramatic phase of specifically Norman expansion began when the same type of 
territorial fragmentation and reorganisation of family structures became pronounced within 
Norman society itself.197 This point becomes even more significant if we compare the 
chronologies of the main events in Normandy and the “immigration periods” in Italy. There 
seems to be a link between periods of particular disturbance in the duchy of Normandy and 
periods of expansion in Italy. The period of the growing power of Rainulf of Aversa (second 
half of 1030s) and the establishment of the Normans at Melfi (1041) were preceded by the 
troubled reign of Richard III (1034-5
period of the two invasions of Normandy between 1053 and 1057 filled the ranks of the 
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Normans in Italy just before the Calabrian, Apulian and Sicilian expansion in the decade 
between 1054 and 1064. The parallels which exist in this chronology of events in Normandy 
and Italy are more than coincidental.  
     As already noted, one of the fundamental developments of the first half of the eleventh 
to the powerful Bellême family this enabled them to participate in full to the civil 
   
century Norman society was the establishment of a number of families that gradually came to 
dominate the provincial administration of the duchy prior to the English invasion, and who 
also provided the bulk of the Norman aristocratic elite in the newly founded Anglo-Norman 
kingdom. How this came to be is relatively uncertain, but the phenomenon has been the focus 
of a number of recent studies.198 Here, however, we are less concerned with social changes in 
the pre-Conquest Norman society than with evidence of the links existing between families in 
Normandy and Italy in the eleventh century. 
     The first of these is the Norman family of the Tosny which “exported” a member of its 
family to Italy around the mid-eleventh century.199 Raoul Glaber gives us a story of how 
Ralph II fled from the duke’s wrath after having being entrusted with the defence of Tillières 
in the 1010s and reached Italy, only to return back to Normandy after the defeat at Cannae 
(1018).200 Another family that had migrated to Normandy, near Argentan in the southern 
marches, during the last decades of the tenth century, were the Giroie.201 The family 
originally came from Brittany during the reign of Hugh Capet (987-996),202 and being vassals 
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disturbances of the second quarter of the eleventh century, gaining a significant amount of 
lands including Montreuil and Echauffour. Arnold of Echauffour, one of Giroie’s grandsons, 
was deprived of his lands and went to exile in Apulia, in 1060, for a period of three years 
id a visit to Apulia.207 Another 
like William who married one of Guiscard’s daughters but later rebelled and found refuge in 
   
before he was restored.203 William of Montreuil, another famous grandson of Giroie, was 
established in Italy soon after 1050 and he married the daughter of Richard of Capua, 
receiving as dowry the counties of Aquino, Marsia and Campania, while he was also 
pronounced Duke of Gaeta.204 Finally, Giroie’s elder daughter Heremburge was married to a 
certain Walchelin of Pont-Echanfray and their sons, William and Ralph, later joined Robert 
Guiscard’s army fighting in Italy and Sicily.205  
     A family connected to the Giroies by blood was the Grandmesnils, who sent members of 
its lineage not only to Italy but also to the Holy Land, Constantinople and England.206 Robert 
II Grandmesnil became a monk at St-Evroul, in 1050, and nine years later he was elected 
abbot of the monastery. In 1061, due to a serious disagreement with Duke William, he left St-
Evroul to take his case before Pope Nicolas II and he also pa
member of the family that is mentioned to have been to Italy was Arnold of Grandmesnil, 
who is named by Orderic in a list of Normans along with the sons of Hauteville, William of 
Montreuil and three others.208 Other sons and grandsons of Robert acquired secular lordships, 
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Alexius Comnenus’ court, sometime in the 1090s. The latter is mentioned by Orderic Vitalis 
to have taken part at Guiscard’s 1084-5 Illyrian campaign.209  
     Two other Norman families that greatly profited from their descent into Italy from the mid 
eleventh century were the Blossevilles and the Moulins.210 The first were the successors of 
the Ridels as dukes of Gaeta, while the Moulins on the other hand, coming from the Moulins-
la-Marche in the Orne, gave their name to the area of southern Abruzzi, including Venafro, 
Isernia and Boianno, in the 1050s.211 
     Yet if the analysis of the aforementioned families demonstrates the Norman origins or 
background of many of the high profile adventures to Italy, the Italian sources and charter 
evidence also refer to those from other parts of France who had come to Italy along with the 
Normans. Amatus clearly distinguishes the Normans from the French and the Burgundians,212 
while William of Apulia talks about the habit of the Normans in Italy to welcome anyone, 
even someone staying close to them, then instructing him in their customs and teaching him 
their language.213 Four charters from Aversa of the years 1068-73 were issued by men calling 
themselves Francus, or ex genere Francorum, something that marks a clear distinction 
between Normans and Franks,214 while from a study of anthroponyms and cognomina of 
foreigners in eleventh and twelfth century south Italian documents, we can conclude that 
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approximately one in three of the “invaders” were of non-Norman origin.215 More 
specifically, charter evidence collected by Professor Menager reveal the origin of a number of 
non-Norman elements in Italy, between the eleventh and twelfth centuries, of which eleven 
y in the first half of the eleventh century were 
were Angevin, four were central French, three were Burgundian, thirty-one were Breton, two 
were from Champagne and five from Flandres.216 That clearly reveals the significant role that 
Bretons, Flemings and other non-Norman elements played in the conquest of the south. An 
additional research of north French charter evidence, collected by Professor Musset, provides 
ten names for departures to the south, of which five are Norman, three are men from Chartres, 
one comes from Anjou and one from Maine.217  
     A number of very interesting conclusions can be drawn regarding the people who 
infiltrated into southern Italy in the first half of the eleventh century. The reasons behind their 
migration varied accordingly but we can identify four major categories; pilgrimage to 
Jerusalem and other Holy places like Monte-Garganno certainly had influenced a large 
number of people; inheritance issues were also a significant factor in driving people out of 
Normandy, with the younger and poorer knights choosing the life of a brigand and a 
mercenary in exile; others might have been political exiles, but the main reason was 
undoubtedly the political disturbances in Normandy in the 1030s-50s, a period that shaped 
the Norman society of the post-1050s years. These people were primarily Normans but 
modern research has highlighted that between a quarter and a third of them were also French 
from various regions neighbouring Normandy like Anjou, Maine and Brittany and Flemish as 
well. Thus, the immigrants that arrived in Ital
influenced by the forms of lord-vassal relations, and the customs of tenure, military service 
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and inheritance established in Normandy and other parts of France, and it was expected that 
they will attempt to enforce these norms, at least in some degree, in the areas which they 
conquered. In other words, they were about to establish an administrative system based on 
their own experience from back home ex nihilo, that had never been seen in Italy – at least 
south of Spoleto and the Abruzzi 218– before.  
     Here we must briefly refer to the debate amongst modern historians regarding the so-
called Normannitas. R.H.C. Davis raised questions about the nature of the Norman expansion 
and compared the depiction of the Normannitas in works of chroniclers such as Dudo of St-
Quentin, William of Poitiérs, William of Jumièges and Orderic Vitalis.219 He draws a 
distinction between Dudo’s work and that of William of Jumièges, based on the notion of the 
“Frenchness” identified by Dudo and the distinct Danish ancestry highlighted by William. 
sue, D. Bates thinks in terms of fusion of cultures; a 
   
Davis also underlined the unity and indivisibility of Normandy in Dudo’s work and the 
identification of the Normans not as Vikings or French but as people/immigrants who 
belonged to that land – Normandy, a point developed further by Orderic Vitalis who 
established the historical connection between Neustria and Normandy. This general notion of 
the “Frenchness” of the Normans is also supported by D.C. Douglas who considered the 
Norman conquests of the eleventh century to have been made by men who were French in 
their language, culture, religion and political ideas.220  
     In a different approach to this is
Scandinavian character stemming from their ancestral roots filtered with elements from the 
Carolingian character of the land they were settled. He identifies both a tendency for political 
and economic assimilation, but also the clearly demonstrated self-assertiveness and 
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independence of the Norman rulers.221 This view is shared by N. Webber who believes that 
the assimilation of the Scandinavian and Frankish characteristics in Normandy, in relation 
with the adoption of the new ethnonym – gens Normannum – marked the ethnogenesis of a 
new people with distinct identity.222 
     But did the Normans consider their conquests in Italy as “Norman” as those in England? 
What Davis and Bartlett point out is that Norman or English chroniclers of the late eleventh 
and early twelfth century direct their attention to the south and several of them like to “boast” 
about the military achievements of their fellow countrymen. Davis points to the examples of 
William of Malmesbury, Henry of Huntington and especially Orderic Vitalis.223 But is there 
anything to suggest that this notion was reciprocal from the Normans and their chroniclers in 
the south? Several interesting points can be raised regarding the histories of our three 
“Italian” chroniclers; that these newcomers were identified predominantly as Normans, with 
the chroniclers giving their own version of the etymology of the term;224 the fact that the term 
Normans played a unifying role between the different bands of them operating in the south, 
having already encapsulated its cultural identity of the gens Normannorum long before 1016; 
the leaders of the Normans who personified the Normannitas and possessed “great martial 
valour”; several features that are dominant in the “Italian” histories, like the Norman energy 
(strenuitas), courage (corage), boldness (hardiesce) and valour (vaillantize).225 But although 
 is clear that the southern Normans were aware of the deeds of their countrymen and 
ts of the Norman race. The Normannitas could only remain viable in 
aly as a notion of identity and unity in a period of constant territorial expansion, but after 
                                                
it
recognised Normandy as their place of origin, none of them saw the expansion in Italy as part 
of the wider achievemen
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the death of Robert Guiscard and especially during the years of monarchy after 1130, the 
identity of the Normans in the south was redefined, with the Sicilian Kings not showing the 
slightest interest to appear Norman.226 
 
 II.  the eleventh century and their Military institutions in Normandy, France and England in
links to southern Italy 
 
     In this part of my thesis, my intention is not to go into a thorough examination of the 
military institutions of the eleventh century Normandy and England in relation to southern 
Italy, but a summary of key elements will help contextualize what follows concerning the 
structure and composition of Norman armies in Italy and Sicily, the methods by which they 
were raised and their limitations in each operational theatre. 
In the eleventh century and the first decades of the twelfth century Normandy and Anglo-
Norman England, there were two main categories of troops in the service of a senior lord. 
Those who owed service in return for their lands (enfeoffed knights), and those who fought 
for pay, the stipendiaries or mercenaries. The two most important military duties of an 
enfeoffed knight were the duty in the host and castle service. The latter will be analysed in a 
parate chapter, but concerning the host service there were three types of military service in 
Norm  arrière-ban, the service d’host and the service de chevauchée (or 
hevalchia). The mercenaries can be divided into three categories; members of the royal and 
m 
se
andy and France; the
c
baronial households that formed the core corps of every medieval army, the professionals 
hired for a specific campaign or series of military operations who lacked political or social 
ties to those who employed them and clearly fought for profit; and the armies hired fro
neighbouring kingdoms or counties and served the king or lord as allies or vassals.  
 
Stipendiary knights 
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      The core of most medieval armies from Charlemagne to Edward III was the household or 
familia, which can be divided into the royal and the baronial familia.227 Although very rarely 
mentioned in the primary sources, the familiae would have had a key role in the expansion of 
the Norman principalities in southern Italy between the 1040s-70s, while the small numbers 
of the Normans in Sicily before 1072 suggests that it would have been they who would have 
formed the core of the armies that invaded the island since 1061. Malaterra for example refers 
to the role of Robert Guiscard’s household in subduing Calabria in the late 1050s,228 while in 
the same early period we also see Roger Hauteville entering Guiscard’s household along with 
other newly arrived Normans. These troops, sixty according to Malaterra, were sent by 
Robert to Calabria “to make war against many thousands of the enemy.”229 Some 300 iuvenes 
are mentioned after the Norman victory at Castrogiovanni in the summer of 1061 under 
Roger’s orders.230 The same number of knights appears once more in 1063 when Roger 
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returned to Calabria to collect supplies and to distribute lands to his followers before 
returning to Sicily.231 Malaterra also notes that “milites et stipendiarii” garrisoned the cities 
of Troina and Petralia in 1061, after the citizens surrendered their cities to Roger.232 Their 
numbers certainly would not have been great at that early stage; only a hundred and thirty-six 
knights are said to have defeated the Muslims at Cerami in June 1063,233 while another small 
Norman force clashed with a Muslim army at Misilmeri in 1068.234  
     Since the chronicle material does not allow us to draw any solid conclusions about the 
structure of the Italian-Norman noble households, we can only examine the Anglo-Norman 
royal familia by way of analogy; it is likely that many similarities existed between them, 
since the Normans in the south came from the same institutional background as their 
compatriots in Normandy and post-Conquest England. The Anglo-Norman royal familia was 
remarkably heterogeneous in its composition and it included both landless, unenfeoffed 
knights and members of great aristocratic families with large estates that owed their rise to 
their close ties with the king or the great magnates. These milites were, in essence, well-
trained and experienced troops in the personal service of the king or a great magnate, 
travelling with him and acting as a bodyguard, carrying messages, helping maintain law and 
order in his domains and, most importantly, forming a unit of troops that was combat-ready 
anytime of the year at a very short notice. When in service, the household knights would have 
been paid a standard daily wage,235 provided with food and compensated, if neccessary, for 
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the loss of any horses or equipment. An additional income would have been the spoils of any 
military operation. In times of unrest these troops would have been particularly useful, 
could be recruited to service for long periods and they were not subject to any feudal 
Both the mercenaries and the household knights were 
 that 
especially when it comes to the Apulian rebellions in 1067, 1072 and again in 1078. The 
speed in which Robert Guiscard moved from Calabria to Apulia to suppress the 1067 
rebellion seems quite remarkable, if we are to believe Amatus’ comments, and this strongly 
suggests that the Duke had a combat-ready core of troops to besiege Geoffrey of 
Conversano’s stronghold.236 The quick surrender of the latter forced the rest of the 
ringleaders to seek for terms. In 1079 Robert was in Calabria when the city of Bari was 
betrayed to the rebels and again he had to march north with 460 knights, probably those of his 
ducal household along with mercenaries, to re-establish his authority.237  
     The professional mercenaries can be described as a distinct group of elite mounted 
warriors who were hired to serve in a particular campaign or number of campaigns and were 
dismissed after the conclusion of the military operations.238 When called for service they 
were often incorporated into the familia and followed its command structure and regulations. 
The household knights were preferred to their enfeoffed comrades-in-arms because they 
limitations as we will see further down. 
paid from the king’s coffers but it is the way that these sums of money had to be raised
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caused concern, public anger, protests and even rebellions. The main source of mercenaries 
for the Norman counts and their Anglo-Norman successors were the Low Countries and 
Brittany and in many campaigns they would form a large percentage of the Norman or 
English armies in action. For example, William I relied heavily on his mercenaries for his 
Hastings campaign and the establishment of his authority in England immediately after 
that.239 In southern Italy and Sicily, the noble households and the numerous bands of 
mercenaries played the most prominent role in the subjugation of the Byzantine outposts in 
Apulia and Calabria. Sicily also offered some attractive opportunities for stipendiary troops 
and it was probably they, along with household knights, who formed the core of the armies 
that repeatedly invaded the island since 1061, faced the Muslims in three pitched battles in 
the 1060s and manned a number of fortified towns in the north-east of the island. For 
example, we have the number of about 300 knights placed as garrison of Messina in the late 
summer of 1061, while a force of 250 knights under Roger crossed to Sicily, in December 
1061, for a plundering expedition to the south-west and the city of Agrigento – all of them 
                                                
probably stipendiary troops.240 The numerous bands of Norman knights who had found their 
way to Italy before the 1050s can be identified as mercenaries by the fact that they were 
employed by several lords, either Norman, Lombard, Byzantine or German, and because by 
this early stage the enfeoffment of Normans had been limited. A notable exception is the 
Normans of Aversa who owed service as vassals to Gaimar V of Capua-Salerno from 1036 to 
1042.241  
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     We read for the first time in Malaterra about Robert Guiscard’s household while the latter 
was in the first stages of subduing Calabria in 1057 and about the employment of Slavs as 
mercenaries.242 “By giving them gifts and promising them even more in the future he had 
practically transformed them into brothers.”243 – Malaterra’s words reveal the fundamental 
idea behind Robert Guiscard’s hiring of troops; no regular fixed pay would have been offered 
in this early period of expansion but rather numerous promises for future gifts, lands and 
booty.244 Such would have been the main source of (irregular) income for Robert Guiscard 
and Roger, which would have been mainly in cash, along with tribute money and profits from 
diplomacy, such, for example, as the marriage negotiations between Guiscard and 
Constantine Doukas in the 1070s.245 It is therefore no coincidence that a large number of 
knights abandoned Roger after 1064, when the Sicilian theatre of operations was at a 
standstill – there were no opportunities for enrichment and plundering. And we can also 
understand Guiscard’s anxiety for regularly rewarding his followers with large sums of 
money. Referring to the great ransom gained from Peter of Tira, a leading citizen of 
Bisignano, Malaterra noted of the 1057 campaign in Calabria: “After receiving such a large 
amount of money, Guiscard strengthened his men’s fidelity toward him by abundantly 
rewarding them.”246  
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     However, service from vassals and fideles was, indeed, asked when large-scale operations 
were to take place like the sieges of Bari and Palermo and the invasion of Sicily in 1061.247 
The first example of a large-scale mobilization of the southern Italian magnates took place in 
1067/8, just months before the beginning of the siege of Bari. Robert Guiscard needed all the 
troops he could get and it was this demand, along with Byzantine money as we will see in a 
following chapter, that sparked a rebellion by some of his leading magnates (January 1067). 
ccording to Malaterra, an incident that involved Geoffrey of Conversano got out of hand 
when Guiscard demanded military service and Geoffrey argued that he owed him service 
nly for the lands the duke had given him and not for what he had conquered on his own.248 
A
o
Geoffrey of Conversano had arrived in Apulia in the early 1060s, thus not having taken place 
in the Melfi arrangements of 1042 between the “twelve Norman captains”, and in theory he 
should not have disputed Guiscard’s authority as Duke of Apulia and Calabria (styled by 
Pope Nicolas II in 1059) and deny him military service for the lands in southern Apulia 
where he had established himself. 
 
Enfeoffed knights 
 
     The arrière-ban can be seen as one of the most interesting obligations of this period which 
concerned the general levy of all able-bodied freemen to defend their land in a case of an 
emergency, defined by the high-ranking officials like a prince or the king himself. It was not 
considered to be an obligation from a vassal to his lord or a kind of military service 
associated with tenures and fiefs, but it was based on the ancient sense of duty of all men to 
                                                 
247 If we are to believe Amatus’ numbers of 1,000 knights and 1,000 foot, a large amount of 
them should have been enfeoffed knights and their followers from Apulia and Calabria. 
248 Malaterra, 2. 39; Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 133-34; Chalandon, Domination Normande, 
pp. 178-85. 
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defend their nation from a foreign threat.  It also presented a great opportunity for the 
prince to call upon the full military power of his realm, by short-circuiting the feudal 
hierarchy. The term, probably stemming from the Carolingian heriban – a kind of military tax 
– developed after Courtrai to a summon of all fief-holders regardless if they were subjects of 
the king, lay lords or ecclesiastical institutions.
249
250 However, the vagueness of the chronicle 
material does not help us in determining whether the arrière-ban was called many times by 
the Norman dukes, due to the expected aristocratic opposition, and what was the kind of 
emergencies they manufactured. This obligation was further introduced in the Crusader states 
of the Latin East in the period of the First Crusade and its aftermath, at a time when the Latin 
Princes were in a desperate need for able-bodied men.251 For the later Anglo-Norman period, 
the mentioning of the arrière-ban, or of the nomen praelii under which it frequently appears 
in the records, can first be seen in the Bayeux Inquest of 1133.252    
     Concerning the middle ranks of the feudal hierarchy, the service de chevauchée 
(chevalchia) was a more informal type of duty from a vassal to his lord.253 As it is made 
perfectly clear: only those who possessed regalian rights could summon the host, which is the 
fundamental distinction between the chevalchia and the service d’host. The military force 
which was requested at each case was to be of modest size, or even a fraction of the servitium 
debitum, like the one fifth or one tenth as it should have happened in Norman England by 
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William I, with the intention being more localised and limited in extent, like the siege of a 
castle, the pursuit of a fugitive or just the escort of the lord.254 Since the general summons for 
a service d’host could only have been issued by the king himself or by the prince and only for 
king’s banner were theoretically limited to serve only up to the frontiers of the realm, and in 
the case of Normandy they could not proceed outside the Norman frontiers, which meant that 
paign against an invading force or in 
ber of 
an important reason, the service de chevauchée could have been ordered by a lesser lord. In 
this case, the enfeoffed knights were obliged to follow their lord wherever the latter wished 
and for any purpose, bearing in mind however that the time frame must have been quite 
limited in most cases. Although the service does not appear in the Norman records by name 
before 1066, it leaves little doubt that it must have been a significant obligation in post-
Conquest Normandy, appearing in the Inquests of 1133 and 1172.255 If this is the case, and if 
we consider the degree of wide-spread private warfare in the duchy of Normandy, especially 
during William I’s accession and minority years, it is highly likely that the chevalchia would 
have been known in pre-Conquest Normandy as well.   
     The king himself or one of the great princes of the kingdom of France, such as the duke of 
Normandy,256 could officially summon the feudal quotas of their realm, with this military 
obligation of all the tenants-in-chief being identified as service d’host (expeditio).257 In 
comparison to the arrière-ban, the service d’host was more limited in numbers but its purpose 
was not restricted to cases of emergency. However, the enfeoffed knights serving under the 
they could participate only in a defensive royal cam
some disputed marcher area, like i.e. Maine.258 It was after the Conquest that a num
                                                 
254 J. Sanders, Feudal Military Service in England, Oxford University Press, London, 1956, p
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magnates owed over-seas service due to them holding lands in both sides of the Channel.259 
However, this limitation could be overcome at the expense of the suzerain and with a sharp 
reduction in the quotas,260 although there are cases to show that this rule was not so strictly 
enforced.261 Further, there was a time limit to the employment of the baronial servitia debita, 
with the knights being obliged to serve at their own expense in the lord’s host for no more 
                                                
than forty days a year.262 This specific number of days was first mentioned in Italy in 
1095,263 while in Normandy it is found on the Bayeux Inquest of 1133, where it appears as 
the regular period for the service due to the king of France as well as for that owed to the 
duke within the confines of Normandy.264  In the twelfth century Kingdom of Jerusalem, 
however, the service “inside” the kingdom was established by the Haute Cour at one year.265 
     Bearing in mind what we have examined so far about the feudal service, we have to 
examine two known cases that deviated from the aforementioned limitations: William the 
Conqueror’s Hastings campaign and Robert Guiscard’s expedition in Illyria in 1081. But 
before that, we must address a number of the earliest cases of overseas expeditions where the 
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Normans took part. First, we have the Byzantine expedition in Sicily (1038-41) when Gaimar 
V of Salerno, as an Imperial vassal, was asked to furnish troops for the campaign. He chose 
” of knight and ship service. But in what way were the 
magnates persuaded to serve their duke beyond the Channel? The most adequate answer 
                                                
to send the “restless” Normans who had been his vassals since May 1038 under German 
recognition.266 As Malaterra notes, Gaimar saw this “as an opportunity to send away the 
Normans in his service without slighting them. In an effort to encourage the Normans to go, 
he [Gaimar V] made much of the gifts which had been promised to them [Normans] by 
Maniaces [the Byzantine general], enumerating them in his own words, even promising to 
add more of his own.”267 In essence, what Malaterra is referring to is a bargain between the 
Duke of Salerno and his vassal the Count of Aversa, with promises of generous gifts and 
large sums of money being made if the Normans were enticed to serve overseas to Sicily, 
although they were under no formal obligation to do so. 
     Continuing with Hastings, although the chronicler material is scarce concerning William’s 
preparations for this campaign, we are informed from Wace, in his Roman de Rou,268 writing 
about a hundred years after the Conquest, about the war councils William had with the most 
important magnates of his realm. We follow a dialogue between William Fitz Osbern, who 
reminds the rest of the magnates that they owed military service to the duke in return of their 
fiefs, with the latter answering that they were not bound to serve beyond the sea.269 However, 
we need to make it clear at this point that in the pre-Conquest period we cannot talk about 
fixed quotas of the senior magnates who were serving under William II. Later, we find 
William Fitz Osbern suggesting to the duke that each magnate was “willing” to provide at 
least double of what they owed to him, with the Conqueror negotiating with each one of them 
separately for their “contribution
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seems to be that the duke proposed to each of his men a minimum contribution to the English 
campaign, based on each one’s possessions, with the latter being free to contribute more, 
depending on their desire for rewards if the campaign was successful.270 By doing this, 
William would have wanted to assess his strength and decide whether a campaign of such 
importance would have been feasible. William’s army was, in short, an army of stipendiaries 
and fideles; although some among them owed military service to their suzerain, were not 
following him overseas as direct result of that obligation but rather as fellow adventures 
seeking lands, booty and money. 
     Comparing William’s Channel operation with their fellow country-men in the south, in 
1081, Robert Guiscard gathered according to Malaterra a “poorly armed mob” (imbecille 
vulgus),271 while Anna Comnena describes these footsoldiers (Greeks and Lombards) as 
“over age and under age, pitiable objects.”272 Probably, these troops were ducal levies 
conscripted to serve overseas as a result of Guiscard calling for the arrière-ban – although no 
term of this kind appear in the primary sources – to be assembled for his expedition 
overseas.273 But since the lords of the realm had no feudal obligation to serve in Illyria, what 
would have changed their minds? We pressume that a much similar pattern with the 1066 
negotiations must have been followed. Although the chronicler material is silent about any 
formal or informal talks between the Duke and his magnates and the promises, which almost 
certainly would have been made,274 or about any further details concerning the rates of wages 
ke any expedition more 
   
paid to the leading commanders of the Norman army. In order to ma
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lucrative for a greedy medieval nobleman, promises for a number of estates in the conquered 
regions were given.275 Rather later, in the early twelfth century, a fixed sum of money was 
promised to a lord or prince,276 paid either annually or quarterly, with the latter being obliged 
to recruit a fixed number of men and transport them to an agreed place at his own cost, as 
happened with Henry I and Count Robert of Flanders in 1101, a case from where it emerged 
the contract service or the money-fief (fief-rente).277 
     But another question arises that needs to be addressed, albeit briefly. Were the quotas 
owed by the great magnates in pre-Conquest Normandy to their lords definitely fixed or were 
they based on vague arrangements between the two parties? The prevalent view since the 
beginning of the twentieth century was Haskins’ argument that fixed quotas of military 
service were imposed in ducal Normandy before 1050.278 This thesis, however, has been 
challenged due to most recent interpretations of the primary material starting with an article 
written by Marjorie Chibnall279 and works like those of Yver280, Bates281 and Douglas282. 
D.C. Douglas believes that the terminology of the Norman charters of this time is 
                                                 
275 Compare with William’s promises to his troops in the campaign of 1069/70: Orderic 
Vitalis, II, pp. 234-35 
, 
, War 
Ages, p. 93; Mallett, “Mercenaries”, 211-215. 
5; see also: J.H. Round, Feudal England, Swan 
ons du Duche de Normandie”, I Normanni e la loro 
evo, Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi 
276 These were only standardized in the mid-thirteenth century. See: Prestwich, Armies and 
Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp. 84-5; Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 94-5; 
Hollister, Norman England, pp. 211-3. 
277 H. Delbruck, History of the Art of War, vol. III, University of Nebraska Press, London
1990, p. 316; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp. 90-91; Contamine
in the Middle 
278 Haskins, Norman Institutions, pp. 8-1
Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1895; Haskins bases some of his arguments in Round’s 
conclusions. 
279 Chibnall, “Military Service”, 65-77. 
280 J. Yver, “Les Premieres Instituti
espansione in Europa nell’alto medio
sull’alto medioevo, 16, (1969), 334-7, 591. 
281 Bates, Normandy Before 1066. 
282 Douglas, William the Conqueror. 
68 
 
characteristic of an age in which feudal obligations have not yet been fully defined.283 In 
support of this there is an entire analysis of the use of the terms feudum, beneficium, alodium 
ween 1070-87 
and miles which can be found in pre-Conquest and post-Conquest charters.284 It is at least 
arguable, according to Chibnall, that the services owed were either relics of older, 
Carolingian obligations, or the outcome of individual life contracts between different lords 
and their vassals, and that their gradual systematisation was the result of the intense military 
activity of the period of the Conquest.285 
     We have already seen the main reasons behind the descend of the Normans to southern 
Italy and Sicily – reasons that varied from pilgrimage to social unrest in the Duchy, and 
indeed how many of them were coming from other parts of France as well, places 
neighbouring Normandy like Brittany or Anjou. Coming from the same institutional 
background, we would expect that the Normans would introduce to Italy the administrative 
system of pre-Conquest Normandy. What is striking, though, is the absence of any primary or 
charter material from the eleventh century that would confirm this assumption. But from 
whatever information we can get from our primary sources, it is highly likely that stipendiary 
household troops and mercenaries, under the command of Guiscard, Roger and other great 
magnates, played a prominent role in the territorial expansion in Apulia, Calabria and Sicily. 
In addition, military service from vassals and fideles was asked for large-scale operations like 
the siege of Bari and Palermo and the 1081 Illyrian campaign, with institutions like the 
arrière-ban being called – although not clearly identified by our primary sources. A 
significant difference, however, with post-Conquest England of the period bet
– when the entire country was claimed by William by the right of conquest and lands were 
given to great magnates – was the precisely defined and rigidly enforced servitium debitum. 
In eleventh century Norman Italy, just like in pre-Conquest Normandy, the members of the 
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powerful aristocratic families did not regard their holding of lands as a result of any ducal 
grand, thus no specified number of knights was demanded for military service. 
     Well-established feudal quotas did not exist in southern Italy and Sicily before the 
compilation of the famous Catalogus Baronum.286 This was the register of the defence force 
levied during the years from 1150 to 1168 by the Norman Kings of Sicily in the mainland 
provinces of Apulia and Capua in the case of an attack from the north or a rebellion. It notes 
in detail the precise amount of each man’s service owed to the King which had been 
established in a series of provincial courts. The catalogus, however, does not reflect in any 
way the military situation of the Norman state before the 1150s and before that period there is 
no record from where we can firmly establish what sort of military service a suzerain was to 
receive from his knights and their followers. It can be argued that, as it was the case with 
ost-Conquest England, the systematisation of the services owed by vassals to their lords was 
 be a gradual procedure that surpassed the Norman expansion in southern Italy and Sicily in 
e eleventh century. It was to be the firm leadership of Roger II and the external threat by 
o Empires, the German and the Byzantine, in the aftermath of the Second Crusade that 
sulted to the quaternus magne expeditionis, as the catalogus should be referred to more 
ccurately.287  
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3. Castle-service and castle-building in Normandy, England and southern Italy: a contextual 
study 
 
     As an additional chapter to the previous section that deals with the military institutions in 
Normandy, France and England, in this part of my thesis I intend to expand my research into 
g of fortifications in the same period (tenth to early twelfth centuries) in Western 
rban and rural fortifications while focusing on the transition from the 
urgh and curtis” to the motte-and-bailey type. My intention is neither to go into detailed 
the buildin
Europe and in southern Italy and Sicily as well. I will base my research on the examination of 
the several types of u
“b
analysis of the castles and fortifications in Western Europe and Italy in the eleventh century, 
but rather to establish a link between these regions. And that is precisely what the reader will 
find in the second part of this chapter where I analyse the pre-existing fortifications in the 
Italian peninsula and Sicily along with the Norman building activity in the same period. 
               
The establishment of earth-and-timber and stone fortifications in Normandy and England in 
the eleventh century 
   
has 
 
     The period of Norman expansionism in southern Italy coincides with a widespread 
phenomenon that had begun to appear in mainland Europe during that same period. It 
been termed as the encastellation of Europe, which took place between the tenth and the
71 
 
thirteenth centuries and was of cardinal importance for the continent’s political, social and 
military structure.  But even before the introduction of a new castrum in Europe, fortified 
sites did exist since the Roman times, with the characteristic Anglo-Saxon burgh  and the 
Frankish curtis – settlements enclosed by a large ditch, an earth bank and very often 
reinforced with a wooden palisade or a stone wall, often forming the administrative centre of 
royal or baronial estates.  But around the end of the tenth century a new type of fortification 
emerged that would dominate Western Europe until the mid-twelfth. It was significantly 
smaller  and taller and its main building material was earth and timber; it was seignurial 
rather than communal, generally cheaper and involved much less work and it could also be 
defended even by a few dozen soldiers.  But it was clear that these earth-and-timber 
fortifications were inadequate to provide long-term security, mainly because of maintenance 
288
289
290
291
292
reasons. Thus much more secure and impressive structures would come to replace them after 
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the late eleventh century, the keep-and-bailey castles and the tower keeps, two types of 
fortification where the main building material was stone.293 However, there is plenty of 
w type of fortification: 
                                                
documentary evidence to suggest that timber castles continued to be used until the fourteenth 
century.294 
     In England, the greatest period of castle building was during the reign of the Conqueror 
(1066-86), when fortifications were established in a naked land and in great speed. With a 
total number of known mottes and ring works in England numbering 625,295 most of them 
were concentrated in strategic areas like the Welsh marches, the south-east and north-west of 
England.296 A further 36 stone castles were built of which 24 were attached to major urban 
centres.297 In brief, the Norman Conquest resulted in (a) a radically ne
the motte-and-bailey, (b) the introduction of the private castle as a new administrative 
system, and (c) a dramatic increase in the number of fortified places.  
     This great increase in the number of castles build in England in the first period after 
Hastings had to do with the Norman re-use and/or the modification of many pre-existing 
enclosures and fortified sites in England, either from the Saxon or often the Roman times – to 
name Pevensey (Sept. 1066), Dover (Oct. 1066) and Hastings (1066) as three typical 
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examples.298 What is quite striking is that during exactly the same period, meaning roughly 
between the 1060s-80s, the same phenomenon was taking place in southern Italy and Sicily. 
The intense military activity in the Italian peninsula in the previous two centuries, the rise of 
ber castles. Another theory wants the castle 
a great number of fortified rural communities in the late tenth century (incastellamento) and 
the long history of castle building by the Byzantines and the Arabs can explain why the 
“Italian” Normans gladly settled for the occupation or modification of pre-existing fortified 
sites.  
     Crossing into France, the general concept is that castles up to the late eleventh century 
were primarily made of timber and they stayed in use for a long period.299 In Brittany, it is 
almost certain that the building of mottes was established around the beginning of the 
eleventh century, mostly in the south marches, and went on through the twelfth century.300 It 
has also been suggested that the motte-and-bailey castle may be traced to Fulk Nerra of 
Anjou (987-1040) and his son Geoffrey Martel.301 It is very likely that in the southern 
marches of his county, on the borders with Maine and Anjou, that William learned to 
appreciate the significance of these earth-and-tim
to have a Scandinavian origin, being the response to the Frankish defences of the areas in the 
Loire and Seine where the Vikings were frequently raiding.302 Whatever the case, it is certain 
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301 G. Fournier, Le Chateau dans la France Medievale, Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1978, p. 67; 
Renn, Norman Castles in Britain, p. 4; J. Le Patourel, The Norman Empire, Clarendon, 
Oxford, 1976, p. 304; DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, pp. 204, 213-4; B. Bachrach, 
“Fortifications and Military Tactics: Fulk Nerra’s Strongholds circa 1000”, Technology and 
Culture, 20 (1979), 531-49; idem, “The Angevin Strategy of Castle Building in the Reign of 
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that the knowledge in building motte-and-bailey castles spread out from northern France to 
England, Italy and Sicily in the eleventh century. 
     In pre-Conquest Normandy the construction of new fortifications, adding to the existing 
Carolingian, began in the early years of Richard II’s reign (996-1026). Especially during the 
civil wars in Normandy in the 1030s-50s, a period which saw the rise of the new Norman 
aristocracy, the number of ducal or baronial castles rose rapidly, in striking contrast to their 
small numbers before the death of Robert I (1035). By the 1020s powerful ducal castles have 
been build in strategic locations in the duchy, like those of Mortain, Brionne-sur-Risle, 
ecamp, St-Lo, Ivry, Evreux, Eu and Exmes. All of these sites can be traced back to the late 
ninth yed a significant defensive role not only during the 
arolingian period but as early as the late Roman period.303 Richard II added Tillieres-sur-
F
century, while some of them pla
C
Avre, while Breteuil, Ambrieres and Neufmarche were established by William II in this 
developing frontier barrier.304 This list can be supplemented with numerous motte-and-bailey 
castles – twenty-four in total, either ducal or baronial – built in Normandy before 1066 and 
used in the civil conflicts of the period and in the wars against the Count of Anjou.305  
 
Norman fortifications in Apulia  
 
     Historians have identified two types of fortifications in Byzantine Apulia, the enclosed 
306
   
cities (kastra) and a number of smaller fortified sites (kastellia).  And there are also two 
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306 V. Von Falkenhausen, La dominazione bizantina nell’Italia meridionale dal IX all’XI 
secolo, Bari, 1978, pp. 148-9; Martin, La Pouille, pp. 258-70. On the Greek mainland we can
identify three more types: the towers (pyrgoi) that appea
century, the long walls built at 
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periods when renovations of old Roman and Lombard fortifications and the new building of 
kastra and kastellia took place; at the end of the ninth century after the reestablishment of 
Imperial power in the province, and at the beginning of the eleventh century while the Empire 
was expanding north into the Capitanata.  However, the most striking element of the 
Byzantine society in Longobardia was the contradiction between the enclosed urban societies 
of the coastal areas and the undefended rural population of the mainland (chorion).  The 
kastro in Byzantine Longobardia can be described briefly as a large city enclosed by walls 
which was the administrative centre and the seat of the bishop. Ancient cities that evolved 
gradually into sizeable and important administrative centres were Bari, Trani, Taranto, 
Montescaglioso, Cannae and Brindisi.  These cities, however, did not possess any complex 
defensive fortifications but the ordinary stone city walls, which were usually two (muricinum, 
antemurale), a ditch, flanking towers in the city’s gates and quite possibly extra wall defences 
in the city’s port.  In this castle environment the kastra w
307
308
309
310 ere supplemented by the kastellia, 
                                                                                                                                          
secondary smaller kastra that were situated either in a strategic area or usually in the 
surroundings of a major fortified city, like the small towns of Troia,311 Fiorentino, 
Montecorvino,312 Dragonara, Civitate and Melfi313 which were built after the Byzantine 
 
monastery complexes that took the form of enclosures and first appeared in Macedonia and 
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Membranarum, Naples, 1895, n. 18; Martin, La Pouille, pp. 259-60. 
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victory at Cannae in 1018. Next year, a Norman garrison was permanently established at the 
strong strategic fortress of Troia under Byzantine pay.314  
     During the period of Norman expansion in Apulia (1040s-70s), their first action after 
taking over of a fortified site was to build an inner fortification in the town and man it with a 
Norman garrison, like the cases of Troia (from 1080), Bari (from 1075), Melfi, Monte St-
Angelo, Candela, Fiorentino and Montecorvino.315 In addition, throughout the second half of 
the eleventh century the vast open civitates of the Byzantine period were enclosed and the 
smaller fortified sites (kastellia) were modified to castellum, probably by strengthening the 
walls and building a small chateau or a donjon.316 The contrast, however, between the 
building activity in the coastal areas close to Bari, Trani or Brindisi and the rest of the areas 
 the Apulian periphery, like the sensitive border areas with the Capitanata and the Lombard 
princi lace in the Welsh marches during the 
nqueror’s reign.317 In general, there was no significant castle-building activity in the 
 
in
palities is quite striking, exactly as it was taking p
Co
coastal areas, at least in the second half of the eleventh century, but in the same period the 
building of castella in the Apulian periphery multiplied.318  
The Norman fortifications in Sicily and Calabria 
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    What the Normans found in Calabria after 1056 was a very different situation from what 
they were about to face a few years later in Sicily.319 From the most significant ports of 
Calabria like Reggio, Cariati and Rossano only the first was heavily fortified as the capital of 
Calabria, and in Rossano the Normans built a castle only in 1072.320 As for other major 
fortified cities, in the north of the Val di Crati there were Bisignano, Martirano and Cosenza, 
which were paying tribute to Guiscard already by the year 1056,321 the cities of Nicastro and 
Maida which were taken in 1057,322 Oppido,323 St-Martino,324 Mileto, Gerace and Squillace 
(1058-9).325 Unfortunately no details of their size are given by the chroniclers and Malaterra 
is quite vague or even silent when it comes to details about any renovations that might had 
taken place in these cities after the Norman arrival. Also, the prevailing idea amongst 
historians is that the motte-and-bailey type of fortifications became common in mainland 
Italy only at the end of the eleventh century, when castle-building spread more widely in a 
society affected by civil strife, although a small number of fortified sites built by wood can be 
seen as early as the late 1040s.326 
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     The two fortresses that were first established in Calabria by Guiscard’s forces were Scribla 
and St-Marco Argentano. Both were built in the strategically important Val di Crati,327 during 
the first years of Guiscard’s arrival in Italy (1047-8). St-Marco Argentano was built of 
timber,328 not surprisingly though if we consider Guiscard’s economic status at the time and 
the abundance of timber in that particular area of Calabria. These first traces of earth and 
timber fortifications might ressemble the Norman motte-and-bailey type, but as Malaterra 
tells us the Normans eventually abandoned the timber material in favour of the stone, as in 
Cosenza in 1091.329 Scribla on the other hand, should be considered as one of the most 
characteristic samples of Norman castle-building activity in Italy, built in a highly strategic 
place and, quite possibly, on a previous Byzantine defensive site.330 It is one of the earliest 
castles built by the Normans, thus it certainly bears great similarities to the castles of that 
period in Normandy and France. The castle was surrounded by a ditch and a double stone 
wall, and it is believed to have been reinforced by stone flanking towers, although the exact 
dating can be very difficult.331 The stone tower (donjon) of Scribla was square-based and 
dominated the land-platform in the west side of the castle. It had four levels and it served 
both as a defensive site and a residential place.332  
     Conclusively, although Scribla suffered much destruction since the first period of the 
Norman occupation of the site, we are able to distinguish the Norman characteristics of that 
first period and compare them to the various influential elements imported from Sicily during 
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the second period of the occupation of the site after 1064. As in Sicily, but in a much lesser 
degree, the Normans were able to re-use the existing Byzantine fortifications or modify them 
with wooden superstructures. However, archaeological evidence points out that motte-and-
bailey type of fortifications became wide-spread in Calabria only at the end of the eleventh 
century. As for the typical sample of early “Italian-Norman” castle architecture, a 
reconstructed flanking tower and donjon, along with traces of a primitive ditch and a stone 
curtain wall can be found in Scribla which is the earliest Norman castle in the Italian 
peninsula, dating in the mid-eleventh century.     
     What the Normans found in Sicily, after the 1060s, in terms of influence from other 
cultures, was quite unique for what they had dealt so far in Normandy and mainland Italy.333 
Two completely different civilizations, the Byzantines and the Arabs, had left their mark in 
that part of the Mediterranean, both influenced by each other and about to influence the 
Sicilian Normans as well. Historians and archaeologists have come across three main types of 
isolated and naturally defended location, like Castrogiovanni which dominated a strategic 
crossroad of the island from the east to the west.  
                                                
fortified sites for the island of Sicily between the ninth and eleventh centuries.334 First were 
the highly crowded and heavily fortified ports, which also were the most important 
commercial centres of the island, like those of Palermo and Messina, or smaller ones like 
those of Termini, Cefalu, Girgenti and Syracuse. Second there were the well-defended cities 
situated in closed valleys, and if coastal usually in a certain distance from the coast due to 
security reasons,335 like Trapani, Mazara and Rametta. Third we had the castra, built in an 
 
333 For the Sicilian fortifications, see: H. Bresc, “Terre e castelli: le fortificazioni nella Sicilia 
araba e normanna”, Castelli. Storia e archaeologia, ed. R. Comba, A.A. Settia, Torino, 1984, 
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Bresc, “Terre e castelli”, 73-4, 79.  
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960s. 
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     In this last type of castra, we can find a great number of Byzantine highly fortified places 
which had to be overcome by the Arabs during their expansion and settlement in Sicily 
throughout the ninth century. And it was probably these Byzantine castra that served as a 
model for future Arab castle-building in the island. The list is filled with names, either Greek 
w 
environment. Consequently, the building activities of the Normans increased drastically in 
339 340 341 o 
ta (1074),344 Trapani and 
C al di Mazara in the west we find twelve other names of 
   
or Arab, like Castronuovo (831), Caltabellotta and Platani (840), Ragusa (848), Caltavuturo 
(852), Butera (854), Qasr al-Harir (857), Castrogiovanni (859), Noto (864) and Syracuse 
(878), to mention only a few of them.336 During the last quarter of the tenth century (around 
990), the Arab geographer Muqaddasi lists around thirty names of fortified places, either 
newly built or reoccupied,337 while the number of fortified sites rose to around 90 after the 
“incastellamento” of the second half of the tenth century.338  
     Due to lack of sufficient numbers during the Sicilian expansion and to prevent any 
rebellious activities, the Normans inevitably demolished a number of smaller castra, although 
the exact figure would be impossible to estimate. But they were also quick to seize and 
modify either old abandoned or newly conquered ones, mostly by building overstructures 
and/or inner fortifications, something that proves once more their ability to adapt in the ne
the 1060s-70s in places like Messina (1061),  Troina (1062),  Petralia (1066),  Palerm
(1071),342 Mazara and Paterno (1072),343 Mt. Calascibet
astronuovo (1077).345 In the V
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castra, either conquered or newly constructed, which were given to milites by Roger,346 while 
in 1086 Malaterra talks about eleven castra that surrendered after the submission of 
Agrigento.347   
     Due to the repeated use of a number of fortified sites for many centuries, the 
archaeologists cannot confirm the building of any mottes in the island of Sicily.348 However, 
what we can observe in Sicily in the late eleventh century is the lack of need for earth and 
timber in the fortifications, although this would still probably be used in superstructures, and 
the turn to stone instead.349 But apart from the variety of new features that the Normans 
introduced in their “Sicilian” architecture, such as different kinds of ramparts,350 ditches – as 
I will repeat later on, ditches are rarely found in Byzantine fortifications – or baileys,351 the 
Normans were greatly influenced by two categories of castra from previous historical 
periods; the Muslim palace of Calathamet, built during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph Al-
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Hakim (996-1020) in the predominantly Muslim Val di Mazara, and the Byzantine kastro in 
Caronia, in the north-west of the Christian Val Demone.352  
     Finally, we can say that the originality or the success of the Norman administration in 
icily, which was based in western standards and was enriched with Byzantine and Arabic 
lements, was not a direct result of the Norman ingenuity but rather of the ability to adapt in 
e new environment and combine the existing knowledge that the Normans had carried from 
rance with what they found in Sicily for their interest and necessities. An additional proof 
bout this is the establishment of some sort of a “technical school”, or more precisely a corps 
f studiosi magistrati, who were brought to Messina “from all around” in 1082,353 a clear 
ign of the Norman desire to take advantage of the inherited knowledge.  
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4. The Byzantine Army of the tenth and eleventh centuries 
 
     The Byzantine Army has been an institution that was constantly evolving throughout its 
history. A worthy successor to the vast mechanism set up by the Romans, any detailed 
analysis of the structure of the Byzantine Army at any period of its eleven centuries history 
could be the work of a lifetime, let alone a single chapter of a thesis. But what is truly 
remarkable is the degree of adaptability that characterised the Byzantine Army as an 
institution, along with the open minded attitude of its officers and the tactics they applied in 
the battlefields. Certain military manuals like Maurice’s Strategicon, Leo VI’s Tactica, the 
Praecepta Militaria of Nicephoros Phocas, the Taktika of Nicephoros Ouranos and the 
Στρατηγικόν of Cecaumenos offer us a thorough look into the way the Byzantine officers 
were thinking and how they faced their enemies in each operational theatre. Already since the 
eighth century they had set up two distinct but mutually supportive mechanisms, the thematic 
armies which were clearly defensive in their role and whose main objective was to intercept 
and harass any invading army, while the tagmata were the clearly professional units trained to 
deliver the final blow to the enemy on a pitched battle. While presenting the neccessary geo-
political background of the period, the main objective of this chapter will be to present the 
structure and development of these two mechanisms, in so far as this relates to our period, 
while looking at the basic infantry and cavalry formations put to the field by the Byzantine 
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generals. This will provide the neccessary background for an analysis of the Norman 
expeditions against Byzantine provinces in 1081-84 and 1107-8 and to understand the way in 
which the Imperial Army reacted to them. It will also give an idea of the basic changes that 
were taking place in the Byzantine Army’s structure in the decades following the defeat at 
Matzikert (1071).  
     The basic argument is that the army that Alexius deployed against the Normans in 1108 
was different in both structure and make up than that which Romanus IV Diogenes had 
gathered for his Turkish campaigns that culminated in Matzikert. The old thematic and 
tagmatic units, indigenous troops that formed the backbone of the army’s structure for 
centuries were largely replaced by mercenaries, for reasons that will be mentioned but not 
analysed in depth, as this is not the focus of this research. As we will see in detail in the 
following chapters, Alexius Comnenus had to count on the hiring of large bodies of paid 
troops of any ethnic background for long-term military service, like the Varangian Guard 
(largely comprised of Anglo-Saxons after 1081), the German Nemitzoi and several Frankish 
regiments; there were also units from neighbouring client or allied states that were hired for 
ort-term periods, usually a number of campaigns or a single campaigning season, like the 
ich were organised into battalions that ressembled the old tagmatic 
ructure and bore the name of their place of origin, like the Macedonians, the Thessalians 
 
ent of the Themata from the Heraclian to the Macedonian 
sh
Seljucs of Nicaea, the Patzinaks, the Cumans and the Venetians. And finally, there were some 
indigenous troops wh
st
and the Thracians who constituted a large part of Alexius’ armies in 1081 and 1108. Thus, the 
present chapter that introduces the reader into the structure of the pre-Comnenian period has 
to be closely studied with the main chapters of this thesis in order to fully understand the 
fundamental structural differences between the tenth and early twelfth century Byzantine 
Army.  
The establishment and developm
dynasties (610-1025) 
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     By the term themata we mean the peculiar provincial organization, prompted by the 
condition of the times, whose distinguishing feature was the concentration of both military 
and civil authority in the hands of the military governor (strategos – general) of each 
province.354 It was introduced in Asia Minor during the years of Constans II (641-668), 
successor of the great Heraclius (610-641),355 as a response to the Slavic and Persian threat of 
the period. It originally meant the military corps that were stationed in the newly-created 
provinces,356 and it was only later that it came to mean the actual province where the troops 
were stationed.357 The individual parts of this defensive mechanism were two; the native 
soldiers (stratiotai) who were settled into the frontier areas as “farmer-soldiers” in exchange 
for lands from the Imperial demesne.358 They were attached to the lands surrounding a 
specific fort, a military camp or an important town and these lands provided the economic 
means for the maintenance of themselves, their families and their military equipment. And 
the fundamental principle was that these military lands were inalienable and they remained in 
the possession of the same family as hereditary.359 The soldiers were recruited360 by the 
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strategos of the thema and they were obliged to report for duty when their officers sent for 
them, either for defensive or offensive campaigns or for regular training.361 As far as the 
primary sources let us know, there were no geographic limitations concerning their service or 
a time-limit of any kind. Apart from an irregular fixed pay (ρόγα) of a modest size, which 
varied, of course, throughout the centuries,362 they also enjoyed exemption from a number of 
taxes.363 Although the military service for the soldiers was hereditary and non-personal, the 
most significant difference with the western-European knights was the absence of the homage 
and the investiture binding the two parts together. However, the western knight was of much 
higher status than a Byzantine thematic soldier who resembled more to the old Roman 
legionary.  
     For the first one and a half centuries, the themata were introduced only in Asia Minor, but 
as the Empire expanded throughout the ninth century, new themata were created stretching 
the power of the Emperor from Antioch to the Danube and Calabria in Italy. In addition, 
Emperor Theophilus (829-42) introduced the cleisurae around 840, military districts created 
to guard the mountain passes of the Taurus Mountains in Cilicia against the Arabs, usually 
dominated by a small fortress.364 John I (969-976) united the thirty small frontier themes of 
Asia Minor into three ducates (Chaldea, Mesopotamia, Antioch), with each duke’s authority 
being superior to the local generals. With this new command structure John wished to create 
                                                                                                                                           
 For examples of forced conscription: Ahrweiler, “Recherches”, 13; Haldon, Warfare, State 360
and Society, p. 120. 
361 For the military training, see: E. McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare 
nd Armament”, Byzantine Warfare, ed. J. 
 
aldon, Warfare, State and Society, p. 114. 
in the Tenth Century, Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, 1995, pp. 217-222. 
362 The soldiers received pay when they were called for military service outside their 
localities: Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 118-157; The Byzantine Revival: 780-842, 
Stanford, 1988, pp. 349-51; Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 121-23; N. Oikonomides, 
“Middle-Byzantine Provincial Recruits: Salary a
Haldon, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007, 151-166.  
363 Ahrweiler, “Recherches”, 6-8; Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, p. 121. 
364 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 32, 69; Haldon believes that the cleisurae were
established as early as the reign of Heraclius: H
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a protective curtain in the sensitive frontier zones of the Empire in the East and West. 
However, this move seriously affected the in-depth defensive capabilities of the Empire in the 
frontiers, with the strategy becoming more and more localised and able to respond to threats 
of equal status than large field armies.365 Finally, the question of numbers for the themata is a 
ugh one indeed and I wish to avoid going into a detailed examination. As we might expect, 
the nu enturies but the trend of round and even 
umbers was to be found in all the themes of the Empire, at least in theory. Thus, there were 
to
mbers varied significantly throughout the c
n
the small 800-men strong cleisurae in the East, 1,000-men strong smaller themes like 
Nicopolis and Cephalonia, 2,000-men strong themes like Sicily and Hellas to the 10,000-men 
strong Thracesian theme.366 
 
The Tagmata as the elite units of the Army 
 
     Constantine V’s reign (741-775) is marked by one of the greatest military innovations of 
the Byzantine army’s history, the introduction of the tagmata (τάγματα) or regiments.367
368
 The 
fundamental distinction between the old thematic and the new tagmatic units is that the 
soldiers of the themata were “part-time” soldiers, or they represented a kind of peasant militia 
scattered in large numbers in the Byzantine countryside. The soldiers of the tagmata, 
however, were clearly professional, highly trained, experienced and very well equipped and 
paid. As opposed to their thematic counterparts, they were recruited by the themata close to 
the capital and equipped by the state.  Constantine created six tagmata, the three senior of 
which were cavalry regiments named Scholae, Excubitors and Watch. Nicephorus I (802-11) 
                                                 
365 , p. 90.  Haldon, Warfare, State and Society
366 For more on the numbers of the themata: Treadgold, Byzantium and Its Army, pp. 43-86; 
Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 67-106. 
367 The exact date is unknown. 
368 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 179-86; J. Haldon, “The Organisation and Support 
of an Expeditionary Force: Manpower and Logistics in the Middle Byzantine Period”, 
Byzantium at War (9th-12th Century), Εθνικό Ιδρυμα Ερευνών, Athens, 1997, 111-51. 
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created a fourth cavalry tagma, named Hicanati, while John I founded the cavalry tagma of 
the Athanatoi (Immortals) in the early years of his reign. The three junior tagmata were 
infantry regiments, with the Numera and Walls serving as garrison troops for the capital, 
while the Optimates manned the baggage train on a campaign. The commander of each tagma 
was called domesticus (δομέστιχος) who was assisted by a topoteretes (τοποτηρητής), with the 
domesticus of the Scholae appearing as the commander-in-chief of the Imperial army when 
the Emperor was not leading the campaign. 
a Minor respectively. 
had 4,000 troops each and the three infantry tagmata had 2,000 men each, while after the 
men in the Scholae and the Excubitors increased by 2,000, 
   
     During the period of the Epigonoi, but mainly on the second half of the eleventh century, 
additional tagmata were created which are mentioned by contemporary chroniclers; the 
omoethneis (ομοεθνείς), the stratilate (στρατηλάται), the esperioi arithmoi (εσπέριοι αριθμοί), 
the megathymoi (μεγάθυμοι) and the archodopouloi (αρχοντόπουλοι), probably 2,000 men 
strong and stationed in the capital. These tagmata had already started to replace the original 
tagmata after the defeat at Matzikert, a period when we find less and less references to them 
by the contemporary chroniclers.369  
     Before the mid-tenth century the tagmata were stationed in the vicinity of the capital. 
During the reign of Romanus II (959-963), they were divided into eastern and western 
commands.370 This decision was taken after many decades of experience of the western and 
eastern armies in fighting different enemies in the Balkans and Asi
Detachments of the tagmata, however, were also sent to certain key frontier regions, like 
Macedonia and Illyria in the Balkans or Anatolikon and Armeniakon in Asia Minor, a clear 
sign of the Empire’s offensive policy.371 Before Romanus’ reforms the three cavalry tagmata 
reforms the numbers of the cavalry
                                              
369 Ahrweiler, “Recherches”, 28-9; Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 117-8. 
370 Ahrweiler, “Recherches”, 25-6. 
zation in the thematic structure and 371 These tagmatic sub-units formed an autonomous organi
only in campaigning periods they were under the commands of the strategos. See: Ahrweiler, 
“Recherches”, 31-2. 
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with each domesticus of the East and West having 3,000 at his disposal, while the Hicanati, 
Watch, and the Immortals retained their total of 4,000 troops each.372   
     The basic structural unit of both the thematic and tagmatic armies was the bandum of 200 
men, retaining its numbers at least until the mid-tenth century.373 These banda of 200 men 
could easily be combined to form larger units, like the 1,000-men drungus (or taxiarchy) 
commanded by a drungarie (or taxiarch), which also was the minimum number of troops that 
each thema had, and the 4,000-men turma led by a turmarch. Although these numbers kept 
changing throughout the centuries, the basic principle of keeping the structural units of the 
rmy in round numbers remained the same. Another important structural unit, created by Leo 
anding 50 men. 
his seems of little importance, but if we read the Praecepta Militaria of the Emperor 
a
VI in an effort to expand the cavalry, was the office called tribune, comm
T
Nicephorus II, we will notice the use of the cavalry bandum, meaning a 50-men unit as part 
of a 200-men bandum.374  
 
The rise of the landed aristocracy and the subsequent decline of the themata 
 
     Since the period of Leo VI’s reign (886-912), the landed aristocracy of the provinces 
which had appeared in Asia Minor around the mid-eighth century had gathered an immense 
power in its hands. The fact that the backbone of the thematic organisation of the Empire, the 
small-holders, was rapidly being transformed to dependants375 (πάροικοι) of the landed 
                                                 
372 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 64-86, 113-5. 
 between cavalry and infantry from a fifth to a quarter. See: “Praecepta 
 
 
373 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 93-117; “The Army in the Works of Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus”, pp. 77-162; The Byzantine Revival, 780-842, Stanford, 1988, pp. 27-9. 
374 Leo raised the ratio
Militaria”, IV. 1-2, p. 38. 
375 The term dependant (πάροικος) meant the man who either sold or willingly gave his land
to a patron-aristocrat, and in exchange for his freedom, he “escaped” military service and the
paying of state taxes. 
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aristocracy was first recognised as an immediate threat by Romanus I Lecapenus (920-44).  
However, the already established power o
376
f the landed aristocracy and the excessive taxation 
                                                
of the small-holdings which was a great burden for the stratiotai doomed the imperial 
legislation to almost complete failure.377  
     The proof of the rapidly rising power of the families of Anatolia was the two civil wars 
early in Basil II’s reign (976-79, 986-89). The military aristocracy of Asia Minor, taking 
advantage of the Byzantine “Reconquest” which allowed them to greatly expand their lands 
and earn significant reputation, would not have easily given away its privileges to the 
legitimate representative of the Macedonian dynasty. Thus – according to Psellus’ claims – 
Basil targeted the foundations of their power, meaning the control over their lands and 
consequently over the stratiotai as well, along with their important offices in the army and 
provincial administration (i.e. the rebel Bardas Scleros was dux of Mesopotamia).378 He not 
only revived the old legislation set by Romanus I and Constantine VII, but he further 
introduced the allelengyon (αλληλέγγυον), a law that made the “powerful” responsible for the 
paying of the outstanding taxes of the small-holders.379 Further, in order to deal with the 
 
 
istory of Byzantium from the origins to the Twelfth century. The Sources and the 
See: M. Angold, The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204, Longman, London 1997, 
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best 
ment in the last two decades 
376 Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 272-4; Quelques problemes d’histoire de la paysannerie
byzantine, Brussels, 1956; Vasiliev, Byzantine Empire, vol. I, pp. 419-20; P. Lemerle, The 
Agrarian H
Problems, Galway, 1979, pp. 85-115. 
377 The Byzantine tax system was regressive, meaning that the richer you were the less taxes 
you had to pay. 
pp. 88-9. 
378 C. Holmes, “Political Elites in the Reign of Basil II”, Byzantium in the Year 1000, ed. P
Magdalino, Brill, Leiden, 2003, 44-56; in the same volume: J.-C. Cheynet, “Basil II and Asia
Minor”, 76-79. 
379 Angold, The Byzantine Empire, pp. 26-7; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 306-7; 
Vasiliev, Byzantine Empire, vol. I, pp. 422-3; Holmes, “Political Elites”, 35-69; the 
arguments regarding the centralization of the Byzantine govern
of the tenth century can be found in: H. Ahrweiler, “Recherches sur la societé byzantine au 
XIe siècle: nouvelles hierarchies et nouvelles solidarities”, Travaux et Memoires, 6 (1976), 
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rebellious tendencies of the Armies of the East, he introduced the commuting of military 
service to allow him to hire mercenaries.380 This reform, however, was not regularised by the 
government until the mid-eleventh century.381 It has also been suggested that even during the 
reign of Basil II several thematic units in Asia Minor were disbanded due to their poor 
performance, with the Emperor moving towards the “tagmatisation” of the themes.382 The 
timing of the introduction of these measures was not a coincidence, in a period of intense 
uthorities of the provinces under the duke-katepano, who, in 
military activity when Basil desperately needed the money to finance his Bulgarian wars 
which lasted up to the year 1018.  
     During the Epigonoi period, although the imperial power was controlled by the 
bureaucrats of the capital who wished to diminish the power of their antagonists in Asia 
Minor, no measures were taken to reverse the decline of the themata.  Laws like the 
allelegyon and the epibole were revoked by Romanus III Argyros (1028-34)383 and the final 
blow came during the reign of Constantine IX (1042-55) with the introduction of the new 
ministry of epi ton kriseon (επί των κρίσεων) under the office of the judge-praetor 
(πραίτωρ).384 This was the first office to be abolished by Alexius Comnenus in his struggle to 
reunite the civilian and military a
                                                                                                                                           
99-124; and in the same volume: N. Oikonomides, “L’ evolution de l’ organisation 
administrative de l’ empire byzantine au XIe siècle”, 125-52.   
he 
 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 138-9; Haldon, 
ilitary Service”, 28; Lemerle, The Agrarian 
the thematic 
“Belle Epoque or Crisis? (1025-1118)”, C.H.B.E, 598-601. 
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first half of the tenth century. See:
Warfare, State and Society, p. 124; idem, “M
History of Byzantium, pp. 124-5. 
381 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, pp. 144-9. 
382 Cheynet, “Basil II and Asia Minor”, 82-88. 
383 Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 322, 329. 
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turn, would be under the unified command of the ministry – logothesion of the stratiotikon 
(λογοθέσιο του στρατιωτικού).385 
     The collapse of the military institution of the themata was the result of the gradual erosion 
of its foundations, meaning the military lands and the “farmer-soldiers”. On the whole, the 
decrees issued by the Emperors of the tenth century, although can be considered as a 
significant effort to limit the powers of the great landholders of Asia Minor, accomplished 
very little, and even though they should have been strengthened and further enhanced by the 
successors of Basil II, they were abandoned and gradually forgotten. However, we cannot 
solely blame the Emperors of the eleventh century for the failure to act in favour of the small-
holders because, as we saw, the latter’s transformation into dependants had already begun in 
the early tenth century. The change of policy which appeared to originate with the Epigonoi 
was in reality due to a development which was no longer possible to control, with only the 
final words in the “death certificate” of the themata being put by them. Fortunately for the 
                                                
Empire, the tagmatic units seemed to have suffered much less throughout the same period 
because their organization was not based on military lands but they were, as I mentioned 
earlier, paid and equipped by the central government. It was the economic crisis of the second 
half of the eleventh century that affected them more than any row between the Emperors and 
the provincial aristocracy. 
     The administrative-economic system of the pronoia386 can be seen as the innovative 
solution to two of the most pressing problems of Alexius’ reign, the disintegration of the 
 
ikon 
 
 στη μελέτη του βυζαντινού θεσμού της πρόνοιας: οι προνοιάριοι”, 
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army and the collapsing economy. The pronoia was the piece of land handed over from the 
imperial demesne to imperial favourites387 to administer (εις πρόνοιαν), and during the reign 
of the Comneni the grantee of a pronoia had to offer military service to the state in exchange 
for that land. Having inherited an economy with no reserves of money in the Imperial 
Treasury, a debased coinage and a large army of mercenaries from the Balkans and Western 
Europe, the system of distributing pronoiai in return for military service, a system which 
uch resembled western feudalism,388 seemed to be an answer to the pressing needs for more 
oped at 
 great scale. It was after the 1090s that Alexius had the time and the resources to finance the 
m
troops that Alexius was facing. But it only had short-term effects and it was not devel
a
revival of a strong and centralised land and naval armies that would give him the opportunity 
to recover imperial territories in the Asia Minor and the Balkans.  
 
Introduction to the Byzantine Infantry of the Conquest and its basic battle formations  
 
     Before we begin our analyses of the structure and battle tactics of the Byzantine Army of 
the tenth century, we have to underline the fact that our most detailed primary source for this 
task that is also closer, chronologically, to the Comnenian period is the Praecepta Militaria, a 
military manual attributed to the Emperor Nicephoros II Phocas (963-69) that contains useful 
advice based on experience in fighting the Muslims in Syria in the first years of the 
“Reconquest”. However, it is beyond any doubt that the structure, consistency and tactics of 
the Byzantine Army would have evolved during the Epigonoi period, but to what extend we 
cannot be sure. The Praecepta and the rest of the handbooks of the period set rather strict 
guidelines, but they allowed the commander a great deal of discretion in the field. They 
reflect the practice of older and well-established strategies and tactics, along with a number of 
                                                 
387 The pronoiarioi usually came from the lower levels of the provincial aristocracy, contrary 
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989), 5-40; reprinted in State Society in Byzantium. 
to the old stratiotai of the themata who were mere farmers.  
388 For this debate, see: J. Haldon, “The feudalism debate once more: the case of Byzantium”
The Journal of Peasant Studies, 17/1 (1
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innovative ideas put to practice, and the task of the historian is to distinguish between the 
two. As the author of the late tenth century Byzantine treatise On Skirmishing notes: “We 
have acquired this knowledge not simply from hearing about it [from the old military 
manuals] but also from having been taught by a certain amount of experience.”389 
     Another point that has to be mentioned is the consistency of the Imperial Army. When we 
are referring to the Byzantine Empire as a predominately Greek Empire, we are making the 
same mistake as thinking of the 1914 Habsburg Empire as Austrian or the Empire of Queen 
Victoria as British. Thus, one of the major contributing factors to the adaptability of the 
Byzantine Army throughout the centuries was its ability to effectively incorporate several 
nd slingers and a hundred menavlatoi.391 
   
ethnic groups into its ranks. As we will see, numerous peoples like Kurds, Christian Arabs 
(the Khurramites, the Mardaites, and the Maronites of today’s Lebanon), Vlachs, Armenians, 
Bulgars, Slavs, Rus and Illyrians (Albanians) were recruited in the army, either as individuals 
or in larger groups.390 Discipline was the rule among ethnically diverse units of the Byzantine 
army, although exceptions were noted by chroniclers, like the suspicion which many times 
developed to open hatred of the Byzantines for the heretic Paulicians.  
     The Byzantine infantry of the tenth century was divided into heavy and light infantry 
units, with the consistency of an infantry 1,000-men drungus being 400 infantrymen 
(οπλίται), 300 archers (τοξόται), 200 javeliners a
                                              
389 “On Skirmishing”, 13-15, p. 146. 
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“The formation of the infantrymen under discussion is to be a double-ribbed square, thus 
called “a four-sided formation” by the ancients, which has three units on each side so that all 
together there are twelve units on the four sides. In case the cavalry force is quite large and 
the enemy does not bring along a similar number of infantry, twelve intervals should be left 
open. If, on the other hand, the cavalry force is not large and the enemy does bring infantry 
along, eight intervals should be left open.”392 The basic infantry formation was a quadrilateral 
one which had small intervals on each of the four sides, and depending on the numbers of 
cavalry and their ratio with the infantry units, along with other significant factors like the 
terrain and the composition of the enemy’s units, could either form a square – thus having 
two intervals on each side – or a rectangle – with three intervals on the front and two on the 
flanks. Variations depending on the nature of the terrain and the deployment of the troops – 
either broad or narrow front – are also mentioned.393 However, we have to underline the fact 
that this formation is relatively recent in the history of Byzantine warfare. Although square 
and two in the back. Between them are three light archers, so that the depth of the formation 
                                                                                                                                          
formations existed since ancient times, this particular hollow square where the cavalry could 
take refuge and regroup is first mentioned by Nicephoros Phocas and can be attributed – with 
the neccessary caution – to the defensive frontier wars in Cilicia in the second quarter of the 
tenth century under John Curcuas.394 Thus, another sign of Byzantine adaptability to the Arab 
encircling manoeuvres experienced in this period. 
     Nicephoros also uses the term unit (παράταξις), identifying the basic structural unit of the 
drungus. But what was the deployment of each men of a drungus? “The heavy infantrymen 
must be deployed two deep in a double-faced formation, and keep two infantrymen in front 
 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 22 (1998), 38-50; I have not had the chance to look at: 
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is seven men.”395 Thus the οπλίται and the τοξόται stood seven lines deep and a hundred 
across. Acknowledging the fact that the intervals on each side of the square formation 
presented a weak point to the whole square formation, the 200 javeliners and slingers were 
deployed to guard these points, positioned alongside the last two lines of the infantrymen.396 
The remaining 100 menavlatoi, the elite spearmen of the infantry, were to take their place in 
front of the οπλίται, thus raising the depth of the taxiarchy’s formation to eight men.397    
     Thus, what we understand from Nicephoros’ description of the infantry formation is their 
defensive role in the battlefield and the predominance of the cavalry in all major pitched 
battles of the period. Both according to the Tactica and the Praecepta,398 when a mixed 
formation of cavalry and infantry was facing an enemy force in battle, the general should put 
his foot-soldiers at one or two bow-shots distance behind the cavalry, so that his horsemen 
would seek shelter to rest and regroup inside the infantry square formation.399 The role of the 
                                                
infantry, especially in mixed units with cavalry forces, will be further examined and 
compared with the Norman and Frankish deployment when in joint action with their knights, 
as seen in the battles of Hastings (1066), Dyrrachium (1081) and throughout the First 
Crusade. 
     The role of the infantry units of the Byzantine Army, as seen in the Praecepta Militaria 
written in a period of intense military activity and expansionist policy in Asia Minor and the 
Balkans, reflects the need of the Empire for professional soldiers to be deployed alongside 
elite tagmatic cavalry units with discipline, high morale and excellent training being 
paramount. This, however, comes as a sharp contrast to the view of foot soldiers before that 
period. From the establishment of the themata and their stratiotai in the mid-seventh century 
up to the mid-tenth century the Empire was on the defensive against its enemies both in the 
 
396 Ibid., I. 89-94, p. 16. 
395 “Praecepta Militaria”, I. 62-65, p. 16. 
397 Ibid., I. 94-95, pp. 16-18. 
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Balkans and Asia Minor – with only some short breaks – and the nature of the missions 
undertaken by infantry soldiers was mainly the manning of strategic towns, forts and outposts 
and a kind of frontier guerrilla warfare. Thus the notion of the foot-soldiers of the pre-
Conquest period as relatively undisciplined, poorly trained peasant militias whose role in 
warfare was overshadowed by the heavy cavalry – a situation that the generals of the tenth 
century desperately tried to change. We have to bear in mind that the reading of the 
Praecepta and the rest of the military treatises of the period of the “Reconquest”, although 
they provide valuable information about equipment and battle tactics, they may give us a 
false idea about the status of these units and the general strategic role played by foot-soldiers 
in the battlefields of the period of the Epigonoi when we return to somewhat pre-Conquest 
tactics. Although they still played an integral part in the defence of the Empire’s borders, the 
ecline of the themata, the economic crisis in the middle of the century which resulted to 
ent of 
ercenaries – indigenous or foreigners – seriously undermined their overall battlefield 
d
budget cuts, the fiscalization of the military service and the increasing employm
m
effectiveness by the second half of the eleventh century and especially in Alexius Comnenus’ 
1081-83 campaigns as I will examine in detail.400 
 
Introduction into the Byzantine cavalry of the Conquest and its basic battle formations 
 
     In the period of the Tactica and the Praecepta we can say with certainty that the cavalry – 
and especially the elite tagmatic units – dominated the battlefields of the Balkans and Asia 
Minor and their use sometimes overshadowed even the mentioning of any provincial foot-
soldiers from the contemporary primary sources. The three major types of cavalrymen were 
the prokoursatores, the thematic levies and the heavily armed tagmatic troops (kataphraktoi 
or κατάφρακτοι). The prokoursatores was a reconnaissance unit of lightly armed cavalry 
e archers and the rest were lancers. The 
   
numbering 500 men – 110-120 would have been hors
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regular cavalry of the themata was wearing sleeve-less waist-length cuirass or waist-length 
mail shirt – similar to the prokoursatores, along with conic-shaped iron helmets and round, 
oval or kite-shaped wooden shields.401 Although they had swords, it is specifically noted in 
the Praecepta that they either fought as lancers or as mounted archers (with a ratio of 3:2).402 
     The kataphraktoi were by far the most elite unit of the Byzantine army when it comes to 
training, experience and, of course, equipment. Nicephoros’ Praecepta, along with the 
famous graffito of a third century klibanarius from Dura Europos403, gives us a good idea of 
the defensive404 and offensive equipment of a kataphraktos. Each cavalryman was wearing a 
klibanion,405 a short-sleeved, waist-length cuirass of lamellar, supplemented by extra cuirass 
sleeves, while their arms and forearms were protected by thick gauntlets (μανικέλια). Under 
the klibanion there was the zabai (ζάβαι), which usually meant sections of chain mail, or 
plates of leather, supplemented by the kremasmata (κρεμάσματα) which were the skirt-like 
coverings of the area from the waist to the knees.406 Their heads were protected by iron 
bat helmets with additional two or three layers thick zabai. The kataphract’s main com
weapon was the iron mace, while a second weapon was the παραμήριον, a type of single-
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edged curved sword of Avar influence. An extra sword is being described as a σπαθίον (a 
double-edged sword for a hand-to-hand combat carried over the left shoulder).407  
     The numbers of kataphraktoi serving in the Byzantine army must have been low, simply 
because acquiring and maintaining such equipment must have been difficult for the state’s 
budget. For that reason their formations had to be supplemented by mounted archers and 
lancers numbering perhaps even more than half of a single 504-men strong cavalry unit.408 
These elite soldiers had disappeared by the time of the Norman invasion in 1081, because the 
last time the term kataphraktos is mentioned in our sources is the Taktika of Nicephoros 
Ouranos. It seems possible that after the stabilization of the Empire’s frontiers in the 1020s-
30s they may have fallen under strength and stood down in the middle of the century.409  
     The Praecepta give direct instructions concerning the cavalry’s formation.410 The first of 
the total three lines of the cavalry force had three units, two of them consisting of light 
cavalrymen and the middle one of kataphraktoi. The two light cavalry units had a total force 
of 500 men in five lines, with the basic structural unit being the 50-men bandum. These two 
units should have consisted of 300 mounted lancers and 200 archers, in a double-faced 
formation “for a possible attack from the rear.”411 The third unit consisted of the kataphraktoi 
in their triangular formation412 and a full complement of 504 men.413 Supplementing the first 
                                                 
407 “Praecepta Militaria”, III. 53-60, p. 36; J. Howard-Johnston, “Studies in the Organization 
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line of the cavalry formation were the units of the outflankers (υπερκερασταί) and the 
flankguards (αποσοβήται), each having two 50-men banda of both mounted archers and 
ninth century Abbasid tactician called al-Harthami,419 and is a striking reminder of the 
xth century 
   
lancers. Finally, Nicephoros notes that the first line of the cavalry formation should be 
supported by another two lines, at a “bow-shot” distance, consisting of four and three units of 
light cavalry respectively.414 Galloping ahead of the outflankers and flankguards were the 
prokoursatores.  
     But what caused the addition of a third line of cavalry as rearguard in the first half of the 
tenth century and what does that tell us about the adaptability of the Byzantine military 
thinking? Since the late Roman period, as seen through the Strategicon and the Tactica, the 
deployment of a cavalry force in the battlefield was taking place in two parallel lines of three 
and four units respectively.415 It is in the Praecepta that we read for the first time about a 
third line of three units that should be added as a rear-guard to deal with the encircling tactics 
of the Bedouin auxiliaries of the Hamdanid armies (Arabitai),416 which are clearly 
distinguished from the main Muslim body of the Agarenoi (Αγαρηνοί).417  This third line is 
specifically identified with its Arabic name – saqat,418 which is also described by an early 
addition of the second line of cavalry (rear-guard) that we read in the si
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Crusader Warfare, vol. II, pp. 19-193; B.J. Beshir, “Fatimid Military Organization”, Der 
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Strategikon.420 Further, the corps of the prokoursatores is introduced in this period (mid-tenth 
century). This unit is first mentioned by the Byzantine treatise On Skirmishing, attributed 
probably to Nicephoros Phocas’ elder brother Leo and composed sometime between the 965 
and 971, as the unit of the trapezitai or tasinarioi.421 Nicephoros, however, greatly expanded 
his analysis of the use of this unit during a campaign and the fact that this unit is established 
in the middle of the tenth century and its role in the battlefield is very similar to the Bedouin 
nits of the Arab armies is another indication of the Arab influence on the Byzantine armies 
he importance of stratagems, bribery and other “unchivalric” measures for the Byzantine 
u
of the period.    
 
T
strategic thought - How were they employed against the “Franks”? 
 
     In this chapter, a question that is easily raised is what was the difference between the 
military feeling in the East and West, during the period of the Middle Ages, or in other 
words, how did the Byzantine officer view war? The great difference between East and West 
was, indeed, the chivalric ideas of fair and honourable battle that dominated the latter,422 but 
was considered somehow impractical in the East. In brief, the Byzantine officer was a clear 
professional who saw a battle as the chance to achieve his objective using every means 
possible, fair or unfair, chivalric or unchivalric.423 Military manuals like the Strategicon, the 
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Tactica and the Στρατηγικόν of Cecaumenos, all praise the use of several stratagems to 
deceive the enemy and bring back the army with as few casualties as possible, considering it 
absurd to lose experienced soldiers and money to draw a campaign to a violent and uncertain 
end. The Byzantine mentality can be summarized in a small paragraph written by 
Cecaumenos: “If you learn that your enemy’s general is prudent, be aware of his 
machinations and tricks. And yourself think of the same, and not only what old tricks you 
ough tactical offensive did 
have learned and heard of from older people, but think of new ones, because the human 
nature has an innate wisdom as well as craftiness.”424 
     But we must ask ourselves why these manuals praise the use of fraud and deception to win 
a battle? It all comes down to Byzantium’s geographical position and its economic situation! 
The Empire throughout its history was doomed to fighting in two operational theatres, the 
Balkans (including Italy and Sicily) and eastern Asia Minor, and the Emperors had to allocate 
their limited resources in money and manpower in the most effective way, thus very rarely 
being able to afford any “unnecessary” losses! More so if we take into account that the 
State’s agricultural economy was barely able to support the paying of soldiers: “The financial 
system ... is principally concerned with paying the soldiers. Each year, most of the public 
revenues are spent for this purpose.”425 And due to the fact that these manuals were written in 
a period when the Empire was on the defensive struggling to keep or, to put it more vividly, 
to lose as fewer lands as possible in the Balkans and Asia Minor, we can understand the 
Byzantine reluctance to fight a pitched battle unless it was of utmost need. The Strategicon 
was written in the 570s, a period when Spain, Africa and Italy were viciously attacked by 
Visigoths, Berbers and Lombards respectively. More than three centuries later, the 
compilation of the Tactica coincided with Leo VI’s struggle with Symeon of Bulgaria (893-
927) and the Arab advances in Cilicia and Armenia. And alth
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occur, this was only to preserve or retrieve lost grounds and it does not ressemble with 
n a pitched battle. According to Leo:  
 not challenge them in open war, because luck 
lays as a major role as valour in battle.”427 
And only when you know everything about your enemy, only then you must stand and fight 
 applying tricks 
nd machinations and ambushes to humiliate your enemy, and only when it is the last choice 
   Leo VI and Maurice add three “ancient” tricks to apply against an enemy: 
 
                                                
Justinian’s expansionist wars or the period of the “Reconquest”.  
     Let’s proceed to give a detailed account of what a late ninth century officer was advised to 
do instead of engage his enemy o
 
“You should not endanger yourself and your army if it is not of utmost need or if you are not 
to have major gains. Because these people who do this, they greatly ressemble those who 
have been deceived by gold.”426 
 
“It is good if your enemies are harmed either by deception or raids, or by famine; and 
continue to harass them more and more, but do
p
 
     To compare these aforementioned comments with a late eleventh century work (1075-78), 
Cecaumenos writes in his Στρατηγικόν:  
 
“
them, but do not let your army perish for no reason. Fight in such a way by
a
of all, and in the utmost need, only then stand and fight.”428 
 
  
 
, XX. 36. 426 Leo VI, Tactica
427 Ibid., XX. 51. 
428 Cecaumenos, pp. 9-10.  
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“You should fill your enemies with suspicion of treason from within, by sending false letters 
to high officers and making sure that your messengers are intercepted by them.”429 
 
“You should raise discord and suspicion amongst the high-ranking officers of the enemy by 
Some commanders have welcomed embassies from the enemy and replied in gentle and 
oman author 
lavius Vegetius Renatus who wrote the single most important theoretical work on warfare 
For good generals do not attack in open battle where the danger is mutual, but do it always 
                                                
deliberately sparing their houses, lands and villages while pillaging the enemy lands, and also 
send to them letters of friendship.”430 
 
“
flattering terms, sent them on their way with honours, and then immediately followed along 
and attacked them unexpectedly.”431 
 
     All of the aforementioned principles agree with the dictates of the late R
F
available to medieval commanders, between the years 383 and 450, even though we do not 
know if the writings of Vegetius were known to Byzantine commanders or not: 
 
“
from a hidden position, so as to kill or at least terrorize the enemy while their own men are 
unharmed as far as possible.”432 
 
“It is preferable to subdue an enemy by famine, raids and terror, than in battle where fortune 
tends to have more influence than bravery.”433 
 
 
429 Leo VI, Tactica, XX. 29. 
430 Ibid., XX. 22, 161. 
431 Leo VI, Tactica, XX. 24; Strategicon, IX. 1, p. 93; Maniaces applied this trick against 800 
Arabs at Teluch, in 1030: Skylitzes, II, p. 494. 
432 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, III. 9, pp. 83-84. 
433 Ibid., III. 26, p. 116. 
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And for purposes of comparison and to highlight the continuity of these basic principles, it is 
worth mentioning the writings of Sun Zu (c. 500 BC): 
 
“A skilful leader subdues the units of an enemy without offering a battle. He conquers his 
 
ilitary operations.”434 
ing the sword; there are times when he 
chapter of my thesis, my research will be focused solely on the Franks,436 not being carried 
away by the fascinating but very different military tactics employed against the Arabs in Asia 
                                                
[enemy’s] cities without laying siege on them. He conquers his kingdom without long-term
m
 
“A winner will be the general who knows when to fight and when to avoid giving a battle.” 
 
     However, these already “ancient” tricks of bribing the enemies, sending of spies to bring 
back important information on enemy morale and numbers, along with the sending of 
“friendly” letters to the enemy officers would seem rather up-to-date in Alexius’ dealing with 
the Norman invasion of 1107. We read in the Alexiad’s thirteenth book: “The general (I 
think) should not invariably seek victory by draw
should be prepared to use finesse ... and so achieve a complete triumph. So far as we know, a 
general’s supreme task is to win, not merely by force of arms, sometimes, when the chance 
offers itself, an enemy can be beaten by fraud.”435   
     Setting aside the morality of the aforementioned stratagems, in what way were they 
employed against the various enemies of the Empire, and specifically the Franks? What did 
the Byzantines know about their enemies’ tactics and the ways to combat them? The Tactica 
of Emperor Leo VI serve as a key study to the entire military thinking of a Byzantine high-
ranking officer, devoting an entire chapter on how to combat the Byzantine enemies. In this 
 
434 Sun Zu, The Art of War, tr. Lionel Jails, tr. in Greek by K. Georgantas, Greek edition, 
Vanias, Thessaloniki, 1998, III. 6, 17a, pp. 31-32. 
435 Alexiad, XIII. iv, vol. II, pp. 194-5; Sewter, p. 405. 
436 Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 
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Minor. Also, for purposes of comparison, I will point out any similarities between Leo’s 
writings and Maurice’s eleventh book of the “Characteristics and Tactics of Various 
chapter of his Tactica, 
For the study of several national and Roman battle arrays”. We read: 
istricts, and the cutting off of its supplies, 
an to attempt to destroy it at a single blow.438    
                                                
Peoples.”437 
     Three centuries after the compilation of the Strategicon, we have an examination of the 
Frankish warrior of the post-Carolingian period, in Leo’s eighteenth 
“
 
The Franks and the Lombards are bold and daring to excess, they regard the smallest 
movement to the rear as a disgrace. So formidable is their charge with their broadsword, 
lance and shield, that it is best to decline a pitched battle with them till you have put all the 
chances on your side. You should take advantage of their indiscipline and disorder; whether 
fighting on foot or on horseback, they charge in dense, unwieldy masses, which cannot 
manoeuvre, because they have neither organisation nor drill. Nothing succeeds better against 
them than a feigned flight, which draws them into an ambush; for they follow hastily, and 
invariably fall into the snare. They are impatient of hunger and thirst, and after a few days of 
privation they desert their standards and return home as best as they can. Nor are their chiefs 
above the temptation of taking bribes; a moderate sum of money will frustrate one of their 
expeditions. On the whole, therefore, it is easier and less costly to wear out a Frankish army 
by skirmishes, protracted operations in desolate d
th
 
     The Tactica is the most detailed and most recent – to the Norman invasion of 1081 – 
examination of the Frankish military tactics. But even though Maurice describes the infantry 
armies of the early Merovingian period and Leo talks about the Frankish chivalry in the early 
stages of the development of the feudal cavalry, we can find some common features in both 
works. Something that can be easily taken out is the mentioning of the bravery of the 
 
437 Strategicon, XI. 3, pp. 119-20.  
438 Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 80-98. 
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Frankish soldiery, with special attention being paid to the chivalric nobility of the post-
Carolingian era. Maurice calls them daring and impetuous, as if they are the only people in 
the world who are not cowards. However, this courage and stubbornness was to be their 
downfall because both authors strongly encourage the Byzantine general not to confront them 
in a pitched battle but rather resort to guerrilla tactics and stratagems. Leo also placed much 
attention to the Frankish battle-charges with specific mentioning on how undisciplined a 
Frankish attack is, with the Franks attacking in dense cavalry masses that could not 
manoeuvre easily in the battle-field. However, this weakness of the Frankish armies is 
debatable and the fact that they were fighting in one single battle could simply had been 
viewed that way by the observers.439 Also, we know that in Charlemagne’s period the men 
who had joined the royal army coming from the provinces were forming their own 
contingent, so it is quite likely that they also fought in the same formations.440 Finally, 
another element of the Frankish warrior that was again taken out and used against them was 
their “greedy and easily corrupted nature” that would turn the soldiers against their officers, 
                                                
and the officers against their generals and kings.  
     Thus, according to the Tactica, in order to sustain a heavy cavalry attack from the elite 
Frankish chivalry, the best thing was to avoid battle at all costs until all the chances were in 
the general’s favour. If he could not avoid battle, he should use the feigned flight tactics that 
could draw the Franks into an ambush or attack their unprotected flanks. He should take 
advantage of the terrain and the weather conditions and impose a land-blockade that would 
lead to a shortage of food, water and – most importantly – wine, flaring up discontent 
amongst the soldiers. Finally, a Frankish campaign could easily be brought to an end by 
bribing the enemy officers with a “moderate” amount of money. In any case, Leo considers 
the giving of a pitched battle against the Franks as the last and desperate solution that should 
be avoided at all costs. In Italy, the Byzantines followed Leo’s strategy of avoiding battle 
only after the three consecutive defeats of 1041 and the failed Sicilian expedition of 1038-41. 
 
439 J.F. Verbruggen, L’ armee et la strategie de Charlemagne, Dusseldorf, 1965. 
440 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 22-29; Oman, The Art of War, v. I, pp. 84-88. 
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The deeper reasons behind this lies in the fact that Longobardia was a secondary operational 
theatre compared to Asia Minor or the Balkans, and after the 1050s no significant 
reinforcements could be spared to that distant province. Thus, all the Catepans could do was 
to use the heavily fortified Apulian landscape to their favour and deny battle from the 
ormans. 
f the period of the Epigonoi (1025-71) – The battles at Matzikert 
N
 
The geopolitical instability o
(1071) and Kalavrye (1078) 
arge 
north-eastern borders in Asia Minor and were an invaluable source for the Byzantine 
                                                
 
     The death of Basil II marked a turning point in the history of the Byzantine State. After 
the magnificent achievements of the three Emperors of the period of the “Reconquest” (963-
1025), what followed was a period of relative stability and peace which the Empire had 
hardly ever known. Unfortunately, this breathing space was not spent in conservation and 
consolidation, in an attempt to secure and expand what had already been achieved, but it 
resulted in a period of internal relaxation which gradually broke-up the military system that 
had been carefully managed up to Basil’s reign and resulted to significant ground-losses for 
the Empire in all fronts. The questions that will be asked in this section of my thesis are: what 
were the military defeats inflicted to the Byzantine Army in this period in both Asia Minor 
and the Balkans? Was the result of any of these defeats significant enough to destroy a l
part of the Imperial forces and cause any major geo-political changes to take place?         
     But in order to fully understand the collapse of Imperial control in the frontiers of the 
Balkans and in Asia Minor in the mid-eleventh century, we have to examine the principal 
cause that eroded these foundations. The answer to the question is the “buffer states” of 
Bulgaria and Armenia.441 Before the final annexation of the Armenian Kingdom of Ani by 
Constantine IX, these elite Armenian soldiers served as a protective shield for the Empire’s 
 
441 Angold, The Byzantine Empire, pp. 37-44. 
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infantry.442 The same thing was true for the Kingdom of Bulgaria, with the latter being an 
effective “buffer state” between the Imperial lands of Macedonia and Thrace and the areas 
north of the Danube that were dominated by the nomadic tribes of the Patzinaks.443 The latter 
had served the Byzantine Emperors in several occasions, either as vassals or paid mercenaries 
against the Russians in the north or the Hungarians in the west.444 But the subjugation of 
Bulgaria by Basil II in the 1010s, along with the pressure by the Uzes and Cuman Turcoman 
tribes, caused the Patzinaks to cross the Danube in 1047 and invade Imperial territories, while 
the Arabs in the East were replaced by a far more dangerous enemy, the Seljucs. The collapse 
of the Imperial frontiers seemed imminent, mostly because the army and, most importantly, 
the Treasury could not support the demand for soldiers from both theatres of war, let alone 
more distant provinces like Longobardia where the Normans had already began their 
expansion.445 After the 1050s, the increasing pressure in the Empire’s borders both in the 
East and West, combined with the civil wars of the period that diverted large numbers of 
soldiers away from the external threats proved too much.    
                                                
     In the Balkans, the most significant geo-political development was the invasion of 
Imperial territory by the Patzinak tribes in the winter of 1046/47 and a settlement of about 
800,000 of them in areas of Bulgaria and northern Macedonia, roughly between Sofia and 
Nis.446 The fact that the Empire had to accept the settlement of the Patzinaks on Imperial soil 
and employ them as garrison troops and thematic levies reveals its military weakness to 
barricade their way south of the Danube. In the following decade, the Byzantines were twice 
 
442 E. McGeer, “The legal decree of Nicephoros II Phocas concerning Armenian stratiotai”, 
Peace and War in Byzantium, ed. T. Miller, J. Nesbitt, CUA, Washington DC, 1995, 123-37. 
443 De Administrando Imperio, pp. 49ff. 
444 De Administrando Imperio, 2, 4, 5, pp. 49-53. 
445 For the economy and the debasement of the coinage: Angold, The Byzantine Empire, pp. 
81-91; Hendy, Byzantine Monetary Economy; M. Whittow, “The middle Byzantine economy 
(600-1204)”, C.H.B.S, 465-92. 
446 Angold, The Byzantine Empire, pp. 37-40; Vasiliev, Byzantine Empire, pp. 393-6; 
Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 333-4; Our main primary sources are: Skylitzes, II, pp. 
581-605; Zonaras, III, pp. 641-44; Attaleiates, pp. 30ff; Cecaumenus, pp. 22-23. 
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forced to mount large-scale campaigns to “pacify” them, in 1052 and 1059, and in both cases 
the Byzantines were beaten back by the Turkish guerrilla-war tactics and the weather. Thus, 
in order to use these fine mounted archers for its interests, the central government would 
attempt to turn their territories to buffer zones against the Uzes and the Cumans, in 
coordination with several key Byzantine garrisons in the area, and employ them as mercenary 
troops. The Byzantines were up against a much more formidable enemy, the Seljucs, and they 
needed all the help they could get. 
     Crossing over to Asia Minor, although the Seljucs appeared in the eastern borders of the 
Empire around the mid-eleventh century,447 Turkish troops were familiar to the Byzantines 
due to their employment by the Arabs. Certainly the Fatimids of Cairo, the Hamdanids of 
Aleppo and the Abbasids as well – already since the reign of Mu’tasim (833-42) –448 had 
allowed them to infiltrate into their armies, usually as elite corps of slave-soldiers (ghulam 
mamluk), initially forming the ruler’s or general’s personal retinue which eventually came to 
represent the nucleus of Muslim armies.449 The nomadic tribes of the Seljucs, however, first 
appeared on the eastern Byzantine frontiers in the second quarter of the eleventh century and 
on the early 1050s the Turkish pressure on the Armenian lands, recently annexed by 
Byzantium, resulted in the sack of the key city of Kars in the heart-land of Iberia, in 1053.450 
Two years later, the much weakened but spiritually significant Buwayhid Caliphate of 
Baghdad also fell to the Seljucs. Although the Fatimids of Cairo probably posed a more 
serious threat to the Sultan, the latter, in order to protect his northern borders, diverted a large 
number of mounted Turkish nomads (Islamisized Turks of the Oguz tribe) to conduct large-
                                                 
447 For an introductory study, see: D.A. Korobeinikov, “Raiders and Neighbours: The Turks 
(1040-1304)”, C.H.B.E., 692-710. 
448 For Mu’tasim’s important but largely neglected victory upon the Byzantines at Dazimon, 
in 838, with the crucial help of 10,000 Turkish mounted archers, see: W. E. Kaegi, “The 
Contribution of Archery to the Turkish Conquest of Anatolia”, Speculum, 39 (1964), 99-102. 
449 J. Waterson, The Knights of Islam, the Wars of the Mamluks, Greenhill, London, 2007, pp. 
33-53, especially pp. 37-44.  
450 The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, 47-50, 92, pp. 44-6, 76-7.  
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scale raids in the Sultanate’s northern border areas, including Armenia.451 Due to these raids 
the entire Byzantine defence system in the eastern border areas collapsed in just two years 
(1058-9), with the Turkish nomads sacking the key cities of Melitene (1058), Sebasteia 
(1059) and several others in Syria and Mesopotamia throughout the 1060s.  
     A key question is what caused this sudden collapse of the Byzantine defence system in the 
East in just two years?452 It would be wrong to consider the decline of the thematic army that 
manned these key border cities as one of the reasons, mostly due to the fact that this process 
of erosion had been taking place for many decades, and yet the defence of these areas seemed 
to work well enough before the Seljuc invasion, with the area experiencing only minor 
incursions for nearly the last two centuries. Certainly the absence of the Armenian buffer 
state should be thought as one of them, with the Seljuc raids being directed against Byzantine 
territories and not against any other allied state. In addition, Constantine IX’s decision to 
disband the thematic army of the ducate of Iberia in 1053, an army of about 10,000 men, and 
subject the soldiers to tax instead was seen as unprecedented. According to contemporary 
chroniclers like Attaleiates and Skylitzes who were senior officials in the capital it had 
catastrophic consequences for the Empire’s eastern defences,453 while it also enabled 
professional but unreliable troops to take care of the defence of these border areas. In the end, 
the lightly armed but highly mobile Turkish nomads were able to penetrate deep into 
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Byzantine territory by simply by-passing the highly fortified places, with the Imperial forces 
being unable to intercept them due to their poor mobility and leadership.454 
     What Romanus IV Diogenes found in the army when he was pronounced Emperor on 1st 
January 1068 was quite shocking, with the thematic armies having fallen into decay, the 
tagmatic armies having lost a percentage of their strength and with their morale shattered by 
their involvement into this period’s civil wars, while the small mercenary units were certainly 
unable to stand up to the Emperor’s expectations in taking the offensive against the Turks. By 
the winter of 1070/1, the Emperor was preparing for his third and final expedition against the 
Seljucs, in an attempt to re-establish control over lower Armenia and the important Armenian 
fortresses, apparently to block the Turkish invasions bypassing the Taurus Mountains.455  
     The army that the Emperor had gathered in Armenia is quite difficult to estimate in terms 
of numbers, but the chroniclers do give us its consistency. For the mercenary forces, 
Romanus was certainly accompanied by a detachment of the Varangian Guard, although not 
the full contingent of 6,000 men;456 a detachment of Frankish heavy cavalry of unknown size, 
led by the “Latin from Italy” named Crispinus, had been sent to Abydos earlier in the 
campaign;457 a German mercenary battalion serving as the Emperor’s personal guard, called 
Nemitzoi, was also sent to a distant post in the Balkans due to its rebellious acting;458 a 
contingent of Franks under Roussel of Bailleuil, again of unknown size but probably no more 
than a thousand;459 detachments of Patzinaks and Oguz Turks, whose exact number is 
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unknown;460 there was also a unit of Russian mercenaries of unknown size, distinct from the 
Varangian Guard, which is mentioned by an Arab source.461 
     Regarding the indigenous units, they included both tagmatic and thematic troops. Since 
1069, Romanus had called for the five tagmata of the East for training and to fill in their 
ranks with new recruits.462 Theoretically these units should have numbered 12,000 men in 
total, but it is highly unlikely that Romanus was able to bring their numbers back up to their 
original strength.463 In the spring of 1071 Romanus called for further reinforcements from his 
Western tagmatic units, raising the number to an additional 12,000 men.464 Concerning the 
thematic armies of Asia Minor, the primary sources specifically refer to detachments from the 
themata of Armeniakon, Cappadocia, Armenian heavy infantry from Theodosiopolis and the 
thema of Anatolikon (units from Pisidia and Lykaonia are mentioned), while it is almost 
certain that the neighbouring themata of Antioch (Ducate), Chaldea (Ducate), Sebasteia, 
Charsianum and Colonia also contributed troops in the Imperial army.465 Trying to assess the 
exact numbers of these units seems hopeless, with the margin for error being high enough, 
but in theory the numbers for the small themata like Lykaonia were 800 men, while larger 
ones like Armeniakon could have had a contingent of 5,000 men. Further, detachments of 
unknown strength were brought from mainland Greece, specifically from the theme of 
Bulgaria and Macedonia.466 The grand total of mercenaries and indigenous troops that 
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Romanus had brought with him in the early summer of 1071, and by all means this was not 
the full military strength of the Empire considering all the garrison-troops that were left in 
other sensitive border areas like Italy, the Balkans and Syria, can be put to around 40,000 
men, although both the loyalty of the mercenaries and the training and equipment of many of 
the thematic units has to be seriously questioned.  
     The Imperial army seems to have escaped relatively unscathed from the day’s fighting on 
the 26th August 1071, with the political consequences of the defeat at Matzikert being by far 
more significant than the losses in the battlefield.467 The rearguard and reserve units under the 
treacherous command of Andronicus Doukas, consisting probably of some of the eastern 
tagmata along with the contingents of the Patzinaks and the Oguz Turks, certainly escaped 
back to the capital without suffering any casualties. Bryennius’ left wing, which included the 
five western tagmata also escaped with relatively few losses, with these units being found 
defending the Balkans against the Patzinaks the following years. Concerning the units of the 
right wing under Alyates, and especially the Armenian and Cappadocian forces, the sources 
tell us that a significant numbers of them managed to escape in order to Trapezounta, 
Theodosiopolis and Dokeia (an important fortress on the main routes to Constantinople, 
north-east of Amaseia). In addition, no great military figure is mentioned to have died in the 
battle.468 If we add the elite units of Tarchaniotes and Roussel which retreated to Melitene 
before the battle, a significant number of around 20,000 men,469 it seems clear that the actual 
losses incurred during the battle were limited to the Emperor’s immediate retinue, the 
Armenian infantry and the tagmata close to him, a percentage of around 5% – 10% of the 
campaigning army.470 The Matzikert campaign may have been a strategic failure but it was 
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not a tactical disaster as it has been carelessly noted by some contemporary – like Attaleiates 
– and modern historians.    
     The defeat at Matzikert and the civil wars of the early 1070s that followed the usurpation 
of the throne by Michael VII Doukas (1071-78), marked the collapse of the Empire in both 
the East and West. In Italy, Bari fell to the Normans in 1071, while between the years 1072-
77 the Byzantine authority in the Balkans was also seriously shaken. A Bulgarian revolt 
broke out in 1072, which was suppressed with great difficulty by local generals, while in 
1075 Croatia, a vassal state since the times of Basil II, declared its independence and loyalty 
to Rome. This period is also characterised by numerous Patzinak and Hungarian raids that 
spread havoc in the southern and western Balkans respectively. In Asia Minor, the treaty 
agreed between Alp-Arslan and Romanus was abandoned, thus giving the Turks an excuse to 
invade Imperial territories. The severity of the Turkish raids, conducted by various Turkish 
chieftains and concentrating mainly on the north-western Anatolian plateau, along with 
Constantinople’s tactic of eliminating key local landowners responsible for the defence of 
their localities for fear of rebellions, led to the loss of key cities like Doryleum, Ankyra, 
Ikonion, Amaseia and Caesarea upon which lay the control of the entire Anatolian plateau. In 
1078, according to Anna Comnena: “It is true that in this area [Asia Minor] the Empire was 
reduced to its last men. Turkish infiltration had scattered the eastern armies in all directions 
and the Turks were in almost complete control of all the districts between the Black Sea and 
the Hellespont, the Syrian and Aegean waters ....”471    
     Finally, the last major battle before the rise of Alexius Comnenus to the Imperial throne 
was the one that took place at Kalavrye, in 1078.472 In March 1078, the incapable Michael 
VII was forced to abdicate by a representative of the military aristocracy, the old strategos of 
the thema of Anatolikon Nicephoros Botaneiates. The latter, however, was soon challenged 
by the dux of Dyrrachium Nicephoros Bryennius, a general with a glorious military career as 
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dux of Bulgaria since 1074, who marched from his base at Dyrrachium against the capital, 
and established himself at Adrianople, his home city. The Emperor sent the experienced 
Domesticus of the West Alexius Comnenus to suppress the rebellion with all the troops he 
could muster.  
     The rebel general, taking advantage of his office had managed to gather an army of 
mercenaries and indigenous troops from Macedonia, Thessaly and Thrace.473 The three 
divisions drawn by Bryennius for the battle included the right wing under the command of 
Bryennius’ brother John who had a contingent of 5,000 men including Frankish mercenaries, 
Normans from Italy and, according to Anna, the Maniacatoi who had taken part in George 
Maniaces’ Sicilian expedition (1038-41),474 cavalry units from Thessaly and troops from the 
etaireia, the Emperor’s personal guard which consisted of foreign troops.475 It is clear at this 
point that Bryennius had taken full advantage of his position at Dyrrachium to call for 
reinforcements from the other side of the Adriatic. On the left wing Katakalon Tarchaniotes 
commanded some 3,000 troops from Macedonia and Thrace while the centre, consisting of 3-
4,000 men from Macedonia, Thessaly and Thrace, was under the orders of Bryennius 
himself. Further, there was a contingent of Patzinak mercenaries of unknown size situated at 
a mile’s distance from the main rebel army, ready to outflank the Imperial units. Opposing 
this rebel army of about 13,000 men, Alexius had about 2,000 Turkish troops, provided by 
Sulleyman-ibn-Qutlumus who was a vassal of Botaneiates, a few hundred mounted Franks476 
and the cavalry tagma of the Immortals477 numbering around 1,000, both which he 
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commanded in person, and the indigenous troops from Choma (a place close to the river 
Maeander in Phrygia), probably around 2,000 men strong or even less.  
     There are several conclusions that can be drawn from analysing the composition of the 
two armies of 1078. First, it is quite clear that the role of the mercenaries is a key one, with 
Turkish, Patzinak and Frankish troops being employed by both sides and in large numbers. In 
the same time, the role of the indigenous troops is becoming less and less significant. The 
indigenous troops of the east, both thematic and tagmatic, had virtually disappeared with 
Alexius being capable of mustering only a few thousand Phrygians from Choma, considering 
that these troops had been withdrawn to the capital a few years before by Michael VII. 
However, we must also add the factor of time, something that the central government did not 
have in abundance in order to raise extra troops from the remnants of the themata of the East. 
Further, examining the troops that Bryennius had managed to raise, we can see that the major 
provinces of the west, mainly Macedonia, Bulgaria, Dyrrachium and Thessaly had kept their 
numbers more or less intact. Something that draws attention, though, is the absence of the 
tagmata of the west from this battle. Was the latter unable to contact them? Probably, 
although we have to consider that most of the original tagmata, like the Scholae, the 
Excubitors and the Watch, have declined in such a degree after Matzikert that they were less 
and less mentioned by contemporary chroniclers.  
      
The Varangians and Franks in the eleventh century Byzantine Army 
 
     It is common knowledge to everyone who has dealt with the history of the Byzantine 
Empire that non-Greek mercenaries were employed by the Emperors since the times of the 
Late Roman period, depending on the occasional needs of the Imperial army for additional 
high-quality manpower. Narrowing down our analyses to the period of the “Reconquest” 
(963-1025), we have numerous examples of non-Greek troops finding their way to the 
Imperial pay-rolls, not yet termed as μισθοφόροι (the person who receives pay) but rather as 
“allies” (σύμμαχοι) or “foreigners” (εθνικοί). Throughout the aforementioned period, 
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considerable numbers of Rus, Bulgarians, Armenians, Abkhazians and Hungarians joined the 
Imperial forces in Asia Minor or in the Balkans, with the characteristic examples being the 
Arab campaigns of Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimiskes and the Bulgarian wars of Basil 
II. These troops were supplied by countries that were either in cordial relations with 
Constantinople or were depended upon their trading agreements or were simply satellite or 
vassal states. And in order to raise these sizeable enough units, Constantinople had to have 
the permission and active cooperation of their respective lords or overlords. But what was the 
difference between these large units of foreign mercenaries and the Westerners that first 
appeared in the Imperial Court in middle of the eleventh century? 
     Let’s examine the Byzantine expedition in Sicily in 1038, when a contingent of 300 
mounted Normans took part in that campaign, sent by Gaimar of Salerno who was the 
suzerain of the Normans of Aversa and a vassal of the Empire. The case of the Normans fits 
in the already established pattern of the Byzantines employing large units of mercenary 
soldiers to cover their occasional need for troops, a very common practice for the central 
government or for local commanders. However, the Frankish troops that first arrived at 
Constantinople in the mid-eleventh century, although they were receiving a fixed pay (ρόγα – 
σιτηρέσιον) and could easily desert their employers if their reward was not satisfactory 
enough, their main difference was that they were employed as individuals – materialistic 
volunteers who had travelled long-way in search for sufficient pay and the opportunity to 
pillage and destroy, literally matching the term “soldiers of fortune”. Further, the contingents 
of troops provided by the aforementioned states were serving the Emperor for a limited 
number of campaigns, while a large number of Franks served under Imperial generals for 
many decades, either for or against the Emperor. Thus, the 300 Normans of the 1038 
campaign, although they were sent by Gaimar of Salerno who was a vassal of Byzantium, 
they were not their native subjects and they were serving George Maniaces under their own 
leaders, namely William and Drogo Hauteville. A significant number of them are still 
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referred to as “Maniacatoi” by Anna Comnena in 1078,478 serving the rebel Bryennius at the 
battle of Kalavrye.           
     A key date, however, for the mercenary forces in the Byzantine Empire is the year 988 
which marks the arrival of the Scandinavian regiment of the 6,000 Varangians in the 
capital.479 Upon their arrival, the Varangians relieved the Excubitors480 and they were divided 
into the “Varangians of the City” (οι εν τη πόλη Βαράγγοι), who guarded the Emperor and 
escorted him in his tours outside the palace, either within the capital or in his campaigns, and 
the “Varangians outside the City” (οι έξω της πόλεως Βαράγγοι) who were stationed in key 
posts in the provinces.481 Undoubtedly, the Guard would have formed the spearhead of 
Basil’s expansionist policy, from the Syrian expedition of 999482 and the Armenian campaign 
of 1000483 to the bloody and destructive Bulgarian wars that culminated in the Battle of 
Cleidion (1014).484 In addition, they were involved in suppressing the Lombard rebellion in 
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the Catepanate of Longobardia, sent in that distant province in no small numbers between the 
years 1018-19, again in 1038 while they also took part in the abortive Sicilian campaign of 
1025. But this will be thoroughly analysed in a following chapter. 
     In the period of the Epigonoi, a key date concerning the leadership of the Varangian Guard 
was the year 1034, when the younger half-brother of the Norwegian King Olaf II and future 
King Harald III (Hardrada) had made his way to enter the Varangian Guard. From this year 
onwards, our main primary sources for the Varangians consist mainly of numismatic and 
other archaeological evidence, along with Scandinavian sagas which entail the life stories of 
Haraldr Sigurdarson. These, mainly Norwegian and Icelandic, sagas were written down even 
200 years after the events had taken place and they can be quite misleading. According to 
them, Harald and his mercenaries “served on the galleys with the force that went into the 
Grecian Sea.”485 It is quite reasonable for the Empire to have used those much experienced 
mercenaries in policing duties in the Aegean Sea,486 an area that was ravaged by Arab raids in 
the past centuries, even more so if we consider the grand naval strategy that had started taking 
shape, as early as the reign of Romanus III (1028-34), and involved the revival of the 
Imperial Fleet and the expulsion of the Muslims from Sicily.487 However, whether the 
Varangians were used as crews of some sort of privateer ships or they actually manned 
Imperial ships, thus being under the direct command of the Drungarie of the ploimon, is not 
made entirely clear by the sources, although the last case seems much more likely. Further, it 
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is important to note that in this early period Harald was still in command of the “Varangians 
outside of the City”, which probably had its winter quarters in the Thracesion theme.488  
     The campaign that made Harald’s Varangian Guard famous, however, was their 
participation in the 1038 campaign against the Kalbite Muslims of Sicily, under the command 
of the famous George Maniaces.489 In this campaign a contingent of Varangians, probably 
around 500490 under the command of Harald, was sent to Italy to take part in the expulsion of 
the Kalbites, along with units from the Greek mainland and 300 Normans from Aversa.491 
The specific role played by the Varangians in this campaign is rather obscure, although the 
Heimskringla implies that they were used to man the Imperial naval squadron sent to patrol 
the coastline of eastern Sicily. It is also highly likely that they were sent to reduce a number 
of fortified sites in the east and south-east of the island.492 The fact that they manned Imperial 
ships during this campaign is further supported by their role in Apulia between the years 
1066-68, a very similar operational theatre where they patrolled the Apulian coasts and 
defeated a Norman fleet off Brindisi according to contemporary chroniclers. However, it is 
very regrettable that only the Heimskringla, an unreliable saga written centuries later, is our 
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only source concerning the siege-tactics of the Varangians in Sicily.493 These were the 
enforcement of a land-blockade, the digging of tunnels to undermine the city-walls, along 
with other “unchivalric” tricks employed to win over an unidentified castle.   
     The Varangians were further involved in all the major expeditions that took place during 
Constantine IX’s reign, throughout the 1040s and 1050s, in both Asia Minor and the Balkans. 
A force of 3,000 of them participated in the annexation of the Armenian Kingdom of Ani 
(1045),494 while three years later they were called in the Balkans to fight the Patzinak 
penetration south of the Danube.495 In the mid-1050s, a large unit of Varangians and 
Normans was called to defend the Imperial fortresses in Armenia against the Seljuc raids, 
with much success.496 During the civil conflicts after Constantine IX’s death in 1055 we have 
the first case where the rare phenomenon of Varangians facing each other occured. The fact 
that Isaac Comnenus, the leader of the coup d’état against Michael VI (1056-57), had 
employed Varangian troops as well as Normans as it will be seen later on, is attested by 
Psellus who was an eye-witness of the events as the Emperor’s ambassador to his rival.497 It 
is more likely, though, that the Emperor’s units were the “Varangians of the City”, the 
personal guard of Michael, while Isaac must have employed the “Varangians of outside the 
City”, who would have been in the Armeniac theme fighting the Seljucs just before Isaac’s 
coup d’état.498 
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Bari, under the command of Leo Mavrikas, to take the initiative against the Normans in 
Apulia. He succeeded in re-taking Taranto, Brindisi and Castelanetta, with a number of 
Varangians being posted in Brindisi to defend it against the Normans.499 It is quite possible 
that they were not withdrawn from Italy until the Norman siege of Bari in 1068. During the 
course of the siege they were probably used in one of their usual tasks – the naval patrolling 
of the Apulian coasts. Indeed, Lupus Protospatharius and Skylitzes refer to a naval 
engagement off Brindisi, in 1070, where the Byzantine fleet consisting of Varangians 
defeated Robert Guiscard’s inexperienced fleet.500 Also, Cecaumenos clearly distinguishes 
between the infantry units of the Rus, who are identified as κονταράτοι, and the Varangians 
who were πλόιμοι.501 But all of these events will be analysed in detail in a following chapter.  
     Another foreign element that came to dominate the Varangian Guard in the last quarter of 
the eleventh century and gradually replaced the Rus was the English, and by mentioning 
English we mean both Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Danes. The first mentioning of English 
warriors in the Byzantine court by a Byzantine source comes by Anna Comnena when she 
narrates her father’s rebellion against Botaneiates in the spring of 1081. She specifically talks 
about the “Varangians from Thule”, meaning warriors from the British Isles.502 Our second 
primary source for the English migration is Orderic Vitalis who refers to “some of them 
[English] who were still in the flower of their youth travelled into remote lands and bravely 
offered their arms to Alexius, emperor of Constantinople.”503 At another point in his work, 
when examining Robert Guiscard’s invasion of Illyria, in 1081, he talks about Emperor 
                                                 
499 Anon. Bar., s.a. 1066; Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. 183; Gay, L’ Italie 
Meridionale, p. 535.  
500 Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1071; Skylitzes, II, pp. 722-23.  
501 Cecaumenos, p. 30. 
502 Alexiad, II. ix, p. 120; Sewter, p. 95; I do not agree with Blondal who argues that Anna 
uses Thule to refer to Iceland and, probably, Norway. See: Alexiad, VI. xi, p. 312; Sewter, pp. 
205-6; Buckler,  Anna Comnena, p. 438, and compare with Blondal’s argument: S. Blondal, 
“Nabites the Varangian”, Classica et Mediaevalia, 2 (1939), 145-47. 
503 Orderic Vitalis, IV, p. 202.  
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Alexius who “received into his trust the English who had left England after the slaughter of 
King Harold ... and had sailed across the sea to Thrace [Greece]. He openly entrusted his 
principal palace and royal treasures to their care, even making them guards of his own person 
and all his possessions.”504 Here, Orderic implies that the English newcomers clearly 
replaced their Rus counterparts as the Emperor’s personal bodyguard, but we have no idea 
whether they were numerous enough to dominate the “Varangians outside of the City” as 
well. In addition, Geoffrey Malaterra talks, for the first time, about the “Angles – whom they 
[the Byzantines] called Varangians” when describing the opposing forces right before the 
battle of Dyrrachium.505 In addition, Skylitzes refers to the Varangians who took part in Isaac 
Comnenus’ rebellion against Michael VI in 1057, as of clearly Celtic origin (γένος δε 
Κέλτικον οι Βαράγγοι).506 Since there is no case whatsoever that the Varangian guard would 
have had become “English” already since the mid-1050s we presume that the chronicler, who 
writes around the end of the eleventh century, is confused and apparently refers to the post-
1081 composition of the Guard.507 The aforementioned quotes from four contemporary and 
reliable chroniclers, combined with a chrysobull issued by Alexius Comnenus in 1088, where 
the foreign mercenaries serving in the Imperial army were: “Russians, Varangians, 
Kulpingians, English, Franks, Germans, Bulgarians, Saracens, Alans and Abasgians”,508 
drives us to the conclusion that after the first few years of Alexius’ reign the Rus had come to 
be replaced as the dominant element in the Varangian Guard. In addition, the fact that the 
English are listed separately from the Varangians makes us think that it was probably the 
                                                 
504 Ibid., VII, p. 16. 
505 Malaterra, 3. 27; Blondal believes that Malaterra might have been carried away by the 
presence of separate English regiments amongst the, mainly Russian-Norse, Varangian Guard 
at Dyrrachium, but although possible, it seems to me too manufactured. See: Blondal, 
“Nabites the Varangian”, 151-2, 157; The Varangians of Byzantium, p. 21. 
506 Skylitzes, II, p. 613. 
507 Although he would have certainly been aware of the pre-1081 consistency of the Guard, 
being a senior official of the Imperial Army in the capital (Drungarie of the Watch), this 
reference by Skylitzes to the Celtic origin of the Varangians is used only once. 
508 Zachariae a Lingenthal, Jus Graeco-Romanum, v. III, Lipsiae, 1867, p. 373.  
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Anglo-Danes, themselves of Scandinavian origin of course like the Varangians, who had 
infiltrated into the Guard. Thus, the year 1081 must be seen as a terminus ante quem; but do 
we have enough evidence to trace when this immigration to Byzantium begun?  
     Two other chrysobulls issued by Michael VII and Nicephoros Botaneiates, in 1075 and 
1079 respectively, a list which is identical in both chrysobulls,509 do not mention the term 
English. This is also true for all of the eleventh century Byzantine primary sources that cover 
the 1066-81 periods,510 apart from the sole reference of Skylitzes as we have already seen. 
Matthew of Edessa does mention some “inhabitants from distant islands” at Matzikert, but 
this does not constitute enough evidence to verify the existence of distinct English units for 
the 1068-71 periods.511 The year that is thought to be the most luring one to be considered as 
a terminus post quem is the fatal year 1066. However, the fact that they are not mentioned as 
distinct units in the Imperial army until 1081 is probably because the main wave of 
mercenaries did not come before the complete conquest of England by William II, his 
crushing of the local rebellions and the defeat of Denmark’s king Svein Estrithson in the 
spring of 1070.512  
                                                 
509 C. Sathas, Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi, v. I, Venice, 1872, p. 55. 
510 Skylitzes, Cecaumenus, Zonaras, Psellus, Attaleiates, Bryennius and Anna Comnena. 
511 Matthew of Edessa, Chronique, pp. 166-9; see also: Cahen, “La campagne de Matzikert”, 
629; K. Ciggaar, “England and Byzantium on the Eve of the Norman Conquest (The Reign of 
Edward the Confessor)”, Anglo-Norman Studies, 5 (1982), 87-88. I do not agree with Ciggaar 
that Matthew’s comments constitute enough evidence to identify English units at Matzikert.  
512 The predominance of the English in the Guard after 1081 is supported by a number of 
scholars: A.A. Vasiliev, “The opening Stages of the Anglo-Saxon Immigration to Byzantium 
in the Eleventh Century”, Annales De L’Institute Kondakov, 9 (1937), 39-70; J. Shepard, 
“The English and Byzantium: a study of their role in the Byzantine army in the later eleventh 
century”, Traditio, 29 (1973), 53-92; Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, pp. 235-6; 
Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. 76; Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, pp. 166-7; J.W. Birkenmeier, The 
Development of the Komnenian Army, Brill, Leiden, 2002, pp. 64-5; J. Godfrey, “The Defeated 
Anglo-Saxons Take Service with the Eastern Emperor”, Anglo-Norman Studies, 1 (1978), 68-
70. 
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     Another mercenary element of the Byzantine army that came to play a vital role in the 
Empire’s politics in the second half of the eleventh century, the Franks first appear as 
individual mercenaries in the Byzantine service in the year 1047, during the revolt of Leo 
Tornicius. Argyrus, son of the former Lombard rebel Melus and Catepan of Longobardia 
between the years 1042-5,513 is mentioned by Skylitzes and the Anonymous of Bari to have 
been the protagonist of Constantinople’s defence against Tornicius’ forces, with the latter 
writing about a number of “Franks and Greeks” that have counter-attacked the besiegers in 
late September 1047.514 Judging by this statement, we can see that Argyrus’ coming to 
Constantinople in 1046 is highly likely to have been combined with a number of Normans 
from Italy. 
     Like the Varangians, the Franks were most likely used for purposes of defence, manning 
towns in the Armenian borders like Matzikert. After Tornicius’ rebellion they were recalled, 
along with the rest of the eastern tagmata, to the Balkans to repel the Patzinak invasion of 
1049. This time they also had their own leader, Hérve or Ερβέβιος ο Φραγγόπωλος,515 a 
veteran of Maniaces’ Sicilian campaign who commanded the left wing of the Imperial army 
in the battle against the Patzinaks.516 This unit commanded by Hérve is described by 
Skylitzes as the wing of the “Roman phalanx”, consisting of mounted Frankish mercenaries 
who were Hérve’s fellow-countrymen (άρχοντα τω τότε των ομοεθνών). However, if we 
accept the possibility that Hérve’s men were all Franks, their numbers should have been quite 
substantial if they made up a wing of the Imperial army’s battle-line – probably a few 
hundred strong judging by Skylitzes?517 Hérve also possessed the Court titles of magistros 
                                                 
513 Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. I, pp. 165-6. 
514 Skylitzes, II, p. 563; Anon. Bar., s.a. 1047; Psellus, Chronographia, VI. 111-2, pp. 212-3; 
J. Shepard, “The Uses of the Franks in Eleventh-Century Byzantium”, Anglo-Norman 
Studies, 15 (1993), 285-7.  
515 Frankopoulos meant, in Greek, “the son of a Frank”. See: Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 
vol. I, p. 922; E. Van Houts, “Normandy and Byzantium”, Byzantion, 55 (1985), 554-5.  
516 Skylitzes, II, p. 597-605, 616. 
517 Ibid., II, pp. 597-605, 617. 
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and stratelates of the East which put him in charge of, not only Frankish, but Byzantine 
tagmatic units in Asia Minor as well, thus replacing Catacalon Cecaumenos.518 
     The way in which the new Frankish mercenaries were viewed by the Byzantines can be 
seen through the sending of Argyrus back to Bari to recruit more “Italian Normans”. William 
of Apulia writes of Argyrus’ trip to Italy, in 1051, to buy a number of Normans off to 
Byzantine service against the Seljucs by promising large sums of money and many 
presents.519 In addition, we have to mention the embassy sent to Duke William of Normandy, 
around that period, by the Emperor Constantine IX in an official attempt to recruit new 
Normans “right from the source”, although we do not know if the Byzantine ambassadors 
succeeded in their task.520  
     In the 1050s the Franks were to be found in all the major operational theatres of the 
Empire. Skylitzes mentions the presence of Franks, this time they are specifically put on 
horseback, sent to Upper Armenia by Michael VI to fight-back a Seljuc raiding party in 1056, 
again under the command of Hérve.521 This Frankish contingent not only managed to push 
back the Seljucs but, indeed, successfully pursued the retreating Turks, although as we have 
already seen that was a very dangerous battle-tactic. Perhaps they were still unfamiliar with 
the Seljuc battle-tactics! 
     During Isaac Comnenus’ rebellion against Michael VI, “two Frankish battalions and one 
Russian who were spending the winter in these areas [Armeniac thema]” were reported, 
probably after their successful fighting-back of the Seljucs in the previous summer (1056).522 
For these significant events, we have an eye-witness description from Psellus, who was one 
of the ambassadors sent by Michael VI to negotiate with Isaac: “There were Italians, and 
                                                 
518 Shepard, “The Uses of the Franks”, 296-7; for the significance of these Court titles and 
their evolution since the seventh century, see: J.B. Bury, The Imperial Administrative System 
in the Ninth Century, London, 1911, pp. 20-36. 
519 Gesta, II. 55-60, p. 134. 
520 William of Poitiérs, pp. 96-7. 
521 Skylitzes, II, pp. 617-9. 
522 Ibid., II, p. 624. 
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Scyths from the Taurus, men of fearful appearance, dressed in fearful garb, both alike glaring 
fiercely about them. The one [the Franks] made their attacks as their spirit moved them, were 
impetuous and led by impulse, the other [the Varangians] with a mad fury; the former in their 
first onslaught were irresistible, but they quickly lost their ardour; the latter, on the other 
hand, were less impatient, but fought with unsparing devotion and a complete disregard for 
wounds.”523 Again, we see in this description by Psellus the whole theme that dominated the 
Byzantine military manuals, from the Strategicon to the Tactica,524 where the Franks were 
characterised by the tremendous impact of their cavalry charge and their limited stamina.  
     In the late 1040s and the 1050s, the Franks would have been permanently established in 
areas pointed out by the government in order to live off the land. The places where we read of 
them being quartered for the winter in Asia Minor were in the Armeniac thema, while many 
of them should have been stationed in the neighbouring themata of Chaldea and Iberia, along 
with a number of Varangians.525 One valuable source to trace their whereabouts is the 
exemption acts (chrysobulls), granted to landowners or monastic houses from the obligation 
of providing shelter and all the neccessary supplies to the Imperial army’s troops.526 This 
might be considered as an attempt not only to settle down these restless warriors, especially 
in a sensitive frontier area like the north-east Asia Minor, but also to avoid paying by cash in 
                                                 
523 Psellus, Chronographia, VII. 25, p. 289. 
524 Strategicon, XI. 3, pp. 119-20; Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 80-101. 
525 Skylitzes, II, 789, p. 606. 
526 It was an obligation for every citizen of the Empire (even of great monastic houses) to 
supply the Imperial troops with quarters and all the residential necessities. In addition, there 
were special taxes imposed to the local population termed: μιτάτον, φραγγομιτάτον, άπληκτον, 
μεσάπληκτον, φραγγιατικόν. Thus, a great number of exemptions related to Varangians or 
Franks point out their winter quarters and establishments. See: Actes de Lavra, ed. G. 
Rouillard, P. Collomp, Paris, 1937, 1, 28, 80; Sathas, Bibliotheca graeca, 1, 55. For more on 
these sources, see: Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 146-48; G. Ostrogorsky, “Pour 
l’histoire de l’immunite a Byzance”, Byzantion, 28 (1958), 165-254; G. Leveniotes, “Το 
στασιαστικό κίνημα του Νορμανδού Ουρσελίου (Ursel de Bailleuil) στην Μικρά Ασία, 1073-
1076”, unpublished M.Phil. Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, 2004, 
pp. 66ff. 
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a period when the collapse of the economy seemed imminent and the coin had already been 
significantly debased by Constantine IX. 
     The second of the three Frankish commanders to be found in Byzantium in our period of 
research was Robert Crispin. He had followed a rather similar career pattern as Hérve, having 
sailed to Constantinople “to become a noble (chevalerie) at the Emperor’s Court”,527 
probably around the mid-1060s. After his arrival, Attaleiates tells us that Robert was 
immediately sent east to the Frankish camps to spend the winter, probably in 1068/9, along 
with the rest of his followers.528 It is not possible to estimate the number of his troops in this 
early stage, but Matthew of Edessa does mention a strong garrison of 200 Frankish knights at 
Sewawerat, north of Edessa in northern Mesopotamia, defending the castle against a Seljuc 
raid in 1065/66.529 Information from Skylitzes, Attaleiates, Bryennius and Zonaras put this 
number to four hundred, relating the army that Roussel of Bailleuil took over with that which 
Robert Crispin commanded before him.530 After Matzikert, Crispin took part in a campaign 
with his Frankish contingent against the former Emperor Romanus.531  
     The fact that Crispin commanded the Byzantine Army’s left wing in a battle against 
Romanus would have raised great resentment and discontent from the Byzantine generals, 
both against Crispin and the Emperor. And this is duly noted by Cecaumenos in his 
Στρατηγικόν: “The foreigners, if they do not come from the royal family of their land, do not 
raise them in great offices nor trust them with significant titles; because if you honour the 
foreigner with the officium of primikerius or strategos, then what is the point of giving the 
generalship to a Roman? You will turn him [the Roman] into an enemy.”532 The precedent of 
a Frank commanding a large division of the Byzantine army had already been set by Hérve in 
                                                 
527 Amatus, I. 8. 
528 Attaleiates, p. 122; Skylitzes, II, p. 678. 
529 The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, II, 27, pp. 107-8; Matthew also notes the presence of 
a Frank in the garrison of Edessa for the same year: Ibid., II, 28, p. 109. 
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531 Bryennius, p. 135; Psellus, Chronographia, VII. 31-32, pp. 363-4; Attaleiates, pp. 173-4. 
532 Cecaumenos, p. 95. 
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1049. The fundamental distinction, though, between these two cases is that Hérve 
commanded a division of fellow Franks under the command of a Byzantine general-in-
command against foreign invaders (Patzinak invasion of 1049). Crispin, on the other hand, 
participated in civil conflicts, having the full support of an Emperor that the rest of the 
Byzantine generals quite possibly would not have had, and apparently he was the dominant 
figure in Andronicus Doukas’ army in 1072, inspiring admiration not only by his men but 
from Byzantine troops as well.533 
     The most famous of the Franks to have been employed by Constantinople in the second 
half of the eleventh century was Roussel of Bailleuil. He, along with Geoffrey Ridel the later 
Duke of Gaeta since 1068, was Count Roger’s principal lieutenant in his Sicilian campaign. 
The fact that he is no longer mentioned by the “Italian” chroniclers after Cerami suggests 
that, around that period of standstill in the Sicilian theatre of operations, he decided to pursue 
a more profitable career across the Adriatic. Initially, Roussel managed to take advantage of 
the desperation of the local inhabitants of the areas of Lykaonia and Galatia, on the Armeniac 
thema, for protection against the Seljuc raids.534 Bryennius mentions that the locals were 
paying their taxes to Roussel out of a mixture of “fear and good-will”, with their payments 
strangely being made in money.535 His ambitions were clearly high from the beginning of his 
establishment in Imperial territories, but whether from the first he had designs on the Imperial 
throne is uncertain.  
     For the Matzikert campaign, Attaliates informs us of the presence of a Frankish contingent 
under Roussel, probably of around five hundred knights although no numbers are 
provided.536 In the winter of 1073/4 he openly challenged the Doukades in open battle, 
                                                 
533 Attaleiates, pp. 173-4; Psellus, Chronographia, VII. 30, p. 364. 
534 Shepard, “The Uses of the Franks”, 300; A. Simpson, “Three sources of military unrest in 
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defeating Isaakios Comnenus and taking him prisoner,537 while he also managed to capture 
the Caesar John Doukas who was sent with a large army against him. Before being bought off 
by Michael VII and sent back to his estates in the Armeniac thema to defend the Empire’s 
collapsing borders, he had managed to raise John Doukas as a rival claimant to the Imperial 
throne.538  By that time, his estates and thus his power had been greatly increased and he was 
seen as one of the most powerful nobles in north-eastern Asia Minor.539 
                                                
     Roussel found in the face of Alexius Comnenus a cunning and much more formidable 
rival. Alexius was sent in Amaseia (autumn 1075) in the Armeniac thema with a meagre 
force, probably of a few hundred strong,540 to deal with Roussel once and for all. The young 
general resorted to the plundering of Roussel’s estates and the besieging of the principal cities 
under his control, thus denying him his source of revenue while avoiding a pitched battle.541 
Having very few soldiers in his disposal to even consider a battle, his choice of reducing the 
enemy’s strongholds must have been his only option at the time, and although it seemed to 
work for a while, at least according to the Alexiad, the key to victory lay with the Seljucs and 
with the side that would manage to buy them as allies.542  
     Eventually, Roussel was captured by the Turks and handed over to Alexius, with Anna 
Comnena writing about the famous incident with the inhabitants of Amaseia, where the 
 
537 For Roussel’s 1073/4 rebellion, see: Attaleiates, pp. 183ff.; Skylitzes, II, p. 708; Alexiad, I. 
i, pp. 13-4; Sewter, p. 32. 
538 Roussel’s army must have been around 2,700-3,000 men: Attaliates, pp. 183-93; Zonaras, 
III, pp. 709-712; Skylitzes, II, pp. 708-9. 
539 Alexiad, I. i, p. 14; Sewter, p. 32.  
540 Bryennius, p. 185; Simpson, “Three sources of military unrest”, 196. 
541 Alexiad, I. ii, p. 16; Sewter, p. 33.   
542 Anna gives us the letter sent by Alexius to Tutush, the Seljuc chieftain, where we can 
clearly see his ability to act as a diplomat, and indeed a cunning one, with impressive results. 
His understanding of the geopolitical situation in Asia Minor in connection with the interests 
that each party, meaning the Byzantines, the Seljucs and Roussel, had in the region is 
admirable. See: Alexiad, I. ii, pp. 16-7; Sewter, pp. 33-4; See also: Bryennius, pp. 187-9; 
Attaleiates, pp. 199-200. 
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Imperial force had been stationed, rioting and even trying to set the captured Frank free.543 
Was it because the Frankish army provided better protection to the local population than the 
official Byzantine authorities, or maybe because the locals were used in doing business with 
the foreigners? Probably both, if we consider Alexius’ precautionary measure of sweeping off 
the remaining Frankish garrisons from the neighbouring areas before returning to the capital 
with his valuable prisoner, in case of the province falling back to the previous status quo, 
primarily due to the extensive support Roussel had enjoyed in the area from the local 
Byzantine and Armenian element.544 It is significant that Roussel had not confiscated or 
plundered any of the domains of the “wealthy” nobles of the Armeniac thema,545 fearful that 
they would turn against him and call either the Emperor or, even worse, the Seljucs. 
     Undoubtedly, the period of Alexius’ maturing years, meaning the collapsing period of the 
1070s when the latter was a young officer in the service of the Doukas family, must had 
taught him a lot about how to deal with mercenaries, and especially the Westerners. In a 
significant change of tactics towards them, he may have allowed some of them to have their 
own commander after becoming an Emperor, but Constantine Humbertopoulos, a nephew of 
Robert Guiscard, had been living in Byzantium for a long time, and judging from his 
Orthodox-Greek name he was not a newcomer who had raised his own followers in a distant 
Imperial province, but rather a trusted Imperial officer who actively assisted Alexius’ rise to 
the throne.546 Humbertopoulos also took part in the 1081 campaign against Robert Guiscard’s 
siege of Dyrrachium, commanding a “regiment of Franks”.547 
 
     The increasing dependence of the central government of Constantinople on mercenary 
forces can be seen as the response to a combination of factors whose detailed examination is 
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beyond the scope of this chapter. The extensive frontier areas inherited by seven decades of 
expansionist policy had to be manned by all-seasoned, professional and well-trained troops, 
something for which the thematic troops were incapable of doing. Western mercenaries – 
because it was the Franks who were employed on a permanent basis – were the cheapest and 
most efficient solution to a period of economic troubles and coin debasement. Since their first 
appearance outside the walls of Constantinople, in 1047, they were serving the Emperors in 
all operational theatres most of the times by manning castles and strategic towns in Armenia, 
Cilicia and Bulgaria – crucial frontier regions of the Empire. They were predominantly 
cavalry, numbering a few hundreds and since the early 1050s they had their own leaders, with 
the most renowned those of Hérve, Robert Crispin and Roussel of Bailleuil. However, the 
long-established view of them being the main cause for numerous rebellions throughout the 
centuries has been challenged by a recent series of studies.548 Indeed, as we saw in this 
chapter there were Frankish leaders whose ambitions went far beyond that of a faithful 
employee, but if we carefully look at the political context of those rebellions which would 
have included indigenous troops as well, then the situation becomes different. Would any 
rebellions have been mounted if Nicephoros Phocas or Basil II was on the throne? Probably 
not! The Varangian Guard never rebelled against an Emperor since the 980s and were, in fact, 
the most elite unit of the Byzantine Army. These mercenaries filled a crucial gap in the 
Byzantine Army’s battle-field effectiveness, the Franks by providing elite cavalry battalions 
that seemed to gradually replace the tagmatic units of the kataphraktoi, and the Varangians by 
manning strategic towns in Armenia and the Balkans against important enemies of the 
Empire, a task that was assigned – since the seventh century – to the thematic soldiers now 
seriously neglected by the central government.  
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5. The structure and operational role of the Byzantine Navy in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries 
 
     As a maritime power controlling several sea-routes in the eastern Mediterranean, the 
Byzantine Empire needed an effective naval force to dominate the seas and coordinate with 
the land armies in any defensive or expansionist campaign. In the case of southern Italy and 
especially Dyrrachium, the role of the Imperial Navy was crucial in protecting the coasts and 
enforcing an effective naval blockade on the invading Norman army both in 1081 and 
1107/8. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to present the basic structural units of the navy, 
their ships and crews and their fighting tactics and to examine their decline after the end of 
Basil II’s expansionist wars along with the attempts to revive it by Alexius Comnenus in the 
1090s.  
     The structure of the Byzantine navy allowed it to play both a defensive and an offensive 
role, depending on the policy shaped by the central government. The three major units of the 
Imperial navy, established in the early eighth century, consisted of an “Imperial” fleet, an 
elite unit based primarily at Constantinople and commanded by a droungarios tou ploimou 
(δρουγγάριος του πλοίμου); the fleets of the marine themes of the Cibyrreots, Samos and 
Aegean Sea, each under their strategoi; and the provincial fleets of the rest of the coastal 
themes of the Empire, small squadrons that had as their main duty the policing of the coasts 
and major ports, each under a turmarch or an archon (άρχων).   
     The Imperial Fleet was established in the aftermath of the first Arab siege of 
Constantinople (674-8) and played a very similar role to the tagmatic units of the Army ever 
since. Its units were responsible for the defence of the coastal areas neighbouring the capital 
as well as for its port and maritime traffic; for the policing and monitoring of the traffic in the 
major maritime routes of the Empire; for providing assistance to the provincial fleets of the 
non-maritime coastal themes; for the neutralization of enemy corsair activity; for providing 
transportation for the land armies in large-scale campaigns and undertaking naval expeditions 
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against enemy naval bases.549 Like the tagmata, the Imperial Fleet was built and equipped in 
the capital and also had the same structure with them,550 and by the early tenth century it had 
4,000 marines and 19,600 oarsmen.551 The themes of the Cibyrreots (est. 674 – renamed in 
727), Aegean Sea (est. around 843) and Samos (est. during Basil I’s reign) were the only 
clearly maritime themes (θέματα πλόιμα or πλοϊμόθεμα).552 They were built and equipped in 
the theme itself, with their numbers varying between 600-1,000 marines and 4,000-6,000 
oarsmen.553 The operational roles that the units of the thematic navy were to undertake were 
clearly for the defence and policing of the coastal areas and ports under their jurisdiction; to 
keep the sea-routes safe for navigation, neutralise whatever corsair activity in their patrolling 
area and secure and control the trading activities in all the major ports of the thema. 
     These coastal themata that were never upgraded to the level of a maritime one were the 
themata of Hellas (689), Peloponnesus (800s), Cephalonia (800s), Thessaloniki (before 836), 
Nicopolis (before 845), Dyrrachium (before 845) and Longobardia (902),554 with about 2,000 
                                                 
549 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, pp. 46-7; C. Papasotiriou, Βυζαντινή Υψηλή Στρατηγική, 6ος-
11ος αιώνας, Ποιότητα, Athens, 2001, pp. 199-202. 
550 Leo VI, Tactica, XIX. 23. 
551 De Administrando Imperio, 51/90-92, p. 250; Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, Appendix I, 
p. 403; Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, p. 76 and especially Table 2 on p. 67. 
552 These terms appear in: De Ceremoniis, pp. 656, 662, 668. 
553 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, p. 76; Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, Appendix I, pp. 
397-407. 
554 In the parentheses I have put the date of their establishments as themata or, for the case of 
Dyrrachium and Nicopolis, their mentioning in the Taktikon Uspenskij (845-56). See: G. 
Ostrogorsky, Taktikon Uspenskij und Taktikon Benesevic, Zur Frage ihrer Entstehungszeit, 
Zbornik radova, v. II, 1953; Ferluga dates the establishment of the theme of Dyrrachium as 
early as the 820s, and probably even before the 815, based on letters from Theodore the 
Stoudites:  J. Ferluga, “Sur la Date de la Creation du Thème de Dyrrachium”, Byzantium on 
the Balkans, Studies on the Byzantine Administration and the Southern Slavs from the VIIth 
to the XIIth Centuries, Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1976, pp. 215-24; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, 
pp. 210-217; Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, pp. 71-92. 
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men each.555 The non-maritime coastal themata possessed their own naval squadrons for the 
security of their coasts, ports and maritime commerce, thus being a flotilla of rather light 
ships not suitable for open-sea expeditions. These ships were built in Constantinople and 
controlled by the central government. The crews of the provincial fleet were recruited from 
all the parts of the Empire, mainly though from the coastal areas of the Aegean and southern 
Asia Minor. Further, they were equipped and paid by the central government.556 Apart from 
the drungarie and the turmarch, two offices which were, theoretically, inferior to the office of 
the strategos, there was also the command of the archon-abydikos (άρχων-αβυδικός). This 
middle-rank official was in command of an important naval base or a major thematic port, 
like for example Dyrrachium, Thessaloniki, Corinth, and Chandax. He commanded a small 
squadron of light ships to control the maritime traffic.557 
 
The Byzantine warships of the main period and their naval tactics 
 
     The typical high-seas elite warship of the Empire in this period was the dromon.558 This 
was a two-masted fully decked bireme with two banks of oars, one rowed from below the 
deck and one from above it. There were twenty-five oarsmen on each side of each deck, thus 
raising the total number of oarsmen to a hundred, all fully seated. The marines and the 
officers of the ship amounted to around fifty men, while the ousia (ουσία), the standard 
complement of a war galley (its crew excluding the marines and the officers) totalled 108 
men.559 An almost identical type of warship, which might frustrate us due to its different 
                                                 
555 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 66-69, especially Table 2 in p. 67. 
556 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, p. 110. 
557 Ibid., pp. 54-62, 85-93, 163-70. 
558 Leo VI, Tactica, XIX; De Ceremoniis, I, pp. 669-678. 
559 Pryor, Jeffreys, The Age of the Δρόμων, pp. 123-34, 254-55; J.H. Pryor, “Byzantium and 
the Sea: Byzantine Fleets and the History of the Empire in the Age of the Macedonian 
Emperors, c.900-1025 ce”, War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Boydell, 
Woodbridge, 2003, pp. 85-6; T. Korres, «Υγρόν Πύρ», Ένα όπλο της βυζαντινής ναυτικής 
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name, was the chelandion.560 But although the Greek primary sources use the two terms 
indiscriminately,561 it is interesting to mention that Theophanes, a ninth century chronicler, 
identifies the chelandia as horse-transports.562 Compared to the dromon and the chelandion, a 
smaller but much faster type of ship was the galea. Based on the same design mentality of a 
war ship, the galea had two sails (the one amidships being smaller by a third) and probably 
one bank of oars on the deck.563 Because of its speed, however, this type of ship was used 
primarily for courier service and, during campaigns, for the transport of orders (μαντάτα). 
There is also certain mentioning of galeai being used in espionage.564  
     Regarding the horse-transport units of the Byzantine Fleet, since the early tenth century 
they were equipped with a climaca (κλίμακα), a ramp for the uploading and unloading of the 
horses from the ship’s gunwales, either from the stern but usually from the bow. This term is 
mentioned in the De Ceremoniis for the Cretan expeditions of 911, 949 and 960/1565 and 
reveals the neccessary modifications to the ships when they had to carry horses, like hatches 
not just in the sides but also in the decks leading down into the holds,566 while further 
modifications would have taken place in the hull of the ship concerning the stabling of the 
                                                                                                                                           
τακτικής, Vanias, Thessaloniki, 1995, pp. 83-90; K. Alexandris, Η Θαλάσσια δύναμις είς την 
ιστορία της Βυζαντινής Αυτοκρατορίας, Athens, 1956, p. 79. 
560 Both Ahrweiler and Pryor consider these two types to be almost identical, see: Ahrweiler, 
Byzance et la Mer, Appendix II, pp. 412-3; Pryor, “Byzantium and the Sea”, 85-6.  
561 The Arabic primary sources use only the term chelandion to describe the Byzantine 
warships: Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, Appendix II, footnote 3, p. 412 
562 Theophanes Continuates, p. 471; certain Greek historians believe that the chelandia were 
used primarily for transport, although their design allowed them to be used in battle as well. 
See: Korres, «Υγρόν Πύρ», p. 85; Alexandris, Η Θαλάσσια δύναμις, pp. 73-4. 
563 Leo VI, Tactica, XIX. 9. 
564 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, Appendix II, p. 414; Pryor, Jeffreys, The Age of the 
Δρόμων, pp. 190, 396; Vegetius also writes about the use of camouflage techniques: 
Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, IV. 37. 
565 De Ceremoniis, pp. 658-59; Leo the Deacon, p. 7; The History of Leo the Deacon, pp. 60-
1. 
566 Pryor, Jeffreys, The Age of the Δρόμων, pp. 309-10. 
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horses. As Professor Pryor concludes, in his pioneering study for the construction of a 
Byzantine horse-transport ship, the chelandia were indeed specialized horse transports, able 
to carry between 12-20 horses,567 but they must have been constructed differently to dromons 
when it comes to the dimensions of the ship’s beam, which would have been much wider to 
accommodate both the lower bank oarsmen and the horses.568 A significant structural 
difference between the tenth century Byzantine transport ships and their Italian counterparts 
in the twelfth century was that the latter had placed both banks of oarsmen on the upper deck, 
thus making more room for the horses in the ship’s hull. 
     Turning to the battle tactics of the Byzantine Navy, the existence of an above-water beak 
in the major warships reveals a fundamental difference between the ancient Greek and 
Roman naval tactics and those used by the Byzantine navy, at least after the early tenth 
century. This beak that replaced the below-water ram, possibly as early as the sixth century, 
proves the change in the objective of naval engagements, from penetrating the enemy ship’s 
hull below the water line to damaging the ship’s oars and upper hull and bring it to a stop in 
order to board and capture it or burn it.569 And by the seventh century their main attacking 
weapon, which was primarily used by the units of the Imperial Fleet,570 was the famous 
                                                 
567 Ibid., pp. 325-30; for the purpose of comparison, a fourth century BC Greek horse 
transport (ναυς ιππαγωγός), rowed by 60 oarsmen, could carry 30 horses. See: L. Casson, 
Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, Princeton, 1971, p. 93. 
568 Pryor, Jeffreys, The Age of the Δρόμων, pp. 315-25. 
569 Ibid., pp. 134-152, 382-4; Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, p. 59; “Byzantium and 
the Sea”, 97-103; the naval battle of Dhat as-Sawari (655) was also a turning point in this 
change of naval tactics: V. Christides, “The Naval Battle of Dhat as-Sawari A.H. 34/ A.D. 
655-656. A Classical Example of Naval Warfare Incompetence”, Byzantina, 13 (1985), 1331-
45. 
570 About the Muslim use of the Greek Fire and how this knowledge passed over to the 
Muslims: D. Haldane, “The Fire-ship of Al-Salih Ayyub and Muslim Use of “Greek Fire””, 
The Circle of War in the Middle Ages, ed. D.J.Kagay, L.J.A. Villalon, Boydell, Woodbridge, 
1999, 137-44; V. Christides, “Naval History and Naval Technology in Medieval Times, the 
Need for Interdisciplinary Studies”, Byzantion, 58 (1988), 321-2. 
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Greek Fire, a flammable mixture which was projected through a siphon at the prow.571 
Concerning the naval tactics which should have been used by the Byzantines, according to 
Emperor Leo VI’s Tactica,572 we can see the same spirit that had dominated the advices 
given to a Byzantine general in the previous chapters of his work. We read here just a few of 
the most basic of Leo’s advices to an admiral:  
                                                
 
“During an invasion by an enemy fleet, you should be aware of the enemy’s numbers and 
types of ships and also of the weather and the place where the naval battle is to be fought. If 
all of these work to your favour, only then you should engage the enemy.”573 
 
     When a decision to engage into battle was decided by the senior officers, then the 
Byzantine fleet could deploy its forces in two basic formations,574 depending on the 
circumstances: 
 
“You should deploy your forces in a semi-circle formation, and in the wings of the formation, 
left and right, you should put the best and most powerful of your dromons. In the middle-
 
571 Leo VI, Tactica, XIX. 6; for an indicative bibliography on the Greek Fire: J. Haldon, M., 
Byrne, “A Possible Solution to the Problem of Greek Fire”, Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 70 
(1977), 91-99; A. Roland, “Secrecy, Technology, and War: Greek Fire and the Defense of 
Byzantium, 678-1204”, Warfare in the Dark Ages, ed. J. France and K. DeVries, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2008, 655-79; Korres, «Υγρόν Πύρ»; Pryor, Jeffreys, The Age of the Δρόμων, 
Appendix VI, pp. 607-631. 
572 See also the work of Nicephoros Ouranos, who paraphrazes Leo’s Tactica: Nicephoros 
Ouranos, “On Fighting at Sea”, in The Age of the Δρόμων, Appendix V, pp. 572-604; along 
with our third manual on naval warfare: Syrianos Magistros, “Naval Battles of Syrianos 
Magistros”, in The Age of the Δρόμων, Appendix I, pp. 456-480   
573 Leo VI, Tactica, XIX. 43; A clearly Vegetian spirit of caution and prudence which 
characterises Leo’s work for the infantry as well as the navy. 
574 There are several other tactics like faked retreat and counterattack using small and fast 
ships, surprise night attack and a list of others. See: Ibid., XIX. 47-49 
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hollow part of the formation it is you who should be there, to observe and command 
everything. [...] This formation is deployed to avoid encirclement by the enemy.”575  
 
     This is also, supposedly, the best formation to overtake the enemy’s wings by attacking 
these particular units from the side or rear where they were most vulnerable to Greek Fire. 
 
“You should deploy your forces in full-frontal attack against the enemy, so when the need 
arises you will be able to attack your enemy’s forces from the rear, and you will burn their 
ships with fire from the siphons.”576 
 
     Once the admiral had given the signal to attack the enemy formation, the Byzantine 
squadrons would move towards the enemy and when they would get into close distance they 
would attack the enemy ships and their crews with bows and arrows, snakes, lizards and other 
dangerous reptiles, pots with burning lime or tar and, of course, with Greek Fire577 projected 
either through the ship’s siphons, through small hand-siphons or thrown against the enemies 
in a form of small hand-grenades.578 When the ships were close enough, boarding 
detachments were sent at the enemy ship and the result of the naval battle largely depended 
on the courage and the fighting abilities of the boarding teams. For that reason the admiral 
should keep in his warships “courageous soldiers who are strong when fighting with the 
sword, and they have a daring soul and are also well trained and disciplined.”579 
      
The decline of the Byzantine Navy during the period of the Epigonoi (1025-1081) 
 
                                                 
575 Ibid., XIX. 44 
576 Ibid., XIX. 45 
577 The Greek Fire could be used effectively against enemy formations only when the fleet 
was staging a frontal attack. For the reasons behind that, see: Korres, «Υγρόν Πυρ», p. 88 
578 Leo VI, Tactica, XIX. 51-60 
579 Ibid., XIX. 65 
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     In the period of the “Reconquest” the Empire had managed to expand its borders to a 
degree that it had not been seen since the times of Justinian. However, the pax romana that 
had been established in the Byzantine seas turned the attention of the central government 
away from the seas, with severe consequences, especially for the units of the Imperial Fleet. 
The role of the Navy, from this period onwards, was to police the coastline and control the 
maritime traffic rather than to launch large-scale offensive operations against enemies like the 
Muslims. Consequently the dromon fleets were steadily neglected in favour of the provincial 
light-ship squadrons. The Empire, relying on her land armies, lost the opportunity to 
effectively control the international maritime routes and dominate the Mediterranean.580   
     During the first half of the eleventh century, the Byzantine navy’s history is linked with 
the Empire’s distance province of Longobardia, with two large-scale expeditions being 
organised to expel the Kalbite Muslims from Sicily. The degree of decline of the Imperial 
Fleet can be seen, in this period, by the fact that units from the themes of Cephalonia and 
Samos were mobilized for the 1025 Sicilian expedition instead of the dromons and the 
chelandia from Constantinople.581 But it was not before the rise to the throne of Romanus III 
(1028-34) that a long-term strategy against the Muslims began to take shape and, as a 
consequence, the construction of a high-seas fleet seemed imperative.582 This policy, 
however, took a serious blow when Skylitzes writes of a fire in the capital’s naval base that 
burned all the dromons that were stationed there (1035).583 The decline of the Imperial Fleet 
was so serious that there were practically no ships to defend the capital from Vladimir’s boats 
in 1043.584 Regarding the fleets of the naval themata (Cibyrreots, Aegean Sea and Samos), 
we see the steady decline in their crews and numbers throughout this period. In the 1040s is 
the last mentioning of the Cibyrreots in the primary sources, when they participated in the 
                                                 
580 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, pp. 117-8. 
581 Skylitzes, II, p. 457. 
582 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, p. 123. 
583 Skylitzes, II, p. 529. 
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142 
 
crushing of a revolt in Cyprus, in 1042,585 and they fought against the Russian fleet in the 
waters of Constantinople in 1043, a naval battle that virtually eliminated their strength.586 In 
the same period, the two other naval themata of Samos and the Aegean Sea, like the 
Cibyrreots, were transformed into civil administrative provinces, as it was the case with the 
land themata of Asia Minor.  
 
The Imperial Navy of Alexius Comnenus (1081-1108) 
 
     After his rise to the throne on the 1st April 1081 Alexius Comnenus had to deal with two 
enemies in two different parts of the Empire, the Normans in the Balkans and the Seljucs of 
Rum in Asia Minor. Alexius wisely chose to deal with the Normans first, after concluding a 
peace treaty with the Seljucs, recognising that the latter posed a much more serious threat to 
the Empire and had to be dealt with in the long-term. The role of intercepting any Norman 
invasion fleet would probably have been assigned to the provincial fleets of Dyrrachium, 
Cephalonia and, perhaps, Nicopolis. But the major naval bases in Cephalonia, Dyrrachium 
and Corfu had been abandoned,587 thus allowing only a small squadron of ships to patrol the 
area with no immediate effect. 
     In the Aegean Sea and the Bosphorus, the large naval bases of the Imperial navy in Crete 
(Chandax), the Cyclades and the Dodecanese islands were either severely undermanned or 
deserted,588 while Alexius Comnenus did not have any ships at his disposal when he 
attempted to reclaim the Bithynian coasts opposite the capital from the Turks in 1081. Anna 
Comnena only mentions a number of παρατυχόντα ακάτια (random small boats – skiffs) being 
used to transfer the troops opposite the Bosphorus.589 By the beginning of the 1090s the 
                                                 
585 Skylitzes, II, p. 550. 
586 Ibid., p. 554. 
587 Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, p. 179. 
588 Ibid., pp. 179-81. 
589 Alexiad, III. xi, p. 179; Sewter, p. 129 . 
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situation got even worse with the establishment of a number of semi-independent Turkish 
Emirates in the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, the most notable being that in Smyrne under the 
ambitious Tzachas.590 The latter allied himself with the Patzinaks in a failed attack against 
Constantinople in 1090/1,591 but it seems that this very serious threat of the joint land and 
naval attack, along with a series of revolts in the important naval bases of Crete and Cyprus 
the following summer (1091),592 alerted the government and for the first time we see long-
term plans for the revival of the Imperial Navy. This new fleet was to have a new command 
under the logothesion of the ploimon (λογοθέσιο του πλόιμου).593  
    The fleet was ready in the summer of 1094 and it was placed under the overall command of 
the Grand Drungarie of the Fleet, John Doukas. Thus, the firm hold of the Imperial authority 
was re-established in Crete and Cyprus, in areas of the west coast of Asia Minor along with a 
number of islands of the eastern Aegean like Chios, Samos, Mitylene and Rhodes, marking 
an era of relative peace in the Aegean Sea.594 This new Byzantine fleet was also patrolling the 
Illyrian coasts in the summer of 1097 during the crossing of the Crusaders’ army from 
Apulia. These naval units were under the command of John, the Duke-Katepano of 
Dyrrachium, and the Grand Duke Nicolaos Mavrokatakalon, and although we cannot be sure 
                                                 
590 Tzachas had been a prisoner of Nicephorus Botaneiates in the capital and, probably, quite 
familiar with the tactics of the Byzantine navy. 
591 For Tzachas and a detailed description of his fleet, see: Alexiad, VII. viii, pp. 361-9; 
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594 Ibid., pp. 186-87. 
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about their numbers or types of their ships, they performed well in their duties assigned by 
the Emperor.595  
     The difference between the naval forces that Alexius Comnenus could mobilize in 1081 
and fifteen years later, when his squadrons enforced an efficient naval blockade in 
Bohemond’s base, is significant and it can be attributed, in a grossly oversimplified comment, 
to the stability in the Empire’s political affairs which further allowed the commerce and, thus, 
the economy to recover to a certain degree.596 The Empire was now firmly in control of the 
waters and the maritime routes of the Ionian, south Adriatic, Aegean and eastern 
Mediterranean Seas and with the Fatimid Caliphate in a serious decline at least for the last 
half a century – it was to be revived by Saladin later in the century – it was only the rise of 
other maritime powers of Italy that could threaten her dominance.597 The city that posed the 
most serious threat to Alexius’ plans for naval supremacy was Pisa and it was to be her 
massive naval expedition to the Levant, in the summer of 1099, which was to attract Alexius’ 
attention. Some 900 ships598 that were bound to Syria plundered the islands of Corfu, 
Zakynthos, Leukada and Cephalonia and later clashed with a Byzantine naval squadron off 
Rhodes. This threat caused the construction of a second fleet, which was to be commanded 
by the experienced Lombard Landulf, which significantly reinforced the Imperial forces at 
                                                 
595 For the new offices of the Duke-Katepano and the Grand Duke: Ahrweiler, Byzance et la 
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596 My objective is not to analyse the marked recovery of the Byzantine economy during the 
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Constantinople and the oriental squadrons in Crete and Cyprus against the Norman-Genoese 
alliance of the period 1101-4.599 So, what would characterise Alexius’ state policy from the 
1090s onwards is a combination of policy from the times of the Isaurian (717-802) and 
Macedonian (867-1025) dynasties, meaning an offensive policy for the reconquest of old 
imperial territories, the predominance of army officers in the central and provincial 
administration and the revival of a strong and centralised land and naval armies. 
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6. The political and military organization of Byzantine Italy before the arrival of the 
Normans  
 
     Before I begin with my analysis of the military organization of Byzantine Longobardia, I 
believe it is important that I should first present the geography of Apulia and Calabria so that 
the reader would have a clear understanding of the political and military developments in 
southern Italy. The terrain and the geography of the areas where military operations took 
place is extremely significant and they certainly affected the course of invading armies, thus 
the closer we study the topography of a region the better we can understand the strategic 
decisions that take place. 
     Apulia’s northern limits are fixed by the lower Fortore River, with the area between the 
rivers Fortore and Ofanto been known by its Byzantine name – Capitanata (modern Foggia). 
To the east, the Capitanata forms a fertile lowland peninsula, the Gargano. Between Ofanto 
and the Brindisi-Taranto line, we have central Apulia which is blocked to the west by the 
southern Apennines. Most of the cities in this area were – and still are – situated in the 
shoreline, not just for reasons of commerce with Mediterranean ports, but most importantly 
due to the rough ground of limestone and the absence of any rivers in the Apulian interior.600 
The Via Appia, one of the oldest and most strategic military roads built by the Romans in the 
late fourth century BC, connected Rome with Brindisi via the Apulian countryside and along 
with the Via Traiana, an extension of the Via Appia through Benevento and coastal Apulia, is 
strategically connected to the Via Egnatia that reached Constantinople.601 The Basilicata 
(modern Lucania) between the River Bradano to the north and the Monte Pollino massif in 
the south is the most mountainous region of southern Italy, an inhospitable terrain with 
unreliable rainfall and dry rivers for half a year. Finally, the Terra d’Otranto (modern Lecce 
province) is a rock of limestone that divides the Adriatic from the Ionian Seas. 
                                                 
600 D.S. Walker, A Geography of Italy, Methuen & Co, London, 1967, pp. 204-5. 
601 K. Belke, “Communications, Roads and Bridges”, O.H.B.S., 296; N.H.H. Sitwell, Roman 
Roads of Europe, London, 1981. 
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     Calabria retains the same contrast with Apulia regarding the inland and coastal areas. 
There are two great plateaus that dominate the Peninsula, the Sila between the valleys of the 
rivers Crati and Amato (1,929 metres), and the Aspromonte plateau (1,956 metres) in the 
southern tip. The majority of the plateaus were forested with black pines and oaks. Most of 
northern Calabria and the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic coastline have been ideal for agriculture 
due to their terrain – clay and sand – and mild climate, contrary to the severe winter in the 
plateaus.602 Thus all the major towns in our period have been built either in the valleys of the 
rivers Crati and Amato or in the southern coastal areas. 
     Throughout the tenth century the borders between the Byzantine territories in Apulia and 
Calabria and the Lombard principalities of Capua-Benevento (one state between 900-75) and 
Salerno remained relatively stable. This was mostly because of the lack of sufficient 
resources directed to Italy by Constantinople and the inability of the Lombard princes to 
destabilise the Byzantine rule in Apulia.603 The only territorial gain for the Empire was the 
Capitanata in the first decade of the eleventh century. Thus, on the eve of the Norman arrival 
in southern Italy the Byzantine holdings comprised of two principal areas. First, the province 
of Sicily, consisting of territories under Byzantine rule in Sicily itself (up to 902) and the 
Calabrian peninsula. Second, there was the newly established province of Longobardia which 
was separated from the naval thema of Cephalonia by Leo VI in 902. Longobardia had a 
mixed population, with the southernmost tip in the Terra d’Otranto being predominantly 
Greek, but the rest of the province was mostly Lombard, especially in the border areas with 
the Abruzzi. Calabria was mainly Greek, with the exception of the Basilicata in the north-east 
which included some scattered Lombard elements.604  
                                                 
602 Walker, A Geography of Italy, p. 213. 
603 Periodic expeditions by the Byzantine strategoi (956, 969) only achieved short-term 
recognition of the Byzantine authority. 
604 Martin, La Pouille, pp. 489-532; G.A. Loud, “Byzantine Italy and the Normans”, 
Proceedings of the XVIII Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, ed. J. Howard-Johnston, 
Amsterdam, 1988, 215-33; Robert Guiscard, 48-59; V. von Falkenhausen, “Between Two 
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     Although Longobardia and Calabria were seen as a distant and not so important frontier 
area of the Empire, it formed a part – a peripheral one no doubt – of a highly centralised 
governmental organisation. Based on that, there is no evidence to suggest that these two 
provinces were not organised as themata in more or less the same fashion as all the other 
provinces of the Empire.605 Thus, both military and administrative authority was exercised by 
the strategos of the thema, based in Bari for Longobardia and at Reggio for Calabria. The 
second in command – governor of a smaller administrative area – was the turmarch,606 while 
in Apulia other local offices are also occasionally mentioned like gastald, topoteretes and ek 
prosopou (literally, a representative).607 Emperor Nicephoros Phocas upgraded the thema of 
Longobardia to a Catepanate608 in 969, as a response to Otto I’s invasion of Apulia and 
Calabria in 968 and recognising the significance of the south-eastern coasts of Italy in 
controlling the entrance of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, especially Bari’s importance as a 
commercial centre for the south Adriatic.609 
     Estimating the actual numbers deployed in an average Byzantine thema after 1025 is a 
very difficult task. But even trying to assess the numerical strength of Longobardia in the 
beginning of the tenth century also poses a significant number of problems, mostly due to 
lack of sufficient primary material. The thema of Sicily, the predecessor of the thema of 
Calabria dating back to the era of Justinian, it must have been one of the typical western 
                                                                                                                                           
Empires: Byzantine Italy in the Reign of Basil II”, Byzantium in the Year 1000, ed. P. 
Magdalino, Brill, Leiden, 2003, 139. 
605 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 29-30; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, p. 86. 
606 Gay, L’Italie Meridionale, p. 415; the only non-Greek Catepan in Byzantine Italy’s history 
was Argyrus, see: Anon. Bar., s.a. 1051; Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1051.  
607 Martin, La Pouille, pp. 705-6. 
608 In the beginning of the eleventh century Catepan came to mean the equivalent of a Duke, a 
higher office than a strategos. See: Gay, L’ Italie Meridionale, pp. 348-9. For the significance 
of Longobardia’s military and civil upgrade: Von Falkenhausen, “Byzantine Italy”, 140. 
609 For more on Bari and its commerce, see: P. Skinner, “Room for tension: urban life in 
Apulia in the eleventh and twelfth centuries”, Papers of the British School at Rome, 65 
(1998), 159-77.  
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themata. This means that it should have had at least a 1,000-men drungus, and also bearing in 
mind that the Tacticon Uspensky ranks it between themata of 2,000-men, it is likely that 
Sicily and Calabria may have had a 1.000-men drungus each by the end of the ninth 
century.610 Throughout the tenth century, the significant losses inflicted by the Arab naval 
raids in Calabria during the second half of the century might have been compensated by the 
re-deployment of troops from Sicily, so the speculation that the thema of Calabria might have 
had a 1,000-men drungus by the turn of the eleventh century seems quite sensible. On the 
other hand, the thema of Longobardia was newly established, created from the few territories 
the Empire possessed in the Terra d’Otranto by the 870s. Officially, it was separated by the 
thema of Cephalonia in 902 and if we consider that Cephalonia had a 1,000-men drungus, 
having lost half of its manpower six years earlier (896) due to the establishment of the thema 
of Nicopolis, it is difficult to say whether Longobardia would have had more than 1,000 men 
available to be deployed.611 These soldiers would have been Sicilian veterans, while it is 
almost certain that settlers from Asia Minor and the Balkans were introduced as well.612 
     The military obligations of the local population to the Byzantine authorities were two. 
First, we have the naval service and, judging by Longobardia’s status as a non-maritime 
coastal thema, we understand that in theory the provincial fleet of Apulia and Calabria would 
have been built in the capital and, thus, controlled by the central government. However, we 
know from the Vita St-Nile that the Byzantine government expected the local communities to 
provide a small number of ships sufficient enough for the defence-patrolling of the coasts.613 
Whether this was a well established “exception to the rule” or simply an isolated incident, we 
cannot be sure. It may have been an attempt by the local authorities to replace the losses 
inflicted on the Imperial squadrons in the failed attempt to conquer Sicily the previous year. 
                                                 
610 Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, pp. 66-7, especially Table 2 in p. 67. 
611 Ibid., pp. 76-8. 
612 Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 19. 
613 The incident of the Calabrian strategos Nicephoros Hexakionites, in 965. See: Vita St-Nili 
Iunioris, Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, vol. 70, cols. 105-7. 
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Whatever the case, I have not found any other example of naval squadrons from coastal 
themata been built locally and not in the capital. In addition, a regularly imposed military tax 
termed druggaraton is attested in this period, and judging from the name it must have been 
raised for the local naval forces.614 
     In addition to the naval service, the Byzantine government had established a system of 
land service owed by members of the rural communities in the form of local militias. This 
system greatly resembles the old Lombard military and administrative system of the 
gastaldes, with the gastald being placed as the high official of the state demanding military 
service from the rural populations of his area, the milites who belonged to the social class of 
the mediani.615 The Lombard milites did not own any fiefs or military equipment and horses 
but these were rather provided by the State as a kind of “patrimony”. Unfortunately the lack 
of primary material does not allow us to go deeper into the similarities of these two 
systems.616 We know, however, that well into the eleventh century there was a strong 
relationship between the possession of land and military service, but we cannot provide any 
solid argument as to what were the criteria for someone to be called for military service.617 
However, it is hard to believe that it would have been a re-organization, or re-distribution, of 
lands as in the case of the rest of the Byzantine themata in the seventh and eighth centuries, 
where the general norm was for state land to be given to the stratiotai in exchange for 
military service. The commuting of the strateia (military service) is also attested in the last 
years of the tenth century and into the first decades of the eleventh.618 
                                                 
614 Martin, La Pouille, p. 712. 
615 For the Lombard classes of this period, see: Cahen, La Regime Feodal, pp. 28-30. 
616 The only studies been done for this subject are by: B.M. Kreutz, Before the Normans: 
Southern Italy in the ninth and tenth centuries, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 1991, pp. 10-16, 26-31, 56-8, 97-155; Martin, La Pouille, pp. 226-35. 
617 Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 35-7; Gay, L’Italie Meridionale, p. 367.  
618 Three acts established at Conversano (980), Bari (1017) and Cannes (1034). See: Martin, 
La Pouille, pp. 703-4. 
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     The typical “Italian” soldiers under Byzantine command were the contarati (κονταράτοι), 
with the most likely derivation of the term coming from the Greek κοντάρι (spear), meaning 
that these soldiers were probably armed with short spears.619 These were locally raised 
militia-men of Lombard origin who were lightly armed, poorly trained, undisciplined and 
they were rarely trusted by the Byzantine authorities.620 They were fighting mostly on foot, 
which can explain the elite role that the Norman cavalry played the first four decades of their 
infiltration in the south. Their poor performance at Civitate in 1053 and in the three battles of 
1041 is quite characteristic, when their ranks were easily broken by the Norman cavalry. We 
should also note that, even though in the three battles of 1041 the Byzantines had brought 
with them reinforcements from the mainland, including a Varangian contingent, the 
Lombards probably formed the nucleus of the Byzantine force. We must also not forget that 
Basil Boioannes chose the Normans and not the locals to man his newly and powerful 
fortress of Troia in 1019, undoubtedly being aware of the fighting capabilities of the 
Lombard troops under his orders.  
     During the decades that followed the defeats of the Imperial forces in 1041 and the 
subsequent establishment of the Normans at Melfi, the basis of the military system of the 
militias, the land, was eroded by the continuous expansion of the Norman principalities. 
Thus, the central government could rely either to reinforcements from the Balkans or to 
diplomacy. But with the Byzantine Army and Navy being unable to launch any serious 
counteroffensive in Italy, the Byzantine policy was confined to diplomatic measures. After 
the defeat of the Papal army at Civitate and the deterioration of the diplomatic relations 
between the Eastern and Western churches next year, the next step in Byzantium’s diplomatic 
game against its Italian rivals was to try and buy off the Norman leading counts. And as I will 
                                                 
619 Leo VI, Tactica, XII. 41, 117, XIV. 28, XVIII. 37; Cecaumenos uses the term in contrast 
to the ploimoi (marines): Cecaumenos, pp. 30, 73; other Latin derivations vary: conterranei 
(fellow-countrymen) or contracti (those employed by contract). See: Gay, L’Italie 
Meridionale, p. 454, n. 5.  
620 Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 35-6; Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 36; Gay, L’Italie 
Meridionale, p. 454. 
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explain in detail in a following chapter, this tactic proved effective in the short-term, but it 
did not avert the inevitable which was the loss of all the Imperial lands in Italy.  
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7. The establishment of the Normans in southern Italy and Sicily (1017-1077) 
 
     This chapter will examine the military affairs in southern Italy between 1017, the year of 
the famous meeting between Melus – an Apulian noble of Lombard origin and leader of a 
local rebellion – and a contingent of Norman pilgrims coming from the Holy Land, and the 
siege of Naples by the joint forces of Robert Guiscard and Richard of Capua in 1077. Major 
questions include: in what numbers were the Normans descending to Italy and who were their 
main leaders? Who were the employers of the Normans and what roles do the latter play in 
the military events and developments of the period? Which armies did they face in battle? Do 
we have any information that will help us reconstruct their battle and siege tactics? In what 
way were they influenced by the military tactics of their allies and enemies in southern Italy 
and Sicily and what degree of adaptability do we see throughout the decades? Finally, what 
proved to be more important for the Norman prevalence in the Italian and Sicilian operational 
theatres – battle tactics or numbers being drawn in the battlefield? The main objective of this 
chapter is to present the “military” background of the southern Italian Normans before their 
operations in Illyria and try to identify their strategies, battle-tactics and the development in 
their numbers through the studying of pitched battles, siege and naval operations in Apulia 
and Sicily. 
 
The first stage of the Norman infiltration into southern Italy (1017-38)  
 
     The Lombard defeat of the rebel forces at Cannae in October 1018 certainly dashed the 
dreams of the rebels to oust the Byzantines from the areas of mainland Apulia and parts of 
the Capitanata. The coming of Basil Boioannes – after the subjugation of Bulgaria that year –  
proved to be the key move made by the central government which saw in him an able general 
and a firm leader, much needed to re-establish order in that distant province of the Empire. In 
this Lombard army there was a small core of Norman cavalry, numbering just a few 
hundreds, which participated in all the major confrontations between the rebels and the 
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Byzantine forces. None of the sources make clear the exact role that was played by the 
Normans in any of these battles, but it is almost certain that they would have been auxiliary 
forces kept in reserve in order to inflict a powerful blow whenever needed, mostly because 
they would have been the best cavalry unit the rebels would have had. But even though the 
Normans suffered significant casualties at Cannae, the defeat brought ample opportunities for 
the rest of the surviving contingents to offer their services to other employers like the 
Lombard principalities of Campania, the Byzantines and even the German Emperor.   
     During the next fifteen years after Henry II’s descend to Italy to restore his influence over 
the Lombard principalities in spring 1022,621 a number of serious disputes emerged between 
the Lombard principalities in the centre and west of Campania,622 and what has to be 
examined is the role of the Normans in these conflicts. During these turbulent years a number 
of Normans were employed by Gaimar III of Salerno and Pandulf III in the siege operations 
against Capua (1024-26) and Naples (1028-9).623 Other Normans were installed by Henry II 
at Comino, north of the Terra Sancti Benedicti,624 an area that was probably granted to the 
principality of Capua by the German Emperor in 1022.625 The ranks of the Normans at 
Comino included Toustain (or Thorsteinn) of Begue, Gilbert, Osmund Drengot, Asclettin, 
Walter of Casiny and Hugh Falluca.626 Some other survivors of Cannae were employed by 
the Prince of Benevento, while Abbot Atenulf of Montecassino had manned the fortress of 
Pignetano with a Norman garrison to oppose the Count of Aquino.627 In the decade between 
the fall of Naples (1029) and the Byzantine expedition in Sicily (1038), a certain Rainulf 
                                                 
621 For Henry’s expedition, see: Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 67-69; Chalandon, Domination 
Normande, pp. 59-66; Norwich, The Normans in the South, pp. 31-33. 
622 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 69-72. 
623 Chronic. Casin., II, 38, pp. 240-1; Amatus, I. 31, 34; Gesta, I. 136, p. 106. 
624 Amatus, I. 29; Chronic. Casin., II, 41, p. 245. 
625 Chalandon, Domination Normande, p. 67.  
626 Amatus, I. 31; William of Jumièges, VII, 30; Chronic. Casin., II, 41, p. 245; for the 
Scandinavian origin of these names and their traces to Normandy, see: Menager, “Pesanteur 
et etiologie”, 196-200. 
627 Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 74. 
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would eventually become the greatest of all the lords in Campania and a member of the local 
Lombard aristocracy. Being invested by Sergius IV of Naples as his vassal in the fortified 
town of Aversa – some 15 kilometres north of Naples – in 1030,628 soon after and he allied 
himself with Pandulf of Capua by marrying his niece, the princess of Amalfi in 1034.629 Four 
years later he switched his allegiance again, helping Gaimar V of Salerno against Pandulf, 
thus being installed at Aversa as an Imperial vassal in May 1038, after Conrad II’s descend to 
Italy.630 It was in this turbulent period (1035) when the three sons of Tancred of Hauteville 
rode down to Italy.  
 
The second stage of Norman infiltration to southern Italy (1038-61) – From the establishment 
at Melfi to the Sicilian invasion 
 
     The two decades between Cannae and the second German expedition to Italy in this period 
under Conrad II in spring 1038,631 brought the increasing involvement of the Normans in the 
politics of the Lombard principalities of Campania. During this fragile period, however, the 
control of Constantinople over its subjects and on its neighbours was declining rapidly. This 
political instability in mainland Italy was taken advantage by the Kalbite Muslims of Sicily, 
who initiated an aggressive policy of raids during the first three decades of the eleventh 
century bringing chaos and destruction to the coastal cities of Apulia, Calabria and the 
                                                 
628 Amatus, I. 40; Gesta, I, 169-173, p. 108; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 77-78; 
Norwich, The Normans in the South, p. 43; on the early history of the Normans in Italy up to 
1042, there is a useful study by: S. Tramontana, I Normanni in Italia. Linee di recerca sui 
primi insediamenti I Aspetti politici e militari, Messina, 1970. 
629 Kreutz, Before the Normans, pp. 87-93. 
630 Amatus, II. 3; Malaterra, 1. 6; Chronic. Casin., II, 63, pp. 288-93. 
631 For Conrad’s expedition, see: Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 76-78. 
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Tyrrhenian Sea, thus severely affecting the commercial sea-routes and the income of the 
Amalfitan and Salernitan traders.632  
     We have already studied the role of the Varangian Guard in the military expedition that 
was sent to Sicily in the summer of 1038.633 The army consisted of troops furnished from the 
mainland, mainly Greeks, Bulgarians, Vlachs and contingents from the Varangian Guard, 
while auxiliary Italian troops were also raised from the theme of Longobardia. Further, 
Constantinople called for its vassals in Italy to send reinforcements, with Gaimar being more 
than happy to furnish 300 Norman knights under William and Drogo Hauteville.634 For the 
military operations that took place throughout the campaign until its stalemate in 1040, we 
know nothing apart from the initial Byzantine success in taking Messina and the defeat of a 
Muslim army close to Syracuse that led to the capture of the city.635 But the Normans were 
not numerous enough as to have influenced the military operations, and the role played by the 
three hundred men under the command of William and Drogo would have been limited to 
small scale operations.  However, the experience of marching for two years with a well 
disciplined army and participating in at least one major battle against an enemy they had not 
yet faced in his own ground (Syracuse), including one siege operation (Messina), must have 
been an extremely important experience for the Normans of Aversa and their leaders. 
     Following the Norman establishment at Aversa (1030), the event that had significant 
impact on the Norman establishment in Italy was their settlement in the strategic fortress-
                                                 
632 Ahmad, A History of Islamic Sicily, pp. 34-35; Amari, Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia, v. 
II, pp. 424-6; A. Metcalfe, The Muslims of Medieval Italy, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2009, pp. 79-80. I am grateful to Dr. Metcalfe for sending me the final draft of his 
forthcoming book on the Muslims of Medieval Italy. 
633 For this expedition, see: Malaterra, 1. 7, 1. 8; Gesta, I, 196-221, pp. 108-110; Lupus 
Protospatharius, s.a. 1038. 
634 Skylitzes, II, pp. 520-3, 545; Zonaras, III, pp. 590-4; Malaterra, 1. 7, 1. 8; Gesta, I, 196-
221, pp. 108-110; Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1038. 
635 Malaterra, 1. 7; Amatus, II. 8, 9; Skylitzes also mentions the capture of thirteen more 
cities: Skylitzes, II, p. 520; Zonaras, III, pp. 590-4; Chronicle of the Kings of Norway, III, pp. 
7-12. 
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town of Melfi in the Apulian-Campanian borders, in 1041. The city was “betrayed” to them 
by a Milanese officer of the Byzantine forces in Apulia called Arduin who, after commanding 
the Norman forces in Sicily he was placed as topoteretes (commander) of the town of Melfi. 
The latter would have hoped for a widespread rebellion against the Byzantine authorities 
when he called for the Normans from Aversa to send troops to the town and seize power,636 
but he was soon to be disappointed. The “twelve Norman captains”637 and their followers638 
established themselves in one of the most strategic towns in mainland Apulia, an event with 
major long-term consequences for the status quo in the region. In the short-term, however, 
the Byzantine Catepan Michael Doukeianos reacted sharply and confronted the united 
Lombard-Norman forces in two pitched battles. Both battles, however, at Olivento (17th 
March 1041) and Ofanto (4th May 1041) ended up with the Byzantine forces on a shameful 
retreat and the spreading of the rebellion in other parts of Apulia and the Capitanata. 
However, I should underline once more that the role of the Normans at this early stage of 
their expansion in Apulia was auxiliary and they were far from playing a leading role in the 
outcome of that insurrection. The Byzantines were swift to renew hostilities with the rebels 
and the third and final battle took place at Montepeloso on the 3rd September, ending up with 
the final defeat of the Byzantine arms.639  
     Even by the mid-1040s, the exact figure of the Normans in Aversa and Melfi is not 
known. As I will identify further down in this chapter, the numbers given for the Norman 
army from Melfi which had fought the Byzantines in 1041 were around five hundred, a quite 
reasonable number for two decades of almost continuous fighting and recruiting from parts of 
France. However, the fact that many territories in the north and west of Apulia surrendered to 
William Hauteville does not necessarily imply that this came as a result of their numerical 
                                                 
636 Gesta, I, 234-40, pp. 110-12; Malaterra, 1. 9. 
637 For the Christian meaning of the number twelve, see: Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du 
monde, pp. 175-6. 
638 None of the primary sources mentions the exact number of the Normans sent to Melfi. 
See: Gay, L’Italie Meridionale, p. 456. 
639 Amatus, II. 23; Gesta, I, 322-3, p. 116. 
158 
 
strength or was part of a well-prepared plan. We do have to bear in mind that the Normans of 
Italy have not yet established a coherent political identity. They were still divided, with the 
two most powerful groups being those in Aversa and Melfi and other smaller bands operating 
independently in the Capitanata and northern Campania.  
     Throughout this period, from the establishment at Melfi (1041/2) to the battle at Civitate 
(1053), the Norman Counts of Melfi and Aversa systematically conquered large areas of 
Apulia from the Byzantines, who seemed quite powerless to respond. By 1047-8 almost all of 
the mainland area of northern and western Apulia belonged to the Normans, including 
Bovino, Lavello, Venosa, Montepeloso and Materra, while in the next two years they began 
their incursions further to the south and east, reaching as far as Lecce and Scribla.640 The 
biggest chance the Byzantines and the Papacy had to stop this systematic erosion of their 
territories by the Normans presented itself in 1053, when three years of political struggles 
between Pope Leo IX and the Lombard principalities, Germany and Byzantium,641 ended up 
in one of the most crucial confrontations in medieval Italian history. The Normans were on 
their own against almost all their former friends642 and enemies in Italy and their future in the 
peninsula depended on the outcome of this battle.  
     Leo IX’s defeat at Civitate, apart from the obvious political consequences that it had upon 
all the political powers of southern Italy, it also opened the way to the Normans for further 
conquests in all directions, including Capua, Salerno (Gaimar had died in 1052), Capitanata, 
Apulia and Calabria. From this period onwards, the Normans were taking full advantage of 
their success and by the end of 1055 large areas of the “heel” of Otranto came under their 
strategic control, including Oria, Nardo, Lecce, Minervino, Otranto and Gallipoli, while 
                                                 
640 For a guide to these conquests, from Melfi (1042) to the end of the decade, see: Loud, 
Robert Guiscard, pp. 98-114; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 97-118; Norwich, The 
Normans in the South, pp. 60-76. 
641 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 115-8; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 112-42; 
Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 192-96. 
642 The most notable absence from this anti-Norman coalition was Salerno. 
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many others were paying tribute like Troia, Bari, Trani, Venosa and Acerenza.643 Further, 
Count Humphrey went as far as to besiege Benevento in 1054, an attempt that ended in a 
failure that revealed the Normans’ inexperience in conducting effective siege-warfare. In the 
late 1050s, the most remarkable Norman advances were made in the province of Calabria by 
Robert Guiscard, leader of the Apulian Normans since 1057. By 1056, several of the most 
important strongholds in northern Calabria were paying tribute to him, like Bisignano, 
Martirano and Cosenza, while in late 1059 he was under the walls of Reggio, the capital of 
Byzantine Calabria, which submitted to him in the early summer of 1060.644  
     The strategy employed by the Normans in this crucial stage of their expansion in southern 
Italy, but also during the initial stages of the conquest of Sicily as well, had to do with the 
extraction of tribute from the majority of the cities and the establishment of outposts in order 
to have an effective control of the countryside. The Norman tactics appear to have been the 
seizure of a fortified place, or the building of a fortification in  a strong natural position, using 
it to raid and spread terror to the surrounding areas and force the local population into 
submission, thereby swearing fealty, paying tribute and handing over hostages, but not 
necessarily surrendering the town or its castle (if there was any) into the hands of a garrison, 
like the Calabrian cities of Bisignano, Cosenza, Martirano and Gerace and, later, the Sicilian 
cities of Petralia and Rometta.645 This was quite sensible on the part of the Normans, because 
at this crucial stage they did not have either the manpower to put sufficient garrisons to each 
and every town nor the sufficient resources and, indeed, time to besiege each town into 
submission.   
 
The Norman crossing to Sicily (1061) 
 
                                                 
643 Gesta, II. 293-296, p. 148. 
644 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 123-30; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 143-55; 
Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 184-92, 212-17.  
645 Malaterra, 1. 17, 2. 13, 20. 
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     If we look at what Malaterra writes about the motives behind the Norman invasion of 
Sicily in 1061: “noticing how narrow the sea was that separated it [Sicily] from Calabria, 
Roger, who was always avid for domination, was seized with the ambition of obtaining it. He 
figured that it would be of profit to him in two ways – that is, to his soul and to his body.”646 
By reading this we understand that the decision to invade Sicily was planned by Roger just a 
few months before the actual invasion, which is surely not the case. In fact, already since the 
synod at Melfi in August 1059,647 Robert Guiscard had been invested by Pope Nicholas II as 
“future Duke of Sicily”, thus laying the foundation for the conquest of the island which 
would serve both parties. The Normans would profit from the conquest of an island as fertile 
and rich as Sicily, while the Catholic church would ripe the fruits of glory for taking the 
island away from the “infidels” after almost two centuries and not allowing it to fall under the 
jurisdiction of Constantinople.648 The Norman invasion of Sicily, from the period between 
1061 and the conquest of Palermo in 1072, consisted primarily of three major pitched battles 
between Norman and Muslim armies, either Kalbite or Zirid as we will see further down, two 
major sieges and one great amphibious operation conducted by a hybrid “Norman” fleet.  
     The island of Sicily is covered with mountains (25%) and hills (61%). Its geography is 
dominated by the mountain of Etna in the east  coast (3,263 metres), while in the north there 
are three mountain groups – granite mountains covered with forest – that fall short of 2,000 
metres and cover a zone from Milazzo to Termini and spread as far inland as Petralia and 
Nicosia. The coastlands of northern Sicily from Taormina to Trapani present an alternation of 
narrow alluvial plains and rocky spurs which often leave little space for communications. The 
interior of Sicily is dominated by impermeable rocks and rounded hills separated by open 
valleys, while the brutal climate with its long summer droughts and low rainfalls creates a 
                                                 
646 Ibid., 2. 1. 
647 For Robert Guiscard’s investiture at Melfi: Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 186-94; Taviani-
Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 237-44. 
648 Sicily, Calabria and Illyria were transferred to the jurisdiction of Constantinople by 
Constantine V (741-75), due to the collapse of the Empire’s foreign policy in Italy in that 
period. 
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sharp contrast to the coastal zones. Finally, along the southern shore, low cliffs alternate with 
alluvial plains and between Mazara and Trapani a series of broad marine platforms can be 
identified.649 
     Turning our attention to the enemies that the Normans were to face in Sicily, by the 
beginning of the ninth century the Muslims had overwhelmed all of North Africa and were 
already launching significant and numerous raids in Calabria and Sicily itself. Their major 
chance to establish themselves permanently in the island came in the year 827 when, taking 
advantage of a local rebellion, the Muslims landed in the island in full strength and stormed 
Palermo in 830. Their progress was quite slow, a prelude to the Norman pace of conquest, 
and it took them five decades to subdue the island, which eventually fell to the Muslims 
mostly due to poor leadership and the Empire’s struggle in the eastern frontiers against the 
Arabs.650 The Muslim dynasty of the Aghlavids that dominated Tripolitania and Tunisia had 
invaded Sicily since the second quarter of the ninth century, but the conquest had not been 
fully completed until in 902. The Aghlavids were ousted by the Fatimids, in 909, who 
directly ruled the island for almost four decades, until the year 947 when a governor was sent 
from Ifriqiya to crush a local rebellion at Palermo. His name was Ali al-Kalbi and his 
governorship was to lead to the establishment of the local Muslim dynasty of the Kalbites 
which was to rule the island for more than ninety years. While typically still vassals of the 
Fatimids and practically after 972 of the Zirid viceroys in Ifriqiya, the Kalbites enjoyed a 
significant degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency, while their dynastic rights on the island 
were recognised as hereditary in 970.  
     Despite the political stability and religious toleration of the second half of the tenth 
century, from the early eleventh century the political consensus began to break down and 
separatist forces emerged. Also in this period there was a great migration from North Africa, 
                                                 
649 For the Sicilian geography, see: Walker, A Geography of Italy, pp. 215-22.  
650 Ahmad, A History of Islamic Sicily, pp. 1-24. 
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due to civil-religious conflicts between Sunni and Shi’a factions,651 and several Muslim naval 
raids took place, aiming at southern Italy and western Greece. When the last Kalbite emir, al-
Hasan, was assassinated in 1052, the island became divided into three principalities. The 
south and centre was ruled by Ibn al-Hawas, who also commanded the key fortresses of 
Agrigento (in the west coast) and Castrogiovanni (in the centre), the west by Abd-Allah ibn 
Manqut and the east by Ibn al-Timnah, based in Catania. Ibn al-Timnah emerged in the 
Sicilian political scene in 1053 and in the following years he established himself in Syracuse. 
His conflict with al-Hawas and his gradual loss of power in the east of the island forced the 
Muslim emir to contact Roger, in February 1061 according to Malaterra. From that period 
and until his death in 1062, al-Timnah actively assisted the Normans in their invasion of the 
island by providing troops, guides, money and supplies in the vain hope that his allies, once 
defeating al-Hawas, would hand the island back to him.652  
     Reaching the southernmost tip of the Italian peninsula, after the conquest of the Byzantine 
capital of Calabria in 1059, the next step of the Norman expansion would certainly have 
taken Robert and Roger across the straights of Messina. Before the main invasion, which took 
place in May 1061, there were two other reconnaissance missions, one conducted by Roger 
who led an armed force of sixty knights across the straits and close to Messina in the summer 
of 1060, while the other took place two months before the main invasion and was led by 
Guiscard who targeted the surrounding areas of Messina.653 Concerning the main operation in 
May 1061, in order to avoid the Muslim ship-patrols which were sweeping the coasts, Roger 
landed in the Santa-Maria del Faro, just a few kilometres south, and his advance guard took 
                                                 
651 In 1040 the Zirids of Ifriqiya declared their independence from the Fatimids of Cairo and 
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Kalbites were mostly Shi’a Muslims. See: Metcalfe, The Muslims of Medieval Italy, pp. 92-3. 
652 Ahmad, A History of Islamic Sicily, pp. 25-40; Metcalfe, The Muslims of Medieval Italy, 
pp. 70-87. 
653 Malaterra, 2. 1, 4; Amatus, V. 9, 10. 
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the Muslim garrison of Messina by surprise and overran them.654 At this point, Malaterra 
notes a military tactic used by Roger to conquer the city, according to which Roger feigned 
retreat in order to draw the garrison out of the city, and then turned back and attacked them 
fiercely.655 Whether this was indeed a military tactic employed by Roger or it was just 
presented that way by the chronicler we will never know with certainty. However, it is 
important to note that this tactic of feigned flight was frequently used by the Normans in the 
second half of the eleventh century, with the most characteristic examples those of Hastings 
and Dyrrachium as I will examine in detail in a following chapter. 
     After securing Messina, Guiscard followed across with the main Norman force of about 
1000 knights and 1000 infantry.656 The Norman army proceeded west through the northern 
coastal road, capturing Rometta with no great difficulty, but then failing to take Centuripe 
because of the city’s strong fortifications, the lack of time and the danger of a relief army.657 
Then they targeted the strategic stronghold of Castrogiovanni which was the head quarters of 
the local Emir Ibn al-Hawas and of great strategic importance,658 situated west of Mount Etna 
and Val Demone in central Sicily. The Normans, being far from their bases and in hostile 
territory where they had to rely on the local Christian orthodox population for supplies, along 
with the menacing approach of winter, could not afford to stay in Sicily for long. But the 
Muslims were nowhere to be found. In their usual tactics, Robert and Roger were active in 
seeking battle with their enemy, and they pillaged their way down to Castrogiovanni, killing 
many of the inhabitants, according to Malaterra, in order to provoke the Emir to face them.659  
                                                 
654 It would have been very interesting if we had any idea about the Muslim warning system 
using beacons. See: “On Strategy”, 8. 1-20, p. 26; P. Pattenden, “The Byzantine Early 
Warning System”, Byzantion, 53 (1983), 258-99. 
655 Malaterra, 2. 1. 
656 Amatus, V. 20.  
657 Malaterra, 2. 15; Amatus, V. 21. 
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659 Malaterra, 2. 16. 
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     Thus took place the first of the major pitched battles between the Normans and the 
Muslims (summer 1061), close to the fortress of Castrogiovanni and on the banks of the river 
Dittaino. The heavily outnumbered army commanded by Robert Guiscard inflicted a heavy 
defeat on the Muslim army, a tremendously important victory for the Norman morale, if we 
consider the fact that the Norman conquest of Sicily was in its early stages. In the aftermath 
of the battle, apart from plundering the enemy camp, the Normans did not have any other 
significant gains and with the escape of a large number of Muslims (including Ibn al-Hawas) 
back into the fortress, any further stay in the area would have been pointless. Thus we have 
Roger’s decision to retire back to Messina after a successful pillaging expedition to 
Agrigento.660   
     Despite the promising beginning, the conquest of Sicily proved a very lengthy process. So 
far, in their first year, the Normans had managed to take control over most of the areas of the 
north-east of the island, the Val Demone, mainly consisting of Greek-Orthodox Christians.661 
This anti-Muslim feeling of the population of that region had emerged as a significant factor 
already since the Byzantine expedition of the 1038-41, and it can be attributed to the 
aggressive Kalbite policy of extending the Muslim colonies in the south and east of the 
island.662 But once the Muslims had recovered from their initial shock, they resisted stoutly 
for many more years. However, the main reason for the difficulty in conquering the island 
certainly was the rarity of occasions when the Normans could deploy sufficient forces to 
Sicily, with Roger having just a few hundred knights to maintain his dominions and launch 
plundering expeditions when neccessary. Throughout the year 1062, no major conflicts 
                                                 
660 Malaterra, 2. 17; a similar plundering expedition was conducted during the following 
winter by Roger and 250 knights in Agrigento, see: Ibid., 2. 18. 
661 For the Greek-Orthodox element in Sicily and, more specifically, in the Val Demone: V. 
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between the Normans and the Muslims occured, mostly because of Roger’s strife with his 
brother.663      
     To understand why Robert Guiscard could ill-afford to send many troops to his brother in 
Sicily, apart from their strife already mentioned in 1062, was the fact that Apulia was a far 
more important operational theatre than Sicily. And to follow Guiscard’s operations in the 
region, he had to deal with the conquests of Brindisi (recaptured by the Byzantines soon 
after) and Oria in 1062, along with a serious rebellion at Cosenza, in Calabria, in 1064-65 
which took several months to suppress.664 Robert’s attention was again turned to Apulia only 
after 1065, capturing Vieste and Otranto by the end of 1066. Soon afterwards, however, he 
was about to face the most dangerous rebellion against his power in Apulia, headed by 
Amicus, Joscelin of Molfetta, Roger Toutebove and two of his own nephews, Geoffrey of 
Conversano and Abelard.665 The way in which the operational theatres of Apulia and Sicily 
are connected is clear, thus in order to properly examine the Norman invasion of Sicily we 
should keep a close eye to the political and military developments across the straits of 
Messina.  
     After the settlement of the strife between Robert and his brother Roger in spring 1063, we 
can see a slight change of tactics used by the latter to conduct his warfare in Sicily. In order 
to diminish his disadvantage of having a very small number of knights at his disposal - 
stipendiary troops from his own household in Calabria, along with soldiers serving primarily 
for booty as we have already examined in detail - he used the mobility and speed of the 
horses to lay ambushes to the Muslims, with the most characteristic example that of the 
Norman victory at Cerami, in the early summer of 1063. However, important as it was, the 
                                                 
663 Malaterra, 2. 23; Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 155; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 
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664 Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 132. 
665 Although Chalandon has noted that the rebellion began in 1064, recent studies by Loud 
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victory at Cerami did not bring the Normans closer to conquering the island but merely 
confirmed their holding of the north-eastern part. Roger simply maintained his army in a 
hand-to-mouth basis, relying on plundering raids, mostly in the south and south-west of the 
island, while help from Apulia was far from imminent.  
     Following the events at Cerami, we have very little information concerning what was 
taking place in Sicily during the next four years, which suggests either that Roger had only a 
few troops at his disposal, or because the Muslims were putting vigorous resistance to the 
Norman expansion. Nonetheless, we are told that Roger maintained pressure on his enemies 
and carried on with his advance, albeit gradual, along the north coast towards the capital.666 
Petralia, which had been abandoned in 1062, was reoccupied and made Roger’s main base in 
Sicily,667 with its fortifications being improved in 1066.668 By 1068, the raids conducted by 
Roger were affecting the entire north coast, reaching close to Palermo itself and, in that year, 
he was able to inflict a bloody defeat on the Muslims at Misilmeri, only 12 kilometres south-
east of the capital. 
 
The conquests of Bari (1071) and Palermo (1072)  
 
     By the end of August 1068, Robert Guiscard was ready to begin the most ambitious 
military operation he had yet undertaken – the siege of Bari. And there is no doubt about the 
significance of this military operation. Even though the Byzantines had been dislodged from 
their bases elsewhere in Italy, Bari was still the largest and wealthiest city, the most important 
port of southern Adriatic and the seat of the Catepan of the Byzantine province, or what was 
                                                 
666 Malaterra, 2. 38. 
667 Roger’s attention to the west and north is marked by his moving of his main base from 
Troina to Petralia. 
668 Malaterra, 2. 38. 
167 
 
left, of Longobardia.669 By the year 1068, the Normans had enjoyed a significant number of 
victories against all of their enemies in both Italy and Sicily, with their record being quite 
admirable indeed. But their major weakness at this stage was their lack of experience in 
conducting siege and naval warfare.  
     During the siege of the city, Guiscard did his best to exploit the internal divisions among 
the inhabitants of Bari. From the side of the Byzantine government, two attempts were made 
to relieve the city with shipments of supplies and money. One took place in 1069, when 
Bariot officials returned from Constantinople with a supply fleet, but as Amatus tells us “this 
small amount of money was quickly consumed.”670 The second, early in 1071, was led by 
Joscelin of Molfetta, a Norman rebel who had fled to Constantinople after the suppression of 
the Norman rebellion in 1068.671 In between the two attempts, Guiscard made an expedition 
with his fleet further south, at Brindisi, in 1070. Probably he wished to create a diversion, 
which however ended in a defeat of his fleet by the Byzantine naval officer and commander 
of a naval squadron, Leo Mavrikas, while his land forces were ambushed by the governor of 
Brindisi.672 
     Bari’s surrender on 16th April 1071 was a tremendous success for the Norman duke, who 
now possessed the last Byzantine stronghold not only in Apulia but in the entire Italian 
Peninsula. But not for the first time, luck did indeed favour him. We do not know with 
certainty whether Robert was aware of the geo-political events that were taking place in Asia 
Minor, but his timing in launching this operation could not have been better. Since his climb 
to the throne of Constantinople, in 1068, Romanus IV Diogenes was preoccupied with the 
fight against the Seljuc Turks in Asia Minor, a multitude of provinces far more important to 
the Empire than Longobardia. Thus Romanus, an old and experienced Byzantine general, 
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chose the eastern theatre as his main priority and, consequently, he could not spare any 
reinforcements for the besieged people of Bari. Guiscard might have been informed about 
these events by the Franks who were serving in the Imperial Army, but we cannot be entirely 
sure. Thus, the speed in which the Normans had cleared Apulia and Calabria off the 
Byzantine presence there can be largely attributed to the lack of substantial reinforcements 
sent by the central government.  
     The duke has seen the importance that the conquest of Palermo would have to his 
dominance over the entire island, already since 1064, but his expedition then failed due to the 
lack of resources, sufficient manpower and naval support. In Bari he had managed to overturn 
these inefficiencies, with the naval blockade conducted by his navy being the key move that 
won him the city. Palermo was a large coastal city-port, like Bari, and Guiscard could do 
nothing else but to apply, once more, the same strategy. However, the siege was preceded by 
a diversion expedition to southern Sicily, conducted by Roger, to draw the attention of the 
Zirids of Tunisia to Malta rather than Palermo. This is clearly suggested by Malaterra, who 
also notes the capture of Catania as a “trophy” of this campaign.673 Sicily was very important 
for the Zirids, mostly for importing large quantities of wheat and grain, and although they had 
officially withdrawn from Sicily a few years earlier, they still had forces in the island, as 
William of Apulia mentions the presence of Muslim ships that later engaged the Normans;674 
so the diversion attack was wisely ordered by Robert. 
     The Normans had achieved in conquering half of the island by 1071, including the capital 
and some of the most important cities, only by displaying considerable flexibility in arranging 
terms of surrender when dealing with a siege of a powerful stronghold, a strategy that they 
had already used with relative success in Calabria and Sicily for more than a decade. Both 
Robert Guiscard and Roger allowed the local population to surrender their city without 
inflicting any damage to them or their properties and to swear allegiance to him, while in 
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many cases not even a Norman garrison was installed,675 mostly due to lack of a sufficient 
number of troops. Further, during the period of the 1060s until the siege of Palermo, Guiscard 
was active in taking advantage of the divisions among his enemies. In Bari, he was well 
aware of the fact that a storming operation against the city walls would have been a failure, 
thus he favoured the pro-Norman party of the city which was struggling to convince the 
Bariots to surrender. In Sicily, Robert chose the right timing in leading his army to the island, 
which in the last couple of decades was politically divided between three emirs, taking the 
part of Ibn al-Timnah who controlled the Christian north-eastern part and had earlier asked 
for their military assistance.   
     After 1072 and the gradual establishment of the Norman power in Sicily, we have to 
examine, albeit briefly, Count Roger’s demands for military service from Muslim 
populations.676 From what information we get from our primary sources – mainly Malaterra 
and Amatus, we understand that the great need of Robert Guiscard and Roger for locally 
raised troops would have developed into some sort of an agreement with the local Muslim 
communities for a quota of militias, most likely non-fixed, in addition to the expected tribute. 
If we look first at the demand for military service from the people of Iato, in the Muslim Val 
di Mazara, in 1079: “the people of Iato came to despise the yoke of our people and renounced 
their previous agreement to provide service and tribute.”677 Amatus also writes that Guiscard 
had used Muslim sailors in his blockade of Salerno in 1076,678 while for the 1084 Illyrian 
expedition Malaterra mentions ships from “all over Apulia, Calabria and Sicily.”679 Also, 
Roger used Muslim elements at Cosenza (1091) and Castrovillari (1094).680 The most 
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significant deployment of Muslim troops, however, came during the siege of Capua by Roger 
and Richard II of Capua in 1098, where Roger had “many thousands” of Muslim troops in his 
service that constituted the largest part of his army.681      
 
Major siege operations conducted by the Normans in Italy and Sicily (1050s-70s) 
 
     The Normans took the initiative in Italy right after their victory at Civitate, with the most 
remarkable advances taking place in Calabria, mostly between the years 1056-9, a period 
when all the Byzantine strongholds in the peninsula surrendered to Guiscard. The siege of the 
city of Reggio, which began in the late 1059, marked an important chapter in Norman 
military expertise, not only because it was the first major city that the Normans had to fight 
themselves in, but also because it was the first recorded case where the Normans actually 
used siege engines of such a size and scale.682 The garrison of Reggio was eventually forced 
to surrender in the early summer of 1060, and as Malaterra tells us: “when they [Byzantines] 
saw the siege machines being pulled up towards it [fortress], they lost confidence in their own 
strength and came to terms.”683  
     In Apulia during the same period, Troia fell to Robert not before a land blockade forced 
the defenders to surrender due to hunger, in 1060, while in early 1068, during Robert’s siege 
of his nephew Geoffrey’s stronghold at Montepeloso, after the latter’s rebellion against his 
uncle a few months earlier, the city capitulated only after the Normans bribed the local 
castellan.684 At Messina, the only city where the Normans had to force themselves into, luck 
favoured them because most of the garrison had already been put out of action in a previous 
sortie and the remaining defenders were caught by surprise. But conducting an effective land 
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and naval blockade in a large and well-fortified city such as Bari surely presented a huge task 
for Guiscard’s newly-established navy and relatively inexperienced army.  
     The siege of Bari began in August/September 1068 and the necessity of a wide-range 
mobilisation of all the Italian vassals of Robert was clear. This probably must have triggered 
the rebellion in Apulia and Calabria a year earlier, when Guiscard demanded military service 
from his vassals, a rebellion that was provoked by the refusal of certain powerful vassals to 
offer military service for lands they had conquered on their own – a rebellion that was fuelled 
by Byzantine money.685 Even though the Normans must have brought all the soldiers they 
could spare, along with Calabrians to man their ships, none of the chroniclers give an 
estimate of the numbers of either of the opposing armies.686 The Byzantines were quick to see 
that they were impregnable behind their high walls, and so they were reluctant to offer the 
Normans what they really wanted – a pitched battle. Thus, Guiscard immediately ordered his 
fleet to block the entrance of the city’s port and bring the siege engines “of different types” in 
front of the city, ready to make full use of them.687 The siege continued for more than two 
and a half years, a clear sign of Guiscard’s decisiveness and (financial) ability to keep large 
numbers of troops in the field for long periods, during which reinforcements also arrived 
from Sicily under Roger.688 The determination of the Bariots, however, seemed strong.  
     Something quite striking that needs to be mentioned at this point is the absence of the 
local units of the Byzantine navy from the area. None of the chroniclers mention the presence 
of any Byzantine ships in the initial stages of the siege and Robert Guiscard was left, 
apparently, unopposed to impose his naval blockade on the city. We cannot be sure about 
what might had happened to the Italian units of the Byzantine provincial fleet, but we 
pressume that either they would have been evacuated to Dyrrachium, a much safer base, or 
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they would have been patrolling the southern Adriatic coasts of Apulia, from Bari to Otranto. 
The last seems more likely, since we saw a naval squadron of unknown strength defeating 
Robert Guiscard’s units off Brindisi in 1070 under Leo Mavrikas, a senior naval officer who 
will be seen again off the Dyrrachian coasts in 1081.  
     Once Bari had capitulated on the 16th April 1071, a major expedition to Sicily was ordered 
since the campaigning period had just begun. After staying a few days at Bari, Robert ordered 
his army to move to Reggio,689 while his brother was already on his way to Sicily for his task 
in diverting the Muslims’ attention elsewhere. We do not have any specific numbers by the 
chroniclers, neither for the Muslim garrison of Palermo nor for the Normans, but we know 
that Guiscard ordered all of his troops that had taken part at the Bari campaign to follow him 
to Reggio. Guiscard’s fleet is estimated by Amatus to at least 50, while Lupus 
Protospatharius takes the number up to 58.690 This was an important increase on the 
Norman’s fleet capacity that probably came from all the captured Bariot ships, in comparison 
to the naval operation at Messina only twelve years earlier when Robert had only thirteen 
transport ships. This significant increase in the number of ships makes us think that there 
might have been a plan of overcoming Bari first in order to obtain more ships for the siege of 
Palermo. The mariners that manned the Norman ships were Calabrians, Bariots and, 
according to William of Apulia, captive Greeks, while the marines were definitely 
Normans.691 Finally, we have to mention a great strategic movement by Robert who, in order 
to secure his back from any relief army, he installed the son of Serlo at the region of Cerami 
and Castrogiovanni to harass the enemy.692  
     The siege of Palermo lasted for five months and, although the chroniclers’ accounts are 
contradictory, we are able to reconstruct the basic chain of events. It is clear that the city was 
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blockaded by land and sea and that there were sorties and sharp engagements between 
Norman and Palermitan detachments under the city’s walls.693 As time went on, hunger and 
disease quickly became a major problem for the besieged, a clear sign that the city was not 
adequately prepared for a siege and maybe Roger’s diversionary expedition to Catania had 
brought results.694 Regarding naval engagements, William of Apulia talks about a battle 
between the Norman and a mixed Kalbite-Zirid fleet of unknown size outside the port of 
Palermo, when the Normans forced their enemies to retreat back into the port.695 Finally, 
Guiscard entered the city by applying a simple trick of diverting the enemy in one place of 
the city, while an elite unit climbed the walls elsewhere.696 The last line of defence, in the 
original “old-city” of al-Kazar, lasted only for a few days falling on 10th January 1072, and 
the defenders agreed to surrender their city to Guiscard, on condition that he spared their lives 
and allowed them to continue to practice their religion unimpeded.697    
     In the 1070s, two sieges conducted by the Normans took place in Italy, one at Salerno in 
1076 and the other at Naples one year later. The key point in both these cases is that Richard 
of Capua joined forces with Robert Guiscard against papal territories in Campania. At 
Salerno, the Norman army consisted of “three different peoples, Latins, Greeks and Saracens, 
and he [Guiscard] ordered many ships to come to Salerno to guard the harbour”, although no 
specific number is given, while all the neccessary fortifications were built around the city to 
block its approaches.698 In this case, as in many others, the Normans’ main weapon was 
famine, which did not take long to show its first serious effects on the inhabitants. However, 
the city did not choose to surrender but was rather betrayed to Robert on the 13th December 
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1076, almost eight months after the beginning of the siege.699 Even by the mid-1070s, the 
Norman besieging techniques were still famine and treason from within instead of costly 
siege operations that could not guarantee a desirable outcome. 
     After the taking of Salerno, Richard of Capua ordered his forces to assemble and march 
against Naples in the early spring 1077, while asking Robert’s help for a naval blockade. 
According to Amatus, Guiscard sent help in a form of a naval squadron of unknown 
numerical strength from Amalfi – which had surrendered to Guiscard in 1073 – and Calabria, 
while the neccessary fortifications to blockade the city by land were also erected.700 We are 
informed that there were frequent attacks on the city by the Normans, either by land or sea, 
that were repulsed successfully, and numerous attempts by the defenders to counterattack and 
face the Normans outside the city walls.701 But even in this case, the Normans were waiting 
for famine to force the defenders to consider surrendering their city. However, the siege was 
prolonged for many more months, when finally Richard’s death in April 1078 forced the 
Normans of Capua to abandon the operation.702    
 
Major naval operations conducted by the Normans in Italy and Sicily (1060s-70s) 
 
     One of the greatest challenges that the Normans had to face since their arrival in Italy, 
almost four decades ago was the transportation of a large armed force by sea. Since that time, 
even though they were descendants of the Scandinavians, it is quite unlikely that they had 
ever set foot on a war-ship before,703 let alone organise a massive amphibious operation in a 
                                                 
699 Ibid., VIII, 24; Gesta, III, 424-455, pp. 186-88; Romuald of Salerno, s.a. 1076; Lupus 
Protospatharius, s.a. 1077; Chronicon Casin., III, 45, pp. 422-3. 
700 Amatus, VIII. 25. 
701 Amatus even talks about 200 marines being caught by the people of Naples while 
sleeping, see: Ibid., VIII. 25. 
702 Amatus, VIII. 32; Chronic. Casin., III, 45, p. 423. 
703 However, William and Drogo had taken part in the Byzantine expedition in Sicily in 1038, 
when they were transported from the mainland by transport ships of the Byzantine fleet. 
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hostile territory. As William of Apulia notes just before writing about the siege of Bari: “The 
Norman race had up to this point known nothing of naval warfare. He [Robert Guiscard] 
greatly rejoiced at the novelty of this naval victory, hoping that he and the Normans might in 
the future engage in battle at sea with more hope of success.”704 For the period between the 
years 1060-76 the possibility of the Normans having built their own ships can be clearly 
discounted, not only because there is no indication by the chroniclers but also because there 
are no halts in their operations which can be explained by their stopping to build ships. The 
significance, therefore, of Guiscard’s and Roger’s landing in the coasts near Messina in May 
1061 is great for the evolution of military thinking, not only for Italy but for Normandy and 
England as well.705 
     The Normans, apart from lacking experience in conducting naval operations, did not have 
the knowledge or skills to build a fleet of warships and especially horse-transport ships.706 
Consequently all they could do was to use the ships of their conquered subjects, especially 
because the Greeks and the Apulians were very experienced sailors and the Byzantine fleet 
was accustomed to carrying cavalry units, with the most recent examples the 1025 and 1038 
Sicilian campaigns. By conquering Cariati, Rossano, Gerace and Otranto by 1066, meaning 
some of the most important Byzantine ports in southern Italy after Bari, they had the chance 
to use the Greek ships and crew for their own military purposes. Although information about 
                                                 
704 Gesta, III. 132-38, p. 170. 
705 D.P. Waley argues that the knowledge for conducting massive amphibious operations was 
transported to Normandy by the Normans who had taken part in the crossing of the Messina 
straits in 1061. Which, in turn, had been obtained by Normans who participated in the 
Byzantine campaign of 1038-41 against the Muslims in Sicily: D.P. Waley, “Combined 
Operations in Sicily, A.D. 1060-78”, Papers of the British School at Rome, 22 (1954), 121-
22; Bernard Bachrach supports this argument: B.S. Bachrach, “Some Observations on the 
Military Administration of the Norman Conquest”, Anglo-Norman Studies, 8 (1985), 7; idem, 
“On the Origins of William the Conqueror’s Horse Transports”, Technology and Culture, 26 
(1985), 505-31. 
706 The possibility of having shipwrights with them cannot be supported by the chronicler 
material. 
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the types of vessels employed by the Normans in their amphibious operation are scarce, with 
the chroniclers frequently employing the vague term naves,707 in general terms the ships 
captured in the aforementioned ports must have been mostly long, open galleys, heavy round-
hull merchant and small fishing ships which could have been adapted for naval use and 
Venetian and Amalfitan ships of various types, all mentioned with the terms chelandion 
(χελάνδιον), pamfylos (πάμφυλος), sandalion (σανδάλιον), catina (κατίνα), tarida – Arabic 
tarrada, the horse-transport ship of the Muslims in the tenth century that had a square stern 
with two stem-posts, which enabled there to be a ramp that could be lowered to unload the 
horses – and sagena.708  
     There is a debate among historians concerning the use of the Calabrian and Apulian ships 
and their crews. Although the primary sources are vague in their terminology and avoid 
mentioning precisely if the tribute being paid by certain coastal cities, either Italian or 
Sicilian, was accompanied with any supplementary military service, both D.P. Waley and 
John Pryor agree that the ships and crews were hired by the Normans to be used in Sicily and, 
later on, in Bari and Palermo.709 C.D. Stanton on the other hand argues that the Normans 
demanded a quota from each major port as part of a required tribute. This undoubtedly 
resembles the naval equivalent of the feudal service owed by the Cinque Ports in England, 
already established since the years of Edward the Confessor (1042-66), along with the 
                                                 
707 Malaterra mostly uses naves. When he becomes more specific, which is very rare, he uses 
terms like germundi, galea, catti, golafri and dromundi (from the Byzantine dromon): 
Malaterra, 2. 8; Amatus is using the terms catti, naves and galea: Amatus, V. 13-15. 
708 Bennett, “Norman Naval Activity”, 41-58; Pryor, Geography, technology and war, pp. 25-
39, 60-63; Waley, “Combined Operations in Sicily”, 119-21; C.M. Gillmor, “Naval logistics 
of the cross-Channel operation, 1066”, Anglo-Norman Studies, 7 (1984), 105-31; B.M. 
Kreutz, “Ships, Shipping, and the Implications of Change in the Early Mediterranean”, 
Viator, 7 (1976), 99-100; C.D. Stanton, “Naval Power in the Norman Conquest of Southern 
Italy and Sicily”, Haskins Society Journal, 19 (2008), 130-1. Although I believe that Stanton 
is wrong to suggest that the main type of warship that could have been found in Longobardia 
in the eleventh century was the dromon. I have explained this in a previous chapter. 
709 Waley, “Combined Operations”, 121; Pryor, “Transportation of horses by sea”, 12-13. 
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scipfyrd which simply was the parallel of fyrd-men who served as sailors.710 Although the 
issue of fifteen days service, too short indeed for an ambitious campaign, might have been 
tackled by payment, it would not be wise to dismiss the influence of the Anglo-Saxon naval 
organization upon the “Italian” Normans.  
     In 1061, Guiscard and Roger took, according to Amatus, 270 knights in 13 ships across 
the straits in the first wave and then 166 knights in the second wave,711 in an attempt to 
capture Messina and secure the transportation of the rest of the army from the opposite 
Calabrian coast. However, this number of men transported across the straits in the first wave, 
twenty men with their horses in each ship, meant a ratio of 1:1 for men and horses being 
transported. This would suggest that Guiscard was able to pack his ships with as many horses 
as possible in this short distance crossing, with the distance being a significant factor indeed 
if we compare Messina with Roger’s crossing to Malta thirty years later when he carried just 
fourteen horses in his flagship.712 The number of men and horses also confirms the fact that 
the ships which were used were not designed primarily for transportation, like the Byzantine 
ships which had a loading capacity of about 105-110 men and around 12-20 horses.713  
     If we compare the two theatres of operation, Sicily and England, at first glance there 
seems to be no immediate connection between them. However, there are very strong 
                                                 
710 Stanton, “Naval Power”, 132-4; compare with what E. Van Houts writes about the 
obligation of William II’s magnates to provide ships for the English invasion: Van Houts, 
“The Ship List of William the Conqueror”, 159-83. I did not have the chance to go through: 
S.M. Foster, Some Aspects of Maritime Activity and the Use of Sea Power in Relation to the 
Crusading States, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford 1978. For the service owed by the Cinque Ports, see: 
Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp. 268-72; N.A.M. Rodger, The 
Safeguard of the Sea, vol. I (660-1649), Harper Collins, London, 1997, pp. 23-27; Hollister, 
Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, pp. 103-26; Strickland, “Military Technology and 
Culture”, 373-79.  
711 Amatus, V. 15; 300 and 150 knights respectively, according to Malaterra, see: Malaterra, 
2. 10. 
712 Pryor, “Transportation of horses by sea”, 13.  
713 Pryor, Jeffreys, The Age of the Δρόμων, pp. 123-34, 254-55, 307, 325-30; Waley, 
“Combined Operations”, 121. 
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indications that the knowledge and experience gained in Sicily in 1061 significantly helped 
William the Conqueror in his invasion five years later.714 Even if we dismiss the enigmatic 
line in the Carmen de Hastingae Proelio,715 charter evidence does confirm the fact that 
relations between members of families in Normandy and Italy were maintained,716 and it is 
highly likely that they were the only members of William’s army which the latter could have 
asked for advice on how to transport his large, for the standards of the time, army across the 
English Channel. D.P. Waley notes that the technical problems were the same in the north 
and south,717 and there have been many instances of Mediterranean influence on shipping in 
the north, like the master of the English king’s ship in the early twelfth century who was an 
Italian.718 However, if we dismiss the argument of the many existing similarities of the types 
of warships in the Mediterranean and the North Sea, an argument that cannot be supported by 
what evidence we have for the following centuries, meaning more specifically the absence of 
any “Mediterranean” galleys from northern waters.719 It seems likely that the real 
contribution of the Normans lies not in the ship-building procedure but rather in the 
modification of the existing ships from Flanders or Normandy, either warships similar to their 
Viking predecessors or merchant vessels, to enable them to transport William’s army across 
                                                 
714 I have to include the view of Matthew Bennett who disagrees with the link between the 
Mediterranean and the Channel: M. Bennett, “Amphibious Operations from the Norman 
Conquest to the Crusades of St. Louis, c. 1050-c. 1250”, Amphibious Warfare 1000-1700, ed. 
D.J.B. Trim and M.C. Fissel, Brill, Leiden, 2006, 52-3. Bennett based his argument in a 
series of studies edited in: The Earliest Ships: the evolution of boats into ships, ed. R. 
Gardiner, London, 1996, chapters 5, 7, 8. 
715 The Carmen de Hastingae Proelio of Guy, Bishop of Amiens, ed. and tr. by F. Barlow, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 1999, 259-60, p. 16. 
716 Loud, “How Norman was the Norman Conquest of Southern Italy?”, 13-34; idem, “The 
Kingdom of Sicily and the Kingdom of England, 1066-1266”, History, 88 (October 2003), 
540-67; Menager, “Pesanteur et etiologie”, 189-214; “Inventaires des Familles”, 260-390. 
717 Although Gillmor argues that the landing ground in Sussex required ships with shorter 
hulls, see: “Naval logistics”, 105-31.  
718 Haskins, Norman Institutions, pp. 121-2. 
719 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, p. 265. 
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the Channel. Given that the “Italian” Normans had not witnessed the construction of any 
Byzantine or Italian vessel, or at least their presence in any shipyard in Italy is not recorded, 
they are unlikely to have put into practice a ship-building knowledge that they had not 
acquired. These Normans, however, have seen firsthand how a merchant vessel could be 
modified to transport horses, and this experience they could transfer to their counterparts in 
northern France. This argument can be further enhanced by the fact that, although William of 
Poitiérs tells us that ships were ordered to be constructed, it is highly unlikely that a large 
number of them would have been built in the few months before the landing at Sussex.  
      
Major pitched battles fought by the Normans in Italy and Sicily (1040s-70s) 
 
     The three battles fought in the year 1041 between the Byzantines and the united Lombard-
Norman rebel forces were of great importance for the future of the Norman establishment at 
Melfi and in Italy in general. For the first pitched battle on the banks of the river Olivento on 
17th March 1041, the rebel force consisted of 500 infantrymen and 700 cavalrymen,720 
placing the Normans in the centre of the formation as the most elite and well-equipped unit, 
and keeping the infantry on the sides to protect the flanks.721 William does not tell us of the 
composition of the Byzantine army nor can we believe his comments that they were 
numerous enough,722 but he does let us know of their battle tactic of not letting their entire 
army engage the enemy in one attack-wave. Instead they preferred sending one battalion at a 
time in repeated attacks until the enemy’s front had been broken.723 The Byzantine units that 
engaged the rebel forces at Olivento probably consisted of local militias with limited or no 
military experience and poor equipment and probably did not manage to resist the impetus of 
                                                 
720 William also says that few of the Normans had hauberks: “Obtectos clipeis paucos lorita 
tuetur”, Gesta, I, 259, p. 112; Amatus, II. 21. 
721 Gesta, I. 260-62, p. 112. 
722 Gesta, I. 255-6, p. 112; Amatus, I. 21; Malaterra, 1. 10. 
723 That tactic is also attested by: Amatus, II. 21. 
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a Norman cavalry charge. And this is because it is unlikely that an elite and numerous enough 
army could have been deployed from Sicily, where the army was still based since Maniaces’ 
campaign, to Apulia in such a short notice (maybe even less than two weeks). Also, Skylitzes 
does not mention the presence of elite troops at Olivento,724 but for the next battle at Ofanto a 
few weeks later he specifically talks about troops from the Greek mainland and Varangians. 
     The second battle took place at the river Ofanto further south, on the 4th May. After having 
received all the necessary reinforcements from Sicily,725 the Byzantines faced the rebels in a 
battle for which we know next to nothing apart from the Byzantine army’s retreat after 
repeated attempts to break the enemy’s front, suffering heavy casualties.726 The numerical 
strength of the opposing armies is not known, but the rebel army is unlikely to have suffered 
many casualties at Olivento, and if they had it must not have been difficult to replace them 
with new recruits joining their army after their previous victory. For the third and final battle 
of the year, fought at Montepeloso on the 3rd September, although Amatus tells us that the 
new Catepan Boioannes had brought with him Varangians from the capital,727 and William 
talks about reinforcements called from Sicily,728 it is more likely that Boioannes had to rely 
on the forces that his predecessor had gathered,729 along with newly recruited Apulian troops 
as well. For the rebel force, Amatus’ comments on their recruiting tactics imply that were 
hard-pressed and low on numbers, probably a few hundred strong.730 The initiative on the 
battlefield belonged to the rebels who, being aware of the position of the enemy camp sent a 
small force in an attempt to steal horses – an indication that they still did not possess enough 
                                                 
724 Skylitzes, II, p. 546. 
725 Skylitzes, II, p. 546; Anon. Bar., s.a. 1041; Amatus, II. 22. 
726 Amatus, II. 23; Gesta, I, 297-308, p. 114; Malaterra, 1.10, although Malaterra confuses 
Ofanto with Montepeloso; Chronic. Casin., II, 66, pp. 298-301. 
727 Amatus, II. 24; Chronic. Casin., II, 66, pp. 298-301.  
728 Gesta, I, 328-30, p. 116. 
729 Skylitzes is adamant that no reinforcements were sent with Boioannes from the mainland, 
see: Skylitzes, II, p. 546. 
730 Amatus, II. 25. 
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mounts in the region – from them and force them to come out of the camp and fight them in a 
pitched battle. This they did and they also succeeded in inflicting a third and final defeat on 
the Byzantines.731 
     By the year 1040, the Normans had already established a permanent base at Aversa, but it 
was only in 1041 when they allied themselves with Lombard rebels and seriously challenged 
the Byzantine authority in a key fortress in Apulian territory. As in the previous decades, the 
numbers of Norman cavalry units engaged in the Lombard rebellion is not mentioned, with a 
figure between 500-1000 cavalry being the most likely. The Norman cavalry would have 
constituted the most elite unit of the rebel army and so it would have been deployed in the 
centre of the formation in order to take full advantage of its heavy cavalry charge and, 
hopefully, overrun the Byzantine units. It would have been extremely valuable if we had any 
information about the impact of the Norman cavalry charge on the opposing Byzantine 
formations, especially if they had engaged infantry units of the Varangian Guard, a prelude to 
the battle of Dyrrachium in 1081, but our primary material lets us down.   
     The most crucial battle, however, for the future of the Norman presence in Italy took place 
at Civitate on the 17th June 1053. The army that Pope Leo had managed to gather after his trip 
to Germany in March and his descent to southern Italy in May was indeed substantial. It 
consisted of troops from Capua, the Abruzzi and the Lombard areas of northern Capitanata, 
with some troops arriving also from Benevento and Spoleto. The southern Italian leaders that 
actively participated in the anti-Norman coalition were Duke Atenulf of Gaeta, his brother 
Count Lando of Aquino, the Counts of Teano, Guardia and Campomarino from the Biferno 
Valley in the Adriatic coast.732 Further, this force was augmented by reinforcements from 
Germany, probably freebooters, prosecuted criminals or just men who had been influenced by 
the Pope, even though Henry III had recalled his Imperial troops earlier in March. These 
                                                 
731 For this battle see: Amatus, II. 26; Gesta, I, 373-95, pp. 118-20; Chronic. Casin., II, 66, 
pp. 298-301; Malaterra, 1. 10. 
732 Gesta, II, 148-176, p. 140. 
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troops consisted of an infantry733 force of several hundred, seven according to William of 
Apulia who is our most detailed source for this battle, but probably not more than three from 
Swabia with a certain Garnier and Albert as their leaders.734 But faced with this threat, the 
Normans were also forced to unite, whatever differences and tensions there may have been 
among them in the past. Humphrey of the Hautevilles had the overall command of the army, 
who had succeeded his brother Drogo as leader of the Melfi Normans two years earlier, 
having with him Peter and Walter the sons of Amicus, the Hautevilles’ principal competitors, 
the Beneventan Normans, Gerald of Buonalbergo, Count Richard of Aversa (since 1049) and 
Robert Guiscard from Calabria. William estimated their number to 3,000 cavalry and a few 
infantry, a force which was quite large for the standards of the period and thus we can 
pressume that a number about half of that might seem more reasonable.735 
     The Normans divided their forces into three main divisions, the centre commanded by 
Humphrey, the right wing by Richard of Aversa and the left was entrusted to Robert 
Guiscard. Opposite to him, Humphrey had the Swabian infantry, while in the wings were 
placed the rest of the Italian forces.736 Most of the armies of this early Norman period were 
divided into three or four units called battles or divisions (acies), with them, however, being 
lined up one behind the other.737 But there are many examples of this period where the battles 
were put in the field directly facing the enemy, with Civitate, Tinchebray, Hastings and 
Dyrrachium being just a few examples. It seemed more reasonable, when an army consisted 
of more than one nation, it had more than one general or if they wished to increase the length 
of their formation, like in the case of Civitate, to be arrayed into three parallel divisions all 
facing the enemy. But there was no well-established model to follow in the case of battle-
arraying and it was up to the general to choose the right battle formation for his army. 
                                                 
733 William notes that the “Teutons” were not used to riding a horse, see: Gesta, II, 153-54, p. 
140. 
734 Ibid., II, 151-163, p. 140 . 
735 Gesta, II, 122-138, p. 138. 
736 Ibid., II, 183-191, p. 142; Amatus, III. 40; Chronic. Casin., II, 84, pp. 331-3. 
737 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, p. 315. 
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     The battle took place on the 17th June, with Richard’s cavalry units directly attacking the 
enemy’s left wing which melted away almost at once and was pursued by the advancing 
Norman horsemen. While this pursuit was on its way, the rest of the Norman cavalry had 
already engaged the enemy which, according to William, chose to retreat, apart from the 
Swabians who put a vigorous resistance and refused to leave their position. At this crucial 
point, we are aware of Richard’s return from the pursuit of the Italians to attack the Swabian 
infantry, with his manoeuvre ending up in a massacre and one of the most decisive victories 
of the eleventh century.738 In this case, although the Normans were numerically inferior to the 
Papal army, the key to victory laid on their use their traditional heavy cavalry charge against 
a heterogeneous infantry army. Even the mere sight of a Norman cavalry charge must have 
been terrifying to the Italians, who many of them might not have been well-disciplined or 
trained and with low morale, with the onslaught and the retreat from the battle-field being the 
outcome. However, we must also stress the fact that, although the cavalry dominated the 
battle of Civitate, this battle can also demonstrate the power of heavy infantry as well, like 
the Germans who, even though they were heavily outnumbered, their discipline and 
experience allowed them to put a stout resistance. The retreat of the Lombard units of 
infantry cannot in any case diminish the importance of heavy infantry on a battlefield of this 
period and we can very well imagine that the result would have been rather different if the 
Papal army consisted of more units like the Swabians. Cavalry operating alone stood no 
chance against heavy and well-disciplined infantry – only when the formation had been 
disrupted was it possible to carry on with a heavy charge.739 But this issue will be analysed in 
more detail when I examine the battle of Dyrrachium. 
                                                 
738 Gesta, II, 211-256, pp. 142-146; Amatus, III. 40. 
739 J. Gillingham, “An Age of Expansion, c. 1020-1204”, Medieval Warfare, 64, 76-8; M. 
Bennett, “The Myth of the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry”, Armies, Chivalry and 
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     Crossing to Sicily, the first battle in the Norman quest of subduing the island occured 
close to the fortress of Castrogiovanni and in the banks of the river Dittaino (summer 1061). 
The Norman army consisted of seven hundred knights and maybe the same numbers in 
infantry740 while the Muslims allegedly had 15,000 horsemen and 100,000 infantry, a surely 
exaggerated number given by Amatus.741 However, it is almost certain that the Normans were 
heavily outnumbered. In this battle, they did not put their army in the field in three separate 
battalions, forming one attack-wave as in their victory at Civitate, but Roger was rather 
chosen to command the first wave and Robert would follow him with the second if 
neccessary. Also, the Muslims too had formed three battle lines.742 Unfortunately, the course 
of the battle is unknown to us, but it is suggested that the Norman cavalry charged once again 
upon their enemies in their usual manner, forcing the Muslims to retreat to the castle of 
Castrogiovanni with heavy casualties.743 The result of the battle, although it brought no 
significant military gains to the Normans, it was a tremendous boost for their morale and 
fame as warriors throughout Sicily and Italy.  
     After almost a year of no large scale fighting between the Normans and the Muslims, the 
newly arrived North-African army, along with the re-grouped Kalbite Muslims, marched 
towards the Norman strongholds in June 1063 and met their enemies in the banks of the river 
Cerami, some 10 kilometres from Roger’s base at Troina. After a standstill of three days, the 
Normans won a confrontation at the castle of Cerami, where Serlo, commanding only thirty-
six knights, forced an enemy force of about 3,000 cavalry men and many infantry to 
                                                 
740 Amatus gives the numbers of 1,000 for cavalry and infantry, but Guiscard had 
undoubtedly left some of his men to garrison Messina as Malaterra tells us, and so the 
number 700 must be closer to reality, see: Malaterra, 2. 17; Amatus, V. 23; Guiscard’s 
number of 700 cavalry is also reported by Ibn al-Athir. See: Amari, Storia dei Musulmani di 
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741 Amatus, V. 23; Chronic. Casin., III, 15, pp. 377-9 ; Malaterra is careful to distinguish 
between the local Sicilian Muslims and reinforcements that had arrived from Tunisia, see: 
Malaterra, 2. 17. 
742 Malaterra, 2. 17. 
743 Ibid., 2. 17; Amatus, V. 23. 
185 
 
retreat.744 After this initial success, Roger’s force of a hundred knights engaged the enemy by 
forming two battles (vanguard and rearguard). But the re-grouped Muslim army managed to 
repel the first Norman attack and move against the rearguard which was commanded by 
Roger. At this point, however, according to Malaterra, who is our only source for this battle, 
the divine intervention of St-George along with Roussel of Bailleuil’s exhortations saved the 
day for the Normans who counter-attacked and forced their enemies to retreat. For the 
outcome of the battle, Malaterra gives the number of 15,000 dead and 20,000 Muslim 
prisoners, which even if it is grossly exaggerated, it confirms the fact that the 136 Norman 
knights were vastly outnumbered by their enemies.745 
     Only a few months before Guiscard’s most ambitious military operation until that time – 
the siege of Bari – the last major pitched battle fought against the Muslims took place at 
Misilmeri (1068), some 12 kilometres south-east of the capital Palermo. The information 
given by Malaterra is sparse, but we are able to reconstruct the main chain of events. After 
launching a plundering expedition to the Palermo area, Roger’s cavalry force came upon a 
sizeable mixed Zirid and Kalbite army at Misilmeri which was arranged in battle order, 
waiting for their arrival. We are unaware of the exact size of the two armies, but as usual, the 
Normans must have been many times outnumbered. Roger did not hesitate this time, as in 
Cerami, and after arranging his army’s battle lines and having surprise on his side, launched 
an attack upon the enemy. Once again, the Muslims were unable to withstand a Norman 
cavalry attack and Malaterra tells us that hardly anyone survived to carry the news to 
Palermo.746 
 
     A number of important conclusions about the Norman strategy and battle-tactics employed 
in the south can be drawn here before we proceed to examination of the main topic of my 
thesis, the Norman invasions of Illyria. First of all we have to distinguish two periods in the 
                                                 
744 Certainly an exaggerating number: Malaterra, 2. 33. 
745 Malaterra, 2. 33. 
746 Malaterra, 2. 41. 
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Norman establishment in Italy, with the turning point being the battle at Civitate (1053), quite 
likely the most significant pitched battle in Italian medieval history. In the pre-Civitate period 
the Normans were mere auxiliary units, playing no significant role in the development of the 
political status quo of the region. Numbering a few hundreds, they were bands of elite 
cavalry mercenaries employed by the highest bidder, which included the Lombards, the 
Byzantines, the German Emperors and great ecclesiastical institutions in the Abruzzi. Two 
key-points were the establishment of two bands of them in Aversa (1030) and Melfi (1041/2). 
The first attempt to dislodge the Normans from Italy took place at Civitate in 1053, and the 
failure of the Papal army of Leo IX marked the beginning of the end for the Lombards and 
the Byzantines in the region. Calabria and great parts of mainland Apulia had been conquered 
by the end of the decade, and in 1061 Robert Guiscard and his brother invaded Sicily. The 
conquest of the island, however, was to prove a far tougher bet than the Normans would have 
anticipated, owing to the lack of sufficient numbers available and internal problems in 
Apulia, with Palermo falling eleven years later and the last Muslim garrison being expelled in 
1091.   
     In the pre-Civitate period, pitched battles were relatively rare and with the numbers 
involved not exceeding a few thousands. It was only in Civitate were the Normans played a 
protagonist role, thus facing the Papal army and being heavily outnumbered by the 
Lombards. Having fought with and against their Lombard adversaries they were aware of 
their weaknesses and chose to apply their heavy cavalry charge, which had a tremendous 
effect on the enemy footsoldiers. After Civitate, pitched battles were also rare but this does 
not necessarily mean that the Normans were pursuing a “Vegetian Strategy” – the avoidance 
of battle unless the chances are overwhelmingly in their favour. Being the aggressors in the 
two operational theatres of the period – Apulia and Sicily – they actively pursued battle but it 
was only in Sicily that they got what they wished. In the three pitched battles fought in Sicily 
between 1061-68, we see the Normans once more adjusting their battle tactics to the enemy 
they had to face, being aware of the “quality” of troops they had to fight, meaning their 
discipline, morale and, of course, their equipment. In order to counter their numerical 
187 
 
inferiority they were deployed not into three separate cavalry divisions side-by-side, as in 
Civitate in 1053, but one behind the other forming two or three attacking waves, a tactic 
which makes the front of the army shorter but increases the depth of the formation thus 
giving greater impetus to the cavalry. Further, they were choosing a relatively broken, hilly or 
marshy terrain, which was also dominated by a river or an uphill castle, to diminish the 
numerical advantage of their enemies and the mobility of their cavalry. Two conclusions can 
be drawn at this point; first, military tactics play a much more significant role than numbers 
in a pitched battle, with the Normans using their cavalry charge to overbalance their 
numerical inferiority in the battlefield four times in fifteen years. Second, the Norman 
victories in the battlefields of Italy and Sicily could not determine by themselves the course 
of the events. Italy and Sicily were heavily fortified regions with numerous stone castles 
where their adversaries, the Byzantines and the Muslims (mainly after 1072) could lock 
themselves up and refuse battle, thus denying from the Normans their advantage of heavy 
cavalry attack. 
     Up to the 1060s, the key characteristics of the Norman expansionist strategy in the South 
were negotiation and tolerance. The paying of tributes was agreed, along with the building of 
outposts to control and raid a specific area, but no massacre of population is reported or any 
garrison installed – except, of course, in strategic cities. It seems as if the Normans were 
trying to conquer Apulia, Calabria and Sicily as quickly and as cheaply as possible! But after 
having expelled the Byzantines from the interior of the Apulia, Bari stood as the ultimate 
stumbling block to the Norman predominance in Italy. And with the inexperienced, 
outnumbered and ill-equipped Normans being no match to the Bariot fortifications, thus 
Robert Guiscard’s choice of a land and naval blockade that would wear the defenders down. 
The newly “established” Norman navy, that had previously carried hundreds of knights 
across to Sicily in the first Norman amphibious operations of our period, proved capable of 
the task and the city surrendered in early spring of 1071. Palermo was next and exactly the 
same siege strategy was followed with equally successful results.   
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     A final point that needs to be addressed has to do with the role of religion and the religious 
enthusiasm displayed by the Normans during their invasion of Sicily in the 1060s. Although 
we cannot characterise the Norman invasion of Sicily as a Crusade, we can identify it as a 
Holy War and place it among other holy wars of the eleventh century, like the Spanish 
Reconquista.747 We have already seen the role played by Rome in encouraging the Normans 
to invade the island, but what specific examples of religious enthusiasm can we identify in 
the histories of Amatus and Malaterra?  
     Amatus notes that “he [Guiscard] called his knights to take Sicily, saying, ‘I should like to 
deliver the Christians and Catholics who are bound in servitude to the Saracens ... and wreak 
vengeance for this injury to God’.”748 In his pre-battle speech before the battle at 
Castrogiovanni in 1061, Amatus puts the following in Guiscard’s mouth: “The strength of our 
faith has the flame of the Holy Spirit, because in the name of the Holy Trinity we shall take 
this mountain of the dung of heresy and accumulated perversity. God is powerful enough to 
give us victory over the multitude of infidels...”749 But the most important evidence comes 
from Malaterra regarding the battle of Cerami in 1063. In his attempt to encourage the 
heavily outnumbered Normans to attack the Muslims, Roussel of Bailleuil is reported to have 
said that “It is certain that, with God leading us, the enemy will not be able to stand before us. 
This people [Muslims] has rebelled against God, and power which is not directed by God is 
quickly exhausted.”750 And it was while rushing against their enemies, inspired by this speech 
as they were, that the Norman knights witnessed St-George leading the charge in his white 
                                                 
747 Robinson uses the term “Proto-Crusade”: I.S. Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 324ff; for the debate on the terminology 
of Holy War and Crusade and what applies to the eleventh century religious wars, see: C. 
Tyerman, God’s War, a New History of the Crusades, Harvard University Press, 
Massachusetts, 2006, pp. 43-57; J. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, (4th ed.), 
Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2009, 1-26.  
748 Amatus, V. 12. 
749 Ibid., V. 23. 
750 Malaterra, 2. 33. 
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horse and carrying a white standard with a cross tied to the tip of his lance, thus their battle-
cry “God and St-George”. St-George is the most well-known “warrior-saint” of Christianity 
and the white banner with the cross may be a reference to Constantine’s labarum carried at 
the Battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312. But most important is what Malaterra writes about 
the aftermath of the Norman victory at Cerami: “The Pope [Alexander II] sent both his 
apostolic blessing and absolution from sin to the count [Roger] and to all others who were 
helping him to win Sicily from the pagans. The Pope also sent a banner from the Roman see 
... under which the count and his men were to rise up and wage war against the Saracens.” 
Absolution from sins was a significant development, although not a novelty as it was used by 
Leo IV and John VIII as early as the ninth century, while the banner of St-Peter remind us of 
William II’s invasion of England  three years later.751  
     What is interesting about our chroniclers’ accounts on the Norman expansion in Sicily is 
that, even though they stress numerous times the religious toleration that was demonstrated 
by Guiscard’s and Roger’s men throughout the conquest of the island, someone can clearly 
notice their struggle to highlight the religious nature of their fight against the “infidels”. Of 
course, these pre-battle speeches that dominate Amatus’ and Malaterra’s narratives are a 
topos, even though similar “morale-boosting” speeches might have been made. But the exact 
words reflect how the “Italian-Norman” chroniclers perceived the fight against the Muslims – 
as a Holy War to recover lands that were once Christian.752  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
751 C. Erdmann, Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1955, pp. 
23, 139-40, 172-73, 181-83. There is an English translation: The origin of the idea of crusade, 
tr. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977. 
752 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 155-57. 
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8. Robert Guiscard’s invasion of Illyria. The first stage, from the capitulation of Corfu to the 
victory over the Byzantine army (spring – autumn 1081) 
 
     In order to fully understand the significance of the conference at Ceprano that took place 
in June 1080, along with its implications for the future of the Italian peninsula and the 
Norman invasion of Illyria we have to examine, albeit briefly, the Papal-Norman relations in 
the age of Gregory VII.753 Gregory, almost as soon as he was elected in the Papal Curia, 
became openly hostile towards the Normans, thus returning to the papal policy of the pre-
1059 period (established by Leo IX, Victor II and Stephen IX) when the Normans were 
regarded as enemies who endangered the territories of St-Peter.754 The most important cause 
that changed Rome’s policies was the continuous inroads made by Norman troops into the 
Abruzzi area and specifically around Benevento, territories under Papal overlordship since 
the summer of 1073.755 Attempts by abbot Desiderius of Montecassino to set-up a meeting 
between the two parties at Benevento fell on deaf ears and during the following winter 
(1073/4) Gregory took a step further. In February of 1074 he called upon William I of 
Burgundy for help against Robert Guiscard, specifically directing the “fideles sancti Petri” to 
a campaign to “bring the Normans to peace and then cross to Constantinople to bring aid to 
Christians.”756 Even though this expedition failed to materialise, it provide us with the first 
                                                 
753 For more on this, see: H.E.J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, Clarendon, Oxford, 1998, pp. 
425-39; Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 194-209; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 
399-415; I.S. Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990, pp. 367-97; The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 1073-85, tr. H.E.J. Cowdrey, 
Clarendon, Oxford, 2002.  
754 Robinson, The Papacy, 1073-1198, p. 369. 
755 The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 1.18a, pp. 20-1. 
756 The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 1. 49, pp. 54-5. 
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example of the manipulation of a Crusade for political purposes, openly directed against the 
Apulian Normans.757  
     The continuous depredations of the Normans in the Abruzzi, along with the combined 
operations of Richard of Capua and Robert Guiscard against Salerno (1076), Naples (1077) 
and Benevento (1078) resulted in both being excommunicated twice by Gregory, in Lent 
1075 and again in February 1078.758 But we have to bear in mind that diplomatic relations in 
the Italian peninsula were largely depended upon a third party that, theoretically, regarded 
southern Italy as part of its imperium, meaning the German Emperors. Gregory was in open 
conflict with Henry IV since the latter’s involvement in the election of the Archbishop of 
Milan (spring 1076) and him declaring Gregory deposed through a council of German 
bishops.759 And it was this breach of alliance between Rome and Germany that was about to 
see a brief rapprochement of the former party with the Normans, something that was 
convenient for both parties in maintaining the status quo in Italy.760 Gregory had opened 
hostilities in two distant fronts and that was something he could ill afford, let alone risking a 
possible alliance between Henry and the Normans, which came close to materializing in the 
summer of 1076.761 
     Gregory and the Normans were, once more, at odds due to the latter’s siege operations 
against Salerno, Naples and Benevento, as I mentioned earlier, resulting to the second 
excommunication in 1078. And even though by that time the Pope’s relations with Germany 
had improved significantly, with Henry submitting to Gregory at Canosa in January 1077, a 
                                                 
757 H.E.J. Cowdrey, “Pope Gregory VII’s ‘Crusading’ Plans of 1074”, Outremer, Studies in 
the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem, ed. B.Z. Kedar, R.C. Smail, Yad Izhak 
Ben-Svi Institute, Jerusalem, 1982, 27-40. 
758 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 201-4. 
759 For these events, along with Henry’s excommunication by Gregory, see: The Register of 
Pope Gregory VII, 3. 10a, pp. 187-93. 
760 Something quite interesting is Roger’s absolution from his sins while fighting the Muslims 
in Sicily: The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 3. 11, pp. 193-4. 
761 Amatus, VII. 27. 
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solution to the internal problems facing the Emperor reached a dead-end about a year later. 
Once again Gregory was facing an open confrontation in two fronts and it was obvious that 
the alliance with the Normans would be asked. Thus, after the conference at Ceprano between 
Gregory VII, Robert Guiscard and Jordan of Capua, that took place in June 1080, we have the 
final settlement between the Normans and Rome which saw the lifting of the 
excommunication and Robert’s investment with his lands that he previously held from 
Nicholas II and Alexander II since 1059, even those which he had “taken in defiance of the 
Pope”, meaning the disputed lands of Salerno, Amalfi and the Abruzzi area.762 This 
agreement was crucial, not only for the Pope who desperately needed Norman military 
support against Henry IV’s Imperial Army, after the latter’s excommunication in March 
1080, but for the Norman Duke who was anxiously preparing for his Illyrian campaign. The 
latter could not afford to have such an enemy back home while he was fighting on the other 
side of the Adriatic, bearing in mind that the last rebellion in Apulia having taken place only 
one year before (winter 1078/9).763 For both Gregory and Robert, their alliance was dictated 
by the current political climate which they could not possibly ignore. Peace with Gregory 
VII, after six years of almost continuous strife between them, left the Norman Duke free to 
consider his most ambitious plan up to that moment, his campaign against the Byzantine 
Empire.    
     The Norman preparations that begun in Salerno in the summer of 1080, right after the 
conclusion of the treaty of Ceprano, saw the appearance of the deposed Emperor Michael VII 
at the Norman court, something which provided Guiscard with the pretext he needed to 
justify his campaign as a “restoration mission”. Of course, this convenient story is far from 
true and this was what Guiscard hoped the Byzantines would easily fall for and thus follow 
                                                 
762 For the conference at Ceprano, see: Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 206; Chalandon, 
Domination Normande, p. 257; Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, pp. 414-15; The text 
of Guiscard’s investment by Gregory can be found in: The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 8. 
1a, b, c,  pp. 364-5. 
763 For the 1078/79 Apulian rebellion, see: Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 241-43; Chalandon, 
Domination Normande, pp. 254-55.  
193 
 
him against the usurper of the Imperial throne Nicephoros Botaneiates. For this, he also had 
the full support of Rome that had officially recognised his expedition as an effort “to restore 
Emperor Michael VII to the Byzantine throne”. On the 25th July 1080, Gregory VII called 
upon the bishops of Apulia and Calabria and all the “fideles sancti Petri” to go “resolutely in 
true faith with no differences of mind to the help and defence of the aforesaid emperor”, 
offering absolution from their sins as the heavenly reward for their actions.764 But before 
going into the examination of the Norman campaign we should ask how far back do the 
relations between Robert Guiscard and Michael VII date?  
     Michael VII was not the first Emperor to have sought for the Norman alliance. The 
negotiations between the Duke of Apulia and Constantinople can be traced back to the years 
of Romanus IV who had also sought to conclude an alliance treaty, sometime in 1071, 
although it is not clear precisely when.765 The civil conflict in the capital and the coming of 
Michael VII interrupted the negotiations, but the new Emperor was quick to acknowledge the 
significance of an alliance with the Apulian Normans, mainly for the provision of ample 
bodies of mercenaries for the Byzantine army. Thus, he reopened the talks with Robert 
Guiscard by sending a letter, either at the end of 1071 or the beginning of 1072. However this 
treaty, which was to be ratified by a marriage alliance between Guiscard’s daughter and 
Michael’s brother Constantine, was not to be on equal terms; by the letter sent it seems quite 
clear that the Byzantines were attempting to draw the Normans into their own world by 
lavishly giving away titles. According to the terms of the marriage treaty, Robert Guiscard 
was to promise to respect and defend the Imperial territories with all the forces he could 
muster against the enemies of the Emperor.766 
                                                 
764 The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 8. 6, pp. 371-2; I.S. Robinson, “Gregory VII and the 
Soldiers of Christ”, History, 58 (1973), 182-83. 
765 C.N. Sathas, Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi, Venice-Paris, 1872-94, vol. V, p. 387; W.B. 
McQueen,  “Relations between the Normans and Byzantium, 1071-1112”, Byzantion, 56 
(1986), 429. 
766 Sathas, Bibliotheca graeca medii aevi, V, p. 387. 
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     Robert Guiscard proved smart enough not to be drawn into this “trap” and turn himself 
into a “vassal-Duke” of the Empire. The negotiations carried on throughout the following 
year, with another letter being sent probably at the end of 1072 or the beginning of 1073.767 It 
was the chrysobull of August 1074, however, that finally ratified the alliance between the 
Normans and Constantinople, with Michael’s newly born son being “offered” as a stronger 
footing while we also observe a return to the 1071/2 policy of augmenting the importance of 
Byzantine power over the Norman authority in southern Italy.768 What actually “persuaded” 
Guiscard to give in to Michael’s proposals was the immense political pressure applied by the 
Pope, Gregory VII, triggered by Michael’s exhortations (summer 1073) for a military 
campaign against the Seljucs to save the Empire “after the Normans [Guiscard] have been 
pacified”.769  
     In relation to Robert Guiscard’s pretext of acting in favour of the deposed Emperor 
Michael VII,770 another point that needs to be presented is the deeper reasons behind Robert 
Guiscard’s invasion of the Byzantine Empire.771 Undoubtedly, the marriage alliance between 
Robert and Michael, along with the “shame” that the latter’s deposition must had brought to 
Robert’s daughter would had been a blow to him but it is rather naive to think that the Duke 
would have launched such an expedition for these rather trivial reasons. In the words of Anna 
Comnena: “He [Guiscard] was always thinking out some more ambitious project. He seized 
on the pretext of his connection by marriage with the Emperor [Michael VII] and dreamed of 
                                                 
767 McQueen, “Relations between the Normans and Byzantium”, 430. 
768 The full text of the chrysobull can be found in: H. Bibicou, “Une page d’histoire 
diplomatique de Byzance au XIe siecle: Michael VII Doukas, Robert Guiscard et la pension 
des dignitaires”, Byzantion, 29 (1959), 43-75. 
769 Gregory’s correspondence with William of Burgundy can be found in: E. Emerton, The 
Correspondence of Pope Gregory VII, New York, 1932, pp. 22-28. 
770 For the use of an impostor to act as the deposed Michael VII, see: Alexiad, I. xii, pp. 58-
61; Sewter, pp. 58-61; Gesta, IV. 260-272, p. 218. 
771 McQueen, “Relations between the Normans and Byzantium”, 439-442. 
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ascending the throne himself.”772 The Imperial Crown is certainly considered one of Robert 
Guiscard’s ambitions, influenced by the Byzantine culture, language, state organization and 
economic prosperity, not only of the capital but of Byzantine Italy as well, things that were 
undoubtedly admired by all the Normans. But could this have been Guiscard’s only motive?  
     Another reason has to do with the Byzantine involvement in the Apulian rebellions against 
Robert Guiscard’s authority since the mid-1060s. Although the Byzantine military presence 
in Italy was failing, already since the 1040s, the Byzantine diplomacy seemed more ever-
present than ever, especially if we examine the role of the governor of Dyrrachium, Perenos, 
in providing money for the 1067-8 Apulian revolt that for a time significantly undermined 
Guiscard’s authority and brought the Sicilian and Apulian expansion to a standstill.773 Two of 
the ringleaders of the aforementioned rebellion sought refuge at the Emperor’s Court, namely 
Joscelin of Molfetta and Roger Toutebove, while Guiscard’s nephew Abelard, himself a 
protagonist of almost every major Apulian insurrection in the 1060s-70s also sought refuge at 
Constantinople after 1078 and was one of Alexius Comnenus’ main negotiators between 
Constantinople and the Papacy in 1081-2, as we will see further on. Already since the 
conquest of Bari in 1071, Apulia had seen two major rebellions that significantly diminished 
Robert Guiscard’s resources in money and manpower and, most importantly, challenged his 
authority as Duke of Apulia and Calabria.774 Although the involvement of Byzantine agents 
in these insurrections cannot be certain, Robert Guiscard is quite possible to have held them 
responsible. The Duke needed to act in order to avoid any other potentially threatening revolt 
                                                 
772 Alexiad, I. xii, p. 57; Sewter, p. 57. 
773 For the 1067/8 Apulian rebellion and Byzantium’s role, see: Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 
133-4; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 177-8, 182; Norwich, The Normans in the 
South, pp. 164-5. 
774 For the 1072/3 and 1078 Apulian rebellions, see: Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 240-44; 
Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 223-25, 254-56. 
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in his core territories of Apulia, and the only way was to strike at the source of all the trouble, 
the Illyrian capital Dyrrachium and possibly Constantinople itself.775 
     A factor that also has to be mentioned is the nature of Robert Guiscard’s rule in relation 
with his vassal lords. Even though Robert was invested by Pope Nicholas II as Duke of 
Apulia and Calabria, in 1059, that does not mean that his authority suddenly became 
unquestionable and unchallenged by his powerful counts. Especially those related to him by 
blood, like Robert of Conversano, Geoffrey of Montescaglioso and members of the powerful 
Amicus kin, who belonged to the second generation of Normans in the peninsula were 
unlikely to take orders from Robert Guiscard and follow him if they had no significant gains 
to come back home with.776 Throughout the 1030s, the 1040s and the 1050s, a period when 
the Byzantine resistance in Apulia and Calabria was collapsing rapidly, and more and more 
lands were lavishly given away to these counts, no revolt took place. But when the Sicilian 
theatre of war came to a standstill in the 1060s and the Byzantines had locked themselves up 
to their strongly fortified coastal cities in Apulia, then the situation became even more 
difficult for the Norman Duke. In the 1070s, the enemies of the Normans in Italy had been 
defeated and there were no more lands to be given away to the increasingly demanding 
Apulian counts. The quest for more lands in the opposite side of the Adriatic can be seen as a 
major reason for the Illyrian campaign.  
  
The military operations in Illyria (spring – autumn 1081) 
 
     Trying to assess the size of the expeditionary force that sailed from Otranto in the spring 
of 1081 is a challenging task due to the contradictory estimates of the Byzantine and Norman 
sources. According to Anna Comnena the Norman expeditionary force consisted of some 
                                                 
775 A very good study of the level of contact between the successive Byzantine governments 
with Italy can be found in: Loud, “Anna Komnena”, 41-46. 
776 For more on the relations between Guiscard and his senior magnates, see: Loud, Robert 
Guiscard, pp. 234-46. 
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30,000 men, with 150 ships of all types carrying them across the Adriatic at around 200 men 
and horses on each ship.777 Thirty thousand men is surely an exaggerated figure given by 
Anna to enhance, in her readers’ eyes, Alexius’ victory over the Normans, while we have also 
examined the degree of caution by which we should consider such estimations. Malaterra’s 
figures of 1,300 knights, “as those present have testified”, is surely closer to the truth, and 
even if this number seems relatively small we can say that, at least, it would represent the 
elite core of Guiscard’s army, if we follow Malaterra’s comments that the largest portion of it 
was a “poorly armed mob” (imbecille vulgus).778 Malaterra’s comment about the quality of 
the Norman expeditionary army is also suggested by Anna Comnena, who notes: “From all 
quarters of Lombardy he [Guiscard] gathered them [conscripts], over age and under age, 
pitiable objects who had never seen armour even in their dreams ... ”.779 Other sources, like 
Orderic Vitalis, put the figure up to no more than 10,000 men,780 Peter the Deacon notes 
15,000 men781 while Romuald of Salerno talks about 700 horsemen – a much plausible figure 
as well.782  
     Anna also gives us the names of certain types of ships which the Normans used for the 
transportation of their army: “Dromons, triremes, biremes and sermones and other transport 
vessels in great numbers were made ready”.783 Since the princess was certainly no expert in 
Byzantine ship-building and naval warfare, she has probably confused the dromons with the 
chelandia which were more frequently seen in the waters of the Adriatic and the Tyrrhenian 
Seas. And it must have been the chelandia if the Normans were to “meet the enemy in full 
armour and on the beaches,”784 as this type of transport ship was equipped with ramps 
                                                 
777 Alexiad, I. xvi, pp. 74-5; Sewter, p. 69. 
778 Malaterra, 3. 24. 
779 Alexiad, I. xiv, pp. 68-9; Sewter, p. 65. 
780 Orderic Vitalis, VII, p. 16. 
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(climakes) to unload horses in the beach.785 Also, triremes did not exist in Mediterranean 
waters since the early Roman times and, again, Anna is probably influenced by her readings 
of ancient Greek and Roman works.786 As for the crews that manned the vessels of the 
Norman fleet, they consisted of indigenous Italian elements that had served in the Norman 
navy since the Messina landing in 1061, namely Apulians and Calabrians of either Lombard 
or Greek origin, while it is likely that ships from Amalfi and Muslims would have been used 
as well.787 William of Apulia also informs us of the existence of Ragusan elements in the 
Norman fleet,788 something which confirms an alliance between Robert and the semi-
independent Slav principalities of the eastern Adriatic coast.789 Perhaps Guiscard’s relations 
with the Slav settlers in Italy, quite cordial already since the 1050s as we have seen, played a 
role in winning the alliance of these principalities. 
     Robert Guiscard gave orders for his fleet to sail from Otranto790 in the month of May 
1081, after having appointed his son Roger Borsa as heir to his dukedom, along with Robert 
of Loritello791 and Geoffrey of Conversano792 as his senior advisors.793 Before that, however, 
                                                 
785 Bennett believes that the transport ships of the Normans at Dyrrachium were Arabic 
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he had already dispatched his son Bohemond, along with a small force carried in fifteen 
ships,794 in a reconnaissance mission to capture Corfu and Avlona probably a few weeks 
before. Avlona, due to its protected gulf which offered an excellent point of disembarkation, 
along with its strategic location in the Epirotic coast, was crucial for the Norman operation.795 
Bohemond managed to capture Avlona, Kanina and Orikon (Hiericho), the three most 
important fortresses of the southern coastal approaches of the region of Dyrrachium,796 but he 
failed against the walls of the Corfiot citadel797 and withdrew to the opposite fortified 
Epirotic site of Vouthrotos (Butrinto - Βουθρωτός), at a distance of about 16 kilometres, to 
await his father’s arrival.798   
                                                                                                                                          
     After Robert Guiscard’s crossing of the Adriatic with the main fleet of warships and 
transport ships, he headed towards Avlona to disembark his army and join his son. Before 
reaching Avlona, however, he launched an attack towards the Corfiot capital’s citadel that 
had resisted his son’s forces, probably intending to have it as a forward supply base. After 
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διασυνδέσεις, ανθρώπινα περιβάλλοντα, 16ος-19ος αι., Kerkyra, (1998), 215-28; Castrorum 
Circumnavigatio, ed. I. Georgopoulou-d’ Amico, Hellenic Ministry of Culture – 
Archaeological Receipts Fund, Athens, 2008, pp. 46-49. 
798 Alexiad, I. xiv, pp. 69-70; Sewter, p. 66; Malaterra, 3. 24; for the fortifications of 
Vouthrotos, see: A. Ducellier, “Dernieres decouvertes sur les sites albanais du Moyen Age”, 
Archeologia, 78 (January 1975), 45. 
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landing troops at Cassiopi,799 a favourable point for the disembarkation of the army in the 
north of the island, he proceeded south to commence the siege.800 The Corfiot citadel 
surrendered “most willingly” on the 21st May and paid tribute to Guiscard,801 with the later 
resuming his operations and taking his army across the straights of Corfu. In another side-
expedition, a part of the Norman fleet occupied the port of Vonitsa (Bundicia), further south 
into the Amvrakikos Gulf.802 This side-expedition makes us wonder what were units of the 
Norman army doing so far south from their main target of Dyrrachium. It is not likely that 
Robert may had wished to draw units of the Byzantine Army away from Illyria, simply 
because the provincial units of the western Greek mainland were in complete disarray as we 
have seen in a previous chapter. Unless the town was mistaken for a wealthy merchant port, 
which as far as I am aware of it was not,803 its capture can be connected to what Anna was 
saying about Guiscard’s “initial” plans of capturing Nicopolis, not far from Vonitsa on the 
Epirotic coast, and Naupaktos, further south-east at the entrance of the Gulf of Patras.804 The 
conquest of Naupaktos would have opened the way for further naval raids against some of the 
wealthiest cities, not only of the southern Greek mainland but of the entire Empire due to 
their silk industry, namely Corinth, Athens and Thebes, as it happened during the 1147-49 
                                                 
799 The castle of Cassiopi was built later, in the mid-twelfth century, and remained in use until 
its abandonment in the sixteenth century. See: Castrorum Circumnavigatio, pp. 146-47. 
800 Alexiad, I. xvi, p. 76; III. xii,p. 183; Sewter, pp. 69, 131; Gesta, IV. 201-205, p. 214; 
Malaterra, 3. 24; Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1080. 
801 Chalandon thinks that the Corfiots must have cooperated with Guiscard. Perhaps he 
promised them lucrative trading privileges. See: Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. 73. 
802 This side-expedition is mentioned only by William of Apulia: Gesta, IV. 207, p. 214. It is 
not known whether the castle of Vonitsa was built in the early Byzantine period as the town, 
but the castle was a powerful stronghold of the first despots of Epirus in the thirteenth 
century: Castrorum Circumnavigatio, pp. 142-45.  
803 The town of Arta, a few kilometers to the north coast of the Gulf, which was later besieged 
by Bohemond in 1082, was a major trading port for the Venetians in the twelfth century, 
although we know nothing about the city before that. See: Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 
vol. I, p. 191. 
804 Alexiad, I. xvi, p. 75; Sewter, p. 69. 
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Norman expedition in the Ionian and Aegean Seas.805 Thebes was already a great trading 
centre of the Empire since the eighth century due to its silk industry, with numerous 
Armenian, Jews, Venetians and other traders having it as its base, with the city though being 
almost completely destroyed by the Norman raids of 1147. Corinth had the same fate as 
Thebes, enjoying an economic prosperity until the mid-twelfth century but the Normans 
attacked the city in 1147 and transferred all of its silk workers back to Palermo, causing its 
demise.806  
     After having secured the area around Avlona, Guiscard and Bohemond proceeded north 
against Dyrrachium, with the former taking command of the fleet and the latter taking the 
land route with a part of the army. Bohemond marched northwards without any severe 
interruptions, managing to take Levani at the Semeni River,807 but the Norman fleet was 
much less fortunate. At cape Glossa (Γλώσσα), in todays Cheimara region at the tip of the 
Avlona Gulf, Robert Guiscard encountered a major storm that literally crippled his fleet and 
sank a large number of its ships. Although we are unaware of the exact number of ships that 
were destroyed or put out of action because of the storm, it certainly was a big setback for 
Guiscard’s ambitious plans, thus his decision to remain at Glabinitsa, to the south of cape 
Glossa, for one week to allow for his troops to recoup.808 However, despite these significant 
losses, the Norman heavy cavalry and infantry had taken the overland route to live off the 
land, thus escaping unscathed by this disaster.  
                                                 
805 O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniatēs, tr. H. J. Magoulias, Wayne State 
University Press, Detroit, 1984, chapter II, book II, pp. 43-45. 
806 Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 382-3; Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, (1118-1143) et 
Manuel I Comnène, (1143-1180), pp. 317ff.; idem, Domination Normande vol. II, pp. 136ff.; 
Angold, The Byzantine Empire, pp. 86-7; Z. Tsirpanles, The Medieval West (5th-15th century), 
Vanias, Thessaloniki, 2004, p. 242; Encyclopedia Papyrous Larous Brittanica, Papyros, 
Athens, 1981, vols. 28, 35, pp. 165, 184.  
807 Anonymi Vaticani Historia Sicula, RIS, vol. 8, col. 769. 
808 Alexiad, III. xii, pp. 184-5; Sewter, pp. 132-3; Gesta, IV. 218-224, p. 216. 
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     Alarmed by the events, and while waiting for his army to assemble, Alexius did not 
remain idle but rather took immediate steps, to boost the morale of the Corfiot Greek-
Orthodox population by upgrading the bishopric of Kerkyra and Paxoi islands to the status of 
a metropolis;809 to improve the defences of the city of Dyrrachium;810 and to set in motion the 
Byzantine diplomacy in search for allies against the Norman Duke. Alexius’ first action was 
to replace the governor of Dyrrachium,811 George Monomachatos, with his faithful friend and 
brother-in-law George Paleologos.812 This tactic of appointing members of the royal family in 
crucial administrative posts, both in the capital and in the provinces, with typical examples 
being George Paleologos, Alexius’ brother Isaac and their mother Anna Dalassena, 
Constantine Doukas and Nicephoros Melissinos, and even though this was not out of the 
ordinary for the eleventh century Byzantine administrative system – Michael VII Doukas had 
also relied in family members during his reign – it has not been seen in such a scale before. 
We have to bear in mind that the Emperor was a usurper of the throne and had been in power 
for a few weeks, thus he had not firmly established his authority over the provincial officials. 
He had every right to be afraid of Monomachatos’ loyalty because Monomachatos was placed 
as governor of Dyrrachium by Botaneiates and remained faithful to him.813 In addition, Anna 
repeatedly accuses Monomachatos of secret and treacherous dealings with Guiscard as 
                                                 
809 G. Charizanes, «Ο μητροπολίτης Κέρκυρας Νικόλαος και η βυζαντινο-νορμανδική 
σύγκρουση στο Ιόνιο (τέλη του 11ου αι.)», Byzantiaka, 24 (2004), 197-210. 
810 Alexiad, III. ix, pp. 172-3; Sewter, p. 126. 
811 For the placement of senior members of the Imperial family in high posts in the capital 
and the provinces, including Dyrrachium, see: P. Francopan, “The Imperial Governors of 
Dyrrakhion in the reign of Alexios I Komnenos”, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 27 
(2002), 65-103; idem, “Kinship and the distribution of power in Komnenian Byzantium”, 
English Historical Review, 495 (2007), 1–34; J.-C. Cheynet, Pouvoir et Contestations a 
Byzance, 963-1210, Paris, 1990, pp. 359ff. 
812 George Paleologos was an experienced military commander and the staunchest supporter 
of Alexius’ rebellion. See: The Oxford dictionary of Byzantium, vol. III, 1557-60. 
813 Alexiad, I. xvi, pp. 78-9, Sewter, p. 71. 
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well.814 If we are to believe William of Apulia’s comments, Monomachatos did engage in 
talks with Guiscard when he learned that Botaneiates was dethroned.815 
     In order to disrupt Guiscard’s communications with his Apulian dominions Alexius 
needed a combat fleet of his own. But the only certain thing is that the Byzantine naval units 
available were not up for the task. The squadrons that were to protect the coastal non-
maritime themes, like Illyria, Cephalonia and Nicopolis consisted of light sailing ships, with 
their main duty being the patrolling of the coasts and major ports. Thus Alexius’ immediate 
decision to call for his vassal and old ally, the maritime republic of Venice. In theory, 
Byzantium and Venice had close ties since the fifth century, with the latter becoming a part of 
the Byzantine Empire during Justinian’s expeditions against the Ostrogoths in the second half 
of the sixth century. In 992 we have the first military-commercial agreement between 
Byzantium and Venice, signed by Basil II and Peter II Orseolo (991-1009), by which Venice 
promised naval assistance whenever the Byzantine Emperors would plan to send an army in 
southern Italy in exchange for commercial privileges in Constantinople and Abydos.816 And it 
was Venice who relieved Bari from a long Arab siege in 1002.817 Although much had 
changed since the death of Basil II in 1025, the Venetians still remained vassals of the 
Byzantine government, staying faithful to their alliance not because of the presence of any 
Imperial troops in their city but for a very different reason. Constantinople and the rest of the 
Byzantine ports were the treasure houses of Venetian trade, which was their gateway to 
Western European markets, while Venice also needed Byzantium as an ally against the 
growing ambition of the German Emperors. 
                                                 
814 Alexiad, I. xvi, pp. 78-9; III. ix, pp. 171-2; Sewter, pp. 71, 125-6; this is also noted by 
William of Apulia: Gesta, IV. 228-230, p. 216; In fact, after his replacement Monomachatos 
defected to Bodin, the ruler of the semi-independent principality of Dioclea in the Adriatic 
coast: Alexiad, III. xii, p. 181; Sewter, p. 131. 
815 Gesta, IV. 215-217, p. 216. 
816 Von Falkenhausen, “Byzantine Italy”, 144, especially n. 40. 
817 Ibid., La Dominazione bizantina, pp. 53ff. 
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     When Alexius appealed to his subjects in the summer of 1081 he knew that the Venetians 
would respond favourably for an additional reason. They had a common enemy who was 
trying to establish himself firmly on both sides of the Adriatic, thus being able to block the 
entrance of the sea if he wished to do so and severely cripple the Venetian trade.818 In 
addition, a significant percentage of Dyrrachium’s population was from Amalfi and Venice, 
traders who had settled in the entrance of the ancient Via Egnatia that led to Constantinople, 
through Thessaloniki and Adrianople, many decades ago.819 The Doge Domenico Silvio 
(1070-84) did not hesitate to send a large squadron to the rescue of Dyrrachium in exchange 
for, as Anna tells us: “some rewards were pledged, others granted at once. All their desire 
would be satisfied and confirmed by chrysobulls, provided they were not in conflict with the 
interests of the Roman Empire.”820 The commercial privileges of Venice were officially 
ratified by the Emperor in the following May (1082) and undoubtedly were the stimulus for 
the huge economic growth of Venice in the twelfth century.821 
     The most pressing danger for the Empire, however, at this stage was the Sultanate of Rum, 
and Alexius’ top priority was to secure his flanks before embarking into a campaign so far 
from his home base. The Sultanate of Rum, under Sulleyman-ibn-Qutlumus I (1077/8-86), 
had been established shortly before the rise of Alexius to the throne, after being a vassal state 
                                                 
818 In 1074, Amicus II of Molfetta and Giovenazzo had attacked the Dalmatian coasts, 
resulting in a Venetian naval expedition that swept the Normans off Dalmatia. See: D.M. 
Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 55-6; Fine, 
The Early Medieval Balkans, pp. 281-2. 
819 Alexiad, V. i, p. 223; Sewter, p. 155; A. Ducellier, La façade maritime de l'Albanie au 
moyen âge: Durazzo et Valona du XIe au XVe siècle, Institute for Balkan Studies, 
Thessaloniki, 1981, pp. 71, 105. 
820 Alexiad, IV. ii, pp. 191-2; Sewter, p. 137. 
821 The text of the chrysobull which Alexius had promised the Venetians in 1081 exists only 
in incomplete Latin versions contained in later documents and in a Greek resume by Anna 
Comnena, see: Alexiad, VI. v, pp. 285-7, Sewter, p. 191; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 
59-63; A.R. Gadolin, “Alexius I Comnenus and the Venetian trade privileges. A new 
interpretation”, Byzantion, 50 (1980), 439-46. 
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to Nicephoros Botaneiates. It occupied most part of Bithynia, large parts of Phrygia, Galatia 
and the Aegean coasts as far south as Phocaea, with its capital being at Nicaea – just 40 
kilometres from Constantinople.822 Alexius applied guerrilla tactics to repel the invading 
Seljuc detachments from the Asiatic suburbs of Constantinople, tactics which had been 
advised by Nicephoros Phocas and Leo VI in the previous centuries and which Alexius, as a 
life-long officer must have been aware of.823 These repeated raids seemed to have brought 
some results, with the Seljucs gradually retreating from the regions of Bithynia and Phrygia. 
Anna tells us that after the Byzantine victories the Sultan sought for peace,824 but probably 
Alexius realising that his eastern borders were temporarily secured he pledged for a period of 
truce while also promising to employ large numbers of Seljuc soldiers. Alexius did ask for 
troops from the Sultan in the summer of 1081, but it is uncertain whether he received a 
favourable answer or not.825 It was much later during the siege of Larissa in the winter of 
1082/3 that Alexius again urgently requested reinforcements from Sulleyman I and thus 
received 7,000 men.826  
     Alexius was working in another direction as well, trying to stir up a rebellious mood in 
Guiscard’s rear. William of Apulia mentions Abelard, Guiscard’s rebellious nephew and one 
of the ringleaders of many of the previous insurrections in Apulia, including the one in 
1078/9, who had taken refuge in Constantinople.827 Alexius was able to use him as an 
emissary to send letters to Herman, Abelard’s half-brother and lord of Cannae, to Archbishop 
Hérve of Capua and, of course, to Gregory VII.828 Alexius also sent letters to Henry IV, 
whose relations with Rome had severely worsened, especially after the meeting at Canosa in 
                                                 
822 For more on Qutlumus’ state, see: Korobeinikov, “The Turks (1040-1304)”, 706-10. 
823 Alexiad, III. xi, p. 179; Sewter, p. 129. 
824 Ibid., III. xi, p. 181; Sewter, p. 130. 
825 Alexiad, IV. ii, p. 191; Sewter, p. 137. 
826 Ibid., V. v, p. 244; Sewter, p. 167; Chalandon erroneously reports that the unit of 7,000 
men were sent for the 1081 campaign, see: Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. 74. 
827 Gesta, III. 659-67, p. 200. 
828 Alexiad, III. x, pp. 173, 176-77; Sewter, pp. 126-27. 
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June 1080 when he was excommunicated for the second time by Gregory and Robert 
Guiscard became Rome’s vassal, thus breaking a century’s long tradition where Italian lords 
were appointed to their lordships by the German Emperors. 
     To assess the Empire’s resources in able-bodied men and what the government in 
Constantinople could actually put in the field, we have to examine the last major battle fought 
by the Byzantine forces, the civil conflict of Kalavrye (March 1078). The two parties that 
fought against each other on the outskirts of Adrianople represented the two different worlds 
of the Byzantine Empire – the experienced governor of Dyrrachium and one of the best 
officers the Empire had in the West, Nicephoros Bryennius, and the aged Emperor himself, a 
former governor of the thema of Anatolikon who was represented in the battlefield by 
Alexius Comnenus. Bryennius was able to collect troops from Macedonia, Thessaly and 
Thrace, probably around 8,000 strong, while as governor of Dyrrachium he had managed to 
reinforce his army with Norman (the Maniacatoi) and Patzinak mercenaries, again around 
8,000 strong. Alexius, on the other hand, had a force of about 13,000 men consisting of 2,000 
Turkish troops, provided by Sulleyman I, a few hundred mounted Franks and the cavalry 
tagma of the Immortals numbering around 1,000, and the indigenous troops from Choma829, 
probably around 2,000 men strong or even less.  
     Since the establishment of the Sultanate of Rum by Sulleyman I, we have little doubt that 
looking for indigenous troops in Asia Minor would have been fruitless. The decline of the 
Empire in Asia Minor can be clearly seen by Anna’s mentioning of the toparchs (town 
governors) which were summoned by Alexius to send all the forces they could spare to the 
capital. Anna only talks about the governor of Pontic Heraclea and Paphlagonia, of 
“Cappadocia and Choma” and “of other officers” probably from the north-western regions of 
the old Opsician and Thracesian themes.830 Anna adds to this: “Turkish infiltration had 
scattered the eastern armies in all directions and the Turks were in almost complete control of 
                                                 
829 Fortress of Phrygia in the upper Meander valley that became important as a frontier post in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. See: Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. I, p. 426. 
830 Alexiad, III. ix, pp. 169-71; Sewter, p. 125. 
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all the districts between the Black Sea and Hellespont, the Syrian and Aegean waters.”831 
Further indication of the degree of Turkish infiltration in Asia Minor can be seen by the place 
names of Turkish-Oguz origin found predominantly in the transitional lands of Paphlagonia, 
Phrygia and Lycia.832  
     In about mid-August Alexius set out from the capital heading for Dyrrachium. He had 
with him 300 men from Choma and a contingent of Varangian Guards under their leader 
Nampites,833 and although we cannot be certain of its numerical strength it has been 
estimated to be around 1.500-2.000 strong,834 bearing in mind that some units would certainly 
have stayed back in the capital and in other garrison towns in the Balkans (i.e. we find 300 
Varangians at Kastoria in 1082). With Alexius in the capital and his Domestic of the West 
Gregorius Pakourianus835 at Adrianople, the armed units that the two of them managed to 
gather consisted of the tagma of the Excubitae, led by Constantine Opus,836 units from 
Macedonia and Thrace under Antiochus and Thessaly under Alexander Cabasilas. These 
Balkan units are unlikely to have been greatly affected by the Patzinak raids of the last 
decades, thus it is perhaps safe to assume that they would have been around 5,000 strong. 
These units consisted of veterans and large numbers of new recruits, judging by Anna 
                                                 
831 Ibid., I. iv, p. 25; Sewter, p. 38. 
832 We have the survival of the toponyms yayla and kisla and their derivatives in many areas 
of the aforementioned former Byzantine themes. See: Roche, “In the Wake of Matzikert”, 
142. 
833 For Nampites, see: Blondal, “Nabites”, 145-167; The Varangians of Byzantium, pp. 123-7, 
184-5, 216. 
834 Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, p. 134. 
835 He held the title of doux, while his support of the Comneni rebellion earned him the office 
of Domesticus of the West. See: Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. III, p. 1553. 
836 For Constantine Opus, see: A. Savvides, “Περί του Βυζαντινού οίκου των Ώπων στον 11ο 
αιώνα”, Byzantina, 17 (1994), 323-28. 
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Comnena’s description of their march from Adrianople to Thessaloniki.837 Strangely enough 
we do not find units from the province of Hellas or Peloponnesus, probably because they 
could not have been summoned on time for the campaign. Further, there were the units of the 
vestiaritae, the Emperor’s household, and the “Franks”, mercenaries serving under the 
Emperors’ banner since the Maniacatoi of the early 1040s, which were led by Panoukomites 
and Humbertopoulos.838 The Emperor also had a corps of 2,000 Turcopoles from the northern 
Macedonian region of Achrida839 under Taticius840 and a force of heretic Manichaeans841 
from Philippoupolis, some 2,800 strong under Xantas and Kouleon.842 In addition, according 
                                                 
837 Alexiad, IV. iv, pp. 198-9; Sewter, p. 141; this is the second stage of the training of the 
Imperial soldiers, as described by: “Praecepta Militaria”, I. 3-7, p. 12; see also: McGeer, 217-
8.  
838 Alexiad, IV. iv, pp. 198-9; Sewter, p. 141. 
839 Savvides believes it is not the Macedonian city of Achrida but rather Achrido in the 
central Thracian region of Rodope. These populations were either converts to Christianity or 
the children of Christian-Turkish marriages, installed in a Balkan region of the Empire 
following the long-established tactic which had been applied recently for the Patzinaks in 
northern Macedonia. See: Savvides, Byzantino-Normannica, pp. 51-2; J. Richard, “Les 
Turcopoles: Musulmans convertes ou Chretiens Orientaux?”, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, 
54 (1986), 259-70. 
840 A. Savvides, “Taticius the Turcople”, Journal of Oriental and African Studies, 3-4 (1991-
2), 235-38. 
841 The Manichaeism/Bogomilism first appeared in the Slavic populations of Bulgaria, 
Macedonia and Thrace in the first decades of the tenth century, before spreading throughout 
Bulgaria to Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and even northern Italy and southern France. 
Manichaeans had been settled around Philippoupolis by John I Tzimiskes. See: A. 
Christophilopoulou, Byzantine History, Vanias, Thessaloniki, 1997, pp. 95-7; M. Angold, 
Church and Society in Byzantium under the Comneni, 1081-1261, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 468-504; Fine, The Early Medieval Balkans, pp. 171-9; Oxford 
Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. I, p. 301.  
842 Alexiad, IV. iv, pp. 198-9; Sewter, p. 141. 
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to an Armenian source, there was a contingent of an unknown number of Armenians under a 
certain Prince Ochin.843 
     Alexius also called for his Imperial ally and vassal the Serbian Prince (zupan) 
Constantine-Bodin of Dioclea (Zeta).844 The relations of this Slavic principality with 
Byzantium date back to the mid-1040s when Michael son of Vojislav gradually emerged as 
the sole ruler of the principality of Dioclea (a term that will be replaced by Montenegro in the 
fifteenth century) over his four brothers (1043-46), and to secure his dominions from the 
Byzantine offensives he signed a treaty of peace and alliance. Michael ruled Dioclea from 
1046 until 1081, when we find the last mentioning of him in the primary sources, but as I am 
about to explain, his feelings towards the Empire were not always cordial. In the early winter 
of 1072, for example, he sent an army under his son Bodin to support a Bulgarian rebellion in 
the vicinity of Skopje which was timed to take advantage of the internal strives in the Empire 
after the defeat at Matzikert the year before.845 In fact, Bodin was captured after his army was 
defeated and he spent the next five years as a prisoner of Michael VI Doucas in 
Constantinople. This Serbian involvement in the politics of the Empire in the Balkans might 
seem insignificant at first glance, but as I am about to point out it bears much greater 
implications that involved a third party as well – the Normans of southern Italy. As J. Fine 
has suggested, Michael of Dioclea sent his son Bodin to Skopje in 1072 in an attempt to 
move further away from the Byzantine sphere of influence, towards the Pope of Rome from 
whom Michael received his crown as papal vassal in 1077.846 This diplomatic move makes us 
think that Michael would have hoped that the Pope would act in his favour and deter any 
expansionist attempts by the Normans against his principality, if we bear in mind Amicus II’s 
                                                 
843 I am not aware of any recent edition of this Armenian source which is given by Chalandon 
in his Alexis Ier in p. 77: Tchamtchiam, Histoire d’Armenie, Venice, 1784-86, 2 vols., III, 10. 
844 Alexiad, IV. v, p. 204; Sewter, p. 144. 
845 For this rebellion and its significance for the political status-quo of the region, see: Fine, 
Early Medieval Balkans, pp. 213-15; J. Ferluga, “Les Insurrections des Slaves de la 
Macedoine au XIe Siécle”, Byzantium on the Balkans, pp. 393-97. 
846 Fine, Early Medieval Balkans, p. 214. 
210 
 
campaign against Byzantine Dalmatia only three years before. Another point that further 
complicated the Byzantino-Serbian relations was Michael’s wish to create his own church 
(archbishopric) that would have been independent from the Greek-Orthodox archbishops of 
Dyrrachium and Ohrid. Again, all these facts might seem irrelevant to the Norman military 
operations in the Balkans, but I will come back to examine the Serbian role in the events of 
1081 in the following sections of my thesis.   
     Now let me return to the main theme of this chapter, the Norman invasion of Illyria. After 
spending about a week at Glabinitza, resting his demoralised troops from the storm, we find 
Robert Guiscard outside the fortifications of Dyrrachium on the 17th June,847 setting up his 
camp in the “ruins of the city formerly called Epidamnos”,848 probably the ruins of the city of 
Dyrrachium that was devastated by the catastrophic earthquake of the second half of the fifth 
century. The city was very well-defended, built on a long and narrow peninsula which ran 
parallel with the coast but with a marshy and swampy lagoon separating it from the mainland. 
There were also two fortified outposts situated on the opposite mainland area and some “four 
stadia” from it, both of them centred around two churches, the one dedicated to St-Nicholas 
where we will see Alexius observing the enemy camp and the battlefield and the other to 
Archangel Michael where the Varangians will seek refuge after their retreat from the battle.  
     Very little is known about the eleventh century fortifications of the city, mostly because 
little survives intact due to later use during the late Byzantine and Ottoman period, and even 
less is provided by our contemporary chroniclers.849 According to recent excavations which 
have uncovered a part of the north-eastern fortifications, the city was surrounded by a 
rectangular curtain wall which was supported by semi-circular stone towers with irregular 
                                                 
847 Alexiad, IV. i, p. 187; Sewter, p. 135. 
848 Alexiad, III. xii, p. 185; Sewter, p. 133; Gesta, IV. 241-243, p. 216; the city’s ancient 
Greek name, Epidamnos (Επίδαμνος), was changed to Dyrrachium when the city fell to the 
Romans in 229 BC. 
849 Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, pp. 208-13; A. Bon, “Fortresses medievales de la Grece 
Centrale”, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique, 61 (1937), 136-208; idem, La Moree 
Franque, Paris, 1969. 
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double brick bands and occasional vertical brickwork, a typical style of Byzantine military 
architecture of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.850 Three of these circular towers 
have been excavated so far, thus marking the eastern corner of the city’s citadel, while other 
polygonal ones built in the north side represent the twelfth century fortifications.851 In 
addition to the archaeological evidence, our idea of Dyrrachium’s eleventh century 
fortifications is further enhanced by Anna Comnena’s brief mentioning of the city’s walls. 
We read in the thirteenth book of the Alexiad which covers Bohemond’s campaign in 1107, 
“its wall is interrupted by towers which all round the city rise to a height of eleven feet above 
it (the wall). A spiral staircase leads to the top of the towers and they are strengthened by 
battlements. So much for the city’s defensive plan. The walls are of considerable thickness, 
so wide indeed that more than four horsemen can ride abreast in safety.”852  
     The Normans pressed on with the siege from all accessible sides, meaning both from the 
north and east.853 Siege machines were built, namely helepoleis854 and other enormous 
wooden siege-towers which made an impression on the besieged population.855 However, 
according to Anna these had a poor impact on the city’s defences and on the morale of the 
soldiers who made repeated sorties to burn down these machines.856 A more detailed analysis 
of these siege-engines, along with their use in this period by the Normans and other Crusader 
                                                 
850 Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, p. 209; Castrorum Circumnavigatio, p. 30. 
851 For the medieval fortifications of Dyrrachium, see: Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan 
Frontier, p. 161; Stephenson’s main source is an Albanian monograph: G. Karaiskaj, “Kalaja 
Durresit ne mesjete”, Monumentet, 13 (1977), 29-53; see also: Ducellier, “”Dernieres 
decouvertes”, p. 45; for general works on the Byzantine fortifications, see: C. Foss, D. 
Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications: an Introduction, Pretoria, 1986; Castrorum 
Circumnavigatio, pp. 20-43; Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, pp. 208-13.  
852 Alexiad, XIII. iii, vol. II, p. 190; Sewter, p. 403; compare with: “On Strategy”, 12. 1-56, 
pp. 34-6. 
853 Gesta, IV. 213, p. 216; Malaterra, 3. 25. 
854 A helepoleis was a multi-storey wooden siege tower on wheels or rollers, fitted with stone 
throwing catapults and drawbridges. It was protected from fire by layers of hides. 
855 Alexiad, IV. i, pp. 188-9; Sewter, p. 135; Gesta, IV. 250-1, p. 218. 
856 Alexiad, IV. ii, p. 194; Sewter, pp. 137-9. 
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armies, can be found in the following chapter which examines Bohemond’s Illyrian campaign 
of 1107-8, due to the more detailed description given to us by Anna Comnena. And while the 
siege lingered on, the Venetian squadron857 arrived in the Illyrian waters, sometime in late 
July or early August.858 
     The accounts of the ensuing naval battle between the Venetian and Norman fleets are 
rather contradictory. According to the Alexiad,859 the Venetian fleet arrived at the promontory 
of Pallia, further to the north of the besieged city at some “eighteen stades from Robert’s 
camp”, but they refused battle on the first day. And while they prepared the fleet during the 
night for the next day’s naval confrontation, having wooden towers erected on the main mast 
and manned with experienced men, there was a fierce battle between the two fleets. But the 
Normans were unable to break the solid Venetian “sea-harbour” (πελαγολιμένα), meaning the 
defensive formation where the biggest and strongest vessels were tied tightly together 
forming a closing crescent, thus sheltering the smaller and more vulnerable vessels inside 
their formation. The Venetians eventually managed to route the enemy fleet, which landed 
inshore and suffered a second major defeat by a sortie party led by Paleologos.  
     Malaterra had a rather different story to tell, presenting the Venetians as a cunning and 
crafty enemy.860 The Normans immediately attacked the Venetians once they realised their 
arrival in Illyrian waters, and after a most violent naval battle, by sunset the Normans seemed 
to had won the day. The Venetians, promising to surrender the next day asked for a truce, but 
during that night they erected wooden towers in the ships’ main masts and made their vessels 
                                                 
857 I have found nowhere any numbers for this unit. Nicol gives a number of fourteen 
warships and forty-five other vessels but he neglects to give his source, see: Nicol, Byzantium 
and Venice, p. 57. 
858 Since both Lupus Protospatharius and the Anonymous Barenses Chronicon put the arrival 
of the fleet in the end of their year 1081, knowing that the new year started on the 1st 
September on their accounts like Anna Comnena’s indiction. See: Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 
1081; Anon. Bar., s.a. 1081. 
859 Alexiad, IV. ii, pp. 192-4; Sewter, pp. 137-9. 
860 Malaterra, 3. 26; Dandolus, Chronicon, s.a. 1081, p. 216. 
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lighter and, thus, more manoeuvrable. By sunrise, the re-organised Venetian squadron 
attacked the unprepared Normans, forcing them to retreat while they were breaking the naval 
blockade imposed to the city. After consulting with the inhabitants of Dyrrachium and 
making further preparations they attacked the Normans again early the next day, making 
effective use of the Greek fire.  
     The main offensive weapons aboard a warship in the early period of the Crusades were 
bows and javelins, though crossbows were already being used by the Muslim navies. It was 
only in the thirteenth century, though, that the crossbow had become by far the most 
important naval weapon on board Italian ships, thus we see small but elite units of 
crossbowmen dominating the ships of the period.861 Because a naval battle, most of the time, 
was limited to exchanging volleys of arrows from the enemy ships, the rival fleets included 
certain superstructures in the form of wooden towers or “castles” at the ship’s stern and 
sometimes prow.862 According to Malaterra, the Venetians busied themselves in erecting 
these wooden superstructures to provide better cover for their bowmen in the following day. 
These wooden superstructures could also be used against coastal defences, but they very 
rarely had any success.863 Whether the Norman navy used any of these erections against 
Corfu in the spring of 1081, is unknown but since nothing is reported by our chroniclers we 
cautiously presume that this technique was still not used by the Norman navy. 
     After this serious setback in Guiscard’s siege of the city, which probably cost him the 
tribute paid by the people of Corfu (although the citadel remained in Norman hands until the 
Easter of 1084),864 and with his communications and supply routes with the Italian mainland 
                                                 
861 Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, pp. 142-6; compare with the English navy of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, pp. 
276-80. 
862 Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, p. 148. 
863 Ibid., p. 150; Bennett, “Amphibious Operations”, 57. 
864 Gesta, IV. 313-316, p. 220. 
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completely cut off by the patrolling squadrons of the joint Venetian and Byzantine fleets,865 
the Norman army was about to suffer from another much more serious misfortune. Their 
naval defeat, the harassment by the Venetian-Byzantine naval squadrons and the Dyrrachium 
garrison, the lack of supplies from Apulia, the humid environment of coastal Illyria along 
with the insalubrious conditions in a medieval camp had already spread starvation and 
disease, thus making the need to move the camp to another place quite pressing. Robert 
Guiscard took his forces further south to the estuary of the river Glykys (Acheron) and 
remained there for about two months.866 
     We find Alexius in Thessaloniki sometime probably in early September. Following the 
Via Egnatia he arrived at Dyrrachium on the 15th October, pitching camp on the banks of the 
river Charzanes.867 The place where he chose to camp was on the opposite side of the lagoon 
which separated the Dyrrachian peninsula from the mainland, thus having a natural obstacle 
between his army and the Norman camp. Before his arrival, however, the Emperor had 
already sent Basil Mesardonites with the 2,000 Turkopole mercenaries, elite cavalry archers, 
in a reconnaissance mission of Robert Guiscard’s camp. But this unit was involved in a battle 
and completely defeated by the Normans.868 
     Before the battle we have a unique opportunity to take ourselves to Alexius’ war council 
and we see George Paleologos being hastily summoned from the besieged city. According to 
Anna Comnena, we have two conflicting views of what tactics should have been applied 
                                                 
865 Sometime in late summer a Byzantine squadron of an unknown size arrived to reinforce 
the Venetians. See: Alexiad, IV. iii, p. 195; Sewter, p. 139; Anna makes us think that the 
Byzantine squadron was not present in the area before August and it simply arrived as 
reinforcements. However, it seems to me more likely that the Byzantines were simply 
avoiding battle due to their small numbers. Their leader was Mavrikas, leader of the 
Byzantine fleet that had beaten the Normans off Brindisi in 1070. 
866 Alexiad, IV. iii, pp. 196-7; Sewter, pp. 139-40. 
867 Ibid., IV. v, p. 203; Sewter, p. 143. 
868 This event is described only by William of Apulia, see: Gesta, IV. 324-343, p. 222; 
Orderic Vitalis also gives an account of a small-scale battle which preceded the main battle 
outside Dyrrachium: Orderic Vitalis, VII, p. 18. 
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against the Norman siege of Dyrrachium. The more experienced officers of the army, with 
Paleologos at their head, insisted that no immediate action should be taken against the 
invaders, thus urging for a blockade of the Norman camp and continuous skirmishing that 
would reduce the enemy’s numbers and morale.869 This plan was quite sensible coming from 
a very experienced and reliable officer, summarizing everything that Leo VI, Nicephoros 
Phocas and Vegetius dictated about getting to know your enemy, the terrain and avoiding 
battle unless all the chances are at your side. It is very doubtful that the Byzantines had 
sufficient and accurate intelligence concerning the numbers and consistency of the Norman 
army, even after being in close proximity for so long, nor about the geography of the area,870 
while the fact that one of their elite units had already been heavily defeated should have 
dictated caution and prudence.  
     Alexius, however, followed the younger and hot-headed officers of his army who were 
calling for an immediate battle to be given, probably raising issues of pride and honour 
against a “barbarian” Duke who dared to provoke the mighty Byzantine Empire, thus leaving 
little room for the recently crowned Emperor to manoeuvre. These officers were Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus, the son of the former emperor Constantine X Doukas (1059-67) and brother 
of Michael VII (1071-78), Nampites the leader of the Varangian Guard, Nicephoros 
Synadenus and the sons of the former emperor Romanus IV, Leo and Nicephoros. It is quite 
possible that Constantine, whom Anna makes look like the leader of the “opposition” against 
Paleologos’ plans for a blockade, might have been hoping for a defeat of the Byzantine arms, 
something that would have enabled him to raise claims to the throne as a descendant of the 
Doukades and younger brother of the deposed Michael VII. It was his elder brother 
Andronicus Doukas who had betrayed Romanus IV at Matzikert ten years earlier. On the 17th 
October, when it probably became evident to the Normans that the Byzantine Army was 
                                                 
869 Ibid., IV. v, p. 204; Sewter, pp. 143-4. 
870 A striking contrast to Alexius’ campaign against Bohemond at Larisa two years later, 
when he specifically asked for information about the topography of the region from a local. 
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preparing to launch an attack, Robert Guiscard ordered his ships to be burned,871 in a 
desperate attempt to boost the morale of his soldiers and encourage them to fight to the 
end.872 However, whether it was really his entire fleet that Guiscard ordered to be burned or 
just the landing crafts that had transported the Norman forces from the ships it depends on 
how we interpret our chroniclers’ writings. 
     The Emperor’s initial plan, according to the Alexiad,873 was not to engage the Normans in 
a pitched battle but rather to perform a surprise night-attack on the Norman camp from two 
sides, sending his “allies” – the Serbs and the Turks – on the longer route through the 
marshes towards Robert’s rear, while he would have pressed for a frontal attack-raid, most 
likely with a coordinated attack-sortie by the Dyrrachian garrison as well. However, during 
the night of the 17th/18th October the Normans had already moved out of their camp opposite 
Dyrrachium to the sanctuary of St-Theodorus, a place much closer to the Byzantine camp on 
the opposite side of the Dyrrachian lagoon, with all their forces ready for battle. Whether it 
was simply a coincidence or the Byzantine plan had somehow reached Guiscard’s ears we 
will never know for sure, but next morning the Normans had placed themselves between the 
lagoon and Alexius’ army, having the lagoon on their rear and the sea on the right.    
     Although Alexius had already sent some units, probably light cavalry, to attack Guiscard’s 
camp from the north through the marshes, seeing the Normans in battle array on the morning 
of the 18th October he re-adjusted his plans to face them in a pitched battle that same day. The 
Normans had arranged their battle lines as follows874: Robert Guiscard, as the natural leader 
of that campaign, commanded the main force at the centre of the formation; his son 
                                                 
871 Alexiad, IV. vi, p. 214; Sewter, p. 145; Malaterra, 3. 27. 
872 We read in Vegetius: “Most people ignorant of military matters believe the victory will be 
more complete if they surround the enemy in a confined place or with large numbers of 
soldiers, so they can find no way of escape. But trapped men draw extra courage from 
desperation, and when there is no hope, fear takes up arms.” See: Vegetius, Epitome of 
Military Science, III. 21, p. 107. 
873 Alexiad, IV. vi, pp. 208-9; Sewter, pp. 145-6. 
874 Alexiad, IV. vi, pp. 208-9; Sewter, p. 146. 
217 
 
Bohemond, the second-in-command, took command of the left wing, while the right wing 
closer to the sea was entrusted to “Amiketas” (probably Amicus II of Molfetta and 
Giovenazzo).875 Unfortunately we have no idea of the composition of each of the three battles 
of the Norman army. It is most likely though that Guiscard would have kept the bulk of his 
elite cavalry units in the centre of his formation, and probably behind the heavy infantry for 
better protection against enemy missile weapons, the deployment used by William at 
Hastings. In the wings he had probably put the conscript levies and the most light or 
inexperienced cavalry. Whether the Normans had brought any archers with them is not sure, 
but even if they did their presence was not felt during the battle that day. 
     Alexius arranged his battle lines accordingly, taking command of the centre division of the 
army, while Pakourianus was at the head of the left wing, closer to the sea, and the Caesar 
Nicephoros Melissinos being in charge of the right wing. The Varangian Guard, fighting 
dismounted in the Anglo-Saxon custom, was put in the centre front line of the whole 
formation and projected a few yards forward. Alexius, by putting the Varangians in front of 
the central division, would probably have wanted to take advantage of their thick infantry 
formations against a possible charge of the Norman heavy cavalry, while he also would have 
been aware of the English hatred for the Normans over the conquest of their homeland.876 In 
addition, units of lightly armed archers and peltasts were ordered to move through their lines 
release volleys of arrows before retiring, in order to weaken the enemy advanced units.877 
Unfortunately, as with the Norman army, we have to idea of the consistency of each of the 
three divisions of the Imperial army. It would be likely that Alexius kept the units of the 
Excubitae, the Vestiaritae and the Chomatianoi with him, along with the elite cavalry troops 
of the Franks and, possibly, the Thessalians as well. The Macedonian and Thracian units 
                                                 
875 Amicus II took part in all three Apulian rebellions in 1067/8, 1072 and 1078/80. See: 
Gesta, III, 118-131, p. 170; 392, p. 184; 642, p. 198. 
876 Malaterra, 3. 27. 
877 The peltasts and the javeliners of the Comnenian armies would have been of Caucasian 
origin, probably Georgian or Abasgian: Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, pp. 196-7. 
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might have been kept in the same division, as had happened in Kalavrye (1078) and 
Matzikert (1071), while the Armenians (if indeed there were any at that campaign) would 
have been placed under the command of Pakourianus, himself of Armenian origin. 
     The first stage of the battle was opened by the Normans, with Robert Guiscard beginning 
his march towards the Byzantines.878 His first tactical move was to send a body of his 
horsemen, most likely from his own division containing the most experienced knights, to 
charge against the English and then pretend a disorderly retreat back to their lines in order to 
entice their opponents into breaking their ranks and pursue them. The Byzantine reaction to 
this was immediate, with the archers and the peltasts that were put behind the ranks of the 
Varangians marching forward to repel the Norman charge by volleys of arrows. The peltasts 
engaged in moderate skirmishing with the Normans and while the Byzantine centre was 
occupied in repelling the first attack-wave, Robert Guiscard was quickly covering the 
distance between the two armies. While the first attack wave must have been forced to retreat 
and the three Norman divisions were marching forward, Amicus’ cavalry and infantry units 
charged forward and attacked Nampites’ left flank, exactly at the point where it met with 
Pakourianus’ division. This may be seen as an attempt to break the English ranks by attacking 
their exposed flanks which are every infantry unit’s weak point. But the Normans were met 
with heavy resistance by the English while Pakourianus’ units, along with certain elite units 
from Alexius’ division, rushed forward to support them. The Normans broke into disorderly 
retreat, “throwing themselves into the sea up to their necks and when they were near the 
Roman and Venetian ships begged for their lives – but nobody rescued them”.879 At this 
point, Anna, by far the best account we have of the battle, adds the famous story of Robert’s 
wife Sigkelgaita who managed to bring the retreating Normans to their senses by grabbing a 
spear and charging at full gallop against them. If we are to believe Anna’s account, the 
                                                 
878 The main secondary works for the battle of Dyrrachium are: Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, 
pp. 133-37; Birkenmeier, The Komnenian Army, pp. 62-70. 
879 Alexiad, IV. vi, p. 210; Sewter, p. 147. 
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Norman right wing under Amicus must have consisted of conscript levies and light cavalry 
because of their poor morale and lack of discipline. 
     By the time the Norman right wing was forced to a panicky retreat by the Byzantine units, 
the rest of the army would have marched forward enough to be involved into skirmishing 
with the Byzantine divisions of Alexius and Melissinos, but no unit would make a decisive 
tactical move that would tip the battle in its favour. The Varangians, however, who had just 
repelled a joint cavalry and infantry attack, could not resist joining their comrades in the 
pursuit of the fleeing Normans along the coast. The consequences of this move were to prove 
disastrous for the Byzantine campaign, with their quick pace of marching forward resulting 
into them being separated from the main body of the Imperial army and, thus, making them 
extremely vulnerable to flanking movements by the enemy.880 Robert Guiscard was a too 
experienced tactician to let this opportunity pass by. He immediately ordered a unit of elite 
heavy infantry, probably spearmen, to fall upon them on their right flank and at a short period 
of time the exhausted, surprised and outnumbered Varangians had suffered heavy casualties. 
Due to the fact that they were not completely surrounded, a few of them managed to seek 
refuge to the nearby church of Archangel Michael (Αρχιστράτηγος Μιχαήλ)881, where they 
were all burned to death by the Normans who set the church alight.  
     With the Varangian Guard completely annihilated and his left wing in a disorderly pursuit 
of the retreating Normans, Alexius found his main division exposed to the Norman cavalry 
attacks from the front and left flank. Robert Guiscard had not yet used his elite cavalry units, 
with the exception of the feigned retreat during the opening stages of the battle, and he saw 
that this was the right time to throw them against his enemy.882 This all out attack by the 
Norman cavalry proved effective in shattering the Byzantine morale and discipline. Although 
Anna mentions that certain units did stand and fought courageously, many of their comrades 
abandoned the fight and ran away, with the entire front soon disintegrating rapidly. Only the 
                                                 
880 Ibid., IV. vi, pp. 210-11; Sewter, p. 147. 
881 Alexiad, IV. vi, p. 211; Sewter, p. 148; Malaterra, 3. 27. 
882 Alexiad, IV. vi, p. 211; Sewter, p. 148. 
220 
 
Emperor and his retinue resisted as long as they could, but they too realised that any further 
resistance would have been pointless.      
     The losses for the Byzantine forces must have been heavy. It is quite possible that as much 
as 25% of the total Byzantine forces engaged might have been killed or wounded,883 if we 
include the entire Varangian contingent of some 2,000 men, units of the left wing that 
repelled Amicus’ attack and units from the front ranks of the main and right divisions. The 
Manichaeans may have suffered some 300 casualties, since Anna give us a number of 2,500 
of them being discharged by Pakourianus sometime after the battle,884 while it is certain that 
the Dalmatians and Turkopole troops from Achrida did not even engage the enemy. These 
units had just found the Norman camp abandoned and were marching towards the battlefield 
at the time when Guiscard was launching his first feigned cavalry attack. They had every 
chance to attack the Normans from the rear but, as Anna tells us, Bodin who was the leader of 
the Diocleans, remained a spectator of the battle and awaited patiently for its outcome to see 
which side would prevail.885 The Norman casualties, on the other hand, must have been much 
less since the only major unit that dealt a severe blow was Amicus’ division which, after 
launching an attack on the Varangian left flank, was repelled and routed. Even though large 
numbers must have been killed or drowned in their desperate attempt to evade their pursuers, 
this would not have constituted a serious blow to Robert Guiscard’s army since, as it was 
mentioned above, these men would probably have been inexperienced peasant levies and 
lightly armed cavalry. 
 
The battle of Dyrrachium - Conclusions 
 
     In studying the battle of Dyrrachium and the Norman battle tactics used against an army 
which had developed a quite different mentality and concepts about warfare throughout, at 
                                                 
883 Haldon, The Byzantine Wars, p. 137. 
884 Alexiad, V. iii, p. 232; Sewter, p. 160. 
885 Alexiad, IV. vi, p. 214; Sewter, p. 149. 
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least, the previous five centuries, a comparison between the tactics used by Robert Guiscard 
against the Byzantines and those applied in the fields of southern Italy, Sicily, Normandy and 
England is inevitable. If we examine the battle stage by stage, first we come across the 
feigned retreat that was applied by Robert Guiscard in the opening stages of the battle. But 
before we relate this tactic to Sicily and, to what seem much more obvious, Hastings, we 
have to ask ourselves, how the eleventh century Normans had learned about this battle tactic, 
especially since we know that they had used it at least three times before Dyrrachium, namely 
at Arques (1053), Messina (1060) and Hastings (1066)?886  
     The feigned retreat was a well applied trick which had been introduced in Europe already 
since the mid-fifth century by the nomadic tribes of the Huns. Although contacts did exist 
between the Magyars, who also fought in a similar way as the steppe nomads,887 and the 
Eastern Franks, we cannot be sure whether there was any transmission of the experience 
gained in the region of Carinthia, Moravia and the middle Danube to mainland Francia. The 
answer is suggested in a series of articles by Professor Bachrach who argues that the Alans, 
another steppe people, had been settled by the Romans in Armorica, the name given in 
ancient times to the part of Gaul that includes the Brittany peninsula and the territory between 
the Seine and Loire rivers, and their influence on Armorican cavalry tactics are dated from 
                                                 
886 The debate on whether there was indeed a feigned retreat of William’s cavalry on the 
second stage of the battle has been fought as hard as the two enemy armies at Hastings, and 
we need not engage this issue more. I find the arguments of Oman, Brown, Verbruggen, 
Douglas and Bachrach more convincing than those of Beeler, Lemmon and Delbruck 
suggesting a “cover-up” of a true retreat by the contemporary chroniclers. For more on 
Hastings feigned retreat and battle tactics see: Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, pp. 149-166; 
Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, p. 96; R. A. Brown, “The Battle of Hastings”, Anglo-
Norman Studies, 3 (1980), 1-21; B. S. Bachrach, “The Feigned Retreat at Hastings”, 
Medieval Studies, 33 (1971), 344-7; Douglas, William the Conqueror, pp. 203-4; C.H. 
Lemmon, The Field of Hastings, St-Leonards-on-Sea, 1956; Beeler, Warfare in England,  pp. 
21-22; Delbruck, Medieval Warfare, vol. III, pp. 158-9. 
887 For the Magyar battle tactics and an analysis of the Battle of Lechfeld, see: Oman, The Art 
of War, vol. I, pp. 116-25; Delbruck, Medieval Warfare, vol. III, pp. 115-29; Contamine, War 
in the Middle Ages, p. 35. 
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the fifth century.888 Count Alan of Brittany was in command of the routed left wing of the 
Bretons and Angevins at Hastings, while Walter Giffard, a commander at Arques, was also 
present there.889 Since we have already established the steady flow of immigrants from 
“beyond the Alps” to southern Italy after the second quarter of the eleventh century, then it 
should come as no surprise the use of feigned retreat at Dyrrachium in 1081. 
     Another theory wants the feigned retreat to have its roots on mock battles which were 
being reported throughout France and Flandres at least as early as the Carolingian period.890 
In fact, we read about a specific type of exercise taking place at Worms, on 14th February 
842, between followers of Louis the German and Charles II the Bald. Saxon, Gascon, 
Austrasian and Breton cavalrymen would ride in teams against each other at full gallop but at 
the moment before impact one party would make a turn and pretend to escape while the other 
would play the role of the pursuers, and vice-versa, all under the cheering of the crowd 
gathered to watch.891 Einhard also refers to numerous military exercises undertaken by 
Charlemagne’s sons “as his ancestors had done, as no one matches the Franks in these 
arts.”892 Could military training and the simulation of pitched battles in France have led to the 
development of this feigned retreat tactic? We cannot be certain but we can at least consider 
it as possible.893 
     Thus the battle of Dyrrachium opened with Robert Guiscard sending a cavalry 
detachment, probably of his elite and experienced knights he kept in his division, to try and 
                                                 
888 Bachrach, “The Feigned Retreat at Hastings”, 344-7; idem, “The Alans in Gaul”, Traditio, 
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dislodge the defensive formation that dominated the centre of the enemy lines. Fortunately 
for the Varangians, however, Alexius had put archers and peltasts immediately behind them, 
in the space between the Varangians’ and Alexius’ division, with orders to march through the 
Varangian lines and repel or slow down an enemy advance. Like in Hastings, when the 
infantry and cavalry charges of William’s army were met with a heavy shower of arrows, 
javelins, lances and other “primitive casting weapons”, this cavalry attack produced poor 
results with the Varangians staying put and their defensive formation unshaken. 
     The second stage of the battle, however, proved to be the most crucial one. While the 
Norman cavalry detachment was engaged in a moderate skirmishing with the Varangians and 
the supporting peltasts, the Norman army had managed to cover most of the distance between 
them and the Byzantines and, at that important point of the battle, Amicus’ division, probably 
consisting of infantry levies and light cavalry, launched an attack which was directed at the 
Varangians’ left flank. Although the latter must have still been supported by the peltasts, their 
flanks were exposed to enemy attack since they were deployed in some distance in front of 
the rest of the Imperial Army. The Varangians resisted stoutly without giving any ground to 
the Normans, receiving reinforcements by the Byzantine left wing and centre which resulted 
in the attackers being routed. And it was at that point that disaster struck for Alexius’ army.  
     With their right wing in a disorderly retreat, thus leaving the main division exposed to 
flanking enemy movements this would have seemed like a perfect opportunity for Alexius to 
strike a serious blow on Robert Guiscard’s army and perhaps even win the field. But as it had 
happened at Hastings, where after the first infantry and cavalry charge Harold’s men from his 
right wing broke ranks in order to pursuit their enemies downhill and they were cut to pieces, 
the same fate followed Nampites’ men in Dyrrachium. Due to “their inexperience and hot 
temper” they broke their dense defensive formation and were carried away in a foot pursuit of 
the retreating Norman right wing. And it does seem frustrating why this division abandoned 
their phalanx formation – the tightly packed body of infantry that was trained to move out as 
a unit on command – which gave them such a great advantage over the Norman heavy 
cavalry. Being separated by the main body of the Imperial Army and out of breath they 
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constituted an easy target for Guiscard who immediately ordered his elite infantry to fall upon 
them. The result was a massacre that not only completely annihilated the Imperial Army’s 
most elite unit in the field but left its main body exposed to the Norman heavy cavalry attack.  
     In total contrast to this traditional idea of the Varangian hot-headed pursuit of the Norman 
right wing that resulted to them being separated from the rest of the army, we have to 
consider another version of the events. It is possible that the Emperor, seeing his enemy’s 
right wing in disorderly retreat and thus realising Guiscard’s vulnerability on his right flank, 
would have signalled a general advance. But with the centre and right divisions of the 
Byzantines already involved in a moderate skirmish and the Varangians advancing well 
beyond the Byzantine line, the cardinal sin must have been Alexius’ failure to catch up and 
support their advance. It is quite unlikely that this version would have been presented to us by 
Anna, but although it is not even mentioned by Malaterra or William of Apulia, at least we 
have to consider it as possible. 
     The retreat and subsequent annihilation of the Varangian infantry units brings out an issue 
that has been mentioned while studying the battle at Civitate.894 The most basic point that we 
can deduct from the studying of battles like Civitate, Hastings and Dyrrachium is that heavy 
cavalry units could make no impression upon well-equipped and disciplined footsoldiers who 
kept their formation unbroken. And that stems from the basic logic that no horse would 
attempt to throw itself against a “wall of shields”, as the dense infantry formations would 
ressemble from a distance. The only chance for horsemen to break through the enemy’s 
formation and engage into a mêlée was to thin down the front ranks of the enemy, and this 
inevitably required the presence of archers to shoot volleys of arrows – preferably 
concentrated on a specific part of the enemy’s formation in order to create a gap. That 
brought the desirable results for Edward I at Falkirk, in 1298, considering the fact that the 
Scots had lost the support of their cavalry that could have neutralised Edward’s archers early 
                                                 
894 Gillingham, “An Age of Expansion”, Medieval Warfare, 64, 76-8; Bennett, “The Myth of 
the Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry”, 304-16, especially pp. 310-16; Morillo, “The 
“Age of Cavalry” Revisited”, 45-58; Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 46-49. 
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in the battle. A unit of well-equipped and disciplined footsoldiers, on the other hand, was 
clearly a defensive formation which, like the Varangian Guard or the previously mentioned 
Scottish schiltron, had to be sufficiently deep and dense and needed the support of units of 
cavalry and archers because, although it could repel the cavalry charges, its speed and ability 
for manoeuvres made any counterattack almost unthinkable. And in the cases when the 
footsoldiers did break ranks and charged against their enemies, like Hastings and 
Dyrrachium, they got slaughtered. At Civitate though, the Swabian infantry took full 
advantage of their only weapon in the battlefield, their disciplined and tight formations, and 
resisted stoutly against the repeated charges of the Norman cavalry, but being surrounded and 
heavily outnumbered they stood no chance. Throughout history, the armies that effectively 
combine both arms – infantry and cavalry – were the most successful. 
     To return to our analysis of the battle of Dyrrachium, the reasons behind the retreat of the 
main units of the Imperial army, many of them veterans with long experience of fighting in 
the Balkans and Asia Minor, are not given by Anna and speculations around this subject can 
be risky. One possible reason can be the fact that the “heavy” cavalry of the late eleventh 
century Byzantine Army was of no match to the cavalry charge of the Norman chivalry due 
to its equipment and training as I have explained in a previous chapter. If we combine this 
with the fact that Alexius had to call up for recruits with no previous military experience, as 
we have already seen, we understand why, although Alexius had the numerical superiority 
over his enemy, numbers do not necessary bring victory on the battlefield. Alexius could 
have been counting on the dense phalanx formations of his Varangians to repel any Norman 
cavalry charge, while he would launch an all out cavalry attack on the weaker Norman flanks. 
But when his “protective shield” was annihilated, the Normans had all the room to take full 
advantage of their tactic that had practically given them the victory in so many battlefields 
thus far, a heavy cavalry attack by the Norman knights.   
     Since my aim is not to speculate on what would have happened if Alexius had used the 
Varangians as, for example, a reserve unit behind the cavalry, we can conclude that the 
Byzantine Emperor, although a life-long army officer, in his early thirties he was facing an 
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enemy whose military tactics were practically unknown to him.895 Whether he had access to 
any military manuals like the Tactica or the Praecepta Militaria, handbooks that strictly 
forbade fighting a pitched battle against the “Franks”, is debatable. Undoubtedly, the greatest 
difference between the Byzantines and other neighbouring cultures lays in the fact that it was 
the former, like the Romans before them, who were writing down useful knowledge and 
experience their generals had gained in the battlefields, thus giving the false impression that 
others like the Muslims were more inexperienced or even inferior in their strategies compared 
to the Byzantines. As the author of the On Skirmishing writes, “In order that time, which 
leads us to forget what we once knew, might not completely blot out this useful knowledge, 
we think we ought to commit this to writing. He [Nicephoros Phocas] entrusted me with the 
task of describing a method as accurately as possible and handing it on to those who would 
come after us.”896 And a number of manuals would have been available to the young nobles 
of the Constantinopolitan Court or the officers of the provincial armies whose fundamental 
occupation would have been the studying of classical Greek, Roman and contemporary books 
that were referring to war.  
     A recent study has concluded, after examining a number of Byzantine chronicler accounts 
of battles and military campaigns and comparing them to the military manuals of the period 
that the military leaders were aware of the existing military manuals and frequently consulted 
them.897 Indeed, the most famous reference to the use of military manuals comes from the 
reign of Constantine Porphyrogenitus (913-59) when among the books that the Emperor had 
to have those which examine the art of war (βιβλία στρατηγικά) and siege (βιβλία 
μηχανικά).898 Cecaumenos notes in his late eleventh century Στρατηγικόν that “when you [the 
                                                 
895 We can hardly call his “arrest” of Roussel of Bailleuil an experience on Frankish battle-
tactics. 
896 “On Skirmishing”, p. 146-8. 
897 T. G. Kollias, “Η Πολεμική Τακτική των Βυζαντινών: Θεωρία και Πράξη”, Byzantium at 
War (9th-12th c.), 158-9; see also: Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 200-1. 
898 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions, Corpus 
Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, vol. 28, ed. J.F. Haldon, Vienna 1990, p. 106.  
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officer] finish with your daily business and go home to rest, do read the military manuals 
(στρατηγικάς δουλείας) and the histories and all the ecclesiastical books; and do not ask, how 
does that benefit you [to read] these dogmas and ecclesiastical books; they are 
overwhelmingly beneficial.”899 In the same period, Bryennius writes that a prince’s training 
included “how to put in order a phalanx, set a camp, put a pole into the ground and all the rest 
that the manuals (τακτικά) teach us.”900 Similarly, the author of the On Skirmishing, when 
examining the defensive measures during the siege of a town, notes that “matters such as 
these and other devices used in sieges, and how the people inside should fight against those 
outside, have been carefully and precisely explained before us by the authors of books on 
tactics (τακτικά) and strategy (στρατηγικά).”901 This specific issue of officers consulting 
several military handbooks is debatable but taking into consideration all the examples that I 
have mentioned in this chapter and in other sections of my thesis it seems to me very likely 
that they did consult them. However, it is hard to imagine a Byzantine officer directing his 
battlefield units with a military manual in his hands and, for this point, I have to mention the 
view of M. Mallett on the influence of classical writers on Renaissance military affairs: “The 
fifteenth century captain learnt the art of war as an apprentice to an established condottiere, 
not from books. He may have been gratified to learn from one of his humanists in his 
entourage that his tactics resembled those of Caesar in Gaul, but it is unlikely that he 
consciously intended it to be so.”902 Thus, the influence of classical works on Byzantine 
officers seems to have been mainly academic and reflected only a small – but undoubtedly 
very important – part of their training as commanders. Whatever the case Alexius, instead of 
imposing a blockade as he did against Bohemond twenty-six years later,903 he gave to the 
                                                 
899 Cecaumenos, p. 19. 
900 Bryennius, p. 75. 
901 “On Skirmishing”, 21. 12-15, p. 224. 
902 M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, Warfare in Renaissance Italy, Bodley Head, 
London, 1974, pp. 176-77; Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp. 62-73, especially, pp. 62-63. 
903 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, III, 26, pp. 116-9. 
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Normans exactly what they wanted, a pitched battle and ample opportunities to use their 
heavy cavalry.   
     A final point that has to be examined is the passive role of Bodin, the leader of the 
Dioclean Serbs and his reluctance to reinforce the Emperor during the crucial moments that 
preceded the annihilation of the Varangian Guard. As I have mentioned previously in this 
chapter, the relations between the Serbian zupan and the Byzantines were hostile, even 
though the Diocleans were Imperial allies since the mid-1040s. But what would Bodin hope 
to get from a Norman victory at Dyrrachium in 1081? I have already highlighted the 
Byzantine aggressiveness in the region of the principality of Dioclea throughout the century, 
along with Michael’s (Bodin’s father) wish for an independent archbishopric, while we also 
should bear in mind the danger that the Normans posed to the Serbs. Was Bodin hoping for a 
future alliance with a Norman principality in the western Balkans, as both he and the 
Normans were Papal vassals, that not only would have diminished the danger posed by the 
Byzantine Emperors but might also have brought the Archbishopric of Dyrrachium under 
Serbian control? In fact, a letter to Michael by Gregory VII on the 9th January 1078 implies 
some sort of correspondence between the two coasts of the Adriatic regarding the bishopric 
of Antibari on the Adriatic coast and a request for its upgrade into an archbishopric under 
Rome’s jurisdiction.904 But even though this is nothing more than speculations we can, at 
least, consider it as a possibility. Bodin would have been aware that, in case of a Norman 
victory, the Normans would not have attempted to proceed north towards Dalmatia – perhaps 
to establish an Adriatic principality – but rather to continue east to Thessaloniki and he was 
perfectly aware that the best route would take them through the Via Egnatia which was 
further south. Thus, he chose to keep his army intact in case the Byzantines would win the 
                                                 
904 The Register of Pope Gregory VII, 5. 12, p. 258; another great source about matters in the 
region of Macedonia are the letters of Theophylact, archbishop of Achrida, dating between 
1088-1115: Théophylacte d’Achrida Lettres, translated with notes and introduction by P. 
Gautier, Association de Recherches Byzantines, Thessalonique, 1986. However, I did not 
find any mentioning of Bodin in Theophylact’s letters.  
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battle in order to defend his country from any punitive attack, which indeed took place 
sometime between the years 1089-91.905 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
905 Fine, Early Medieval Balkans, p. 224. 
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9. The second stage of the Norman invasion. From the capture of Dyrrachium to the siege of 
Larisa (spring 1082 – winter 1083) 
 
     Apart from the Varangian regiment, the Byzantine nobility also suffered a severe blow 
with several of its members being killed during the battle of Dyrrachium. The 
porphyrogenitus Constantine Doukas, Nicephoros Paleologos, general Aspietes,906 
Nicephoros Synadenus and “several other fine soldiers were killed”.907 Alexius and his 
personal guard avoided arrest by seeking sanctuary first at a place called Kake Pleura, just 
north of Dyrrachium, and then to the castle of Lake Achrida. After probably spending the 
months of November and December there, a winter period that can bring severe snowfalls in 
the mountainous areas of Epirus and western Macedonia, he entrusted the defence of 
Dyrrachium’s citadel to the Venetians – due to the blockade Paleologos could not get back 
into the city, thus acknowledging their important role in the defence of the city,908 while he 
appointed a native Illyrian-Albanian (εξ’Αρβανών)909 as Komeskortes (Κόμης της κόρτης),910 
meaning commander of the forces of the lower city.911 As for the rest of the castles in the 
Dyrrachium region, Malaterra tells us that most of them capitulated.912  
                                                 
906 A. Savvides, “Notes on the Armenian-Byzantine family of Aspietes, late 11th-early 13th 
centuries”, Byzantinoslavica, 52 (1991), 70-79. 
907 Alexiad, IV. vi, pp. 211-3; Sewter, p. 148. 
908 It is also quite likely that Alexius, aware of the low morale of the Dyrrachian population, 
would have wanted to avoid any surrender negotiations, at least not from the defenders of the 
citadel. 
909 A native Albanian or a Byzantine official with long commanding experience in that 
region: E. Vrannousi, Κομισκόρτης ο εξ Αρβανών. Σχόλια εις χωρίον της Άννας Κομνηνής, 
Ioannina, 1962; “Οι όροι Αλβανοί και Αρβανίται και η πρώτη μνεία του ομώνυμου λαού της 
Βαλκανικής εις τας πηγάς του 11ου αιώνα”, Σύμμεικτα, Athens, (1970), 207-54. 
910 κόρτη meant the Emperor’s tent. The main duty of the comes tes kortes was the escort the 
Drungarie of the Watch around the camp for the night inspection. See: Bury, The Imperial 
Administrative System, p. 43. 
911 Alexiad, IV. viii, p. 221; Sewter, p. 153; Gesta, IV. 436-448, p. 228. 
912 Malaterra, 3. 27; Gesta, IV. 440, p. 228. 
231 
 
     Regarding the surrender of the city of Dyrrachium we have two different accounts. 
According to Anna Comnena, the citizens of the city, due to their low morale and after 
having heard of Robert Guiscard’s intention to resume the siege on the following spring, they 
– with the role of the Amalfitans and the Venetians in the making of the decisions being 
highlighted – chose to open their gates and surrender the city to the Normans to avoid any 
possible retaliation.913 Both Malaterra and William of Apulia give us another version of the 
events. After four months of negotiations the siege of the city was at a standstill due to the 
winter period and a certain Domenico, a nobleman of Venetian origin to whom the defence of 
a principal tower was delegated, had reached an agreement with Robert Guiscard to betray 
the city to them in exchange for the hand of the latter’s niece – the daughter of William I of 
Principate.914 This person would probably have been the son of the former Doge of Venice 
Otto Orseolo (1008-26, 1030-32) who had been banished from Venice, accused of nepotism, 
and was received in Constantinople with great honours.915 Anna Comnena may well have 
been less informed about the precise circumstances of the surrender, writing six decades after 
the events, and the two versions may simply be the same. Whatever the case, the city opened 
its gates on the 21st February 1082.916  
     The harsh winter periods in the mountainous regions of Illyria and western Macedonia 
were the main cause for Robert Guiscard’s inability to take advantage of his success over 
Alexius’ army. While the Norman campaign was lingering in the surrounding areas of the 
River Diabolis, the Emperor had already established Thessaloniki as a rallying point for the 
remnants of his troops coming from Illyria. However, the Imperial Treasury was empty and 
the collapsed Byzantine economy could not afford the hiring of extra mercenary troops.917 
Thus, the Emperor resulted to the unpopular measure of confiscating precious ecclesiastical 
                                                 
913 Alexiad, V. i, p. 223; Sewter, p. 155. 
914 Malaterra, 3. 28; Gesta, IV. 449-60, p. 228. 
915 Matthiew, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, pp. 323-4; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 45-
49. 
916 Our only source for the exact date is: Anon. Bar., s.a. 1082. 
917 Alexiad, V. i, pp. 225-6; Sewter, p. 156. 
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objects from various churches in the capital.918 According to old ecclesiastical canons the 
Emperor had the right to confiscate ecclesiastical objects in order to pay the ransom of 
prisoners of war. In our case, the entire Christian population of Asia Minor was held 
prisoners by the Seljucs, according to Alexius Comnenus. The government had the support of 
the residential Synod and of the Patriarch Eustathios Garidas (1081-84) and so the measure 
went on with no serious protests.  
     With the coming of the spring, Robert Guiscard left Illyria and proceeded further east, 
where we would have expected him to follow the Via Egnatia, from Achrida to Thessaloniki. 
The Via Egnatia was one of the two most significant land routes that linked Constantinople 
with Europe. It followed a course through Thrace (Adrianople), Macedonia though 
Thessaloniki and Edessa (slav. Vodena), then was passing north of Kastoria to Achrida and 
directly west to the Illyrian port of Dyrrachium that linked the Balkans with Italy.919 To 
return to the Normans, Robert Guiscard instead of marching his army to Thessaloniki, turned 
southwards towards the western Macedonian city of Kastoria. And since the Emperor was in 
the capital until the month of May, our main primary source is Malaterra. We are not sure 
about Guiscard’s motives on turning south, but I suspect that he might have wanted to have 
his flanks covered. Kastoria was also one of the major cities of the Greek mainland and a 
great merchant city and export centre in the Ottoman period.920 Guiscard might also have 
been aware that 300 Varangians – probably a regiment detached by Alexius while on his way 
to Dyrrachium the previous October – were defending the city, since this is one of the few 
numbers that Malaterra gives us in his entire narrative on the invasion.921 Whatever the case, 
the siege of the city did not last for long since, as Malaterra lets us know, the Varangians 
decided to come to terms before the Normans had even brought their siege machines in front 
                                                 
918 Ibid., V. ii, pp. 226-7; Sewter, pp. 157-8. 
919 Whittow, “Geographical Survey”, 219-31; Belke, “Communications, Roads and Bridges”, 
296; F. O’ Sullivan, The Egnatian Way, Newton Abbot, 1972.  
920 A. Glavinas, “Οι Νορμανδοί στην Καστοριά (1082-1083)”, Byzantina, 13ii (1985), 
Thessaloniki, 1256-7. 
921 Malaterra, 3. 29. 
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of the city’s defences, another sign of the declining morale in the Imperial army’s units. The 
city probably fell in the month of March or early April 1082.922    
     Regarding the military preparations of the Byzantines, we do not have any information 
about the units employed apart from the hiring of an unknown number of Seljuc troops.923 
These aforementioned soldiers must have been individuals from the Sultanate of Rum 
flocking in search for pay and must not be confused with the 7,000 Seljucs officially send by 
Sulleyman I next year. In addition, Alexius once more set in motion the mechanisms of the 
Byzantine diplomacy that had worked so well for him about eight months ago. In early April 
1082,924 the Emperor sent another embassy to the German Emperor Henry IV promising 
lavish gifts and a royal marriage.925 But while these negotiations were under way, Henry IV 
was already marching south to Italy in full force against Gregory VII and a fresh Apulian 
revolt had broken out, probably stirred up by Byzantine agents (Abelard, most likely, since 
we have already seen him acting as an Imperial agent in Apulia last year).926 A messenger 
arrived to notify Guiscard about the events back home around the month of April 1082 and 
preparations for his departure immediately went under way.  
     This was an extremely significant turning point for the Norman invasion of Greece and 
although no Norman troops were taken back to Italy, the fact that the leader and mastermind 
of the entire expedition abandoned his troops in hostile ground was to prove a fatal decision. 
                                                 
922 Glavinas, “Οι Νορμανδοί στην Καστοριά”, n. 2, 1256; Anna seems to place the capture of 
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923 Alexiad, V. iii, p. 231; Sewter, p. 160. 
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pp. 232-3; Sewter, p. 161. 
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926 Loud, Robert Guiscard, pp. 219, 244; Chalandon, Domination Normande, pp. 273-4;  
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Not only the capture of Thessaloniki was postponed indefinitely, until its final capture a 
hundred and three years later, but Bohemond was left to face an opponent of about the same 
age but with much greater experience in warfare, who was also fighting in his home ground. 
Bohemond, who was chosen to lead the campaign after his father’s departure for Italy was, no 
doubt, a brave and ambitious officer who was not yet at the peak of his military career. But 
Robert Guiscard’s forty years of combat experience in the battlefields of southern Italy and 
Sicily would have been more suitable to take the right decisions in times of crisis like, for 
example, during the stalemate on the outskirts of Larisa in the winter of 1082/3. However, the 
Norman Duke thought it would be better to attend his affairs in Apulia and Rome personally, 
while he appointed his son Bohemond as commander-in-chief of his forces in Greece, with 
the Count of Brienne (constable of Apulia and lord of St-Mango sul Calore)927 as his deputy, 
and hastily embarked in a monoreme for Italy, probably around the end of April 1082.928  
     Bohemond resumed the operations in north-western Macedonia as soon as he was 
appointed commander-in-chief by his father and he immediately marched south-westwards 
towards the Epirotic capital of Ioannina.929 The first question that comes in mind is why the 
Norman army deviated from his primary target, Thessaloniki, and why did Bohemond 
decided to occupy Ioannina so further south from the Via Egnatia? The answer to the first 
part of the question is not hard to imagine, that with Robert Guiscard back in Italy it seemed 
almost inconceivable for the small, inexperienced and not properly equipped Norman army to 
undertake such a task, especially with young Bohemond in command. We cannot be sure 
about Bohemond’s motives on his turn south towards Epirus, but it is highly likely that his 
decision was greatly “influenced” by his father’s advice before his departure. He might have 
thought that his affairs in Italy would not have kept him there for long and that he would soon 
                                                 
927 For Bryennius see: Loud, “Anna Komnena”, 49, n. 37 
928 Alexiad, V. iii, pp. 232-3; Sewter, pp. 161-2; Gesta, IV. 524-27, p. 232. 
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be back to Greece to resume hostilities. Thus, Guiscard might have wanted his son to secure 
what had already been conquered, meaning the areas of Illyria, coastal Epirus and western 
Macedonia. As we saw before, it is possible that Guiscard would have been aware of the 
presence of the 300 Varangians at Kastoria and, fearful for his army’s flanks and for the 
presence of any other strong contingents of enemy troops in his rear, he would have wanted 
to sweep Epirus and western Macedonia off any enemy elements.  
     Another factor that could have influenced the Norman advance southwards and later on 
eastwards to Larisa, something which has been mildly mentioned by Chalandon and had not 
been picked up by any scholar since, is the role of the Vlach populations of these regions and 
their cooperation with the Normans. The first mentioning of the term Vlach in Byzantine 
primary sources is made by Skylitzes930 and the term vaguely refers to the Latinised 
populations of the predominately Greek-speaking inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula during 
the Imperial Roman period, with its origin being Germanic (walhs) meaning “foreigner” or 
“neighbour”. These pockets of Latin-speaking population in the Greek mainland took the 
name Aromanians (from the –a and the Latin adjective romanus, meaning citizens of the 
Roman State) and could have been found, during the ninth and tenth centuries mainly in 
Thessaly (Larisa being its capital) and western Macedonia.931 Due to the great dissatisfaction 
of these populations of Thessaly regarding high taxation and corrupt state officials, a great 
revolt is reported around the end of 1065 or the beginning of 1066, led by a powerful 
magnate of the region of Larisa called Nikulitsa Delfin – clearly of Bulgarian origin. And 
even though this revolt was short-lived, an agreement between its leader and the Emperor’s 
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officials was eventually reached.932 Although the purpose of my research is not to analyse the 
geographical expansion of the Vlachs in the Greek mainland or to go into great details 
regarding the 1065/66 revolt, I simply intend to raise this particular question: In connection 
with Chalandon’s comments about possible alliance talks between Robert Guiscard and 
Vlach leaders in 1066,933 do we consider Bohemond’s turn southwards as a coincidence? 
Bearing in mind the almost certain hatred of these, mainly nomadic, populations for the 
Byzantine government, along with the view of the Vlachs as liars, thieves and beggars by the 
contemporary Byzantine authors,934 the answer would be negative. If there were, indeed, any 
talks held in 1066 or afterwards I have not been able to trace anything in the primary sources, 
but we do have to be suspicious about Bohemond’s movements in the Greek mainland from 
now on.  
     In late April 1082,935 Bohemond marched from western Macedonia to Epirus and towards 
Ioannina, following roughly the course Korytsa-Konitsa-Kalpakion-Bella-Kalama.936 During 
his journey, his army was reinforced by elements of the Byzantine Army who deserted to the 
Normans.937 Bohemond could have taken advantage of these men’s knowledge of the local 
terrain, meaning the routes leading southwards through the rough and inhospitable Pindos 
mountains, while they could have betrayed to him the numbers of Ioannina’s garrison. But 
the inhabitants of Ioannina quickly capitulated in order to avoid any destruction and pillaging 
by the Norman forces. Thus Bohemond’s contribution to the reinforcement of the city’s 
defences during his short stay in the region is significant, although it has been pointed out 
that he has been credited with more that he could actually have achieved. And this is due to 
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the usual problem that the archaeologists face when a site has been used for many periods in 
history, in our case the Byzantine (Despotat of Epirus) and the Ottoman.938 From what 
scattered evidence that archaeology can give us, we know that the city’s citadel was built 
sometime in the tenth century. The fact, however, that the Normans reinforced Ioannina’s 
fortifications with a second “most strong” acropolis, a typical strategy employed by them in 
Italy and Sicily as we saw in a previous chapter, is given to us by Anna: “After making an 
inspection of the ramparts and recognizing that the citadel was in a dangerous condition, he 
[Bohemond] not only did his best to restore it, but built another of great strength at a different 
section of the walls where it seemed to him that it would be most useful.”939 
     Alexius left Constantinople with the troops that he had managed to collect in the past 3-4 
months to face the Normans at Ioannina. Trying to assess the numbers and consistency of the 
Emperor’s army is very difficult because even Anna, our only detailed source for this period 
of events, gives us little information to work with. However, it is most likely that a large part 
of the conscripts recruited for the Dyrrachium campaign would have returned home instead of 
reporting to Thessaloniki. So we are almost certain that the Byzantine army was outnumbered 
by the Norman host. Through Anna’s narrative940 we see that Alexius had learned a valuable 
lesson from his previous experience against the Normans, thus his decision to send 
skirmishing detachments to harass the Norman camp and gather intelligence regarding their 
numbers and the commanding skills and fighting capabilities of their leader Bohemond. The 
Emperor, “fearing the first charge of the Latins”, also adopted a new and rather innovative 
battle-tactic. He had a number of small and light chariots, with spears fixed on top of them, 
put behind the first lines of his division in the centre with infantry men hiding underneath and 
ready to emerge and manoeuvre them when the Norman cavalry charge was at a striking 
distance from the Byzantine lines. However, “as though he had foreknowledge of the Roman 
                                                 
938 On the fortifications of Ioannina: L. Vranousses, Ιστορικά και τοπογραφικά του 
Μεσαιωνικού κάστρου των Ιωαννίνων, Athens, 1968. 
939 Alexiad, V. iv, pp. 236-7; Sewter, p. 163.  
940 Ibid., V. iv, pp. 237-9; Sewter, pp. 163-4. 
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plan he [Bohemond] had adapted himself to the changed circumstances.” Bohemond’s 
answer was to divide his forces into two major units and attack the flanks of the Imperial 
Army, thus engaging into a mêlée that quickly led the terrified Byzantines to flee the 
battlefield. Thus, the Byzantine disorderly retreat from the battlefield makes us think that 
either there was no heavy cavalry at all, or that unit was simply swept away by the Norman 
knights who then immediately turned and attacked the infantry. 
     The next confrontation is poorly placed chronologically and geographically, and if 
someone reads the Alexiad he gets the impression that it took place a couple of days after the 
first battle of Ioannina. However, it should have taken several weeks for Alexius to go to 
Thessaloniki, get his troops ready and then march back south to Epirus. Due to Anna’s brief 
statement that “the armies were assembled once more and when the mercenaries were ready 
he [Alexius] marched against Bohemond...”,941 we understand that these units might have 
been summoned to Thessaloniki for the previous campaign, but probably failed to arrive on 
time and simply stayed there and awaited for new orders. In the meanwhile, Bohemond 
probably left Ioannina and headed further south-east towards the southern Epirotic coast and 
the city of Arta,942 just a few kilometres north of Vonitsa which had been taken by Guiscard 
at the end of May 1081.  
     Alexius devised a similar plan like the one at Ioannina, with his primary aim being to 
disrupt the Norman heavy cavalry charge that had proved irresistible so far. According to 
Anna,943 who again is our only detailed source for the events, on the previous day of the 
battle the Emperor had his men set up iron caltrops (τρίβολος) in front of the centre of his 
formation where he expected the Norman cavalry attack to take place, in order “to frustrate 
the first (and decisive) charge when the caltrops pierced the horses’ hooves”. In addition to 
the setting up of the caltrops, this time the Byzantine front lines would have had the support 
of peltasts who were deployed behind the infantry front lines of the centre. After the first 
                                                 
941 Alexiad, V. iv, p. 239; Sewter, p. 164. 
942 Malaterra, 3. 29. 
943 For this battle, see: Alexiad, V. iv, pp. 239-40; Sewter, pp. 164-5. 
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Norman cavalry charge had been neutralised, the wings (for which we do not know their 
composition but probably light cavalry units) were to advance and immediately attack the 
frustrated knights in an encircling manoeuvre that could well had won the battlefield for 
Alexius. The course of the battle, however, was a repetition of what had taken place at 
Ioannina, with Bohemond finding out about the Byzantine plans, either by treason or simply 
by sending scouts close to the enemy lines, and the result was another cavalry attack on the 
Imperial Army’s flanks which quickly melted away once again.944 
     What we need to underline at this point is the knowledge of this specific tactic of using 
obstacles, in our case chariots and caltrops, to obstruct the advance of a heavy cavalry unit. 
According to the On Tactics, these obstacles like the caltrops were used in the perimeter of a 
camp to protect it from surprise cavalry attacks.945 They were apparently tied together with 
strings so that they could be recovered even when hidden in grass. In addition, the author of 
the sixth century treatise On Strategy refers to caltrops as a measure to defend a camp from 
enemy attack while he specifically writes about iron plates put on the horses’ hooves so that 
they will not be injured during an attack.946 The Taktika of Nicephoros Ouranos also mention 
caltrops, as well as other devices, to be placed in the ditches surrounding a camp.947 I am not 
aware of any cases where Alexius had actually used this specific battle-tactic before in any 
operational theatre, but this proves the continuity of long-established battle tactics and 
reinforces the argument which puts the officers of the Byzantine army studying several 
military manuals of their time. 
                                                 
944 “They were frightened before the battle started because of their previous disaster and did 
not dare to look their opponents in the face.” See: Alexiad, V. iv, p. 241; Sewter, p. 165. 
945 “On Tactics”, 2. 17-20, p. 263; these are also mentioned in: “On Strategy”, 6. 12-3, p. 22, 
38. 25-27, p. 114. 
946 “On Strategy”, 6. 12, p. 22; 17. 17-18, pp. 56-58. 
947 J.-A. De Foucault, “Douze chapitres inedits de la tactique de Nicephore Ouranos”, 
Traveaux et Memoires, 5 (1973), 298-300. 
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     With the Emperor retiring to Thessaloniki and then to the capital, Bohemond was free to 
expand his dominions in the Greek mainland and march further north and east.948 From Arta 
he turned north-east towards Skopje (Skoupoi) and the surrounding regions of Two Polovoi, 
south of Skopje, and Achrida to the west. We learn from Anna the names of his two senior 
officers that were sent to occupy the aforementioned towns, Peter of Aulps who took Two 
Polovoi and Raoul, Count of Pontoise who subdued Skopje. The castle of Achrida was 
defended by a certain Ariebes who managed to repel the repeated attacks made by 
Bohemond’s troops, forcing the latter to quit the siege and move towards Ostrobos, east of 
modern day Florina in western Macedonia, where he was again forced to withdraw. From 
there he probably plundered Verroia, Servia (a town south of Verroia), Edessa (slav. 
Vodena),949 Almopia (slav. Moglena, east of Edessa), although Anna’s narrative is not 
entirely clear whether these areas were indeed occupied or not, reaching through the Vardar 
valley to Aspres Ecclesies (Άσπρες Εκκλησιές) on the north-western suburbs of Thessaloniki. 
He captured the aforementioned town and stayed there for about three months (autumn 1082), 
while afterwards he marched towards Kastoria.   
     The course that Bohemond followed is not coincidental at all, and only if we trace his 
route on a map we will understand why. Once more we have to say that the primary target of 
the Norman campaign was the capital of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, and the main route than 
connected it with Dyrrachium was the Via Egnatia. The cities of Achrida, Florina and 
Modena/Edessa were situated exactly on the Via, while Verroia, Servia and Moglena 
controlled the southern approaches. But going for the siege of Thessaloniki, as we have 
repeatedly said, was not an issue for the small Norman army and, due to Kastoria’s cold and 
dump winter climate, the Norman leader decided to transfer his winter camp further south to 
the fields of Thessaly, one of the warmest and most fertile places in the Balkans. His march 
                                                 
948 Alexiad, V. v, pp. 242-4; Sewter, pp. 166-67. 
949 In the main Byzantine period, the Slavic name-places had dominated over the Roman and 
ancient-Greek. That is why our sources refer to them with their Slavic names. The Greek 
terms are provided so that the reader can trace these places to a modern-day map. 
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southwards took him through Pelagonia and Trikala (in the middle between Ioannina and 
Larisa), while another detachment subdued Tziviskos,950 clearly intending to spend the winter 
in the Thessalian fertile plains. 
     Considering the date of the beginning of the siege of Larisa, Anna Comnena says the 
following: “He [Bohemond] then moved on to Larisa, arriving in full force on St-George the 
Martyr’s Day.”951 All the non-Greek scholars who have dealt with this event have accepted 
the 23rd April – St-George’s day, as the day when Bohemond came to Larisa, meaning that 
until then he had pitched his camp at Trikala and had sent a detachment to enforce a blockade 
of the city.952 It is most likely though that Anna Comnena meant the 3rd November, which 
commemorates the consecration of a cathedral dedicated to St-George in Lydda, south-east of 
today’s Tel-Aviv in Israel, during the reign of Constantine the Great (305-337).953 This does 
not seem to have any major implications in the turn of events that winter, although we have to 
note that the defenders of Larisa would certainly have been more reluctant to try and break 
the blockade if that was enforced by the main Norman force under Bohemond himself. As for 
the city of Larisa, for which we know next to nothing about its medieval fortifications or 
Anna gives us any details, it was entrusted to the experienced officer Leo Cephalas who 
managed to resist the besiegers for around six months before the blockade began to take its 
toll on the morale of the population.954  
     Alexius once again resorted to diplomacy to deal with the Normans and spread discord 
and discontent among the senior of Bohemond’s officials. Unfortunately, the Alexiad does 
not give us any details of the conspiracy but we do know that three senior figures in the 
Norman army, Peter of Aulps, a certain Renaldus and another called William were accused of 
                                                 
950 Alexiad, V. v, p. 244; Sewter, p. 167. 
951 Ibid., V. v, p. 244; Sewter, p. 167. 
952 Chalandon, Alexis Ier, p. 88; Yewdale, Bohemond I, p. 20; Loud, Robert Guiscard, p. 219; 
Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, p. 471. 
953 A. Glavinas, “Οι Νορμανδοί στην Θεσσαλία και η πολιορκία της Λάρισας (1082-1083)”, 
Byzantiaka, 4 (1984), 39-40. 
954 Alexiad, V. v, pp. 245-7; Sewter, p. 168. 
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conspiracy to desert to the Emperor. In addition, about early winter 1082 the Emperor asked 
for a large mercenary force from Sulleyman I, thus receiving a division of 7,000 men under a 
certain Kamyres.955 The Byzantine preparations went on throughout the winter with the 
intention of marching towards Thessaly early in the spring of 1083. And while Alexius was 
raising troops in the capital, the Patriarch of Jerusalem Euthemius, along with Pakourianus, 
were sent to Thessaloniki (probably in late 1082/early 1083) to gather additional units and see 
if they could break some sort of a deal with Bohemond.956 
     Probably in the month of March (1083) the Emperor left Constantinople to raise the siege 
of the Thessalian capital. Nothing is given about the numbers and consistency of his army, 
with his march towards Larisa taking him through a series of strategically important locations 
in medieval Thessaly; passing through the very narrow valley of Tempi (the only route 
southwards coming from Thessaloniki), he reached Plabitza, north-east of Larisa and close to 
a river which is not named by Anna due to a lacunae, but probably modern Pineios.957 
Alexius obviously wished to avoid a direct contact with the Norman troops for now, and so 
he marched through the southern approaches of the city of Larisa and headed west, through 
the “Gardens of Delfina” towards Trikala, where he arrived in late March/early April without 
encountering any resistance.958 
     Being aware of the poor morale and fighting experience of his troops, the Emperor wisely 
decided to avoid a fourth battle and to lay a series of ambushes instead. But before that, he 
followed the neccessary steps dictated by the Praecepta Militaria and the De Rei Militari for 
                                                 
955 Ibid., V. v, p. 244; Sewter, p. 167. 
956 The only source that mentions this is: Typicon Gregorii Pacuriani interpretatus est 
Michael Tarchnisvili, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, vol. 144, Louvain, 
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957 Alexiad, V. v, p. 245; Sewter, pp. 167-8; Savvides, Byzantino-Normannica, pp. 60-61; 
Glavinas, “Οι Νορμανδοί στη Θεσσαλία”, 37-38. 
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west of Larisa. See: Alexiad, V. v, p. 245; Sewter, p. 168. 
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the precautions taken before an encounter with the enemy forces.959 Anna does not let us 
know whether he sent any scouts to reconnoitre the enemy camp, although it seems likely that 
he did, but Alexius got a local man and asked numerous questions about the topography of 
Larisa and the surrounding areas, for “he wished to lay an ambush there and so defeat the 
Latins by guile, for he had given up any idea of open hand-to-hand conflict; after many 
clashes of this kind – and defeats – he had acquired experience of the Frankish tactics in 
battle.”960  
     The ambush that was planned against the Normans was primarily based on the use of the 
feigned retreat tactics, this time used by the Byzantines. Anna Comnena once more describes 
in detail Alexius’ war-council that took place on the day before the battle, where he explained 
his strategy to his senior officers including the Caesar Nicephoros Melissinos and Basil 
Curticius.961 Alexius’ plan was simple but brilliant; he intended to hand over the command of 
his forces and his personal standards to the aforementioned officers, and instruct them to 
form their battle lines “in their usual manner followed in former engagements”, somewhere 
on the east of the city. The orders that the officers in command were given were to attack the 
Norman front lines and engage in moderate skirmish before turning their backs to them in a 
disorderly retreat towards a location named Lykostomio (Wolf’s mouth), probably somewhere 
on the west of Larisa. In the meantime, Alexius would have taken a unit of elite cavalry at the 
area  close to Lykostomio the night before,962 to pillage the Norman camp and lay an ambush 
on the unsuspected Norman knights.  
     The Byzantine strategy worked as planned. The Normans immediately fell into Alexius’ 
trap, thus opening the battle themselves with a full-frontal cavalry charge that was directed 
                                                 
959 “Praecepta Militaria”, IV. 192-208, p. 50; Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, III. 9, p. 
84-85. 
960 Alexiad, V. v, pp. 246-7; Sewter, p. 168-9. 
961 Alexiad, V. v, pp. 247-8; Sewter, p. 169. 
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against the division where the Imperial standards could be seen. While the main Byzantine 
forces were being pursued by the two cavalry divisions led by Bohemond and the Count of 
Brienne, Alexius’ next move was to send a small force of mounted archers and peltasts to 
harass the pursuing Normans and tempt them to turn around and engage them. Alexius had 
advised these soldiers to “shoot great numbers of arrows from a distance and at the horses 
rather than the riders. For all Kelts whenever they dismount they become very easy prey.”963 
This was a clever advice given by Alexius, because he must have been aware that the short 
bows of his mounted archers were unlikely to penetrate a Norman knight’s shield or 
hauberk,964 but their horses were much more vulnerable and when dismounted the Normans 
were indeed a much easier prey for an elite cavalry unit. 
     For a second time in a few hours the Normans under Brienne took the bait.965 The 
Byzantine archers did what they were ordered to do and soon “Bryennius’ men, as their 
chargers fell, began to circle round and round in a great mass.966 However, the Count 
managed to send for reinforcements and, if Anna is correct, the messengers found Bohemond 
having pitched a temporary camp on a small river-island called Salabria, with himself eating 
grapes.967 From this small detail we understand that, even though Anna and William of 
Apulia do not give us any date for these events, this may have taken place in late July, since 
Bohemond would not had been able to eat grapes in May or June. However, since this 
conclusion jumps a period of around three months we have to be very cautious about Anna’s 
accuracy, even more so since William of Apulia does not mention this detail. Is Anna trying 
to conceal any negotiations between Alexius and Bohemond? We cannot be sure, but it is at 
least possible, especially if we bear in mind that Pakourianus along with the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem were sent early that year to Thessaloniki to do just that. 
                                                 
963 Alexiad, V. vi, p. 251; Sewter, p. 171. 
964 For the Byzantine bows of this period, see: Kaegi, “The contribution of archery”, 237-49 
965 Gesta, V. 32-42, p. 238. 
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     The final defeat of the Norman contingents took place the next morning in a narrow and 
marshy area on the outskirts of Larisa where they had pitched their camp. A few elite 
“Turkish and Sarmatian” mounted archers were sent by Alexius to lure the Normans out of 
their camp, with Bohemond not taking the bait this time and ordering his men to dismount (if 
they had managed to get to their horses) and “stand firm in serried ranks, protecting 
themselves shield-to-shield”,968 clearly deployed in a phalanx formation probably after 
Bryennius’ bitter experience on the previous day. However, panic was spread in the Norman 
ranks when Bohemond’s standard-bearer was killed and they eventually fled to Trikala.969 
     After Bohemond’s retreat, Alexius went back to Thessaloniki from where he once again 
set the mechanisms of Byzantine diplomacy against his enemies. His aim was to spread 
discord and disaffection amongst the senior officers of Bohemond’s army for their leader, 
with them demanding their payment for two and a half years of campaigning in a hostile 
country.970 With Bohemond being unable to meet their demands he was forced by the 
deteriorating atmosphere within the ranks of his soldiers and officers to pull back, first to 
Kastoria – where he installed the Count of Brienne as governor and Peter of Aulps at the Two 
Polovoi with an unknown number of men – and then to Avlona in the early August of 
1083.971 
     With the main Norman army ready to embark for Italy, the most significant outpost left in 
Norman hands was Kastoria. We do not know whether Bohemond had left garrison troops in 
the town since the spring of 1082, but it seems to me highly unlikely that he would have had 
sufficient manpower with him to afford a strong garrison in the city. A similar tactic like the 
one applied during the conquest of Calabria and Sicily two decades ago, meaning the 
extraction of tribute or a simple oath by the local population might had been enough. So what 
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made Kastoria so important to the Normans as to install a garrison when everything seemed 
to have been in such a desperate situation? Probably the city’s location, because it was the 
only major city on the Via Egnatia’s part between Achrida and Thessaloniki that they thought 
they could hold. However, even that last Norman outpost in the Greek mainland was about to 
fall to Byzantine hands, probably sometime in early October 1083.  
     The Alexiad once again is our only source for the siege of Kastoria by the Imperial 
troops.972 With siege machines, namely helepoleis, having a poor impact on the city’s 
defences and enemy morale, Alexius came up with a brilliant plan which reminds us of the 
conquest of Palermo (1072) and Jerusalem (1099). In brief, he was to sent a number of elite 
troops under George Paleologos in small vessels to launch an attack on the city from the side 
of the lake, and at the same time the Emperor would attack from the land and attempt to draw 
the attention of the defenders on him while Paleologos’ party would be climbing the walls 
almost undetected. Because everything worked as planned Bryennius’ Counts decided to call 
it a day,973 with the majority of them actually deserting to the Emperor, while the Count of 
Brienne was made to swear never to take up arms against the Empire again. Thus ended the 
siege of the last outpost still in Norman hands, probably around the end of October or early 
November of 1083.974 None of the primary sources mention the departure of Bohemond to 
Italy, but it seems quite likely that he decided to spend the winter in Illyria, not risking a 
passage to Italy in November, especially if we consider the fact that he joined his father at 
Salerno soon after Henry IV had left Italy, in May 1084.975  
     In the aftermath of the lifting of the siege of the city of Larisa, within the next few months 
almost all the Norman conquests in the Illyrian and Greek mainland had been recovered by 
Alexius. Already since the summer of 1083 a Venetian naval expeditionary force of unknown 
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size recaptured the city of Dyrrachium, with the exception of the citadel which resisted 
stoutly.976 The Venetians spent the winter in the city, but recognising the danger the 
proximity of the citadel posed to them they chose to remain in their ships and in a small 
wooden castrum they hastily erected close to the city’s port. Also, Avlona was captured 
shortly after Bohemond’s departure while the local population of Corfu, apparently after 
finding out about the Norman failed expedition, rebelled against the Duke with only the 
citadel remaining firmly in Norman hands.977 
     The causes of the Norman failure of the invasion are numerous, but all of them have their 
route in one important factor. And that is the fact that the Norman army operated far from its 
home base and in a hostile ground. The inhospitable terrain of the Illyrian, Epirotic and 
western Macedonian regions, with their cold and humid winters, diseases that could have any 
medieval army depleted in large numbers and in a very short period of time, especially in the 
marshy area of Dyrrachium as we saw earlier, the immensely difficult task of transporting 
provisions and reinforcements from the home-bases, something imperative when living off 
the land was not sufficient enough as the surrounding areas of Dyrrachium proved to the 
Normans. Further, we had the eventual casualties in battle or siege operations, and even if 
Bohemond had thirteen hundred knights when his father left him in charge of the army in 
1082, he certainly could not spare a single unnecessary loss. But he had to man a number of 
castles that would secure his route back to Dyrrachium, and although we are unaware of the 
numbers involved in this task, it certainly was a heavy burden for the small army Bohemond 
commanded. Finally, we have to mention the absence of the campaign’s natural leader, 
Robert Guiscard, who although had left a capable commander in his place for whom no doubt 
can be raised about his fighting skills, his absence would have been felt throughout the ranks 
of his army, and especially his knights many of whom were veterans of the Italian and 
Sicilian campaigns, thus used to serving under him in almost every battle or siege.   
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10. The second Norman invasion. From autumn 1084 to Robert Guiscard’s death in the 
summer of 1085 
 
     Robert Guiscard’s preparations for his second invasion of Byzantine Illyria in the autumn 
of 1084, probably started immediately after he was free from his preoccupations in the 
Eternal City, where he had marched in the month of May that year to the rescue of Gregory 
VII from Henry IV’s Imperial troops. By the time he arrived at the city with his army, in late 
May, the German Emperor had already retired back to Germany with the Normans engaging 
on a fierce urban conflict with the citizens of Rome who wanted Gregory expelled from the 
throne of St-Peter.978 In examining the size of the Norman army that was mobilised against 
Henry IV, William of Apulia’s Gesta tells us that the Norman Duke led to Rome 6,000 
cavalry and 30,000 foot-soldiers.979 These numbers may seem as an exaggerated figure, but if 
we reduce the cavalry to about a half of what the Gesta give us we might get much closer to 
the truth, if we bear in mind that even troops from Sicily under Guiscard’s brother Roger had 
arrived as reinforcements.980 The crucial question is how many of these troops that were 
mobilised in May 1084 would have taken part in the Illyrian campaign four months later?  
     Unfortunately, the primary sources are even more silent about the numbers and 
consistency of the Norman army in 1084 than they were for the 1081 campaign. The only 
names of high-ranking officers that are mentioned to have followed Guiscard across the 
Adriatic were his four sons, namely Bohemond, Roger (Borsa), Robert and Guy,981 while 
Geoffrey of Conversano was also made to join the Duke after his previous rebellion in 1082-
83.982 Judging by the size of the May expedition and the danger posed by a German army 
marching against the Norman capital Salerno, many of Robert Guiscard’s vassals would have 
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been summoned to bring their quotas to Salerno in preparation for the march northwards. 
Would the Duke have been able to force them for a second time within less than six months 
to mobilise their troops, this time for a campaign overseas? The answer would be positive 
only if we consider that they would have been promised large sums of money and a share on 
the spoils of war because, as we will see further on, this time Robert was aiming at the 
financial centres of the southern Greek mainland, namely Athens, Corinth and Thebes. 
     For this campaign, William of Apulia gives us the figure of some 120 ships that were 
mobilised to carry the Norman army across the Adriatic in the autumn.983 We do not know 
with certainty the ratio between transport ships and warships, but probably less than a quarter 
of this fleet would have been warships if we bear in mind that in the following naval 
engagements between the Norman and the Venetian fleets, Guiscard had twenty-five 
warships in his disposal, all of them being “inferior to their [Byzantine and Venetian] 
ships.”984 This leaves us with around 80-90 transport vessels that would have carried the bulk 
of Guiscard’s army to Avlona. Even if all of them were specially modified horse-transport 
ships, something highly unlikely, bearing in mind the average capacity of 15 horses in each 
ship as we have seen in a previous chapter, this would have given us a number of 1,275 
horses being carried from Italy.  
     This number, although quite reasonable if we recall the numbers of the 1081 campaign, 
must be much lower since Anna Comnena mentions that Robert Guiscard had dispatched all 
of his cavalry force, under Roger and Guy, to capture Avlona sometime prior to the departure 
of the main fleet.985 However, I believe that a number maybe even half of the 1,275 
mentioned before would seem much more realistic. As for the foot-soldiers, bearing in mind 
the maximum capacity of 108 men in a tenth century Byzantine dromon, which certainly 
                                                 
983 Gesta, V. 143, p. 244; not 150 ships as Chalandon erroneously notes, see: Chalandon, 
Alexis Ier, p. 91. 
984 Gesta, V. 155-158, p. 244. 
985 Alexiad, VI. v, p. 282; Sewter, p. 189; Malaterra tells us that Bohemond was sent as well, 
see: Malaterra, 3. 40. 
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would not had been the case for the Norman transport ships, this would give us a maximum 
of 9,180 men. Again this number is surely exaggerated and we should narrow it down to at 
least a third.   
     Whatever the case, even after these very risky calculations, my point is that the numbers 
mobilised for the 1084 campaign were, almost certainly, much lower than three years before. 
Both Anna Comnena and William of Apulia overestimate, in their usual manner, the size of 
the Norman host, but there is no doubt that their comments are exaggerated.986 If Robert 
Guiscard’s army was indeed huge in size, then why did they not choose to march against 
Thessaloniki, the second largest and wealthiest city-port of the Empire, as they had done 
three years ago? Instead, they turned south-eastwards, towards Corinth, Athens and Thebes, 
cities that belonged to the poorly defended themes of Hellas and Peloponnesus.  
     Meanwhile, Alexius went on to ensure that the last enclaves of Norman military presence 
in the Balkans were wiped out. Avlona, as we have already seen, was captured soon after 
Bohemond’s departure in the spring of 1084, while in the same period, a combined Venetian 
and Byzantine987 fleet attacked the citadel of Corfu, since the lower city and the rest of the 
island had rebelled against the Normans.988 But this expedition failed to dislodge the 
Normans from the well-fortified citadel. Alexius seems to have been aware of Robert’s 
preparations, and sometime during the summer he requested Venice’s naval assistance to 
defend the Illyrian coastline, since a Venetian squadron was already active there by the time 
the Normans crossed to Avlona.989 
     At the end of September/early October, Robert Guiscard departed from Brindisi after 
having sent his two sons Roger and Guy with a reconnaissance force of knights to capture 
                                                 
986 Alexiad, VI. v, pp. 281-82; Sewter, p. 188; Gesta, V. 127-156, pp. 242-44. 
987 Again, the leader of the Byzantine squadron was Mavrikas. 
988 Gesta, V. 96-105, pp. 240-42.  
989 Alexiad, VI. v, p. 283; Sewter, p. 189. 
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Avlona.990 The Normans occupied the town and they joined up with the main expeditionary 
force somewhere between Avlona and Butrinto, probably close to the castra of Hiericho and 
Kanina as three years ago. William of Apulia, much better informed about this part of the 
Norman campaign, talks about a weather system that forced the Normans to remain in their 
base near Butrinto for the next two months, not being able to sail to Corfu to raise the siege of 
the city’s citadel.991 Around the end of November/early December, Robert Guiscard took his 
army across to the island of Corfu, landing at the northern port of Cassiopi just like he had 
done in 1081.992 The only difference this time was that he found a joined Venetian-Byzantine 
fleet waiting to attack him. 
     We are not informed about the number of ships that were sent by the Doge, but we should 
not expect a large expeditionary force since it only took the Venetians a few weeks to prepare 
and sail south.993 Both William of Apulia and Anna Comnena use vague terms like triremes 
and naves to describe the consistency of the Venetian fleet, although by reading the Alexiad 
we understand that both large vessels, like chelandia or types of dromons, and lighter and 
faster ships, like the galeai, would have been deployed.994 As for the Byzantine navy’s 
numbers and types of ships, it is most likely that it was the same squadron that faced the 
Normans in 1081, judging by the presence of the same admiral, Mavrikas.995 What is most 
interesting about William’s narrative is that, for the first time, he mentions the term chelandia 
to describe the types of ships of the Byzantine fleet, contrary to the term naves for the 
Venetian ships of the 1081 naval battles. Since we know that Mavrikas’ fleet is highly 
unlikely to have been reinforced by newly built ships during the years 1082-4, we can say 
                                                 
990 Malaterra, 3. 40; Gesta, V. 143-53, p. 244; Anna erroneously reports Otranto as the point 
of departure: Alexiad, VI. v, p. 283; Sewter, pp. 188-9.  
991 Gesta, V. 147-49, p. 244. 
992 Alexiad, VI. v, pp. 282-83; Sewter, p. 189; Gesta, V. 156-159, p. 244. 
993 “They [Venetians] had not been long in the harbour of Passaron before they heard of his 
[Guiscard’s] move.” Alexiad, VI. v, p. 283; Sewter, p. 189. 
994 Alexiad, VI. v, pp. 283-84; Sewter, pp. 189-90. 
995 Gesta, V. 99, p. 240. 
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that the Normans faced chelandia in 1081 as well. The fact, however, that he identifies the 
Norman ships as triremes is completely wrong, because he writes that “Robert Guiscard’s 
naves were seen as inferior by the Venetians, who attacked them”.996  
     We follow the writings of the Alexiad, our most detailed source for these three naval 
battles.997 Before the Norman crossing to Corfu, the Venetians had established their head-
quarters in the harbour of Passaron, close to Cassiopi in the north-eastern side of the island. 
During their first encounter, the Venetians managed to rout the Norman squadron, but Anna 
gives us few if any details about the course of the battle. Three days later the allied fleet 
attacked the Normans once more, trying to inflict a significant blow upon the relatively small 
Norman squadron of warships, but again their victory was not decisive enough to force 
Robert Guiscard to retreat back to Avlona. This time, however, the Venetians made the grave 
mistake of underestimating the enemy’s losses and, almost certain about their crushing 
victory, they sent envoys to their Doge in Venice to announce the news. With the Venetian 
small and fast ships sent back home, the Normans attacked their enemies.998 Their assault 
was certainly not expected by the Venetians999 who barely had the time to tie their ships 
together and form the pelagolimena, the defensive formation seen three years before at 
Dyrrachium. The Norman ships, being made much lighter the day before, took full advantage 
of their speed and mobility and overwhelmingly defeated the Venetians.  
                                                
     Both Anna Comnena and William of Apulia report large numbers of dead and prisoners. 
Anna mentions around 13,000 Venetian casualties, surely an exaggerated figure which 
 
996 “Roberti naves dum conspicit inferiores esse suis”: Gesta, V. 163-164, p. 244; inferiores 
means inferior in quality than in numbers. 
997 Alexiad, VI. v-vi, pp. 283-87; Sewter, pp. 189-91; See also: Gesta, V. 147-198, pp. 244-6; 
Dandolus, Chronicon, s.a. 1084, p. 218; Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1084; Anon. Bar., s.a. 
1085; Romuald of Salerno, s.a. 1085. 
998 Anna tells us that Guiscard was given this information by a certain Venetian called Pietro 
Contarini, probably a member of the powerful Contarini family: Alexiad, VI. v, p. 284; 
Sewter, p. 190; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 50-67. 
999 William of Apulia tells us that the Byzantine squadron had left the scene of the naval 
battle: Gesta, V. 186-7, p. 246. 
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reflects, however, the serious blow to Venice’s prestige, and 2,500 prisoners who were 
probably sent back to Avlona.1000 Lupus Protospatharius talks about more than a thousand 
men killed in action, five ships captured by the Normans and two which were sunk with their 
entire crew, a much more realistic estimate for the Venetian casualties.1001 However, it is only 
in the Alexiad where we get an idea of the way in which the Venetian prisoners were treated 
by Robert Guiscard: “Unfortunately Robert behaved in cruel fashion after his famous victory. 
Many of the prisoners were treated with hideous savagery: some were blinded, others had 
their noses cut off, and others lost hands or feet or both.”1002 There was no precedent in 
Robert Guiscard’s behaviour against prisoners of war, neither at Dyrrachium three years ago 
nor against the Bariots, the Palermitans or the people of Naples in the 1070s. Probably the 
Duke wished to send a warning to the Venetians never to launch another naval campaign 
against his army. A similar pattern was followed by Roger after the battle of Misilmeri 
(1068), when hardly any Muslim survived to bring the news to the inhabitants of the Sicilian 
capital. Instead, the Normans used carrier-pigeons, supposedly writing the notes with the 
blood of the dead Muslim soldiers. This gruesome method of psychological warfare proved 
very effective, with Malaterra reporting: “When the people of Palermo heard the news, the 
whole city was shaken: the tearful voices of the children and women rose up through the air 
to the heavens.”1003  
     By mid-December 1084, Robert Guiscard was free to sail southwards and relieve the 
besieged Norman garrison of the Corfiot citadel. Later, he returned to his winter quarters on 
the banks of the river Glykys (Acheron) in the Epirotic coastline to spend the winter, with 
himself and his elite cavalry pitching a camp further south at Vonitsa, the town which they 
had captured in a side-expedition three years ago.1004 Meanwhile, famine and an outbreak, 
                                                 
1000 Alexiad, VI. v, p. 285; Sewter, p. 190; Gesta, V. 193-197, p. 246. 
1001 Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1084. 
1002 Alexiad, VI. v, p. 285; Sewter, p. 190. 
1003 Malaterra, 2. 41, 42. 
1004 Gesta, V. 202-209, p. 246 
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probably of malaria, had swept his army and claimed, according to both Anna and William of 
Apulia, some 10,000 men of whom 500 were knights – another exaggerated figure.1005 This 
disease though would certainly have had a demoralising effect on the men and officers of the 
army, especially if we consider the fact that even Bohemond requested to return to Italy for 
treatment.1006  
     While examining Robert Guiscard’s conquest in the Illyrian and Greek mainland and the 
islands of the Ionian Sea, it is imperative that we should keep a careful watch on a detailed 
map in order to note down these initial conquests. This would make much easier and sensible 
the tracking down of Guiscard’s next moves, bearing in mind his long-term goal which was 
the cities of Athens, Corinth and Thebes. In sailing from the straits of Otranto the main trunk 
routes that a medieval fleet could take, heading southwards towards the island of Crete 
through the west coast of the Peloponnesus, laid inshore of the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, 
Zante, due to the prevailing north-westerly winds, and Modon in the south-western tip of 
Peloponnesus.1007 However, if a fleet targeted the areas of Attica, Corinth and Boeotia, it was 
better to sail east passing Patras, Naupaktos, through the Gulf of Corinth and land a raiding 
party off the coasts of Corinth than sail all the way around the Peloponnesus. Thus far, he had 
managed to subjugate the port of Avlona and the island of Corfu as his main supply bases, 
and having established himself at Vonitsa, in the entrance of the Amvrakikos Gulf he had 
under his control the sea-routes half-way to the entrance of the Gulf of Corinth. His next step 
would have been to subdue the island of Cephalonia, which was the capital of the coastal 
thema of Cephalonia which included the seven islands of the Ionian Sea.  
     In the early summer of 1085 Robert Guiscard sent his son Roger Borsa, along with a small 
force of elite troops, to Cephalonia in an attempt to capture the island’s capital Agios 
                                                 
1005 Gesta, V. 210-220, pp. 246-8; Anna erroneously puts the outbreak of the disease in the 
first campaign of 1081: Alexiad, IV. iii, p. 196; Sewter, pp. 139-40. 
1006 Gesta, V. 223-225, p. 248. 
1007 See: Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, pp. 12-24, 87-101, especially the map in p. 
14 which puts down the sea-currents, the trunk routes and prevailing winds in the 
Mediterranean. 
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Georgios.1008 At first, Roger proved unsuccessful in his siege of the town and it was Robert 
Guiscard who arrived to take command of the operations, landing at the promontory of 
Atheras in the north-west of the island. William of Apulia and Anna Comnena give slightly 
different version of what actually happened next. According to the Alexiad, Robert Guiscard 
arrived in a single galea at the promontory of Atheras, in order to take command of the 
operations against the island’s capital, while the rest of his army remained on the opposite 
Epirotic coast, in battle positions ready to sail and bring reinforcements if neccessary. He had 
not sent for the rest of his army to embark for Cephalonia, and before he even managed to 
reach his son, Robert Guiscard fell ill “by a violent fever”.1009 William of Apulia tells us that 
the Duke, after sending his son to besiege the town of Agios Georgios, returned to Vonitsa to 
take his entire army across the sea and march against the island’s capital. He embarked from 
the Norman base-camp heading for Cephalonia, but “before he managed to see the castles-
fortifications [of Agios Georgios] he went down with fever”.1010   
     Robert Guiscard died on the 17th July 1085, after suffering from intense fever for six days 
in an area which retains until the present day the Norman Duke’s name in the form of 
Fiskardo (former Panormos).1011 Although a historian of medicine might give a better 
explanation concerning the Duke’s cause of death, the most likely illness that brought his life 
to an end so rapidly and, indeed, unexpectedly must have been malaria. As we have already 
                                                 
1008 Alexiad, VI. vi, p. 287; Sewter, pp. 191-2; Gesta, V. 228-232, p. 248; the Byzantine castle 
of the island’s capital was probably built in the eleventh century and formed the most 
important settlement nucleus on the island and the seat of the governor: Castrorum 
Circumnavigatio, pp. 58-61; for the topography of Cephalonia, see: D. Zakythenos, 
“Κεφαλληνίας ιστορικά και τοπωνυμικά”, Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών, 6 
(1929). 
1009 Alexiad, VI. vi, pp. 287-88; Sewter, pp. 191-2.  
1010 “Navim conscendes, quam castra revisere possit, febre prius capitur”: Gesta, V. 288-289, 
p. 252. 
1011 For the two other locations which “claim” Guiscard’s death, see: A. Savvides, Τα 
Βυζαντινά Επτάνησα, 11ος-αρχές 13ου αι. Το ναυτικό θέμα Κεφαλληνίας στην Υστεροβυζαντινή 
περίοδο, Athens, 1986. 
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seen, the Norman camp was struck by a violent disease that cost the lives of thousands of 
men, both foot-soldiers and knights, and although the figures provided by our chroniclers 
may seem to be exaggerated, they certainly reveal the severity of the situation. Malaria1012 is 
a vector-borne infectious disease caused by parasites, which is transmitted by an already 
infected person to another through a mosquito-bite. Its most typical symptoms are fever, 
chills, nausea and flulike illness, which they certainly match what was described by Anna 
Comnena and William of Apulia of a violent fever that killed Robert Guiscard in just six 
days. Since the mosquitoes re-produce in large numbers in cool and humid places, Vonitsa in 
the extremely humid Amvrakian Gulf must have been the worst place Robert Guiscard could 
have picked to pitch his winter camp.   
     The consequences of Guiscard’s death for the Norman campaign were disastrous. Roger 
Borsa, the legitimate heir to the Dukedom of Apulia and Calabria since 1081,1013 took 
advantage of the absence of his older half-brother Bohemond to arrange for his succession 
and win over the allegiance of his father’s high-ranking vassals. He immediately called for a 
meeting of all the Counts that were camped at Vonitsa and demanded an oath of fealty to him 
in person, before sailing to Apulia to assume the command of his dukedom. However, the 
most significant consequence of Robert Guiscard’s death was the Byzantine capture of 
Dyrrachium, the last remaining outpost of Norman military presence in the east side of the 
Adriatic Sea since the spring of 1082. Alexius once again set in motion the mechanisms of 
Byzantine diplomacy and, as Anna writes, “to sow dissension among them [Normans] by 
letters and every other method. He also persuaded the Venetians resident in Constantinople to 
write to their fellow-countrymen in Epidamnos, and to the Amalfitans and all other foreigners 
there, advising them to yield to his [Alexius’] wishes and surrender the place. Unceasingly, 
                                                 
1012 For more information about malaria, see the World Health Organization’s website: 
http://www.who.int/malaria/ . 
1013 Gesta, IV. 195-97, p. 214; Roger had already been recognised as heir by Robert 
Guiscard’s vassals since the spring of 1073. See: Amatus, VII. 20. 
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with bribes and promises, he works to this end”.1014 As for the Venetians of the lower city, 
the fact that he used their countrymen at Constantinople as intermediaries makes it quite 
likely that even more privileges and future trading agreements would have been promised to 
them in addition to the 1082 and 1084 chrysobulls. The Normans were eventually 
“persuaded” by the inhabitants of the lower city, the Venetians, and surrendered the city to 
Alexius’ officers.1015 The surrender of the city must have taken place in the late autumn of the 
year 1085.1016 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1014 Alexiad, VI. vi, p. 289; Sewter, pp. 192-3. 
1015 Alexiad, VI. vi, pp. 289-90; Sewter, pp. 289-90; Gesta, V. 377-390, p. 256 
1016 Alexiad, VI. viii, p. 295; Sewter, p. 196; see also: Buckler, Anna Comnena, p. 39; 
Savvides’ erroneous dating is striking: Savvides, Byzantino-Normannica, pp. 68-9. 
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11. Bohemond of Taranto and the First Crusade  
 
     The main objective of this chapter is not to provide a military history of the First 
Crusade1017 but rather to establish a link between Bohemond’s military achievements in 
Illyria and Greece in the 1080s and his following invasion of 1107. Thus the two major 
questions will be: what was Bohemond’s role in the First Crusade? What experience did he 
acquire while fighting against Turkish troops in Asia Minor and Syria which would seem 
useful ten years later?  
     None of the contemporary chroniclers give an exact estimate of the size of Bohemond’s 
followers for the First Crusade, with Albert of Aachen writing about 10,000 cavalry and 
“very many troops of infantry”, a greatly exaggerated figure.1018 Lupus Protospatharius’ 500 
knights sound more realistic, a number which confirms that the “Italian” Norman contingent 
was, indeed, one of the smallest in the crusading army.1019 If we assume that the infantry 
would have been between five and seven times the size of the cavalry, then a number of 
2,500-3,500 would have been reasonable, if we include Tancred’s contingent.1020 
Additionally, we have a list of the counts that followed Bohemond in his expedition, namely 
his nephew Tancred, Richard of Principate and his brother Rainulf, Humphrey of 
                                                 
1017 Key studies on the history of the First Crusade are: France, Victory in the East; S. 
Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1951-54; C. Tyerman, God’s War, a New History of the Crusades, Harvard University Press, 
Massachusetts, 2006; J. Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the idea of crusading, Athlone, 
London, 1986; idem, The Crusades, Athlone, London, 1987. 
1018 Albert of Aachen, II. 18, p. 88; Albert was a contemporary of the events of the First 
Crusade and wrote his account based on oral testimonies of the participants. 
1019 Lupus Protospatharius, s.a. 1096; Alexiad, X. xi, vol. II, p. 60; Sewter, p. 326; Yewdale, 
Bohemond I, p. 36; Riley-Smith, Crusades, p. 22. 
1020 Tancred had a contingent of 2,000 men: Gesta Francorum et aliorum 
Hierosolimitanorum, The deeds of the Franks and the other pilgrims to Jerusalem, ed. R. 
Hill, Nelson, London, 1962, iv, p. 9. 
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Montescaglioso and nine others.1021 What is very important in this case is the presence of 
Richard and Humphrey, the two most powerful and influential Apulian magnates after Roger 
Borsa himself, even though it is almost impossible to estimate the size of their contingents.  
     Some of the facts about Bohemond’s army can explain why the count of Taranto quickly 
became the leading figure in the First Crusade. The Norman army consisted of many hybrid 
elements like any crusading army of the period, but we must admit that the Normans were the 
most experienced for what was lying ahead of them. A significant number of their 
experienced knights had faced the Byzantines in battle several times, from Bari (1071) to 
Dyrrachium (1081-4). During the Sicilian expansion they had been facing Muslim armies and 
Bohemond had fought against Turcopoles during his first campaign against Dyrrachium 
fifteen years ago. Further, if we are to believe the author of the Historia Belli Sacri, a monk at 
Montecassino writing in the 1130s who seems to be well informed on south Italian affairs of 
the period, both Tancred and Richard of Principate and possibly a large number of their 
followers knew Arabic,1022 something extremely rare for the armies of the First Crusade. 
Also, it is highly likely that Bohemond himself spoke Greek, something which can explain 
his advantage over the other Latin leaders in their dealings with Alexius, his representatives 
and the number of Greek merchants that they encountered during the crusade.  
     Bohemond entered Constantinople on the 17 April 1097,1023 taking the oath of homage 
which the Emperor had demanded from him and from all the other leaders before him.1024 In 
                                                 
1021 Gesta Francorum, iii, p. 8; William of Tyre, vol. I, Book II, XIII, p. 134; William of Tyre 
is writing in the 1170s and largely copies the contemporary chroniclers of the First Crusade. 
1022 Historia Belli Sacri, R.H.C. Oc., vol. 67, p. 198; for the spread of the Arabic culture and 
language in Sicily up to the 1060s, see: Metcalfe, “The Muslims of Sicily under Christian 
Rule”, 289-317, especially 289-93. 
1023 For the date see: H. Hagenmeyer, Die Kreuzzugbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100, 
Innsbruck, 1901, pp. 64-5; J. W. Nesbitt, “The Rate of March of Crusading Armies in 
Europe, a Study and Computation”, Traditio, 19 (1963), 167-81. 
1024 Alexiad, X. xi, vol. II, pp. 63-6; Sewter, pp. 328-9; for Alexius’ dealings with Bohemond, 
see: J. Shepard, “When Greek meets Greek: Alexius Comnenus and Bohemond in 1097-98”, 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 12 (1988), 189ff. 
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order to proceed inland in Asia Minor it was imperative that the crusaders should first take 
Nicaea, a city which effectively controlled all the roads leading to the Anatolian plateau and 
situated only 40 kilometres from Constantinople.1025 The crusading armies needed provisions 
in order to besiege the city effectively and it was at this stage of the crusade when we can see 
for the first time the significant role played by Bohemond in the campaign, since he was the 
leader who managed to negotiate sufficient supplies to be sent to Nicomedia.1026 The siege of 
Nicaea begun on the 14th May and lasted about five weeks, mostly due to the crusaders’ 
difficulty in organizing an efficient blockade of the city.1027 During the siege the crusaders 
managed to repel a Seljuc relief force of around 10,000 men in a battle that took place in the 
vicinity of the city and a key role was played by Bohemond’s troops and the Germans who 
supported the contingent of the Provencals on the south side of the city.1028 And it was a 
combination of the sheer size of the Crusader force and the confined space that did not allow 
the Turks to fully develop their encircling tactics, thus forcing Kilij-Arslan to retreat from the 
vicinity. Once the defenders realized that they had no hope of being rescued, they decided to 
surrender, not to the crusaders, but to the Imperial unit that was besieging them from the side 
of the lake.1029 
                                                 
1025 About the Turkish Emirates established in Asia Minor in the 1090s, see: Korobeinikov, 
“The Turks”, 692-710. 
1026 Gesta Francorum, vii, p. 14. 
1027 Alexiad, XI. i, vol. II, pp. 69-82; Sewter, pp. 333-40; William of Tyre, vol. I, Book III, I, 
pp. 152-3, 165-6; Albert of Aachen, II. 37, p. 126; Le “Liber” de Raymond d’Aguilers, ed. J. 
Hugh and L.L. Hill, Libraire Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1969, pp. 39-47; Raymond 
D’Aguilers, Historia Francorum Qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, tr. J.H. Hill and L.Hill, The 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1968, pp. 25-29; regarding the numbers of the 
crusaders gathered at Nicaea, see: Fulcherius Carnotensis, pp. 181-3, 186; Ekkehardus 
Uraugiensis abbas, Hierosolymita, ed. H. Hagenmeyer, Tubingen, 1877, p. 21; The most 
detailed accounts on the siege of Nicaea are: France, Victory in the East, pp. 143-69; R. 
Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century, Clarendon, Oxford, 1992, pp. 16-25. 
1028 For a detailed analysis of this battle, see: France, Victory in the East, pp. 160-62. 
1029 Batumites, the general with a force of 2,000 men acting under Alexius’ orders, had 
secretly negotiated with the Seljucs. See: Alexiad, XI. ii, vol. II, p. 77; Sewter, pp. 337-8; 
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     The huge crusader army that had gathered at Nicaea marched south towards Doryleum in 
two groups of divisions, obviously to keep up with the supply and baggage trains and for 
better defence against possible enemy attacks, with Bohemond in the head of the first group 
of armies.1030 The Latin armies’ formation in the eleventh and twelfth century was usually a 
column which included flank-guards and rear and/or vanguard depending on the prudence of 
the commanding general.1031 After leaving behind the Bithynian Mountains and coming into 
central Anatolia they found themselves in a broken country with no easily defensible 
positions and very well-suited for the particular tactics of the Seljucs. Thus, on the morning 
of the 31st June, Bohemond deployed his forces in front of a marsh1032, which might had 
provided some safety from the Turkish encircling manoeuvres, left the infantry to guard the 
baggage train and ordered the cavalry to stand in a dense mass and hold the line. We have no 
credible account about the numbers involved in this first clash between the crusaders and the 
Seljucs and an attempt to make an estimate would certainly be futile.1033 However, Fulcher of 
Chartres and the Gesta give an estimate of 360,000 Seljuc troops, while William of Tyre 
narrows it down to 200,000, which are surely exaggerated figures. France has suggested that 
the Seljuc army was smaller than the force of the Crusaders and it would have been roughly 
equal to the total mounted host of the Latins, thus a battle of movement would nullify the 
                                                                                                                                           
Gesta Francorum, viii, pp. 16-7; William of Tyre, vol. I, Book III, XI, pp. 165-66; Albert of 
Aachen, II. 37, p. 126. 
1030 Gesta Francorum, ix, p. 18; Albert of Aachen, II. 38, p. 128; Alexiad, XI. iii, vol. II, p. 
84; Sewter, pp. 341-2. 
1031 For a good introductory study on this topic, see: Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, pp. 
60-70; compare with Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 154-66. 
1032 Fulcherius Carnotensis, book I, XI. 3. 
1033 Gesta Francorum, ix, p. 20; William of Tyre, vol. I, Book III, XIII, p. 170; France argues, 
based on Cahen’s conclusions about the Turkish settlement in Anatolia in the previous 
decades, that Kilij-Arslan would not had been able to gather more than 10,000 troops. See: 
France, Victory in the East, p. 157; Cahen, “The Turkish invasion: the Selchukids”, 135-76. 
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numeric advantage of the latter by attacking their vanguard.1034 And this time Kilij-Arslan 
chose the approaches of a high plateau to ambush the Latin vanguard, a less confined space in 
comparison to his attack against the Provencals at Nicaea.1035 
     Before the crusaders had the chance to be fully deployed in their battle formations, the 
Seljucs arrived en masse and attacked the westerners from all directions in an attempt to 
encircle them. They applied their usual steppe tactics of releasing constant showers of arrows 
from a distance and falling back when their enemies would charge forward to neutralize 
them, but then pretending to retreat they would make a sudden turn and come back to harass 
them. The pace and agility of their horses was quicker and more manoeuvrable than the 
Frankish cavalry, mostly due to their equipment which was significantly lighter, although the 
horses themselves did not differ much from those used in Islam by the end of the century.1036 
Their principal weapon was the bow, but they were also carrying a small round wooden 
shield, a lance and a sword. As for their armour, it is very difficult to know what they were 
wearing as defensive equipment in the later decades of the eleventh century. But the influence 
from the Byzantines was becoming strong and already since the Crusade the chroniclers 
mention heavily armed knights with hauberks. There is significant evidence to show that all 
these were much lighter than the western European ones.1037 Their aim was to confuse and 
demoralise the enemy, isolate and break-up their formations before charging in with their 
                                                 
1034 France, Victory in the East, pp. 174-75. France also draws an interesting comparison of 
Doryleum with Myriokephalo (1176). 
1035 Ibn-al-Qalanisi, The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, extracted and translated by 
H.A.R. Gibb, Luzac & Co, London, 1932, pp. 41-42. 
1036 J. France, “Technology and the Success of the First Crusade”, War and Society in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, 165. 
1037 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 77-8; France, Victory in the East, pp. 148-49, 204-5; 
idem, “Technology and the First Crusade”, 169; A. Ayton, “Arms, Armour, and Horses”, 
Medieval Warfare, 190, 192-3; D. Nicolle, “The Impact of European Couched Lance on 
Muslim Military Tradition”, Journal of the Arms & Armour Society, 10 (1980), 13. Nicolle 
also mentions the very useful illustrations of a mid-eleventh century Turkish manuscript 
named Warqa-wa-Gulshah.   
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swords and lances.1038 As most of our Latin sources agree, these steppe tactics were 
completely unknown to the crusaders – apart from Bohemond of course – who certainly must 
not have fought against any large Seljuc force before.1039 Taticius, a Turk in the service of the 
Emperor was accompanying the crusaders with a force of about 2,000 light cavalry and 
Alexius had given advice on how to deal with the attacks of the Turks on the battlefield,1040 
but it is rather doubtful that any Byzantine advice would have been applied properly at 
Doryleum. 
     The first stage of the battle found the crusaders completely enveloped by the Seljuc 
cavalry. And this would have been exactly Kilij Arslan’s main strategic objective, as he had 
attacked – or ambushed might be a better term – the Latins at a relatively narrow point where 
two valleys meet.1041 Although there was no main body which Bohemond could order to 
advance, an attempt was made by the Frankish cavalry to counterattack, probably a 
spontaneous reaction to the shower of arrows, “but the Turks ... purposely opened their ranks 
to avoid the clash, and the Christians, finding no one to oppose them, had to fall back 
deceived.”1042 They soon realised that any sallies forward would accomplish nothing and the 
crusaders resorted to closing in their ranks and holding the line. Smail insisted that this was 
the best action they could take, because this mass “represented a formidable defensive 
power”, while Oman argued that “this passive policy only made them more helpless prey to 
the Turks.”1043 I would have to agree with the latter opinion because, since we know that the 
Latin foot did not have the equipment or training and discipline of the Roman testudo to hold 
                                                 
1038 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 75-83; Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, pp. 206-19, 273-4; 
France, Victory in the East, pp. 147-9. 
1039 Gesta Francorum, ix, p. 19; Fulcherius Carnotensis, pp. 194-95; William of Tyre, vol. I, 
Book III, XIV, pp. 170-1; Albert of Aachen, II. 39, p. 130; excluding the several Latin 
mercenaries serving the Emperors since the mid-eleventh century, as we have already seen. 
1040 Alexiad, X. xi, vol. II, pp. 67-8; Sewter, pp. 329-31. 
1041 For the topography of the region, by far the most detailed study is: France, Victory in the 
East, pp. 173-75. 
1042 William of Tyre, vol. I, Book III, XIV, pp. 171. 
1043 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 169; Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, p. 274. 
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back enemy volleys of arrows, then staying idle would not have been the best choice. It was 
only when they had gained greater experience on the battlefield after Antioch, as I mention 
later, that they became a cohesive and effective fighting force.  
     At this crucial stage of the battle, when Bohemond’s battle group was in danger of being 
completely cut off, the latter sent an urgent message to Godfrey and the rest of the armies of 
the second group (only the knights) arrived just in time to save the day, forming their lines on 
the right of Bohemond’s battle-group.1044 Once the crusaders had crossed the mountain ridge 
that led to the battlefield they did not waste any time forming a front but immediately charged 
upon the surprised and frustrated Seljucs, mainly focusing on their left flank and centre, 
forcing them to flee.1045 Contrary to what advice Alexius had given to them, the crusaders 
pursued the defeated foe for many hours, thus preventing them from regrouping and taking 
large amounts of booty from their camp. 
     The first encounter of the crusaders with a relatively unknown enemy to them resulted to a 
complete victory. But this was a victory of chance and, although it was one of the rare cases 
when the Westerners enjoyed numerical superiority over their enemies, it was in no way due 
to the superior battle-tactics applied by the crusaders or the mistakes made by the Seljucs. If 
the messengers sent by Bohemond to Godfrey had not made it through the Seljuc lines, or if 
the Latin reinforcements had not arrived on time, things would certainly have been very 
different. Most likely the armies of Bohemond and Robert of Normandy would have been cut 
to pieces or forced to a disorderly retreat, something which Kilij-Arslan was hoping for. But 
in the crisis moment, when the crusaders’ front was ready to collapse, religious fervour 
kicked in: “Stand fast all together, trusting in Christ and in the Victory of the Holy Cross. 
Today, please God, you will all gain much booty.”1046 Undoubtedly, this first battle 
experience would prove very useful to the crusaders because it taught them several valuable 
                                                 
1044 See the map on: France, Victory in the East, pp. 178-79. 
1045 Gesta Francorum, ix, p. 20; William of Tyre, vol. I, Book III, XV, pp. 171-3; Albert of 
Aachen, II. 41, pp. 132-4. 
1046 Gesta Francorum, ix, pp. 19-20. 
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lessons about steppe warfare. They witnessed firsthand the thick formations of mounted 
archers attacking them from all sides, using the mobility of their horses to attack both the 
front and rear of their units, constantly employing the tactic of feigned retreat, not just in 
large divisions but in smaller units as well. They were able to combine all the above with 
their archery which, according to many contemporary chroniclers, was deadly accurate 
aiming not just at the men but at their horses as well. The heavy Frankish cavalry’s battle 
formations and its cooperation with the still inexperienced masses of infantry proved a 
tactical failure against the mounted troops of the Seljucs. 
     The crusaders might have been lucky outside the walls of Nicaea, but Antioch was one of 
the most heavily defended cities of the Empire that combined a strong natural position, while 
on the most exposed sides it was surrounded by double walls which were said to be wide 
enough for a chariot to ride on the battlements.1047 As they were to find out soon enough, 
there were three ways to subdue the city – either by starvation, treachery or by a trick.1048 The 
two major problems for the crusaders during the winter months were the provision of food 
and other supplies for the army and to prevent the increase of desertion among its ranks.1049 
Logistics were crucial at this point of the campaign, and the task of bringing supplies to the 
crusader army was taken over by Bohemond who held foraging expeditions in the region of 
Antioch during the winter (1097/8) and attempted to neutralize several smaller garrisons in 
the area that were harassing the crusaders.  
                                                 
1047 For an exhaustive account on the siege, see: Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. I, 
pp. 213-36; Flori, Bohémond d’ Antioch, pp. 133-42; our main primary sources for the siege 
are: Raymond d’Aguilers, pp. 47-64/Hill and Hill, pp. 30-64; Albert of Aachen, III. 38 – V. 1, 
pp. 198-338; William of Tyre, Book IV, 12-24, Book V, Book VI, pp. 206-297; Gesta 
Francorum, xii-xxix, pp. 28-71; for the city’s defences: G. Downey, A History of Antioch in 
Syria, Princeton, 1961, pp. 528-52; Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 26-30. 
1048 In 969, a daring party of Byzantine soldiers scaled the walls of Antioch using ladders 
while the Muslim guards were asleep. See: Leo the Deacon, pp. 81-2; The History of Leo the 
Deacon, pp. 132-4. 
1049 For an examination of how serious a factor desertion and diseases were for a medieval 
army, see: France, Victory in the East, pp. 134-7. 
266 
 
     Supplies for the Latins were supposed to be provided by the Byzantines naval bases in 
Cilicia and Cyprus,1050 but in a hostile area like Syria and so far from the rest of the 
Byzantine centres it was apparent that an alternative supply source had to be found. Even 
though the crusaders officially chose Stephen of Blois as their leader,1051 the active role for 
this task was taken by Bohemond who did everything within his power to look like the leader 
of this operation.1052 His strategic thinking, high morale and his resourcefulness certainly 
greatly helped him. He led numerous foraging expeditions further inland and towards the port 
of St-Symeon and he was involved in numerous skirmishes with the Turks, one of them 
developing into a small-scale battle with a Seljuc force from the castle of Harem,1053 a 
constant source of harassment some three hours to the east of Antioch, in the middle of 
Damascus, another of Malik Shah’s sons, in late December but it brought poor results and 
                                                
November (1097).1054  
     By the end of the winter, Bohemond would have the chance to lead a cavalry force against 
a large relief party send by the Seljucs and ambush it, thus demonstrating his resourcefulness 
and strategic thinking. The Seljucs under Ridwan of Aleppo, Malik-Shah I’s (1072-92) son, 
had managed to gather a large force of about 12,000 to 28,000 men to inflict a blow to the 
besiegers of Antioch. A smaller expedition had already been launched by Duqaq of 
 
1050 For the role of the Byzantine Navy in supplying the crusaders, see: B.S. Bachrach, “Some 
observations on the role of the Byzantine navy in the success of the First Crusade”, The 
Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2002), 83-100. 
1051 Gesta Francorum, xxvii, p. 63. 
1052 It is possible that his ambitions caused Taticius’ departure from Antioch later in February 
(1098). For the debate, see: Yewdale, Bohemond I, pp. 57-62; Chalandon, Alexis Ier, pp. 200-
5; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 34-7; J. France, “The Departure of Tatikios 
from the Crusader Army”, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 44 (1971), 137-47; 
Shepard, “When Greek meets Greek”, 193ff. 
1053 France, Victory in the East, p. 208. 
1054 For the harassment by the Turkish garrisons: Raymond d’Aguilers, pp. 48-49/Hill and 
Hill, pp. 31-32; Fulcherius Carnotensis, pp. 215-24; Gesta Francorum, xii, p. 29; Albert of 
Aachen, III. 59, p. 230. 
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was dealt with by Bohemond and Robert of Flanders.1055 We need to point out here that there 
is a difference between these troops and the Turks who had engaged the crusaders at 
Doryleum. The forces that Duqaq, Ridwan and later the governor of Mosul, Kerbogha, put in 
the field were composite armies of Arabs, Seljucs and probably other nationalities like the 
Iranian Daylami, the Kurds and other Bedouin tribes,1056 and in which the Seljucs were the 
dominant party, but Kilij-Arslan’s army was almost entirely Turkish.1057 The news of their 
mobilization quickly alerted the crusader leaders, mainly Bohemond who was effectively the 
leader, and a force of every available knight was raised and sent out to face the Turks. By that 
time the horses which would have survived the march though Anatolia would not have been 
more than 1,000 and so we can presume that this would have been the number of the 
mobilised Frankish knights.1058 Bohemond decided to pursue an aggressive strategy and 
ambush the Seljucs on a narrow neck of land which passes between the Lake Bengras and the 
River Orontes, some eleven kilometres east of Antioch. His other option would have been to 
wait for the Seljucs on the Iron Bridge that led to Antioch, where Bohemond could have 
made better use of his infantry units. But the size of Ridwan’s army quickly led to the 
crusaders taking the initiative. When Bohemond saw the vanguard of the Seljuc army thrown 
out in front of the main body in their disorderly fashion, Bohemond kept waiting until most 
                                                 
1055 France, Victory in the East, pp. 237-41. 
1056 For the employment of these groups by the Abbasids, the Fatimids and the Hamdanids in 
the ninth and tenth centuries, see: McGeer, Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, pp. 229-42; Beshir, 
“Fatimid Military Organization”, 37-56; Hamblin, “The Fatimid Army”;  Lev, State and 
Society in Fatimid Egypt; War and society in the eastern Mediterranean; “Infantry in Muslim 
armies during the Crusades”, 185-206; Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. II, pp. 19-193. 
1057 Some of the Latin chroniclers could understand this difference and use different terms, 
like Turks and Saracens. See: Albert of Aachen, III. 62, p. 236; V. 29, p. 374; Gesta 
Francorum, ix, p. 20; xvii, pp. 35-7.   
1058 On how we arrive to this number, see: Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, p. 280; Riley-Smith, 
The Crusades, p. 28; idem, The Idea of Crusading, pp. 64-5; Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, 
pp. 225-27; Nicolle puts the figure down to 200, see: Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. I, p. 
137. 
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of the main body was inside the defile and then launched his attack. He had deployed his 
forces in five divisions, keeping a sixth in reserve which he commanded himself, a tactic 
which would be followed against the relieving army from Mosul in the following June. When 
the Latins were beginning to give ground to the repeated attacks of the Turks it was this 
reserve division that gave the final blow. Most of the Turks who were lured into this ambush 
were killed and Bohemond returned triumphant in his camp (8th-9th February 1098).1059  
     The outcome of this battle is extremely significant because it is the first time that we see 
Bohemond pursuing an aggressive strategy and setting an ambush on a large Seljuc force. He 
had seen firsthand at Doryleum how difficult it was for the Frankish cavalry to resist the 
encircling manoeuvres and the showers of arrows of the Seljuc cavalry and so he decided to 
take the initiative himself. He used the topography of the region in his favour, choosing a 
narrow ground where the Seljucs would not have had the space to perform their usual 
encircling tactics, quite likely influenced by the outcome of the battle at Nicaea, thus they 
would have been trapped more easily by the few hundred horsemen he had brought with him. 
Once he managed to get his cavalry in close contact with their enemies, the Turks were no 
match for the superior Frankish chivalry. In addition, we see Bohemond keeping a division in 
reserve, in case the main body of the army was to be encircled by the Turks, which reminds 
us of the third line of cavalry added by Nicephoros Phocas to fight the Bedouin units of the 
Hamdanids of Aleppo.1060 Finally, the battle against Ridwan was the first time during this 
crusade when the Latins fought under a single count that had the overall command of the 
dispatched force, since at Doryleum there was no leader and they were under no unified 
command until that time. This remarkable adaptability of Bohemond with battle-tactics, and 
his pursuit of an aggressive battle-seeking strategy to make optimum use of limited forces, 
                                                 
1059 For this battle, see: France, Victory in the East, pp. 245-51; Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, 
pp. 279-81; Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 170-1; Delbruck, Medieval Warfare, vol. III, p. 
404; Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 224-25; Yewdale, Bohemond I, pp. 63-4. 
1060 “Praecepta Militaria”, IV. 180-84, p. 48. 
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certainly highlights why he was viewed by his allies and his enemies as the true military 
leader of the First Crusade.  
     According to our chroniclers, after the capitulation of the lower city of Antioch (3rd June 
1098), the Count of Taranto was one of the protagonists of the siege of the Antiochene 
citadel.1061 But Bohemond’s leading role as a Latin leader was to be highlighted once more in 
the second major battle against the Seljucs, this time when a large relief force arrived outside 
Antioch to find the westerners locked inside their newly acquired trophy. What is important 
to underline before examining the battle of Antioch is not only Bohemond’s place amongst 
the rest of the leaders, with Raymond of Aguilers putting him as the general who proposed 
the battle-plan, but also the battle-plan itself which was, in essence, similar to the one applied 
against the Turks from Aleppo in February. He used the topography of the region in his 
favour while keeping a number of units in reserve in case the army was surrounded.  
     The governor of Mosul Kerbogha, with the main body of his army,1062 had pitched his 
camp on the north side of the Orontes, so the only way for the Latins to reach the camp was 
to exit the city through the Bridge Gate, which was the only one that connected the two banks 
of the river. On the 28th June,1063 the crusaders sallied out of the city in battle order in four 
major divisions; Hugh of Vermandois, Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy were 
deployed in the right wing; the Lorrainers, Burgundians and other French troops, under the 
command of Godfrey of Bouillon formed the centre, and Provencal and Aquitanian troops 
were posted in the left wing under Bishop Adhemar. Tancred and Bohemond’s units formed 
                                                 
1061 Gesta Francorum, xxiv, pp. 57-9; William of Tyre, Book VI, V, pp. 266-8; Alexiad, XI. 
iv, vol. II, pp. 86-91; Sewter, pp. 342-5. 
1062 The chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the crusading period from al-Kāmil fī’l-ta’rīkh, tr. D.S. 
Richards, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006-7, part I, 276, p. 16. 
1063 The main primary sources for the battle are: Gesta Francorum, xxix, pp. 67-71; William 
of Tyre, Book VI, XVI-XXI, pp. 284-94; Albert of Aachen, IV. 47-56, pp. 320-36; Raymond 
d’Aguilers, 77-83/Hill and Hill, pp. 59-64; Ralph of Caen, 83-90, pp. 105-10. 
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the reserve divisions of the crusaders’ army.1064 The infantry and the archers were placed in 
front to hold back the enemy’s attacks, while the cavalry was kept behind in order to break 
out and win the battle with its heavy charge.1065 This tactic of deploying the cavalry behind 
the foot soldiers of the infantry and the archers had been seen before, both at Hastings (1066) 
and Dyrrachium (1081), and indeed resembles the whole idea of the infantry serving as a 
“shield” for the cavalry. Further, precautions were taken by Bohemond to prevent the 
encirclement of the army by the Seljucs, thus keeping a division in reserve while the flanks of 
the crusaders were covered by the Orontes on the right and the high mountains on the left.1066 
     The crucial stage of the deployment of the crusader army would have been their crossing 
of the Orontes Bridge and Bohemond was afraid that the Seljucs would allow one or two 
divisions of them across the river and then fall upon them while the rest of the army was 
crossing the bridge. But this did not happen and the Latins were left free to be deployed as 
they wished, quite likely because Kerbogha would have wanted to use his encircling tactics 
and outflank the entire army.1067 There is a debate, however, on the deployment of the 
crusader forces on the battlefield right after they had marched over the Orontes River and 
whether the divisions changed their formation from column into line.1068 Kerbogha would 
have seen that the left wing of the Latins, under Adhemar, was the last to have crossed the 
Orontes’ bridge to be deployed alongside the rest of the divisions and he ordered his right-
wing units to attack them before they were ready for action. These mounted troops – 15,000 
                                                 
1064 Oman, The Art of War, vol. I, pp. 283-4; Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 173; Delbruck, 
Medieval Warfare, vol. III, pp. 404-5; Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, pp. 226-28. 
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1068 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 173; compare with: France, Victory in the East, pp. 284-5. 
271 
 
horsemen from the Sultanate of Rum –1069 managed to bypass Adhemar’s divisions and arrive 
at the rear of the crusaders’ left wing, thus being completely cut off from the main Seljuc 
army. Fortunately for the Latins, Bohemond’s precaution of keeping his Norman troops in 
reserve proved a wise decision since if the detached right wing of the Seljucs was left 
unchecked to attack the Latin centre from the rear it would certainly had been a disaster. The 
Anatolian Turks, after the rest of the army was overpowered by Godfrey and Hugh, kept an 
immense pressure on the Normans and dropping their usual encircling tactics charged against 
them with their swords and lances before they were eventually beaten off by the Norman 
infantry units who formed a perimeter ring around the cavalry. 
     A rather different approach on how the events unfolded that day is given by J. France.1070 
He believes that since the plain between the Orontes and the mountains opposite the Bridge 
Gate was too wide – about four to five kilometres – for the small Crusader force to cover its 
full extent, the argument of the Crusading army taking advantage of the topography of the 
battlefield to avoid any encircling is invalid. The Latins rather took full advantage of the 
dispersal of the Turkish forces in the perimeter of Antioch’s fortifications, something that 
they had been at pains to avoid throughout their siege of the city. Since Kerbogha had pitched 
his camp up the valley of the Orontes at a distance of some five kilometres to the north of the 
city and had sent infantry and irregular mounted Turcoman detachments to blockade the main 
gates of Antioch, the Latins wisely decided to exit the city through the Bridge Gate and face 
the Turkish besieging detachments before the main army had time to organise and march 
against them. Thus, Hugh of Vermandois’ division would have opened the way out through 
the forces that were blocking the Bridge Gate and each division would have been deployed 
next to the one preceding it and on its left flank, following the order I have already mentioned 
although it is unlikely that they would have had time to deploy into tidy formations before 
attacking their enemies. The rather short fighting and retreat that developed after the 
Crusaders fighting exit from the city must have been a result of them being attacked 
                                                 
1069 Albert of Aachen, IV. 49, p. 326; William of Tyre, Book VI, XX, p. 291. 
1070 France, Victory in the East, pp. 287-93. 
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piecemeal and in no order by Turkish infantry detachments that were gradually leaving their 
besieging posts and pressing with the attack without waiting for orders from Kerbogha’s 
headquarters. And perhaps the force that “arrived” on their rear might have been a force that 
was besieging St-George’s Gate on the south of the city. Thus what France suggests is that 
the Crusaders’ first and second divisions were engaged in a fight with the Turks from the 
Bridge Gate while Adhemar’s long march westwards towards the plain would have served to 
cover the flanks of the army and eventually received the piecemeal attacks of several Turkish 
detachments. Bohemond’s division was, indeed, placed as a reserve to prevent the 
encirclement of the army while an improvised unit was detached from the armies of Godfrey 
of Bouillon and Robert of Normandy to deal with a unit of 15,000 men, as reported by Albert 
of Aix, that had managed to bypass Adhemar’s division. 
     The lessons learned for the crusaders on the aftermath of this battle were simple enough. 
In order to diminish their numerical disadvantage and to check the attacks of the Seljuc 
mounted archers they put their infantry in front of their formations and kept the cavalry in the 
back, waiting for the perfect chance to break out and fight them in close quarters. Thus, the 
Latin East experienced for the first time the mixed units of infantry and cavalry where the 
foot-soldiers acquired a fundamental role in Middle-East warfare. However, we should 
underline the fact that by this stage of the Crusade the infantry would have evolved into a 
quite formidable fighting unit – with better armour protection as well – which was most 
needed in the East. This comment does not suggest that the footsoldiers of the First Crusade 
were a mere rubble of untrained men when they crossed to Asia Minor in 1097, but that it 
took several months of intense interaction with the Turks to develop into a cohesive and 
disciplined unit.1071 And even if the Latins did not actually use natural obstacles to cover their 
flanks, meaning the Orontes on the right and the mountains on their left, we have to remark 
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the keeping of a reserve division under Bohemond that seemed to offer great protection for 
the Latins’ flanks. The key to the victories at Antioch and Harem depended on their 
command, with the Latin leaders – and Bohemond in particular, adapting to the Middle-
Eastern warfare in both a rapid and effective way. 
 
Bohemond’s establishment at Antioch 
 
     In March 1099 Bohemond was officially proclaimed Prince of Antioch.1072 His dominions 
extended from the vicinity of Antioch to northern Syria and southern Cilicia, including the 
strategic passes of the Taurus and the Armenian principalities of the region. To the north-east 
his flanks were covered by Baldwin’s principality of Edessa, while from the east and south 
his domains were exposed to the Turkish principality of Aleppo which was under the rule of 
Ridwan and, thus, posed no immediate danger. To the south, Bohemond had to face the 
Byzantine outposts of Laodicea, Valania, Tortosa and Maraclea, Syrian coastal cities handed 
over to the Byzantine legates in April 1099. A number of Norman troops, under Tancred, 
departed for Jerusalem, but the bulk of Bohemond’s men would have stayed with him,  
certainly not numbering more than a few hundred.1073 Apart from a border dispute with 
Imperial troops and the loss of two Cilician coastal towns – Seleucia and Curicus,1074 
Bohemond’s major target in 1099 was Laodicea, one of the most strategic ports of the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The Norman Count even enlisted the help of Daimbert of Pisa – the new 
Papal legate in the east who was also supported by a large fleet – but due to the arrival of 
Raymond of St-Gilles from Jerusalem in September and the flaring up of the old rivalry 
between the two leaders, the siege reached a halt.1075 
                                                 
1072 I have not had the chance to look at: T. Asbridge, “The Principality of Antioch 1098-
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1073 Gesta Francorum, xxxvii, p. 87. 
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     In 1100, Bohemond managed to get involved into the internal politics of the Seljuc 
dynasty of the Danishmenids who controlled a large area of Asia Minor, from Caesarea to 
Ankara and Sinope. He marched with an army towards Melitene and, according to Albert of 
Aachen he took with him 500 knights, a quite reasonable number if we compare it with Ibn-
al-Athir’s implausible figure of 5,000. They were ambushed by the Turks and in the ensuing 
fight Richard of Principate and Bohemond were taken prisoners, probably in the month of 
July or early August 1100.1076 There is no detailed description of the battle, but from the 
chroniclers’ accounts we can see that the Norman knights were completely surprised by the 
Turks, quite likely due to Bohemond’s neglect of sending scouts to reconnoitre the area, who 
were then able to apply their usual encircling tactics until “the whole company was 
overcome: killed or put to flight and scattered.”1077 
     Nearly a year after his release from captivity,1078 there is one last battle where Bohemond 
took place before his return to Italy, a battle that was literally a disaster in terms of battle-
tactics applied. The battle of Harran (1104)1079 was the result of an expedition carried on by 
the combined forces of Bohemond of Antioch and Baldwin of Edessa to neutralize a threat to 
the latter’s principality coming from the Seljuc stronghold of the town of Harran, some forty 
kilometres east of Edessa. While the siege of the town was under way, a Seljuc relief army of 
about 10,000 men arrived with a plan to attack the Latin camp while attempting to supply the 
garrison of Harran. As Sir Charles Oman puts it, the battle of Harran may be taken as an 
example of the manner in which even the most practised veterans of the First Crusade could 
fail when they neglected obvious precautions and fought on unfavourable ground. But what 
                                                 
1076 Ibn-al-Athir, I, 300, p. 32 ; Orderic Vitalis, XIII, p. 506; The Chronicle of Matthew of 
Edessa, II, 134, pp. 176-7; Ralph of Caen, 141, pp. 156-7; Albert of Aachen, VII. 27, p. 524. 
1077 Matthew of Edessa tells us that they were not wearing their hauberks when the Turks fell 
on them. See: The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, II, 134, pp. 176-7; Ralph of Caen, 141, p. 
157. 
1078 For Bohemond’s captivity: Flori, Bohémond d’ Antioch, pp. 219-26. 
1079 Our main primary sources are: William of Tyre, vol. I, X. 29, pp. 456-8 ; Ralph of Caen, 
pp. 164-5; the best secondary work on this battle is: Oman, Art of War, vol. I, pp. 320-24. 
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were, exactly, the tactical blunders of Bohemond and Baldwin in this case and why did they 
prove so disastrous at Harran in particular? The crusaders deployed their forces in three 
battles, once again throwing the infantry in front of the cavalry, while the Seljucs applied 
their usual tactics of encirclement and feigned retreat. Despite their great experience in 
Middle-Eastern warfare, Bohemond and Baldwin followed the Seljuc retreat into the sandy 
and hilly terrains east of Harran, a serious tactical error. By the afternoon hours, with the 
infantry and cavalry unable to carry on the chase, the Latins halted the march and for the first 
time they experienced an attack by their enemies when least expected, during the night. 
Night-attacks were not uncommon in the Middle-East, with the Fatimids applying it several 
times since the late tenth century, while the Byzantine treatise On Skirmishing sets out in 
detail how a night-attack should be organised.1080 Thus, the disaster at Harran was due to the 
failure of Bohemond and Baldwin to follow a series of simple precautions against an enemy 
that they had faced numerous times in the last seven years and had grown accustomed to their 
tactics by then. Bohemond’s decision to follow the Turks far from Harran and not place any 
guards in the camp during the night is wholly inexcusable.    
 
     As a concluding section of this chapter I wish to return to the two main questions that I set 
in the beginning: what was Bohemond’s role in the First Crusade and what experience did he 
acquire in fighting against the Seljuc Turks, lessons that would seem invaluable during his 
Illyrian expedition in 1107? I will base my conclusions on the analyses of the three major 
battles of the second stage of the Crusade: Doryleum, Harem and Antioch; and I will focus on 
three major factors that decided the outcome of each one of them: general strategy of the 
commander of the Latin army, composition of the army and battle formations, and 
topography of the battlefield.  
     Bohemond’s leading role in the Crusade was obvious even before the first major operation 
of the Latin armies in the East – the siege of Nicaea. He was certainly the most experienced 
                                                 
1080 Nicolle, Crusader Warfare, vol. II, pp. 124-35; “On Skirmishing”, 24. pp. 234-37. 
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of the officers for what was lying ahead of them as he had fought against Byzantine and 
Turkish forces in the previous decades, both in Italy and in the Balkans. It is very likely that 
his forces would have consisted of veterans of the Apulian and Sicilian expansion and 
soldiers who would have taken part in Robert Guiscard’s Illyrian expedition almost two 
decades before. Finally, we should mention the unknown number of western mercenaries 
serving in the Byzantine army already since the late 1040s, with a large number of them 
returning to their countries with huge experience in the battlefields of Asia Minor in fighting 
against the Seljucs. Thus, we should not be surprised to see Bohemond negotiating the 
amount of supplies shipped to Nicomedia while the rest of the Latin army was besieging 
Nicaea, or his leading role in conducting foraging expeditions and neutralising enemy 
garrisons during the siege of Antioch. 
     But Bohemond’s resourcefulness and great strategic thinking have to be viewed through 
the study of the three major battles of the period. I will ask in which cases was he the 
undisputed leader of the Latin army that clashed with the Turks. What role did the 
topography of the battlefield play? Was his overall strategy considered defensive or not? At 
Doryleum, Bohemond was the commander of the group of armies that was attacked by Kilij 
Arslan on the 31st June 1097 and he commanded an unknown number of cavalry and infantry, 
including a large number of civilians. The tactical mistakes that the Count of Taranto made 
that day was that he left his infantry to guard the baggage train, while the cavalry was ordered 
to hold the line against the Turkish attacks in a single mass of horsemen. In a clearly 
defensive formation, this mass of Latin knights was hopeless against the encircling 
manoeuvres of the Turkish mounted archers. Their attempts to counterattack brought no 
result and it was only the timely arrival of the second group of armies under Godfrey that 
saved the day for the crusaders. If the Latins had formed a mixed unit of infantry and cavalry 
as in Antioch or Ascalon, they would certainly have found themselves in a less desperate 
situation and would have suffered much less losses. Kilij Arslan placed an ambush on the 
vanguard of the Latin armies, having to choose a battleground that would suit both the 
relatively small size of his army and the encircling tactics of his mounted archers. Thus, the 
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Seljucs held the initiative at Doryleum, something that the Latins – and especially Bohemond 
– would never let this happen again.   
     Bohemond was the undisputed leader who proposed the battle-plan – according to 
Raymond of Aguilers – for the clash with Kerbogha’s army outside Antioch. He took 
advantage of the dispersal of Kerbogha’s forces and decided to suddenly sally-out of the city 
in order to bring the enemy forces in close combat and neutralise them as soon as possible 
before the arrival of the main army. He had divided the Latin army in five divisions, keeping 
one in reserve, thus having both his flanks covered from any encircling movement by the 
enemy.  And it was in Antioch that we see for the first time in the history of the Latin armies 
in the Middle-East units of infantry being put in front of the cavalry for better protection of 
the knights from the Turkish mounted archers. This, however, does not imply that this tactic 
was unknown to western armies, as the examples of Hastings and Dyrrachium can show. But 
Bohemond’s strategic thinking proves his adaptability to the Middle-Eastern way of fighting 
and to the worsening conditions in his army – the crusaders would have had maybe even less 
than 300 horses by that time.1081 
     Compared to the battle of Harem a few months earlier, the basic strategic principles 
applied against the Seljucs were the same. The strategic initiative belonged to Bohemond 
who ambushed a large relief army heading for Antioch. He used the topography of the region 
in his favour, trapping the Turks in a narrow defile between Lake Bengras and the River 
Orontes where it would have been impossible for them to apply their usual tactics. Also, 
having divided his 700 horsemen into five divisions, he kept one in reserve in case the main 
body of his army was encircled. He knew that the crucial strategic move was to bring his 
knights in contact with the enemy as quickly as possible, and that was exactly what 
eventually gave him the field. 
     Bohemond was, indeed, a soldier with great experience in fighting overseas. He had 
fought against Greek, Anglo-Saxon and Turkish troops during his father’s Illyrian campaign 
                                                 
1081 France, Victory in the East, pp. 281-82, 286; Riley-Smith, Crusades, p. 30. 
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some fifteen years ago, having defeated the Emperor’s army in pitched battle three times 
before he was forced to pull back to Dyrrachium after his failure at Larisa. In 1083, it was a 
series of ambushes and feigned retreats conducted by units of the Byzantines that defeated 
Bohemond’s army, with the Normans easily falling into the trap that was planned in every 
detail by Alexius Comnenus. Thus his experience in the East should have made him more 
cautious and innovative in the battle-field, because for years he was facing a cunning enemy 
– as the Turk’s night attack at Harran in 1104 proves – whose battle-tactics were very 
different that what the Normans were used to. However, the tight blockade that was imposed 
by Alexius’ forces in 1107-8 would prove unbreakable and Bohemond’s first strategic 
objective of establishing a forward base for his “Crusade” will end up a failure. 
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12. Bohemond’s invasion of Illyria (1107-8) 
 
     Bohemond returned to Italy sometime in the early months of 1105,1082 after having to fake 
his own death and be transported from Syria to Italy through Corfu. In Corfu, Bohemond 
“emerged from the dead” and sent a defiant message to Alexius: “I want you [Alexius] to 
know that, I have escaped your clutches. ... If I reach the mainland of Italy and cast eyes on 
the Lombards and all the Latins and the Germans and our own Franks, men full of martial 
valour, then with many a murder I will make your cities and your provinces run with blood, 
until I set up my spear in Byzantium itself.” 1083 There can be very little doubt that this 
incident in Corfu did not take place, but a number of questions quickly arise. What were the 
deeper political reasons that drove the Norman count to invade Byzantium? How was 
Bohemond’s expedition preached in the West? Can we characterise it as a crusade?  
     By 1104, Bohemond had left his territories in Syria under serious pressure from the 
Imperial forces, with the Byzantine Army firmly in control of Cilicia and the lower city of 
Laodicea and the Navy carrying offensive operations from Cyprus and the Cilician ports.1084 
Thus, if Bohemond had taken his newly recruited army back to Antioch he certainly would 
not have achieved much, with the Byzantine resources in manpower and money far 
outnumbering what the Normans could put in the field.1085 Bohemond must have been 
perfectly aware of that, thus, he thought that he had to strike at the root of all his troubles in 
Syria, meaning Alexius himself and attempt to replace him with a more sympathetic 
Emperor. A plan very similar to that of the Fourth Crusade.1086 
                                                 
1082 January according to: Anon. Bar., s.a. 1105. 
1083 Alexiad, XI. xii, vol. II, pp. 128-30; Sewter, pp. 367-8. 
1084 For more details on this, see: Yewdale, Bohemond I, pp. 85-105; Chalandon, Alexis Ier, 
pp. 231-8. 
1085 Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, p. 74; Flori, Bohemond d’Antioch, p. 278; 
Vasiliev, Byzantine Empire, vol. II, p. 58. 
1086 Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 401-15, especially pp. 413-15; Treadgold, Byzantine 
State and Society, pp. 656-66. 
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     We know little of Bohemond’s whereabouts in Italy during the second half of 1105, but 
his intentions were to raise an army of volunteers and mobilize powerful allies for his 
planned invasion. Pope Paschal II (1099-1118) seemed like an obvious ally, along with Philip 
of France and Henry of England, but how fruitful did his journey through Italy and France 
prove to be? Bohemond remained in southern Italy, probably at Taranto or Bari preparing his 
fleet, from the early months of 1105 until September,1087 when he departed for Rome. Paschal 
was a Crusading enthusiast and he, like others, held the Byzantine Emperor accountable for 
the misfortunes of the 1101 Crusade, bearing in mind the famous denunciation of Alexius by 
bishop Manasses of Barcelona at the Papal court in 1102.1088 According to Bartolf of Nangis, 
the continuator of Fulcher of Chartres writing in Syria around 1108-9, who is our only source 
for this event, Pascal gave Bohemond the banner of St-Peter.1089 Further, Bruno, bishop of 
Segni, a Cluniac and a bishop who had escorted Urban II in his visit to France in 1095-6, was 
appointed as Papal legate to preach for the upcoming campaign against Byzantium in France 
along with Bohemond himself.1090 As for what might have encouraged Pascal to give his 
blessing to the Norman count, for this we have to turn to Orderic Vitalis who informs us 
about the presence of a supposed son of the deposed Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV 
Diogenes (1068-71) and a number of nobles at his papal court.1091 This is significant in a 
                                                 
1087 Anon. Bar., s.a. 1105. 
1088 This sentiment can be seen in: Ekkehard, Hierosolymita, pp. 29-32, 37-8; Fulcherius 
Carnotensis, p. 521; Orderic Vitalis, X, p. 18 ; William of Tyre, XI, pp. 79-80, 460-2, 470-1; 
Albert of Aachen, VIII. 45-6, pp. 634-6; Compare the two different views of the “Manasses 
incident”: Runciman, History, vol. II, p. 35; J.G. Rowe, “Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch 
and the Byzantine Empire”, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 49 (1966-67), 170-6. 
1089 Bartolf of Nangis, Gesta Francorum Iherusalem Expugnatium, R.H.C. Hist. Oc., vol. 65, 
III, p. 538; for the reliability of this source, see: Rowe, “Paschal II”, 180; Yewdale, 
Bohemond I, p. 108; for more on Bartolf of Nangis, see: C. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord a 
l’Epoque des Croisades, Paris, 1940, p. 11; Runciman, History, vol. I, p. 329. 
1090 Chronic. Casin., IV, p. 493; Suger, Abbot of St-Denis, Vie de Louis VI le Gros, ed. H. 
Waquet, H. Champion, Paris, 1929, p. 48. 
1091 Orderic Vitalis, XI, p. 70. 
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sense that we see Bohemond using the same pattern to win over the Pope as his father had 
done twenty-five years before.  
     Bohemond stayed in Rome until mid-November 1105,1092 and then he departed for France 
to recruit the bulk of his followers by launching an unprecedented anti-Byzantine propaganda 
campaign. Even before leaving Italy, Bohemond had already sent envoys to Henry I of 
England (1100-1135), but since Henry’s preoccupations at the time lay across the Channel 
and against Robert Curthose, so it is no surprise that a meeting never took place.1093 In March 
1106, Bohemond was in the Limousin fulfilling a vow he had made to St-Leonard, the patron 
saint of prisoners, and sometime later he requested an audience from Philip of France 
concerning a possible marriage between him and Philip’s daughter.1094 The marriage took 
place at Chartres right after Easter, while during Lent Bohemond had been travelling around 
France spreading his anti-Byzantine propaganda. Some Latin chroniclers attest that he went 
far into the south-west of France and even to Spain,1095 important centres of recruitment for a 
crusade, accompanied by bishop Bruno of Segni to add a more religious tone to his appeal, 
before returning to Apulia in August 1106. 
     Concerning Bohemond’s tour of France, both Anna Comnena and Orderic Vitalis write 
about him inciting hatred among the French population in the cities he visited, not only by 
accusing Alexius Comnenus of being “a pagan who was helping pagans wholeheartedly”,1096 
but also through the parade of the supposed son of the Emperor Romanus and a number of 
Byzantine nobles.1097 Also, it is known through modern research that Bohemond distributed 
copies of the Gesta Francorum in which he had inserted a passage suggesting that the 
                                                 
1092 On the 18th November we find Paschal issuing a privilege in favour of a Church at Bari, 
requested by Bohemond. See: Patrologia Cursus Completus, series Latina, vol. 163, col. 178. 
1093 Orderic Vitalis, XI, p. 68. 
1094 Orderic Vitalis, XI, p. 70; Alexiad, XII. i, vol. II, p. 132; Sewter, p. 369; Romuald of 
Salerno, s.a. 1106; William of Tyre, vol. I, Book XI, I, p. 460. 
1095 Ekkehard, Hierosolymita, p. 293; Yewdale, Bohemond I, p. 112. 
1096 Alexiad, XII. i, vol. II, pp. 132-3; Sewter. p. 371. 
1097 Orderic Vitalis, XI, p. 70. 
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Emperor had promised him the lordship of Antioch, in an obvious attempt to advertise his 
crusading achievements, attract more followers and display the “wickedness” of Emperor 
Alexius.1098 But even though Bohemond’s real objective was Constantinople, he would have 
presented the expedition to his audience as a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, a via Sancti Sepulchri, 
after the Byzantine Empire had been “pacified”.1099 Orderic Vitalis also writes about 
Bohemond who “urged all who bore arms to attack the Emperor with him, and promised his 
chosen followers wealthy towns and castles. Many taking the Lord’s cross, left all their 
belongings and set out on the road for Jerusalem.”1100 Whether this statement about the attack 
on the Empire was made under the advantage of hindsight we cannot be certain, but Orderic 
Vitalis’ reliability is difficult to question. To add to the aforementioned accounts, a number of 
Latin sources, namely Ekkehard, Albert of Aachen, the author of the Historia Belli Sacri and 
the Anonymous of Bari, note that Bohemond’s purpose in coming to Italy and France was to 
raise troops to invade the Empire.1101 
     From the evidence that we have mentioned so far, we can conclude that Bohemond’s 
expedition was a Crusade for it was preached as a via sancti sepulchri, the banner of St-Peter 
was provided and a papal legate was sent to preach and inspire the masses. Whether or not 
Pope Pascal had given his full support for this campaign can be debated and all depends on 
                                                 
1098 A.C. Krey, “A Neglected Passage in the Gesta and its Bearing on the Literature of the 
First Crusade”, The Crusades and Other Historical Essays: Presented to D.C. Munro, ed. J.L. 
Peatow, New York, 1927, 57-78. 
1099 The references about the terminology used to identify the campaign of 1107 come from 
the Council of Poitiers, held on 26th June 1106. They come from the testimonies of Suger and 
Orderic Vitalis who were eyewitnesses of the events. See: Suger, pp. 44-50; Orderic Vitalis, 
XI, pp. 68-70. 
1100 Orderic Vitalis, XI, p. 70. 
1101 Ekkehard, Hierosolymita, p. 293; Albert of Aachen, IX. 47, p. 702; Anon. Bar., s.a. 1105; 
Historia Belli Sacri, R.H.C. Occ., III, pp. 228-9; Rowe argues about how reliable Ekkehard’s 
and Albert’s accounts are. See: Rowe, “Paschal II”, 176-7; Rowe’s arguments have been 
challenged by: McQueen, “Relations between the Normans and Byzantium”, 458-62. 
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whether we think that the primary sources are credible enough or should be dismissed 
because they provide information based on hindsight.1102 
     Regarding Alexius’ preparations for the Norman threat, Alexius decided to mediate for the 
release of 300 western knights of the Kingdom of Jerusalem that had been captured by the 
Fatimids at Ramlah in May 1102.1103 This can be seen as Comnenus’ answer to rapidly 
diminishing popularity of the Empire in the West after the 1101 Crusade and the Manasses 
incident. He also took immediate steps to recall several senior officers of his army and navy 
from distant posts to Dyrrachium. Generals with experienced troops who were serving in 
Coele-Syria and Cilicia, a very important and strategic post neighbouring the newly 
established Latin principalities and the Seljucs, like Cantacuzenos and Monastras were sent to 
report for duty at Dyrrachium.1104 
     In addition, Alexius sought to take on his side any Italian naval power that might have 
provided assistance or reinforcements to Bohemond’s army. Anna Comnena talks about a 
number of letters sent to the great Italian naval powers like Pisa, Genoa and Venice, seeking 
to persuade them not to join forces with the Normans.1105 Alexius’ action was quite 
reasonable if we consider their actions and alliances in the First Crusade. All three of them 
had actively taken part in the Crusade, with Genoa helping the Latins to take Antioch (1098), 
Jerusalem (1099), Caesarea (1101) and Acre (1104), and Venice very reluctantly helping 
                                                 
1102 Tyerman, God’s War, pp. 261-2; J. Riley-Smith, The Crusades, Athlone, London, 1987, 
p. 90; Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, Oxford, Clarendon, 1994, p. 
74; Rowe, “Paschal II”, 165-202; J. Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, Continuum, 
London, 2006, pp. 88-92; Runciman, History, vol. II, p. 48; Yewdale, Bohemond I, pp. 106-
14; Flori, Bohemond d’Antioch, pp. 266-72, especially pp. 275-77; Angold, The Byzantine 
Empire, p. 164; J. France, The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom, 1000-
1714, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 102; McQueen, “Relations between the Normans and 
Byzantium”, 458-62. 
1103 Alexiad, XII. i, vol. II, p. 133; Sewter, pp. 370-1. 
1104 Alexiad, XII. ii, vol. II, p. 136; Sewter, p. 371; Chalandon, Alexis Ier, n. 1, p. 239. 
1105 Alexiad, XII, i, vol. II, p. 132; Sewter, p. 369. 
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Baldwin of Edessa to take Haifa and Tripoli in 1100.1106 But Alexius was deeply concerned 
about Bohemond’s possible “flirting” with Pisa, since it was its navy that had devastated 
Corfu, Cephalonia, Leukada and Zante, the largest of the islands of the Ionian Sea, had 
clashed with a Byzantine naval squadron off Rhodes and later joined Bohemond in the siege 
of Laodicea in the summer of 1099.1107 But why would the relations of the Pisans with 
Byzantium amount to dislike, not mentioning hatred? In theory, at least, Venice was still a 
vassal state of the Empire and especially after the chrysobull of 1082 the former had become 
by far the most important player in the Byzantine Empire’s commercial life. Alexius was 
perfectly aware of the antagonism between the Italian naval states, thus the letters he sent and 
it is, indeed, unfortunate that we do not have the details of any diplomatic correspondence 
between the two sides to see what kind of language the Emperor used to address the Pisan 
municipality.1108  
     Alexius left Constantinople for Thessaloniki in September 1105, where he spent the winter 
of 1105/6, still being there in late February – early March of 1106, calling for recruits from 
the Balkan provinces.1109 There would certainly have been a large number of veterans from 
past conflicts in the Balkans, but new recruits formed a significant part of Alexius’ army. The 
Emperor also replaced John Comnenus, the former governor of Dyrrachium with Alexius, the 
second son of the sebastocrator Isaac Comnenus, while also giving the latter strict 
instructions concerning the strengthening of the city’s defences.1110  
     Alexius’ affairs in Thessaloniki got more complicated when a rebellion broke out by the 
Serbs and John Comnenus was defeated in Dalmatia, forcing him to stay in the city for 
fourteen more months before dismissing his troops and retiring back to Constantinople. Since 
by this time Bohemond had been spreading his anti-Byzantine propaganda in France, I do not 
                                                 
1106 Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 68-78. 
1107 For more on this incident, see the previous chapter on the Comnenian navy.  
1108 Neither Anna Comnena, Dandolo or the Annales Pisani mention anything in their 
accounts. 
1109 Alexiad, XII. iv, vol. II, pp. 141, 147-148; Sewter, pp. 374, 378-79. 
1110 Alexiad, XII. iv, vol. II, p. 148; Sewter, p. 379.  
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think we should consider a possible cooperation between the Serbs of Raska, that had 
replaced the Diocleans as the dominant Serb principality in the region since 1091, and the 
Normans.1111 During this time Alexius appointed Isaac Contostephanus as Grand Duke of the 
Fleet, while orders were given for a naval squadron to be assembled from several maritime 
and coastal areas of the Empire like the Cyclades and “the cities on the coast of Asia and 
from Europe itself”, probably meaning the old naval themes of Hellas, Peloponnesus, Samos, 
Aegean Sea and Cibyrreots, including Crete and Cyprus.1112 His fleet would probably have 
consisted of relatively small and fast ships specifically build for the purpose of patrolling the 
coastline and not large dromons or chelandia which were expensive to build and hard to keep 
at sea for long periods. But again, we cannot be certain about the consistency of the navy 
because Anna’s terminology is not accurate enough. Isaac Contostephanus, however, being 
ignorant of naval affairs and of the coastal topography of Epirus and Illyria, took the decision 
to attack and besiege Otranto on the opposite Adriatic coast (early in 1107), an undertaking 
which proved an utter failure for the Byzantine commander.1113 
      
Bohemond’s invasion of Illyria  
 
     Bohemond was in Apulia preparing his fleet from August 1106 until September 1107.1114 
In late summer of 1107 his army was ordered to gather at Bari and from there they marched 
to Brindisi where the fleet had already assembled, in the early days of September. The 
Norman forces set sail from Brindisi on the 9th October and landed on the opposite coast of 
Avlona.1115  Trying to assess the size of the army or of the naval force gathered by Bohemond 
                                                 
1111 For the politics of the region and the tense relations between the zupans of Raska and 
Alexius Comnenus, see: Fine, Early Medieval Balkans, pp. 230-32.  
1112 Alexiad, XII. iv, vol. II, p. 148; Sewter, p. 379; XII. viii, vol. II, p. 165; Sewter, p. 389. 
1113 Ibid., XII. viii, vol. II, pp. 165-9; Sewter, p. 389. 
1114 Anon. Bar., s.a.1106-7. 
1115 Fulcherius Carnotensis, pp. 519-20; The Anonymous of Bari mentions the 10th October, 
which probably was the day of landing at Avlona: Anon. Bar., s.a. 1107; Anna Comnena does 
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for his expedition can be a challenging task since the Latin sources and Anna Comnena give 
quite vague and rather confusing assessments. However, before going into detailed 
examination of the sources, we have to note that by the end of the eleventh century the south 
Italian ports seem to have developed a technological and technical capacity to carry rather 
more horses per ship than the fifteen or so of the Byzantine navy of the time.1116 Thus, the 
Norman navy had developed since the times of the Sicilian invasion or Robert Guiscard’s 
Illyrian campaign. According to the Alexiad, Bohemond had deployed a core of twelve 
warships, biremes according to the princess, but she does not give a definite number for his 
transport vessels thus making it impossible to have an accurate figure of the men and horses 
transported across the Adriatic.1117 The Anonymous of Bari talks about a nucleus of thirty 
warships, again probably biremes, and a number of around two hundred large and small ships 
for the transportation of his army and the neccessary supplies, an excessive number which, I 
believe, we have to narrow down to a half to reflect a possible figure. Our source also 
estimates the total of men, both infantry and cavalry, to around 34,000 which is once more an 
exaggerated number.1118 Other Latin sources like Fulcher of Chartres give a number of 5,000 
cavalry and 60,000 infantry,1119 William of Tyre talks about the same number of cavalry but 
notes a figure of 40,000 foot,1120 while Albert of Aachen puts the figures up to 12,000 cavalry 
and 60,000 infantry.1121 I believe that the figure provided by the Anonymous of Bari is closer 
to the truth concerning the foot soldiers, but even 5,000 men is an excessive number for the 
cavalry which we have to narrow down to around a half, probably somewhere between 2,500-
3,000, although I have to repeat that any speculations of this kind are very risky. Anna 
                                                                                                                                           
mention the 9th October but erroneously gives as point of embarkation the port of Bari: 
Alexiad, XII, ix, vol. II, p. 172; Sewter, p. 392. 
1116 Pryor, “Trasportation of Horses by Sea”, 14. 
1117 Alexiad, XII, ix, vol. II, p. 170; Sewter, p. 392.  
1118 Anon. Bar., s.a. 1107. 
1119 Fulcherius Carnotensis, p. 521. 
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Comnena tells us that Bohemond had with him “a countless host of Franks and Kelts, 
together with the entire contingent of men from the Isle of Thule who normally serve in the 
Roman army but had through force of circumstances then joined him; not to mention an even 
stronger force of Germans and Celtiberians.”1122 It was French, Italians, Germans, Spaniards 
and Anglo-Norman soldiers who answered Bohemond’s and Bruno’s Crusading call against 
the “pagan supporters”, with the Anglo-Normans however probably joining Bohemond’s 
contingent from Normandy and not England.1123 
     Isaac Contostephanus had been informed about Bohemond’s gathering of troops on the 
opposite coast and, based on his little experience in naval affairs, he concluded that the 
landing would take place at Avlona rather than Dyrrachium. Surprisingly enough, after 
posting the bulk of his units off the coasts of Avlona, Isaac Contostephanus along with a 
number of his senior officers pretended to fall ill and retired to the local baths. There is no 
way by which we can find out the deeper reason behind this controversial decision of 
Contostephanus, apart from any possible traitorous correspondence between him and 
Bohemond, quite likely when the latter was besieging Otranto a few months before.1124 The 
officer who took effective command of the Byzantine naval units was a certain Landulph who 
had “vast experience of surprise attacks in naval warfare over a long period.”1125 Landulph 
was an officer born in Italy and the first time he is mentioned by Anna Comnena was a Grand 
Duke of the fleet that intercepted the Pisan naval squadron heading for the Holy Land in 
1099, while he was also in command of a fleet that attacked a Genoese squadron off the 
Cilicia coasts in 1104.1126  
     After disembarking his army at Avlona and securing and plundering the surrounding 
region, Bohemond must have taken over the smaller castles of Kanina and Orikon, as his 
                                                 
1122 Alexiad, XII, ix, vol. II, p. 172; Sewter, p. 392.  
1123 Orderic Vitalis, XI, p. 68. 
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father had done in 1081, because this would have significantly helped him to secure his 
flanks.1127 After a failed attempt to take the city by surprise, Bohemond pitched his camp on 
the east of the city, probably close to the ruins of the ancient city of Epidamnos where Robert 
Guiscard had pitched his twenty-six years before. Thus, by late October 1107, Bohemond 
began laying down his plans and preparing different types of siege machines to breach the 
city’s defences, while his troops occupied the castles of Mylus and Petroula on the banks of 
the River Diabolis.1128  
     The Emperor, having been alerted a few weeks before, he set out from the capital to 
Thessaloniki on the 6th November 1107,1129 crossing the River Euros (Maritsa) a few days 
later and arriving at the Macedonian capital to spend the winter probably on the last days of 
the month. While Alexius was on his way to Thessaloniki, Anna Comnena describes how he 
was eagerly drilling his army to march properly as a coherent unit and perform certain basic 
battle formations.1130 Also, sometime in early December, a naval squadron of unknown size 
arrived from Venice under the Doge Ordelafo Falier, in accordance with the treaty that was 
drawn in 1082.1131 But most importantly, the local levies refused access further inland to the 
foraging parties of the Norman army, strongly defending the mountain and coastal passes. 
“Hence came famine which continually affected horses and men alike. Bohemond’s army 
also suffered from dysentery; it was apparently caused by some unsuitable diet, but the truth 
is that this countless, invincible multitude was visited by the wrath of God, and they died like 
flies.”1132 
     Bohemond made no further serious attempts to take the city before the coming of the 
spring, while Alexius was spending the winter in Thessaloniki gathering fresh recruits. When 
                                                 
1127 Anon. Bar., s.a. 1107; William of Tyre, XI. 6, p. 471; Alexiad, XII. ix, vol. II, p. 172; 
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the spring of 1108 finally arrived, the Norman leader burned his ships1133 like his father had 
done twenty-six years before and vigorously pressed on with the siege, bringing in front of 
the city’s defences every siege machine his engineers could build. Anna Comnena has given 
us a brief account of the siege machines used by Robert Guiscard in 1081, namely belfries 
(wooden siege-towers), but in this second siege of Dyrrachium she devotes a relatively large 
part of her thirteenth book to describe in much detail the construction, use and eventually 
destruction or failure of each of these machines used against the city of Dyrrachium in the 
spring of 1108. But before we have a look on what Anna has to say, it is worth mentioning in 
brief the history of these machines of this period.1134 Perhaps the biggest and most dangerous 
of them was the belfry, a multi-storey wooden siege tower moving on wheels or rollers, 
protected from the enemy by thick hides. It had to be made at least a storey taller than the 
walls so that the besiegers could lower the drawbridges or jump into the ramparts of the wall. 
It can be seen in Western Europe at least since the tenth century, with the Normans also using 
it in southern Italy in the mid-eleventh century. It was undoubtedly of Roman origin, with 
Vegetius, the anonymous author of the On Strategy, Leo VI and Cecaumenos giving a 
description of a tower in their works, along with ways to be set on fire.1135 Undermining the 
city’s walls was a very common way of trying to break through the city’s defences, and it 
usually involved two methods. First, we had the miners who were called to undermine the 
foundations of the walls by digging with picks and chisels. And since these vulnerable 
workers had to be protected, we also had the “armoured sheds” or wooden roofs. These were 
                                                 
1133 Anna specifically talks about the cargo and horse-transport ships: Alexiad, XIII. ii, vol. II, 
p. 184; Sewter, p. 399. 
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1135 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, IV. 17, 18, pp. 130-1; “On Strategy”, 13. 1-135, 
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constructed by light wood and protected from enemy shots and fire by hides. A second 
impressive siege machine was the battering-ram or the so-called “tortoise”. This was a 
wooden construction, usually parallelogram but it could had been triangular as well, moving 
on wheels with an iron-tipped head that was slung from a framework of beams and projected 
against the city-walls. Again, both Vegetius and Leo describe these aforementioned methods 
of undermining the curtain walls in much detail, along with the appropriate counter-measures 
taken by the defenders.1136   
     The Alexiad narrates quite vividly the three attempts made by the Normans to capture 
Dyrrachium using several besieging methods.1137 First, Bohemond brought in front of the 
city’s walls, on the east side facing the lagoon, a battering-ram. From this description of the 
attack we understand that the city of Dyrrachium probably lacked a motte, if the defenders 
were to approach the walls so easily. Although this was against the advice given by the 
contemporary military manuals of the Byzantines,1138 moats – with or without water – are 
rarely found in either the early or the later Byzantine period and other outer defence works 
are even rarer.1139 But it certainly must have been futile for the Normans to force a crack on 
the walls of Dyrrachium if we remember the exaggerating comment by Anna Comnena 
concerning the walls which were “of considerable thickness, so wide indeed that more than 
four horsemen can ride abreast in safety.” The Normans also attempted to undermine the 
city’s walls by digging a tunnel on the northern side of the city. But immediately a counter-
mine was dug to repel the Normans by shooting Greek fire at them.1140 Finally, Bohemond 
resulted in building an enormous wooden siege-tower, and once the defenders realised that 
they could not burn the tower down by shooting Greek fire directly at it, they came up with 
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the idea of filling in the space between the walls and the tower with any flammable material 
they could find and they set it on fire.  
     In the meantime Alexius left Thessaloniki for Dyrrachium in the early spring, and he 
pitched his camp at the River Diabolis just a couple of weeks later.1141 Unfortunately, Anna 
Comnena does not give any figures concerning Alexius Comnenus’ army or any specific 
information about its consistency. From the Narrative of Fleuri we get the figure of 60,000 
men,1142 while Albert of Aachen talks about 10,000 men,1143 estimations which are far from 
the reasonable figures for an army of the period. Throughout Anna’s narrative, however, we 
get an idea of the different nationalities that had gathered under the Imperial banner of the 
Comneni. That included Greeks (probably from Macedonia and Thrace), Alans, Seljuc Turks, 
Turcopoles, Patzinaks and Cumans.1144 The Cumans were nomads from southern Russia, 
probably from the same Turkic ethnic background as the Patzinaks, employed by 
Constantinople since they were defeated in battle in 1094.1145 The Patzinaks were well-
known mercenaries serving under the Byzantines and it is not surprising that they took part in 
the 1107-8 campaign. After their defeat at Mt-Levounion in 1091, a number of them were 
settled in the areas of eastern and central Macedonia guarding the approaches to 
Thessaloniki.1146 In addition, as it had happened in the summer of 1081, Alexius asked for 
troops from Malik-Shah of Ikonion, with whom he renew the old treaties that had been signed 
by his predecessors Sulleyman I (1077-86), Abul-Kasim (1086-92) and Kilij-Arslan I (1092-
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1107).1147 What is most striking, however, is the absence of the Varangian Guard from 
Anna’s account. Why would Alexius have left his personal guard in Constantinople? Perhaps, 
since he had finalised his plans for a land blockade he knew that his Varangian heavy infantry 
units would have been of limited use against the Norman knights in the Dyrrachian terrain. 
But this is just speculation. 
     Having learned a valuable lesson at Dyrrachium twenty-six years before, and perhaps 
because he did not have any opposition to his plans like in 1081, when he followed the advice 
of his younger and more hot-headed officers – this time, his officers were all veterans of the 
1081 campaign and had dealt with the crusaders as well – Alexius’ plan was not to risk 
another pitched battle. He had already instructed his local troops to control the passes that led 
beyond the vicinity of Dyrrachium, thus denying the Normans the chance to conduct any 
foraging further inland. Now that the main army had arrived to deal with Bohemond’s 
invasion, it was time to tighten the blockade to a point when the Normans would seek for 
peace.1148 It seems remarkable how the Byzantine generalship had adapted itself against the 
same enemy that had faced in battle a quarter of a century before, with the First Crusade 
certainly providing some useful lessons on how to deal with western European knights. Anna 
attempts to explain to her readers the deeper reasons behind her father’s decision to adapt his 
plans and not to offer Bohemond a battle, which clearly shows a combination of Vegetian 
thinking and influence from Leo’s Tactica: “For reasons already mentioned, despite the fact 
that he [Alexius] was most impatient for war, he acknowledged the rule of reason in 
everything and his desire was to conquer Bohemond by another method. The general (I think) 
should not invariably seek victory by drawing the sword; there are times when he should be 
prepared to use finesse and so achieve a complete triumph. So far as we know, a general’s 
supreme task is to win, not merely by force of arms, sometimes, when the chance offers itself, 
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an enemy can be beaten by fraud.”1149 Alexius also had the most suitable troops for the 
strategy he wished to follow, meaning expert lightly-armed horse-archers like the Seljucs, the 
Turcopoles, the Patzinaks and the Cumans who were unaccustomed to the Norman way of 
fighting on horseback and, thus, unlikely to be able to resist the impetus of a heavy Norman 
cavalry charge. These troops were much more suitable for a war of attrition and it was exactly 
that kind of strategy that was chosen by the Byzantines.  
     Another point that highlights Alexius’ experience and tactical adaptation was his 
summoning of three “westerners” who had defected to the Byzantine Army in previous years, 
one of them certainly a veteran of the 1081 Norman invasion of Illyria and Greece.1150 He 
was Peter of Aulps, a senior commander of the Norman army in Robert Guiscard’s campaign 
of 1081 who joined the Imperial Army while at Antioch, in June 1098. The two others were 
Marinus Sebastus, a noble from Naples and a certain Roger, himself a Frankish noble as 
well.1151 It is difficult to track any possible links between Marinus, Roger and Bohemond 
and, indeed, if they had ever met the Norman count in person. But they, along with Peter of 
Aulps, certainly were familiar with the Frankish battle-tactics and the things that could spread 
discord among a western army. The crucial move was to win over Bohemond’s senior 
commanders by sending a number of trusted servants to Bohemond’s officers – his younger 
brother Guy of Conversano,1152 Richard of Salerno, Richard of Principate and a certain 
Coprisianus – carrying treacherous letters as though in response to ones supposedly having 
been sent to the Emperor, thus hoping that they would fall in Bohemond’s hands and spread 
dissension in his army.1153 We have already seen this tactic been dictated by Emperor Leo VI 
in his Tactica and the influence from this early tenth century work is more than obvious at 
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this point.1154 Bohemond, however, took no actions against his officers with a number of 
western sources, and especially Orderic Vitalis, being keen to accuse Guy and Robert de 
Montford of having collaborated with the Emperor.1155 But why these allegations were not 
made by Anna herself, always willing to write about the Frankish duplicity and avarice? 
Probably because this was for the Latin chroniclers the most convenient explanation for the 
failure of the campaign and the humiliating Treaty of Devol. 
     In the meantime, Anna Comnena notes her father’s next moves in tightening the blockade 
around the Norman camp at Dyrrachium. She tells us that he sent for four of his most able 
and trusted officers Michael Cecaumenos, Alexander Cabasilas, Leo Niceritas and Eustathios 
Kamytzes to occupy Avlona, Kanina and Hiericho, Petrula, Deura and Arbanum 
respectively.1156 I have mentioned earlier that, even though this was not noted down by Anna, 
the first three of the aforementioned castles must have been occupied by the Normans since 
their landing at Avlona in October 1107. It is quite possible that Anna was not aware of that 
and these officers were actually sent to control the mountain passes leading to the castles and 
not the castles themselves, especially when she mentions the xyloklasiai (ξυλοκλασίαι), the 
road-blocks made from felled timber that were used to block the passes.1157 
     Bohemond’s reaction to the tightening of the land blockade was to send his younger 
brother Guy, a certain count called Saracenus (of Arab origin perhaps?) and another count 
called Pagan, with a significant force to attack Alexius’ commanders. Anna Comnena reports 
that Kamytzes’ men were caught in the middle of two Norman units and were 
overwhelmingly defeated, although we have no exact figures of the casualties on both sides 
(5th April 1108),1158 while Alyates, either because he had heard of the encirclement of 
Kamytzes’ troops or while conducting a reconnaissance of the area, he was also engaged in 
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the mêlée. With two of his senior officers out of action along with their units, Alexius 
summoned Cantacuzenos and dispatched him to Glabinitza along with a significant number 
of reinforcements.  
     Having re-established his position on the right of the River Charzanes, Cantacuzenos now 
had to fight Guy’s forces, after the latter had sent a number of his men at Hiericho and Canina 
and inflicted a defeat on Cecaumenos, the commander of the aforementioned castles. In the 
upcoming battle, Cantacuzenos commanded the centre of the formation, having given the 
right wing to the Alans and the left to the Seljucs, while the Patzinaks were ordered to 
advance and harass the Normans with volleys and arrows using their feigned retreat tactics in 
an attempt to break their tight formation. With the Patzinak attacks bringing no result, the 
Normans were then attacked, initially by the Turks of the left flank and later by the Alans 
from the right, but both of the attacks were checked. However, the centre of the Byzantine 
Army, commanded by Cantacuzenos, made a final frontal attack on the Norman centre and 
managed to break their formation and force them to retreat back to the castle at Mylos. We 
have very little information about the number of Norman troops that were engaged in this 
confrontation, with Albert of Aachen talking about 300 mounted troops and 500 foot soldiers, 
a quite reasonable number for a small-scale battle.1159 No indication about the number of 
Byzantine numbers or casualties is given. 
     The victory of Cantacuzenos certainly boosted the morale of his men and made the 
situation even more desperate for Bohemond who was seeing his supplies running low day 
after day. His only choice was to order a plundering expedition in the area of Avlona, Kanina 
and Hiericho where he hoped that he would catch the Byzantines off guard. Cantacuzenos, 
who had replaced Cecaumenos as commander of the Avlona, Kanina and Hiericho area, was 
not surprised by this Norman expedition and he dispatched a strong force under a certain 
Veroites that managed to route them.1160 A second expeditionary force was sent by 
Bohemond, this time 6,000 men strong of both infantry and cavalry, again hoping to catch the 
                                                 
1159 Albert of Aachen, X. 43, pp. 756-8; Alexiad, XIII. vi, vol. II, p. 205; Sewter, p. 411. 
1160 Alexiad, XIII. vi, vol. II, p. 206; Sewter, p. 412. 
296 
 
Byzantines unprepared for battle and overrun them. In this battle, Cantacuzenos waited for 
the Norman army to reach a halt at River Bouses for all the neccessary preparations to cross 
the river, and at that time when the Normans were most vulnerable he made his move.1161 No 
details are given for this battle, but its result would have certainly been disastrous for the 
Normans. The Byzantine general applied his tactic of attacking an enemy when crossing a 
river and, thus, being in a much vulnerable position, for a second consecutive time which 
indicates his vast experience in laying ambushes as a general commanding small units of 
cavalry.1162  
     After several attempts by the Emperor to strengthen the land blockade and placing 
Marianus Mavrokatakalon at the head of the naval forces patrolling the Illyrian waters – after 
the failure of the Contostephanoi to prevent reinforcements reaching the Normans from 
Apulia – 1163 the conditions on Bohemond’s camp were starting to feel almost intolerable. At 
this stage of the blockade, the Byzantine units deployed in the passes leading to the Norman 
camp were given orders not just to prevent the Normans from foraging and gathering supplies 
but to harass them by applying certain guerrilla tactics.1164 Further, an advice passed on to his 
troops by the Emperor, exactly the same as twenty-six years ago, was to shoot the arrows not 
at the Norman knights but rather at their horses which were much more vulnerable, because 
“the Kelts, when they dismounted, would be easily handled.”1165 But Alexius had serious 
doubts about the loyalty of some of his men and officers and, thus, staying faithful to his 
strategy which had brought him ample result so far he did not risk a pitched battle with the 
embattled Normans, even at this stage, but rather “sat back like a spectator, watching what 
was happening on the plains of Illyria.” In addition, much useful information about the 
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conditions in the Norman camp and the degree of desperation was brought to the Emperor by 
the several Norman deserters who were leaving their camp, either alone or in small bands, 
and were received by Alexius with gifts and titles and then sent on their way.1166 
     Bohemond was eventually persuaded by his senior officers to seek a way out of this 
deadlock that the siege of Dyrrachium and the Byzantine blockade represented and open 
negotiations with the Emperor.1167 A number of Byzantine dignitaries were demanded by the 
Norman Count as hostages and the negotiations eventually took place at some short distance 
from the camp, so that the Byzantines would not experience firsthand the miserable condition 
in Bohemond’s camp.1168 After receiving permission from the Byzantine dignitaries to move 
his camp in a more salubrious spot in the immediate vicinity of the city of Dyrrachium and 
allowing some brief communication between the Byzantines and the governor of the city, 
Alexius Comnenus, Bohemond was allowed to visit the Emperor in his imperial tent and 
agree to a treaty that was to seal the end of the former’s designs and ambitions against the 
Byzantine Empire. 
 
The Treaty of Devol (September 1108) – Its significance and the aftermath 
 
     The Treaty of Devol was drawn eleven years after Bohemond had become homo ligius of 
the Emperor in Constantinople, in the month of September 1108, and the Alexiad is once 
more our most detailed and reliable source. Two documents were drawn. The first, signed by 
Bohemond and given to Alexius which includes a statement with the former’s obligations 
towards the Emperor, was preserved in the Imperial archives and copied by Anna. The 
second document, a chrysobull that was written by Alexius for Bohemond which 
incorporated the grants given to the latter has been lost, but some parts of it were 
reconstructed in the Alexiad. 
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     Much has been written about the Treaty of Devol and there is no need to go into further 
analysis of its clauses and obligations for each party.1169 The fundamental part of the entire 
treaty is what follows the annulment of the 1097 pact: “By the terms of this second pact I 
shall become the liege-man (λίζιος άνθρωπος) of Your Highnesses.” This time in writing, 
Bohemond would become the vassal of the Byzantine Emperor Alexius and of his son and 
successor John,1170 and by the terms of this feudal contract he was to provide military support 
to all the enemies of the Byzantine Empire. Another significant clause of the treaty had to do 
with the future of the Patriarchate of Antioch which was to return to the jurisdiction of 
Constantinople, with John the Oxite who was the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch been 
restored. Finally, there is a huge list of cities and surrounding areas which were either given 
to Bohemond as a fief or were introduced into the Empire, the detailed mentioning of which 
is not neccessary for our analysis. In brief, Bohemond received Antioch and many of its 
surrounding areas, while several other territories that surrounded this newly formed 
principality were incorporated into the Empire, like almost all of Cilicia and the coastal cities 
of Laodicea, Jabala, Valania, Maraclea and Tortosa into northern Lebanon.1171 
     If we examine the exact areas of Syria that were given to Bohemond, we have to say that 
for someone who appeared to have been defeated and humiliated, Bohemond did receive 
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who asked for a number of cities and territories as compensation for those that had been 
divided from Antioch. See: Alexiad, XIII. xii, vol. II, pp. 242-3; Sewter, p. 432 . 
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plenty. But why was he given these specific areas and for what purpose? What Alexius would 
have expected was the establishment of a new principality which would have worked as a 
“buffer-state” against mainly the surrounding Muslim states of Mesopotamia and the 
Fatimids of Egypt and it could have significantly disrupted the Seljuc communications 
between Ikonion and Mesopotamia, especially with the addition of Edessa and Aleppo. He 
must have been aware that the Kingdom of Jerusalem would not have been able to hold out 
for long and possibly he could have taken a further step and expand the vassal state of 
Antioch further south. Again, these are only speculations but we cannot accept that Alexius 
would have made so many concessions to Bohemond without expecting something in return 
in the long-run. However, what the Treaty of Devol had certainly earned Alexius was a 
vassal, and a well paid one indeed since he would earn 200 gold pounds as an annual income 
and the title of sebastos,1172 who would have had his base at a most strategic region for the 
Empire, be a much valued source of renown warriors, direct the expansion of his lands further 
to the east against Aleppo and Edessa and act as a buffer-zone for Imperial Cilicia and the 
Taurus. This task would have certainly overstretched the military mechanism of the 
Byzantine Empire, if we bear in mind the serious danger that the Seljucs of Ikonion posed to 
the safety of their communications and supplies. As long as the Empire was fully recognised 
as the suzerain of Syria and especially of Antioch, and all the Greek-Orthodox clergy was 
restored, Alexius’ task had succeeded.  
     Alexius was, however, destined to be let down by Bohemond once more. His promises 
became a dead letter once he left Illyria, not for Antioch, but for Apulia where he died, 
probably in March 1111.1173 Tancred, the Count of Taranto’s nephew and successor in the 
Principality of Antioch, proved a match for his uncle and a very “stubborn” and persistent 
thorn in the Empire’s expansion to the East, at least until his death in 1112. He never 
materialised his uncle’s promises and he demonstrated great arrogance and defiance towards 
                                                 
1172 Alexiad, XIV. i., vol. II, p. 248; Sewter, p. 435. 
1173 For the debate on Bohemond’s death and the different dates given by a number of Latin 
sources, see: Yewdale, Bohemond I, p. 133. 
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Alexius’ envoys in Antioch.1174 The fact remains, however, that one of the most prominent 
enemies of the Empire for almost three decades had now died. It would take another century 
for a Crusader army to finally reach and conquer the City of Cities and the bulwark of Eastern 
Christendom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1174 Alexiad, XIV. ii., vol. II, pp. 253-7; Sewter, pp. 438-40. 
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Conclusions 
 
     The Norman infiltration in the Italian Peninsula can be viewed as the story of a few 
hundred men who descended to Italy to make career for themselves as mercenaries, literally 
matching the term “soldiers of fortune”. These people were predominantly Norman, as most 
of our sources highlight, but recent studies have shown that perhaps even a third of them 
were immigrants from regions neighbouring Normandy, like Maine, Anjou and Brittany. And 
we should expect that they would attempt to introduce in Italy an administrative system based 
on their own experience from back home, influenced no doubt by the forms of lord-vassal 
relations, and the customs of tenure, military service and inheritance established in Normandy 
and other parts of France in the previous decades. The political and social background of 
southern Italy was ideal for them, with the politically fragmented Lombard principalities, the 
Byzantine Catepans, great ecclesiastical institutions and even the German Emperors being 
more than willing to get these fine cavalrymen into their service. But we should draw a sharp 
distinction between the pre-Civitate period and what followed after the battle at the River 
Fortone in 1053. Civitate should be viewed as a pivotal moment in Italian medieval history, 
for the simple reason that it established the Normans as major players in the political arena of 
Italy. For the first four decades up to Civitate, the Normans were serving in the Lombard 
rebel armies as elite cavalry units in a clearly auxiliary role, numbering just a few hundred 
and thus unable to greatly influence Italian politics. It was only after the late 1050s when the 
major Norman expansion in mainland Apulia, Calabria and Sicily begins to take shape.  
     As I have already mentioned, we believe that the Normans would have attempted to apply 
to Italy the basic principles of the administrative system they had experienced in pre-
Conquest Normandy, even though there are no firm evidence in any charter or primary 
material that would confirm this assumption. Thus, it would probably have been stipendiary 
troops – both household and mercenary – that would have played a protagonist role in the 
territorial expansions of the Norman principalities in mainland Apulia, Calabria and Sicily 
throughout the 1050s-70s. In addition, military service from vassals and fideles would have 
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been requested by the Duke of Apulia for large-scale operations which included, of course, 
the Illyrian expedition of 1081. However, well-established feudal quotas did not exist by that 
early period of the Norman infiltration in the south and we know from the number of serious 
rebellions that took place between 1067-82 that this demand would not have gone down 
without any protests from the part of senior Apulian magnates, since they did not consider 
themselves to be holding their lands as ducal grants. And these institutions like the arrière-
ban and the service d’host had significant geographical and time limitations as well. That is 
why Robert Guiscard would almost certainly have negotiated the terms of overseas service 
with his senior vassals when he called for the arrière-ban in 1081, following a similar pattern 
with William II in 1066.  
     The period of the eleventh century after the death of Basil II in 1025 is characterised by 
the serious decline of the Byzantine army. The rising power of the landed aristocracy of Asia 
Minor and its struggle for power with the senior civil servants in the capital had caused the 
military lands of the provinces to disappear and the thematic levies (stratiotai) to be turned 
into dependants or to be given the right to buy off their military service, thus eroding the 
foundations of the oldest military institution of the Imperial Army since the seventh century. 
This, along with budget cuts in the middle of the century led the central government to 
gradually replace indigenous troops with foreign mercenaries from the west, like German 
Nemitzoi, Anglo-Saxon Varangians, Frankish knights and Venetian seamen, and from 
neighbouring countries, like Seljuk Turks, Patzinaks, Rus and Armenians. But the inadequacy 
of this system was proved at Matzikert in 1071, when the numerically superior but 
heterogeneous and undisciplined army of Diogenes IV was defeated by Alp-Arslan. Thus by 
1081, the old thematic system was dead and the tagmatic armies had been significantly 
reduced in numbers due to the civil strives of the period and the economic decline. In 1081, 
Alexius Comnenus resorted to hiring even more mercenaries to deal with Robert Guiscard’s 
invasion, thus the crisis in the Imperial treasury in that year. Later in his reign he made bold 
steps to introduce strong and centralised land and naval armies and reunite the civilian and 
military authorities of the provinces under an army officer (duke-katepano). Also, 
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smallholders were settled in rural areas of the Empire with the obligation to provide military 
service. So, the army that the Emperor led against Bohemond in 1108 was very different in 
structure and composition than twenty-seven years before. Foreign mercenaries were, indeed, 
the core of the army but we can also find many units of indigenous troops which were 
organised into battalions that ressembled the old tagmatic structure and bore the name of their 
place of origin. 
     In the view of the wider debate between modern scholars like C.J. Rogers, J. Gillingham 
and S. Morillo about the term “Vegetian Strategy”, I will attempt to give an answer to what 
degree we can characterise the Norman and Byzantine strategies in Italy, Sicily and the 
Balkans as Vegetian.1175 By the term “Vegetian Strategy” scholars have identified a particular 
type of warfare in which the commander sought to avoid battle at all costs except if the 
chances were overwhelmingly in his favour. Instead he was to seek to defeat his enemy by 
other means such as the use of fortifications, harassment and blockade.1176 First, I wish to 
focus to Italy in the post-Civitate period, characterised by the territorial expansion of the 
Norman principalities and a marked absence of any major battles. A basic principle that we 
have to keep in mind is that the party who wanted to expand and conquer – the aggressor – 
would often be more willing to seek a decisive battle, while the party already controlling 
these territories – the defender – would wish to deny his enemy doing that. In post-Civitate 
Italy we can easily identify who was the aggressor and who was defending the territories of 
Apulia and Calabria. But why did no major battles take place? We would expect the 
Normans, operating close to their bases, conscious of their numerical inferiority and certainly 
short of cash to avoid pitched battles and focus on the piecemeal conquest of towns in 
mainland Apulia. And that is what they did, perhaps because of the paucity of their numbers 
and the difficulties of being reinforced, but also for an additional reason, namely that a major 
                                                 
1175 Gillingham, “Richard I and the Science of War”, 78-91; “Up with Orthodoxy!”, 149-58; 
Morillo, “The Context and Limits of Vegetian Strategy”, 21-41; Rogers, “The Vegetian 
‘Science of Warfare’”, 1-19. 
1176 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, III. 9, 22, 26, pp. 83-86, 108-10, 116-17.  
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battle would probably not have achieved anything due to the high number of fortified sites in 
Apulia. By the late 1050s, the Byzantines had to rely on the local levies and some elite troops 
furnished from the mainland, with expensive expeditions like the 1025 and 1038 Sicilian 
campaigns being a distant memory. Asia Minor was a far more important operational theatre 
for the central government and the Catepans of Longobardia had to go on the defensive, thus 
locking themselves up in their fortified cities. Whether Guiscard knew about this situation 
from the Frankish mercenaries serving in the Imperial army in Asia Minor is quite possible, 
but not certain.  
     Numerous similarities can be identified between two other operational theatres, Sicily and 
Illyria, where the Normans also appeared as the aggressors. In both cases they operated far 
from their home-bases, with no substantial reinforcements and having to rely on plundering 
expeditions, primarily to supply their armies and to undermine the political authority of their 
enemies. The Normans were also aware of the political fragmentation of Sicily into three 
contesting emirates, while the civil conflicts on the opposite side of the Adriatic would also 
have been known to Guiscard. Further, they had clear strategic objectives, Palermo and the 
second largest city of the Empire – Thessaloniki. Considering the aforementioned facts, we 
can understand why the Normans wished to engage their enemies in battle. And although 
numerically inferior to both their enemies, their aim was to achieve a victory that would have 
had significant consequences on the enemy’s morale by winning the field from its leaders. 
But even victories in the field could not necessarily bring progress in an operational theatre, 
as Castrogiovanni (1061) and Cerami (1063) demonstrate. After the conquest of Palermo in 
1072, the Muslims defended themselves in their numerous fortified sites, with the Normans 
finally expelling the last Muslim garrison in the Val di Noto only in 1091.  
     If we focus specifically on the Balkan operations, then Dyrrachium is a characteristic 
example of what I just mentioned, a victory of morale. Robert Guiscard was well aware of the 
numerical inferiority of his army, and with the city of Dyrrachium putting a stout resistance 
and the Norman navy unable to keep the communication and supply lines open with Italy, he 
desperately needed a victory in a pitched battle against a senior general or the Emperor 
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himself. Thus the result of the battle on the 18th October 1081 led to the surrender of the city 
of Dyrrachium, and within the following months the towns of Kastoria, Ioannina and Arta 
also capitulated to the Normans to escape devastation. This had clearly become a war of 
attrition in which the party which was more determined and with the greater resources would 
prevail. Alexius had to confiscate ecclesiastical objects to fund the raising of a mercenary 
army, and Guiscard had underestimated the stability of his domestic affairs in Italy. Thus, in 
the two years that followed Guiscard’s departure for Italy in April 1082, Bohemond actively 
pursued battle by marching up and down the north-western Greek mainland, covering a great 
geographical area and targeting strategic cities that controlled the approaches to the Via 
Egnatia, even reaching as far east as the outskirts of Thessaloniki. However, even though 
Bohemond accepted the surrender of Byzantine towns, thus significantly undermining the 
Emperor’s authority, no massacre of population or any serious devastation is reported by any 
of our contemporary chroniclers. Perhaps his plan was to secure the areas already under his 
control while waiting for his father to return from Italy with the neccessary reinforcements. 
But the suppression of the Apulian rebellion and Guiscard’s preoccupations in Rome took 
him more than two years, and it was this lack of money and provisions from Italy that proved 
fatal for the continuing of the Norman operations in Greece. 
     Alexius Comnenus experienced firsthand the main weapon of the Norman army at 
Dyrrachium, the heavy cavalry charge, and the effects of the Norman attack on Byzantine 
units after the Varangian Guard – the “protective shield” of the army – had been annihilated. 
But even though he further pursued a confrontation with the Normans at Ioannina, we can see 
the first signs of Alexius’ resourcefulness already since the early summer of 1082. Because 
the Emperor did not have any units of heavy infantry to place in front of the rest of his army 
to repel the Norman cavalry attack, he instead placed a number of light chariots and caltrops. 
His “Vegetian strategy” became even more apparent during the siege of Larisa in 1083, for 
“he wished to lay an ambush there and so defeat the Latins by guile, for he had given up any 
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idea of open hand-to-hand conflict.”1177 Although his victory left the Norman army largely 
intact, Bohemond was forced to pull back to Dyrrachium because exhaustion and desertion 
were becoming endemic among his men; and it is likely that Alexius was aware of this from 
the deserters that had joined his army in the past months.  
     The same protagonists had the chance to meet each other on the outskirts of Dyrrachium 
twenty-four years later under very different circumstances. Bohemond had taken part in the 
First Crusade, having fought numerous times against Seljuc forces of the Sultanate of Rum 
and the Emirates of Aleppo and Mosul and learning valuable lessons on steppe battle-tactics 
and warfare. He was the undisputed leader of the Latins during the battles of Antioch and 
Harem and the commander of the vanguard that was ambushed by Kilij-Arslan at Doryleum a 
year earlier. He had experienced firsthand the charge of the Turkish horse-archers in great 
masses and their showers of arrows that were deadly accurate. He knew that any attempt to 
counterattack was doomed to fail because of the mobility and manoeuvrability of the Seljuc 
units, thus a combination of infantry units in-front of the cavalry would guarantee better 
protection for the vulnerable knights. The tactical error of dismissing the infantry and putting 
the cavalry in a single dense mass, a battle tactic that was seen at Doryleum was not repeated 
at Antioch, a fact that proves Bohemond’s strategic adaptability in the Middle-Eastern 
warfare. Further, the Norman count learned to take advantage of the topography of the battle-
field to limit his enemy’s numerical superiority and likely use of any encircling tactics or, in 
the case of Harem, to place an ambush.  
     However, despite this invaluable experience that Bohemond had acquired in the Middle-
East, he made the error of leaving the strategic initiative to the Byzantine Emperor when he 
invaded Illyria in 1107. The Norman count let his army to be drawn into a prolonged siege of 
the city of Dyrrachium that put a strain on his supplies and had a serious impact on the 
morale of his army. His choosing of the period for the invasion was also ill-thought, landing 
at Illyria in October, thus having only a few weeks to intensify his operations before having 
                                                 
1177 Alexiad, V. v, pp. 246-7; Sewter, p. 168-9. 
307 
 
to halt due to the coming of the winter, obviously not considering the great logistical task of 
getting supplies for the army in enemy territory. Alexius had also learned a lot from his 
previous experiences with the Normans and this time he carefully implemented the advice of 
Leo VI by his imposition of a blockade on Bohemond’s army and the use of tricks to raise 
suspicion amongst senior Norman officers. He denied battle to the Normans and with the 
placing of reliable and disciplined units in the mountain passes that controlled the access in 
and out of the vicinity of Dyrrachium, he simply left hunger and discord to force the Norman 
army to surrender.   
     We do not know if the writings of Vegetius were known in Byzantium or if, indeed, they 
were read by Byzantine nobles in the capital. However, a cardinal distinction between the 
Byzantines and other cultures lies in the fact that they were writing down the useful 
knowledge gained in the battlefields during centuries of fighting against countless enemies. 
But all of the military handbooks of the period, from Maurice’s Strategicon to Leo’s Tactica 
and the writings of Cecaumenos argue repeatedly for the resort to battle only as the last 
option, and even then when the chances were overwhelmingly in favour of the commanding 
general. Whether or not officers of the eleventh century had access to these manuals is still 
debatable, although judging from the quotes taken from contemporary primary sources like 
the Alexiad, Cecaumenos’ Στρατηγικόν and the On Skirmishing it seems highly likely. If that 
is the case, then why did Alexius Comnenus choose to offer the Normans battle in 1081 – 
exactly what they wanted – instead of imposing a blockade as in 1108? Probably he 
succumbed to the pressing demands of his younger and more hot-headed officers, who would 
have raised the matter of prestige for a usurper of a throne who was in power for less than six 
months.  
     This brings out a relatively neglected but extremely crucial issue about Byzantine warfare 
throughout the history of the Empire, from Theodosius I to the era of the Paleologoi. And this 
has to do with a specific doctrine that was passed on to the Byzantine officers by the ancient 
Greeks and the Roman tacticians through the writings of a number of military thinkers of the 
first and second centuries AD like Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, Arian and 
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Aelian.1178 This was the doctrine of avoiding a pitched battle at any cost, engage in warfare of 
attrition, initial passive resistance to an invading force which had to be followed by 
continuous harassment, cutting off supplies and attack the enemy when at its most vulnerable 
state, such as on his way back loaded with booty and prisoners. Scholars like Ralph-Johannes 
Lilie, John Haldon and Warren Treadgold have highlighted the continuity of this doctrine on 
the part of the Byzantines when defending Asia Minor against the Arabs in the seventh and 
eighth centuries,1179 but these ideas and the general mentality becomes even more up-to-date 
when the Byzantines were fighting against the Turkish nomads three centuries later. And if I 
may conclude with a remark by Kaegi: “It is probable that the longevity of the Byzantine 
Empire owes very much to its adoption of a cautious military strategy that avoided bloody 
and risky pitched battles. Such battles did occur, but the tendency and prevailing policy was 
to try to avoid them.”1180 
     Another crucial question that comes out of my analyses so far is why did Robert 
Guiscard’s invasion of Illyria fail to establish a Norman principality in the Balkans, compared 
to William’s successful invasion of England fifteen years before? William II transported 
7,000 men and 3,000 horses across the Channel in 1066,1181 while Robert Guiscard would 
have had maybe even less than half – a number of cavalrymen varying 700-1,300 which was 
                                                 
1178 Onasander, Strategikos logos: Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, tr. by 
members of the Illinois Greek Club, W. Heinemann, New York, 1977; Kaegi compares an 
abstract from the first century AD Greek strategist Onasander with Maurice’s Strategicon. 
The similarities are, indeed, remarkable: Kaegi, “Byzantine Strategy”, 11-16. 
1179 R.-J. Lilie, Die Byzantinische Realtion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber, Munich, 1976; 
Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, p. 37; J. Haldon, H. Kennedy, “The Arab-Byzantine 
Frontier in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries”, Zbornik Radova, Srpska Akademija Nauka i 
Umetnosti, Vizantoloski Institut, 19 (1980), 79-116; Haldon, Warfare, State and Society, pp. 
34-46; Treadgold, “Byzantium, The Reluctant Warrior”, 209-33.  
1180 Kaegi, “Byzantine Strategy”, 14. 
1181 These numbers are, of course, just estimates: Brown, The Normans, pp. 149-51; Oman, 
The Art of War, vol. I, p. 158; Beeler, Warfare in England, p. 12; Delbruck, Medieval 
Warfare, vol. III, p. 152. 
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wholly inadequate for such an undertaking. Second, Harold Godwineson was one of the 
victims of the battle of Hastings, a development of tremendous importance for the future of 
the Anglo-Saxon kingdom. At Dyrrachium, even though Alexius was hotly pursued and 
surrounded by the Normans, he managed to escape and establish a rallying point at 
Thessaloniki. His death would have definitely brought the Empire into the brink of a renewed 
civil war. Third, even though England was as heavily fortified as Illyria or Macedonia, the 
key point is that the decisive nature of the victory at Hastings and the rapid capitulation of the 
Anglo-Saxons saved William from having to besiege a number of burghs in a war of attrition 
that could have seriously crippled his forces.1182 That was not the case for Robert Guiscard 
and even though Dyrrachium, Kastoria and Ioannina did capitulate to avoid any destruction 
by the vengeful Normans, there were plenty of fortified places in the Greek mainland that 
would certainly have resisted the invaders. Finally, the fate of William II and the new 
Norman aristocracy were closely associated, thus a great number of Norman lords eagerly 
supported the Duke on his invasion. But Robert Guiscard was nowhere near having the same 
level of support from his own vassal lords. In fact, the ringleaders of all the Apulian 
rebellions were senior Apulian lords – some of them related to Guiscard by blood – and it 
was a rebellion in April 1082 that forced the Duke to return to Italy, a significant turning 
point in the Illyrian expedition of 1081-83. 
     A final point that I wish to raise has to do with the Norman battle-tactics and their 
“invincibility” in the battlefield, with victory so often portrayed by our contemporary 
chroniclers as being promised to them by God. Writing in line with the argument first 
presented by Bates nearly three decades ago,1183 I would have to agree that the Normans do 
not exhibit any innovation in the battlefields of Normandy, England, Italy, Sicily or the 
Balkans. In all the cases they relied on the charge of their heavy cavalry units and the shock 
impact this would have had on their enemies, especially if they consisted of infantry levies, as 
                                                 
1182 Strickland, “Military Technology and Conquest”, 372-73. 
1183 Bates, Normandy Before 1066, 245-6. 
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in the cases of Civitate and Dyrrachium from the Mediterranean theatre.1184 But heavy 
cavalry attacks were common in Frankish warfare and the Normans simply implemented 
what they had experienced in France for decades. And we also have evidence that the 
Byzantines were well aware of the charge of the Frankish chivalry, judging by the writings of 
Leo VI.1185 This is the case for the feigned retreat as well, as the examples of Hastings and 
Messina demonstrate. But before we completely dismiss the Norman reputation for 
distinctive martial prowess, we have to ask whether it was by simply good fortune and strong 
leadership that a band of Norman bandits conquered half of the Italian peninsula and Sicily, 
in just half of a century, and seriously threatened the Byzantine Empire more than once? In 
the south, bands of Normans were employed by every rival camp precisely because they were 
the best. And they were the best because they depended on a strong leadership and unified 
command, along with a combination of elite mounted warriors, acting in co-ordination with  
recruited foot-soldiers, which were all supported, when neccessary, by fleets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1184 For purposes of comparison, see: Nicolle, “The Impact of European Couched Lance”, 6-
40. 
1185 Leo VI, Tactica, XVIII. 80-98. 
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